[Note: Yesterday Wesley Smith and Gene Fant wrote about the latest controversial remarks by ethicist Peter Singer. Because too few people are aware of how radical and influential Singer is in the field of ethics, I thought it would be worthwhile to shed some light on more of what he believes.]
To give a representative taste of his thoughts, I’ve selected a few choice quotes from some of his most popular works. There is always the danger that taken out of context the quotes could be misconstrued, which is why I recommend that whenever possible the passages be read in their original. Taken in context only makes his positions appear even more disturbing and absolutely chilling in their banality.
On the Sanctity of Human Life
I do not deny that if one accepts abortion on the grounds provided in Chapter 6, the case for killing other human beings, in certain circumstances, is strong. As I shall try to show in this chapter, however, this is not something to be regarded with horror, and the use of the Nazi analogy is utterly misleading. On the contrary, once we abandon those doctrines about the sanctity of human life that – as we saw in Chapter 4 – collapse as soon as they are questioned, it is the refusal to accept killing that, in some cases, is horrific. (1)
On The Acceptability of Killing Newborn Infants
In Chapter 4 we saw that the fact that a being is a human being, in the sense of a member of the species Homo sapiens, is not relevant to the wrongness of killing it; it is, rather, characteristics like rationality, autonomy, and self-consciousness that make a difference. Infants lack these characteristics. Killing them, therefore, cannot be equated with killing normal human beings, or any other self-conscious beings. This conclusion is not limited to infants who, because of irreversible intellectual disabilities, will never be rational, self-conscious beings. We saw in our discussion of abortion that the potential of a fetus to become a rational, self-conscious being cannot count against killing it at a stage when it lacks these characteristics – not, that is, unless we are also prepared to count the value of rational self-conscious life as a reason against contraception and celibacy. No infant – disabled or not – has as strong a claim to life as beings capable of seeing themselves as distinct entities, existing over time. (1)
On How Killing a Sick Child Can Lead to Happiness
Given these facts, suppose that a newborn baby is diagnosed as a haemophiliac. The parents, daunted by the prospect of bringing up a child with this condition, are not anxious for him to live. Could euthanasia be defended here? Our first reaction may well be a firm ‘no’, for the infant can be expected to have a life that is worth living, even if not quite as good as that of a normal baby. The ‘prior existence’ version of utilitarianism sup- ports this judgment. The infant exists. His life can be expected to contain a positive balance of happiness over misery. To kill him would deprive him of this positive balance of happiness. Therefore it would be wrong.
On the ‘total’ version of utilitarianism, however, we cannot reach a decision on the basis of this information alone. The total view makes it necessary to ask whether the death of the haemophiliac infant would lead to the creation of another being who would not otherwise have existed. In other words, if the haemophiliac child is killed, will his parents have another child whom they would not have if the haemophiliac child lives? If they would, is the second child likely to have a better life than the one killed?
Often it will be possible to answer both these questions affirmatively. A woman may plan to have two children. If one dies while she is of child-bearing age, she may conceive another in its place. Suppose a woman planning to have two children has one normal child, and then gives birth to a haemophiliac child. The burden of caring for that child may make it impossible for her to cope with a third child; but if the disabled child were to die, she would have another. It is also plausible to suppose that the prospects of a happy life are better for a normal child than for a haemophiliac.
When the death of a disabled infant will lead to the birth of another infant with better prospects of a happy life, the total amount of happiness will be greater if the disabled infant is killed. The loss of happy life for the first infant is outweighed by the gain of a happier life for the second. Therefore, if killing the haemophiliac infant has no adverse effect on others, it would, according to the total view, be right to kill him. (1)
How Buying a New TV is Like Selling a Homeless Kid’s Kidney
In the end, what is the ethical distinction between a Brazilian who sells a homeless child to organ peddlers and an American who already has a TV and upgrades to a better one — knowing that the money could be donated to an organization that would use it to save the lives of kids in need? (2)
Why Personal Wealth Should be Capped a $30,000 a Year
So how does my philosophy break down in dollars and cents? An American household with an income of $50,000 spends around $30,000 annually on necessities, according to the Conference Board, a nonprofit economic research organization. Therefore, for a household bringing in $50,000 a year, donations to help the world’s poor should be as close as possible to $20,000. The $30,000 required for necessities holds for higher incomes as well. So a household making $100,000 could cut a yearly check for $70,000. Again, the formula is simple: whatever money you’re spending on luxuries, not necessities, should be given away. (2) [Since Singer makes a salary of $18,000, has a trust fund from his father, collects book royalties, owns a house in Princeton, and has an apartment in Manhattan, the professor has plenty to give away. He readily admits, though, that he doesn't live up to the standard that he set for others.]
