Christians Among the Virtues. Theological Conversations with Ancient and Modern Ethics
By Stanley Hauerwas and Charles Pinches
University of Notre Dame Press. 230 pp. $29.95
cloth, $16.95
paper.
Virtue is making a comeback. The success of William Bennett's The
Book of Virtues in 1994 is perhaps the most notable indicator of this
fact, but the "virtuecrats"-the politicians and public figures
who have made careers of promoting virtue-produced enough of a splash to
make the cover of Newsweek some time back. And on its face, this
is surely a good thing that Christians should applaud warmly.
In their new book, however, the Christian theologians Stanley Hauerwas
and Charles Pinches express considerable reservation about the current
revival of interest in virtue. The reasons for their reservation will be
apparent to readers familiar with any of Hauerwas' other work. Convinced
that Christianity is a distinctive community with a distinctive narrative
and distinctive practices, the authors declare that "One of the main
burdens of the book is to argue that the virtues Christianly considered
are in fundamental ways different from the virtues associated with quite
different practices, communities, and narratives."
The book is divided into three sections. The first section consists
of three chapters of "theological reflections on Aristotelian themes."
The next section responds to contemporary exponents of virtue: Alasdair
MacIntyre, Martha Nussbaum, and John Casey. The final section, which the
authors consider most crucial to their case, is devoted to examining particular
Christian virtues.
The opening section's material on Aristotle is foundational for the
author's project, not only because Aristotle's account of the virtues has
been influential in both philosophy and theology, but also because the
critique of Aristotle sets the tone for the rest of the book. The broad
purpose of these chapters is to show the "complex relation between
happiness, temporality, and virtue." Unashamedly concerned with happiness
in his ethics, Aristotle provides us with a powerful picture of how the
virtues are necessary for happiness.
It is easy enough to see affinities between the Christian life and the
Aristotelian life, and theologians have often attempted to synthesize the
two. But even more interesting than the affinities are the contrasts Hauerwas
and Pinches draw between Aristotle and Christianity. The contrast comes
into focus when the authors compare how friendship is understood in the
two traditions. Aristotle recognized the need for friends if we are to
become virtuous. It is not the case that we must first become virtuous
and then seek out similarly virtuous friends. In Aristotle's view, as the
authors put it, "friendship itself is an activity by which we acquire
the kind of steadfastness necessary for our being true friends." There
are, however, limits to friendship among the magnanimous men who epitomize
virtue for Aristotle, for essential to the virtue of the magnanimous man
is the notion that it is better to give than to receive. This has far-reaching
implications if such a man is struck by misfortune or adversity so that
he can no longer give to others. In this case, the man must insulate himself
from his friends to protect them from sharing his suffering.
The contrast with Christianity could hardly be more profound. Christians
worship a God who befriended us while we were in deepest need and displayed
this friendship most vividly while hanging on a cross. "Here it is
assumed that friends will suffer with friends, indeed, that friends will
suffer because of friends, as the disciples will suffer for Jesus'
sake."
At the outset of the second section of the book, Hauerwas and Pinches
remind us that they have "no stake in defending virtue as a thing
in itself." Indeed, to defend virtue that way may result, for the
Christian, in defending what is vicious. Examining the work of Alasdair
MacIntyre, the authors echo one of MacIntyre's famous titles and insist:
"If someone asserts that striving after virtue will bring one closer
to God, Christians are obliged to ask: what virtues? and which God?"
Rather than attack him directly, Hauerwas and Pinches do so indirectly
by summarizing John Milbank's critique of MacIntyre. In particular, they
are interested in Milbank's challenge to the notion that a "universally
compelling philosophical case can be made for the ascendancy of virtue."
Milbank is especially critical of MacIntyre's attempt to defend Christianity
by the allegedly universal method of dialectics. That is, he is skeptical
of the attempt to show that Christianity is true by demonstrating that
it is more consistent than its rivals, resolves more problems, and so on.
Moreover, Milbank believes MacIntyre has a problem as a Christian
in urging a return to virtue as understood by Plato and Aristotle.
