"If God is all-powerful, then he must be able to abolish evil; if God is
all-loving, then he must wish to abolish evil; but evil exists,
therefore God cannot be both all-powerful and all-loving." So runs the
traditional statement of the problem of evil. Anthony Flew and John
Mackie believed that the argument exposes the inner incoherence of
theism; how can one harmonize this world with the traditional attributes
of God? More recently, it has been treated as a good inductive argument
against the existence of God: surely it is very unlikely that a God with
the traditional attributes would have created a universe like this.

John Hick's classic Evil and the God of Love, first published
in 1968, set the contours for all subsequent discussion of the problem.
He was responsible for identifying two different responses in the
Christian tradition. The first and major response, expounded by
Augustine, places all the blame for evil on fallen creatures (both human
and angelic). Because of their disobedience the creation has been
marred. On this view, evil serves no purpose in the plan of God. The
second response is found in Irenaeus. Here evil and suffering are among
God's means for creating souls fit for heaven. Humanity was created
immature; and life is a vale of soul-making. Hick is a passionate
advocate of the second view.

Douglas Geivett, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Biola University
in La Mirada, California, has set himself the task of explaining why
Hick's advocacy of an Irenaean theodicy is inappropriate, and how the
Augustinian tradition can be affirmed. His book is scrupulously fair to
Hick-a model of accurate reporting-and shows the ways in which Hick's
theodicy is of a piece with his opposition to natural theology (in the
sense of proofs for God's existence) and his belief in religious
pluralism.

In responding to Hick, Geivett essentially takes up three themes. First,
he draws attention to the significant role of natural theology in the
Augustinian tradition. He points out that in De libero arbitrio
voluntatis, Augustine is intent on proving the existence of God
before formulating his theodicy. It follows that if God's existence can
be established on other grounds, the theodicy problem is significantly
reduced. Unlike Hick, he believes that natural theology can succeed
here, and he draws upon a significant range of contemporary arguments.
His favorite seems to be the Kalam cosmological argument, much beloved
by William Craig: given that cosmologists tend to believe it is likely
that the universe had a start, and given that it is difficult to imagine
a universe coming into being uncaused, then it is likely that God was
the first cause. This argument is then combined with the anthropic
principle (the universe must have properties that make inevitable the
existence of intelligent life), providence, answered prayer, and
morality to form a cumulative case for the existence of God. God, on
these grounds, is more likely than not. In this sense, we start
discussing the problem of evil with the significant advantage of knowing
that God exists.

Geivett's second theme points to the difficulties with Hick's theodicy.
The anthropology is inconsistent: it would be immoral of God to cause
(and use) evil as a means to the creation of soul. Hick's version of
reincarnation (located in subsequent universes, not this one) and denial
of hell undermine the real significance of human freedom-a freedom that
can thwart the love of God for eternity.

The final theme stresses the coherence and achievement of a traditional
Augustinian theodicy. God is not the direct cause of evil; humans were
created innocent, but exercised a good will badly. Our purpose is
worship; and hell awaits those who succeed in rebelling.

The case for linking natural theology with the problem of evil is
sustained brilliantly. Moreover, one can supplement Geivett's case here,
for it seems clear that within our culture the problem of evil has
assumed an ever greater significance as natural theology and the belief
in life after death have been undermined. For the Christian tradition,
the context for discussing evil has included certainty about God's
existence and the reality of life beyond the grave. As this context has
disappeared, theodicy has become an increasingly insurmountable problem.
Geivett is thus right to attempt to recover this context.

Hick, in a very interesting afterword, objects to the enterprise by
citing the old claim that Kant and Hume demolished all the arguments for
God's existence, and claims that Geivett himself is not really
interested in attaining a proof of God's existence but only in
illustrating that it is highly probable. Here Hick is buying into the
unacceptable Cartesian standard for knowledge: that it must be
established beyond any doubt. However, we now know that this is an
impossible standard to meet. We cannot even have such certainty about
the existence of other minds. And once we see this flaw in Hick's
objection, Geivett's procedure seems entirely reasonable.

Hick is correct, however, in drawing attention to other areas of
weakness in Geivett's case, the most shocking being Geivett's complete
neglect of the Fall and its relation to natural suffering. For Augustine
the Fall is central. According to him, God created an idyllic paradise
with no suffering, death, or natural disasters. It was human
disobedience that introduced these things into creation. Most educated
people in the West no longer find that account plausible. The whole
process of evolution involved the suffering and death of millions upon
millions of creatures, within a context that included occasional
earthquakes and floods. These facts are now part of the scientific data
we must accept. And they strongly suggest that God, in the process of
creation, built in the inevitability of suffering as a part of His
method.

Geivett does not tackle this problem directly. When it comes to natural
evil, he offers two alternatives that he considers compatible with an
Augustinian theodicy. The first is Alvin Plantinga's fallen angels, who
cause earthquakes and floods. The second is that fixed laws are
essential for freedom, and earthquakes are simply the inevitable side
effects of these laws. It is worth noting that these two alternatives
are contradictory: the first views earthquakes as violations of the
natural order, while the second views them as an appropriate expression
of the natural order. More fundamentally, the former is scientifically
implausible-at what point in the process are we to postulate the evil
action? And the second, although a much better suggestion, still leaves
the mystery of why God does not intervene to mitigate the effects of the
natural laws. Presumably, certain goods must emerge from the suffering
caused by an earthquake to justify the nonintervention. If so, then the
problem of theodicy remains.

Despite these problems, this is an elegantly written book and a valuable
contribution to the discussion of theodicy.