Why It’s Better to Experiment on Orphans Babies than on Animals
Would the abolitionist be prepared to let thousands die if they could be saved by experimenting on a single animal? The way to reply to this purely hypothetical question is to pose another: Would the experimenter be prepared to perform his experiment on an orphaned human infant, if that were the only way to save many lives? (I say “orphan” to avoid the complication of parental feelings, although in doing so l am being overfair to the experimenter, since the nonhuman subjects of experiments are not orphans.) If the experimenter is not prepared to use an orphaned human infant, then his readiness to use nonhumans is simple discrimination, since adult apes, cats, mice, and other mammals are more aware of what is happening to them, more self-directing and, so far as we can tell, at least as sensitive to pain, as any human infant. There seems to be no relevant characteristic that human infants possess that adult mammals do not have to the same or a higher degree. (3)
Why It’s Better to Experiment on “Retarded” Babies than on Animals
The same experiments performed on nonhuman animals would cause less suffering since the animals would not have the anticipatory dread of being kidnapped and experimented upon. This does not mean, of course, that it would be right to perform the experiment on animals, but only that there is a reason, which is not speciesist, for preferring to use animals rather than normal adult humans, if the experiment is to be done at all. It should be noted, however that this same argument gives us a reason for preferring to use human infants – orphans perhaps – or retarded human beings for experiments, rather than adults, since infants and retarded human beings would also have no idea of what was going to happen to them.
…
So far as this argument is concerned nonhuman animals and infants and retarded human beings are in the same category; and if we use this argument to justify experiments on non human animals we have to ask ourselves whether we are also prepared to allow experiments on human infants and retarded adults; and if we make a distinction between animals and these humans, on what basis can we do it, other than a bare-faced – and morally indefensible – preference for members of our own species? (4)
Why Killing Babies and Animals is Morally Equivalent
The preference, in normal cases, for saving a human life over the life of an animal when a choice has to be made is a preference based on the characteristics that normal humans being have and not on the mere fact that they are members of our own species. This is why when we consider members of our own species who lack the characteristics of normal human beings we can no longer say that their lives are always to be preferred to those of other animals. In general, though, the question of when it is wrong to kill (painlessly) an animal is one to which we need give no precise answer. As long as we remember that we should give the same respect to the lives of animals as we give to the lives of those human beings at a similar mental level we shall not go far wrong. (4)
The Goal of the Animal Liberation Movement
The aims of the movement can be summed up in one sentence: to end the present speciesist bias against taking seriously the interests of nonhuman animals. (4)
How Freeing Animals is Like Freeing American Slaves
Within the animal liberation movement, some forms of direct action have widespread support. Provided there is no violence against any animal, human or nonhuman, many activists believe that releasing animals from situations in which they are wrongly made to suffer, and finding good homes for them, is justified. They liken it to the illegal underground railroad which assisted black slaves to make their way to freedom; it is, they say, the only possible means of helping the victims of oppression. (4)
On Why Bestiality is Not Innately Offensive
This does not make sex across the species barrier normal, or natural, whatever those much-misused words may mean, but it does imply that it ceases to be an offence to our status and dignity as human beings. (5)
(1) Practical Ethics, 2nd Edition, Cambridge, 1993, pp. 175-217
(2) “The Singer Solution to World Poverty”, The New York Times Sunday Magazine, September 5, 1999, pp. 60-63
(3) “All Animals Are Equal”, in TOM REGAN & PETER SINGER (eds.), Animal Rights and Human Obligations, New Jersey, 1989, pp. 148-162
(4) “The Animal Liberation Movement”
(5) “Heavy Petting“, Nerve.com
June 8th, 2010 | 10:07 am
On the quotes about poverty, this pretty much proves the danger of taking quotes out of context. Let’s take the first one:
In the end, what is the ethical distinction between a Brazilian who sells a homeless child to organ peddlers and an American who already has a TV and upgrades to a better one — knowing that the money could be donated to an organization that would use it to save the lives of kids in need?