The ancient philosophers' view of virtue is fundamentally heroic and situated
in a context of conflict and the defense of the polis by violence. By contrast,
the Christian picture of virtue has as its end not domination but liberation.
"As such it transcends a model of the person whose telos involves
the practice and perfection of the virtues of conflict, and it offers the
new political possibilities of mutuality and community that previously
were inconceivable."
The discussions of Nussbaum and Casey further develop the point that
there are fundamental differences between Christian and Greek accounts
of virtue. The critique of Nussbaum shows that Christianity does not share
her conception of the fragility of human love and friendship. Christians
neither place the same sort of positive value on fragility Nussbaum does
nor think goodness-in a world created by a gracious God whose good purposes
will finally prevail-is as vulnerable as Nussbaum imagines. Hauerwas and
Pinches put the point succinctly: "Christians' affirmations of the
fragility of goodness must always be qualified by their eschatalogical
convictions." The chapter on the contemporary philosopher John Casey
points out some of the difficulties in his project of reviving such pagan
virtues as anger, pride, and courage when we lack a modern context equivalent
to the ancient setting in which these virtues flourished and made sense.
The final section of Christians Among the Virtues begins with
an account of the hopeful virtues, beginning with Paul's classic statement
of justification by faith in Romans 5 and raising the question of how virtue
relates to justification. Hauerwas and Pinches show how distinctively Christian
doctrines such as the resurrection of Jesus radically shape the way Christians
construe suffering, forgiveness, endurance, and the formation of character.
The next chapter examines the sense in which obedience is a virtue from
a Christian perspective. Then follows a discussion of courage that points
out how Christian resources transform and subvert notions of courage defined
by the context of battle. The book concludes with a suggestive treatment
of patience in relation to modern medicine. Here the authors explore, among
other things, the irony of our still being called patients by the medical
profession "given the impatience which so imbues the modern practice
of medicine and the social order it serves."
Consistently provocative and rich with insight, the book deserves a
wide audience. Philosophers as well as theologians will find much in it
to stimulate their thinking and challenge their convictions. There are
numerous passages in the book that edify and even some that are religiously
moving.
Christians Among the Virtues is not without its difficulties,
however. For instance, the authors often mention their rejection of universal
modes of argument. They have little patience with the notion that there
might be universally acknowledged means of resolving disputes, and their
rejection of universals is often accompanied by expressions of disdain
for liberalism.
While certain strands and developments within the liberal tradition
richly deserve all the scorn Hauerwas and Pinches can muster, it is much
less clear that the idea of universal standards of rationality should be
jettisoned as well. They are quite correct, not to mention historically
sensitive, to recognize the distinctiveness of various traditions, their
particular locations, and specific shapes-and that goes for the Christian
tradition as much as for any other. But this cannot be the last word if
one also believes Christianity is true, and true in the deepest sense,
as Hauerwas and Pinches clearly do.
Similarly, the authors are surely correct in claiming that "differing
accounts of the virtues rest on differing claims about the way things are."
As they show, distinctively Christian truth claims alter the shape of the
virtues. The question, however, is whether there are universally accessible
considerations that show the preferability of the Christian vision of reality-a
vision that consists of the Christian account of "the way things are"
and the corresponding picture of virtue.
It is odd, to say the least, to think the Christian story of creation
and redemption, with its extraordinary implications for all persons, could
really be true without its truth being discernible, at least in significant
part, to any properly informed seeker of truth. Perhaps a hopeful pointer
for resolving this issue lies in the authors' comment that "sin and
redemption, while universal, are imbedded in a particular history, one
we must come to share if we are to know our true state." The point
is, Christians believe that universal truths have been revealed in a particular
history. If the true state of all persons is indeed that they are sinful
and in need of the redemption Christianity provides, then surely there
must be considerations that point all persons to the truth of the story
that illumine the meaning of their lives and the way they ought to live.
In Christians Among the Virtues, Hauerwas and Pinches convincingly
argue that Christianity offers a very different account of the virtues.
But they leave us wondering why, if that account is true, it is only accessible
to those who have made a prior commitment to Christianity.
Jerry L. Walls is Professor of Philosophy of Religion at Asbury Theological Seminary in Wilmore, Kentucky.
