In the latest issue of Intelligent Life, the quarterly lifestyle and culture magazine from The Economist, Anthony Gottlieb claims that religious believers face a stumbling block in a sixty-five year old horticulture parable:
In 1944 John Wisdom, an aptly named British philosopher, wrote a parable about a garden. It took up just a few paragraphs of an intricate essay in a professional journal, but it seeded a controversy that ran for a good few years before subsiding into the mulch of abandoned philosophical debates. The essay was about religion: the parable raised the question of what meaning, if any, could be given to the idea that the world is watched over by a loving God. . . .
The parable went like this. “Two people return to their long neglected garden and find, among the weeds, that a few of the old plants are surprisingly vigorous. One says to the other, ‘It must be that a gardener has been coming and doing something about these weeds.’ The other disagrees…They pitch their tents and set a watch. No gardener is ever seen. The believer wonders if there is an invisible gardener, so they patrol with bloodhounds but the bloodhounds never give a cry. Yet the believer…insists that the gardener is invisible, has no scent and gives no sound. The sceptic doesn’t agree, and asks how a so-called invisible, intangible, elusive gardener differs from an imaginary gardener, or even no gardener at all.”
It seems that no evidence could make the man who believes in a gardener concede that he was wrong. Come what may, he will hang on to his faith in a guiding hand with green fingers. Wisdom hinted that this dispute seems not to be one about what it is reasonable or correct to believe, but is instead more like a difference in attitudes towards the garden.
Gottlieb concedes that the logical positivists went too far in their claims but that,
[T]he parable of the gardener did raise an unsettlingly powerful point about the nature of faith. If you believe something, shouldn’t it be possible to say what would make that belief true or false? What is the content of your so-called belief in the existence of a God, or of a gardener, if you cannot say what difference his presence or absence would make to the world?
The direction Gottlieb takes next is rather odd and not really worth pursuing. He claims that Richard Dawkins and the New Atheists “have undermined the idea that the state of the world points compellingly to the existence of a God” yet concedes that ” Fundamentalist believers” (including Catholics) aren’t persuaded because the theologically ignorant Dawkins and pals are knocking down strawmen that no one believes. So far, so good, since this is exactly right.
Gottlieb then shifts to a non sequitur about Karen Armstrong that lasts several paragraphs before he concedes that the she is a “puzzlingly eccentric” whose views appear to be shared by no one other than the former nun.
Finally, after that weird detour he ends the piece with by making his primary assertion—that theological speculation should begin with the presumption of atheism: “A wiser response to the apparent inexpressibility of statements about God may be simply not to express them, and just get on with the gardening.”
The fact that Gottlieb was able to get this article published in The Economist likely has more to do with the fact that he is a former executive editor than with any merit to his argument. Yet the question he raises, though never defends, is one that is worth considering: Is a presumption of atheism the natural epistemic state from which we should begin?
The presumption of atheism is the idea that in the perceived absence of evidence for the existence of God, we should presume that God does not exist. Since atheism is the default position, in this view, the theist is the one who bears the burden of proof in regards to the rationality of their belief in God’s existence. Therefore, since there is an “absence of evidence” for the Christian conception of God (the only form of theism I have any interest in defending) then it is irrational to hold such a belief.
Based on this presumption, I assume that Gottlieb believes in a foundationalist epistemology. Briefly, this is a theory of knowledge that states that all beliefs are either “basic”—immediately justified in themselves—or “nonbasic”—based on a foundation of other beliefs.
Some people might assume that all beliefs are required to be based on “evidence” but this is hardly the case. For example, if I were to say that I believe I have a stomachache I would have no empirically verifiable evidence for this claim. The stomachache is considered to be grounded in my pain but it is not evidence in the technical sense. These types of beliefs that are valid but not rooted in evidence are considered properly basic.