This quote is immediately followed by, “Of course, there are several differences between the two situations that could support different moral judgments about them. For one thing, to be able to consign a child to death when he is standing right in front of you takes a chilling kind of heartlessness; it is much easier to ignore an appeal for money to help children you will never meet.”
It is extremely weird for a professed Christian to pick on Peter Singer on this point, out of all possible subjects. On the subject of how much one should give to charity, Singer admits he is very unrealistic in recommending that people donate all income above $30,000 to charity. That isn’t to say there are not good reasons to do so: simply that setting the bar too high makes it too easy to dismiss entirely (as Joe Carter does).
In his book “The Life You Can Save,” I believe Singer adopts a very modest sliding scale that has him recommending (note, not requiring but rather advocating as a moral duty) between 5-10% of income be given to charity with larger sums for the extremely wealthy.
Rick Warren claims to give 90% of his income to charity yet Singer is the one being inflexible!
And let’s not forget the words of a certain rabbi:
“Jesus said unto him, If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come and follow me. But when the young man heard that saying, he went away sorrowful: for he had great possessions. Then said Jesus unto his disciples, Verily I say unto you, That a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven. And again I say unto you, It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God.” (Matthew 19:21-24)
Even Singer’s recommendation of giving all income above $30,000 is more modest than what Jesus recommends here.
June 8th, 2010 | 11:21 am
I don’t know, Mark.
The follow on for the Brazilian kid is worse than what preceded it. Only if the kid stood in front of him would the act be “heartless”. Or are you suggesting he is not talking about himself as well as everyone else?
And the money issue is strange indeed. Was he advocating that particular amount of money ($30K)? If yes, why wasn’t he following his own convictions? Maybe he only has convictions for other people? Both Warren and that Jewish rabbi followed their own
recommendations.
From all that I’ve heard, including your additions, the man is controversial and incoherent. My guess is he is celebrated for his “controversiality”. (Is that a word?)
June 8th, 2010 | 11:23 am
Mark,
The first quote, being stated in the form of a rhetorical question, implies the two acts are ethically the same. The second quote does so also. So what was lost when it was, as you say, taken out of context?
Speaking of context, you ignored, as is commonly done, the next two verses from Matthew:
“When his disciples heard it, they were exceedingly amazed, saying, Who then can be saved? But Jesus beheld them, and said unto them, With men this is impossible, but with God all things are possible.”
(Matthew 19:25-26)
June 8th, 2010 | 11:42 am
Mark, you are simply wrong here. Nothing in the “context” alters the proposition. (That’s not a matter of opinion, its a matter of logic. If you don’t like it take it up with Aristotle or Peirce.)
Singer gives every indication of being a monster.
June 8th, 2010 | 12:32 pm
Singer is absolutely nuts, if not evil. But arguably, he is instructive in the flaws of utilitarianism. I find it highly plausible that utilitarian calculations must be taken into account in some circumstances (even a stopped clock is right twice a day), but Singer is a clear illustration of what happens when that plausible contention is totalized into an all-encompassing philosophy.
June 8th, 2010 | 1:39 pm
Joe, et. al.,
I think to go after Singer, you have to do the somewhat more difficult work of arguing with him on the basis of his underlying premises. Otherwise, you find yourself engaged in numerous arguments, such as the one above, about the worthiness, or lack thereof, of his various conclusory statements.
In response to the statement by Mark, above, I would say that he himself, and the following writers, make the point that you can arrive at a conclusion about the value of giving away excess wealth (setting aside, for the moment, the question of what is “excess” and the means by which to give it away) on the basis of premises about the purpose and value of human existence which are very different (opposite) of those which Singer proposes.
In making that argument, I would caution against the approach that Jeff implies, i.e., that the only alternative to a Singer worldview is a theistic or specifically Christian one. Even though I might agree with that premise of “only with God”, I can, and will, accept arguments based on premises in which the existence of God is in doubt, or even denied (for what it’s worth, I suspect that most people who describe themselves as atheists are really some form of agnostic).
Those who make the kind of non-theistic arguments I have in mind include writers such as Nat Hentoff and Albert Camus. Hentoff has made some of the most powerful arguments against the type of utilitarian world view espoused by Singer from his perspective as a self-described “pro-life Jewish atheist.” Camus confronted the evils of the world from his humanist/existentialist perspective. I would also entertain arguments from other religious perspectives.