To claim a belief is properly basic means that it is based neither on propositional evidence nor on another belief. While 2+2 = 4 would be a basic belief, 22 x 22 = 484 is considered a nonbasic belief since it is based on a foundation of other beliefs (namely lower level arithmetic). (Evidence based beliefs must ultimately be traced back to a basic belief for their foundation.)
Other examples of basic beliefs would be perceptual beliefs (I see a dog.), memory beliefs (I took out the garbage yesterday.), and beliefs about someone else’s mental states (My wife is mad because I’m spending too much time reading blogs.). All of these experiences are the grounds for the beliefs, but they are not evidence for the beliefs themselves.
I mention this in order to lay the groundwork for a claim made by Reformed epistemologists such as Alvin Plantinga, William Alston, and Nicholas Wolterstorff, et al, that the theist’s belief that “God exists” is a properly basic belief.
To clarify further, let’s look at a basic belief that atheists and theists have in common. (This line of argument isn’t essential to the claim that “God exists” is a basic belief but I think it will aid in clarifying the point.) One basic belief held by all rational people is the belief in eternal existence. The two variations are that “some are eternal” or “all is eternal” (to claim that “none is eternal” is to make the illogical claim that existence came out of non-existence).
Hinduism is an example of a basic belief that “all is eternal.” Theism and atheism, on the other hand, fall into the “some is eternal” category. Theists believe that a Being, usually given the label “God,” possesses eternal existence. Atheists—at least most of them in the West—consider matter (or whatever other impersonal property that constitutes the universe/multiverse) to be the only thing that exists eternally.
Most reasonable and rational atheists would agree that matter has, in one form or another, always existed, either in this universe or in that great metaphysical speculation posing as a scientific theory, the multiverse. They have no evidence for this belief yet they would contend that they don’t need any. It is a properly basic belief. In much the same way, theists believe that an eternal Being has always existed. Neither the atheist nor the theist can be considered to be in possession of an irrational or improper belief. One or the other may be wrong, of course, but that doesn’t mean they are irrational for holding such views.
Obviously this is a but a brief explanation of a complicated philosophical argument for Reformed epistmology. Not all Christians accept this view of epistemology, of course, nor it is it the only defeater argument against the presumption of atheism. But it is a defeater and a sufficient one to hold up against more rigourous claims that those made in Gottlieb’s article.
We must also be careful not to read too much into this claim. This is not an “argument for the existence of God,” for while theists are justified in having a belief in God, that does not necessarily mean that he actually does, in fact, exist. What this does show, however, is that the belief in the Invisible Gardner—assuming, of course, that the gardner is God—requires neither evidence nor outside justification in order to be considered rational.
Update: My buddy Justin Taylor sent me this parody of the gardener parable by theologian John Frame:
Once upon a time two explorers came upon a clearing in the jungle. A man was there, pulling weeds, applying fertilizer, trimming branches. The man turned to the explorers and introduced himself as the royal gardener. One explorer shook his hand and exchanged pleasantries. The other ignored the gardener and turned away: “There can be no gardener in this part of the jungle,” he said; “this must be some trick. Someone is trying to discredit our previous findings.” They pitch camp. Every day the gardener arrives, tends the plot. Soon the plot is bursting with perfectly arranged blooms. “He’s only doing it because we’re here-to fool us into thinking this is a royal garden.” The gardener takes them to a royal palace, introduces the explorers to a score of officials who verify the gardener’s status. Then the sceptic tries a last resort: “Our senses are deceiving us. There is no gardener, no blooms, no palace, no officials. It’s still a hoax!” Finally the believer despairs: “But what remains of your original assertion? Just how does this mirage, as you call it, differ from a real gardener?”
December 18th, 2009 | 10:26 pm
“It seems that no evidence could make the man who believes in a gardener concede that he was wrong.”
In fact, no lack of evidence.
The positivists cook the books, by carefully defining in their own terms what will be considered evidence.
They watch. But “seeing” is not believing. If the believer sees God or an angel in the garden, but the non-believer does not, it will not be considered evidence by the non-believer (or, possibly, by the believing positivist.) What if the bloodhounds do bay? Will that be considered evidence? Of course not.
But the experience of God in signs, conjunctions of events, visions or voices, is fundamental (so to speak) to very many believers, including myself. Such experiences speak directly and powerfully to the self, and their occurrence, and the witness thereto, is one of the lifeblood arteries of the faith. To take a recent example from First Things:
‘Around 1985, the ugly awareness that I had spent almost a decade in a gnostic cult coincided with a dark time in my personal life. Deeply depressed, I sat at the piano one night, playing through the score of Bach’s St. Matthew Passion, and came to the chorale that reads: “Commend your ways and what ails your heart to the faithful care of Him who directs the heavens, who gives course and aim to the clouds, air and wind. He will also find a path that your foot can tread.” For the first time in my life, I prayed, and in that moment, I knew that my prayer was heard. That was a first step of teshuva—of return.’
It’s David Goldman, of course. Where’s the evidence? Where is the Gardener’s effect on the world? It’s pretty obvious.
Incidentally, I don’t think all atheists accept the eternal existence of matter, but those seem to accept the pre-existence of the quantum mechanical laws. I’m not the one to comment here, but you might ask Stephen Barr about this.
I haven’t read the epistemologists you mention, but I was greatly impressed by my desultory reading of Polanyi’s “Personal Knowledge”, which seems germane to this discussion.
December 18th, 2009 | 11:42 pm
I can’t comment too much right now, but I shall return to this idea.
I think two problems with Reformed epistemology and with the “properly basic” idea that belief requires “no evidence or outside justification” are (1) it is so easily brushed aside by a non-believer as equivalent to “Okay, fine, you have no evidence. Believe whatever you want to, God or unicorns or whatever. You’re right; I can’t prove you wrong, and I don’t care.” (2) It seems to have as a partial motivation the assumption that classical natural theology as an enterprise has more or less failed. Many, myself included, would dispute this point and therefore question the necessity of postulating one’s belief in God as a “properly basic” belief.
More later, I hope.
December 19th, 2009 | 5:22 am
What evidence is there for the existence of G-d?
Well, since you ask, my father told me, and his father told him and etc., and ever backwards into the past, until we come to a rainy morning in June about 3200 years ago when an entire nation, WHICH IS STILL BEARING WITNESS TO THIS EVENT, stood in front of a mountain and saw a cloud descend and promptly begged the interlocutor, Moses, to intercede on their behalf so that they would not all die, right there, on the spot!
Which Moses did, and then wrote in a book, which he delivered to the people of which my forebears were part!
Which is why we say, even today, especially today, “And the people believed in G-d and in His servant, Moses!”
We learn at an early age…Anything positive you have to say about G-d demeans Him, because the Bible uses only inadequate human terms!
That’s why Hitchens’ “God is not Great” is not an atheist screed, but a very Jewish POV!
Like the first and greatest of all rational atheists, Baruch Spinoza, Hitchens, Dawkins and their followers are all far more God-obsessed than you and I!
December 19th, 2009 | 1:23 pm
Well, the way of negation is certainly a way of speaking about God. But there are other ways, for example the way of analogy, more closely tied to, again, classical natural theology. Within the Jewish tradition, Moses Maimonides is an outstanding example of this type of theology.
My point in my previous post is simply that I find unconvincing the concept of “properly basic” beliefs, especially regarding God–and I am a believer!
December 19th, 2009 | 1:27 pm
Sorry, I miswrote there. Maimonides held to the way of negation, as you wrote. I should have ascribed the way of analogy to Aquinas, who lived about a century or so after Maimonides; Aquinas read, respected, and borrowed from Maimonides, and I mentally linked the two.
December 19th, 2009 | 1:35 pm
I agree with Craig Payne. The critically thinking non-believer has no use for the “no evidence or outside justification” belief position. This position does not argue FOR the rationality of a particular viewpoint but rather that all positions not requiring evidence or outside justification are equivalent in terms of rationality. And that opens up countless more cans of worms.