With apologies to Jeff, I would try to resist the temptation, when arguing against someone like Singer, to engage in direct apologetics or evangelization. I realize that may not have been your intent by quoting from the remainder of the passage from Mark. I would also add that there are various forms of giving witness, so it is not a question of either/or.
Speaking of Camus, Singer sort of reminds me of his philosophical counterpart, Sartre. Except that Sartre was probably both a better writer and thinker than Singer. They both give off that whiff of cerebral disdain for mere, simple humanity.
Based on what I’ve read here and elsewhere, Singer strikes me as more of a sophist and a polemicist than a serious philosopher. He relies on rhetorical tricks and shortcuts (“speciesist”, “‘normal’ adult human”) to make his points. I think Mike makes a good point above when he asks if Singer is popular at least in part because of his “controversiality”. I would say that he is also popular because some of his conclusions regarding animals appeal to a lot of people with sincere humane or environmental convictions. He also provides intellectual cover for the “pro-choice” view. But, I suspect that for the “Academy” his attraction may be his propensity to “epater le bourgouis.” (i.e. “controversiality”).
June 8th, 2010 | 2:40 pm
This man is spiritually diseased.
June 8th, 2010 | 3:04 pm
I think it’s important to remember that when Singer says “It’s just the same to kill ‘x’ kind of human as it is to kill ‘x’ kind of animal,” he usually means that neither is right and is using our inclination to reject doing something to a particular kind of human as a reason to resist doing that same thing to a “similar” kind of animal. I don’t follow his arguments, but they don’t quite make him the inhuman monster that some call him.
June 8th, 2010 | 3:23 pm
I’m not so impressed with Princeton anymore.
June 8th, 2010 | 6:28 pm
When the death of a disabled infant will lead to the birth of another infant with better prospects of a happy life, the total amount of happiness will be greater if the disabled infant is killed.
So, he’s not an atheist!
He worships the Great God Happiness, to whom all mere human interests must be subjected. Happiness is not good for us; rather, it is our duty to be good for Happiness.
And those who fail can and must be sacrificed to Happiness.
June 8th, 2010 | 10:07 pm
The follow on for the Brazilian kid is worse than what preceded it. Only if the kid stood in front of him would the act be “heartless”. Or are you suggesting he is not talking about himself as well as everyone else?
I simply am not following the criticism. Singer asks us to think about two hypotheticals (I’ve taken poetic license with them for clarity but not, I argue, in a way that changes the underlying issue):
1. A Brazilian kidnaps a slum-dwelling child, sells the child to a kidney-harvesting operation, pockets $1,000 and buys a new TV.
2. An average Joe living in the developing world tosses aside a plea for donations to provide life-saving vaccines or medical treatment for poor children in the third world and instead buys a $1,000 TV.
Singer is arguing these two scenarios are morally closer together than most people want to believe. The entire point of the article is exactly that people ought to feel much worse than they do about not giving enough to charity.
I feel this point has completely escaped some of the people commenting here. Yet that is obviously the point of the article as one can verify by reading it for oneself or by looking at any review of Singer’s new book on the subject of charitable giving.
And the money issue is strange indeed. Was he advocating that particular amount of money ($30K)? If yes, why wasn’t he following his own convictions?
To quote from the article, “Comfortably off Americans who give, say, 10 percent of their income to overseas aid organizations are so far ahead of most of their equally comfortable fellow citizens that I wouldn’t go out of my way to chastise them for not doing more. Nevertheless, they should be doing much more…”
He is saying there are morally compelling reasons to give much more than 10% and even compelling reasons to give all of one’s excess income over an amount needed to live a minimally comfortable life. As I pointed out, Singer has adopted 5-10% as a good and realistic rule of thumb for charitable giving. Giving should be targeted in a way to save as many lives or relieve as much human misery as possible.
I’m waiting for the explanation of what is morally monstrous or chilling about this.
Better yet, I’m waiting for an explanation of how this contradicts Christian ethics. The fact that Jesus adds on “with God all things are possible” doesn’t seem to indicate that it is OK to refuse to help others in need.
Again, that is the whole point of Singer’s article and new book. It is practical now for one to make contributions of several thousand dollars that will directly or indirectly save lives or greatly alleviate suffering. So then why don’t people (including Christians) give more?