December 19th, 2009 | 6:39 pm
[...] Thoughts: The Reformed Epistemologist’s Invisible Gardener by Joe [...]
December 19th, 2009 | 7:24 pm
Responding to Craig’s initial point:
I think you’re mistaken to see a strong connection between reformed epistemology and the rejection of natural theology. To see this, it may be helpful to say a bit more about Alvin Plantinga’s epistemology. (Obviously, I don’t know if you’re familiar with it or not.)
Plantinga has argued that a belief has warrant when it is produced by cognitive faculties that are functioning the way they are supposed to function in the kind of environment in which they were designed to function. The upshot, vis-a-vis theistic belief, is that if God has given us cognitive faculties that are designed to produce theistic beliefs in certain contexts (e.g., I am in church, feel the presence of God, and form the belief that God loves me), then those beliefs can be warranted even if we have no other reason to hold them.
But note that this claim is merely about *sufficient* conditions. If theistic belief is properly basic, then it can be rational even in the absence of a successful argument for theism.
Maybe, however, the rationality of theistic belief is overdetermined. It could well be the case that belief in God is properly basic, *and* that there are cogent arguments for theism. No contradiction there–indeed, I’m among those who believe this is precisely the epistemic situation in which we find ourselves!
December 19th, 2009 | 9:26 pm
Dear Matt: Thanks for the further explanation. I will think about this further. (I always have wondered why Plantinga holds to “properly basic” as an epistemic warrant, but then in other contexts works overtime to provide logically satisfactory ontological arguments!)
December 23rd, 2009 | 11:37 am
Does not conceptual understanding prove the existence of spirit? After all, the brain is mere matter. Spatial and temporal. And yet our mind understands. We didn’t create our minds and neither did our parents. Or their parents. or the first parents.
How could mind simply spontaneously rise from the rest of the physical world if it the principle of cause and effect holds true?
No, if we are endowed with such a mind, it must come from another who is not dependent on matter. That is called spirit by convention.
Now, the counter argument is that mind is an illusion, or that of course highly complex matter can obviously produce effects beyond the sum of its parts….just because you know.
December 26th, 2009 | 11:51 am
In the neocalvinist, or Reformational school of philosophy promoted by Herman Dooyeweerd, Roy Clouser has done several better than the “Reformed Epistemologists” on this issue.
For an introduction, see here:
http://www.allofliferedeemed.co.uk/Clouser/CanWeKnow.pdf
December 28th, 2009 | 8:09 am
John wrote:
Does not conceptual understanding prove the existence of spirit? After all, the brain is mere matter. Spatial and temporal. And yet our mind understands. We didn’t create our minds and neither did our parents. Or their parents. or the first parents.
How could mind simply spontaneously rise from the rest of the physical world if it the principle of cause and effect holds true?
No, if we are endowed with such a mind, it must come from another who is not dependent on matter. That is called spirit by convention.
Now, the counter argument is that mind is an illusion, or that of course highly complex matter can obviously produce effects beyond the sum of its parts….just because you know————– This spurious argument is full of the mistakes so common amongst religious believers. First off take the statement “the brain is mere matter” How exactly is matter “mere”? Even for a believer this is a foolish statement for, according to your own beliefs matter is the clay that the Creator uses for His creation so how can it be ‘mere’ Isn’t that blasphemy? Why should mind or understanding not arise from matter? We know (or some of us do) that matter is capable of dazzlingly complex structures. The human brain is just one these. But you assert “No, if we are endowed with such a mind, it must come from another who is not dependent on matter” This is simply a bald assertion with absolutely no evidence offered in it’s support but presented as if it were undeniable. It illustrates perfectly the circular nature of the Creationist argument which sees everything as proof of the existence of the Creator. This argument says, in effect, “God made everything. How do I know this? Well look around you and observe all the wonderful things in the Universe. Something MUST have created them so therefore there must be a Creator. QED”
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