June 8th, 2010 | 10:54 pm
A sincere question to those who have responded to my comments about Singer’s views on charity and giving:
Suppose it is the case that a well-targeted $2,000 donation can save one human life. Singer argues this is, in fact, the case under present circumstances in the real world. If you earn $100,000, how much is the “right” amount to give under Judeo-Christian ethics?
Do you use a flat rule of 10% and save 5 lives? What is the theological and ethical basis of the answer? Singer is simply arguing the answer from his perspective is “as much as possible.” Why stop at 10% when you can give much more and alleviate even more suffering (Singer claims to donate 25% himself and has been increasing the amount over the years)?
The irony I am trying to point out is that Singer is continuing in a tradition of Jewish and Christian ethicists who point out that being good is difficult. As Jesus points out in the verses from Matthew I quoted, it isn’t enough simply to not victimize other people. You really should do as much as possible to help poor people, even if it entails a large sacrifice and painful sacrifice from yourself. Ignoring the moral dilemma posed by the suffering of others doesn’t make the dilemma go away.
June 8th, 2010 | 11:02 pm
(1) in ethics, consequences matter. more specifically, the agent, the act, the circumstances, and the consequences all matter.
(2) exclusive use of consequentialism (a broader form of utilitarianism) is banal and easily refuted. after all, who is to decide what are good and bad consequences? who can claim the power of omniscience over all the possible subsequent good/bad consequences that may come from a single good/bad consequence? the utilitarian calculus for any moral decision is impossible and inescapably arbitrary.
(3) if humans are not exceptional, we should either (a) file “indecent exposure” charges against the masturbating monkey at the zoo or (b) excuse the local “flasher/rapist” for following his instincts.
(4) institutions of higher learning appear to have sold their souls to the highest bidder. perhaps the authorities at princeton simply believe that having a “controversial” figure on campus is good for business.
June 9th, 2010 | 12:12 am
perhaps the authorities at princeton simply believe that having a “controversial” figure on campus is good for business.
Hiring decisions are usually made by the department — the university administration theoretically has to approve all hiring decisions as well (at least that’s at all the universities I’ve been at — maybe Princeton is different?) but in practice tends to rubber-stamp whatever the academic department wants. See Larry Summers for an example of what happens to a University President who tries to get too involved in personnel decisions.
The philosophy department probably has many reasons for wanting Peter Singer around. First, the faculty probably enjoy discussing and debating with him. I find it boring to be around people who agree with me all the time and most academics are the same. His presence enlivens debate and may help attract higher quality undergrad and graduate philosophy students. Having high-profile professors in a department also means more high-profile academics will come to departmental seminars to present. Since several donors threatened to stop giving to Princeton when it extended an offer to him, I can’t see his hiring being a business decision of some kind.
Academic departments are run by some of the least business-conscious people around — that’s why they are in academia in the first place. University presidents and administrators are more business-minded but, as I say, they tend to rubber-stamp departmental decisions and stay above the fray.
June 9th, 2010 | 2:13 am
Mark: Your correction to some of the comments about the Brazilian kidnaper (at 10:07 p.m.) is well taken, but I do think Singer, like most utilitarians, nevertheless ignores an important distinction that makes the analogy weaker than you seem to think it is. That’s the distinction between bringing about and failing to prevent. The Brazilian is, in effect, an accomplice to the deed, whereas the average Joe, though perhaps guilty of stinginess, isn’t. This is no idle distinction. It is, after all, thoroughly woven into our legal system. Committing a crime has much worse consequences for an individual than failing to prevent one does.
June 9th, 2010 | 3:00 am
Singer, like most utilitarians, nevertheless ignores an important distinction that makes the analogy weaker than you seem to think it is.
Absolutely, and that works as a broader critique of his ideas.
That critique is misplaced when it comes to Singer’s views on charity, though. The debates between consequentialists and non-consequentialists are well-known and there’s no need to rehash it here. It’s worthwhile to consider another hypothetical Singer uses in his new book.
Imagine you are wearing a new pair of expensive $200 shoes when you come across someone drowning in a filthy lake or swamp. If you rescue the person, you will almost certainly have to throw away your new shoes.
Now, most people (and I think even Singer and the Pope could agree on this) say you should go ahead and ruin your shoes for the sake of another person’s life. And on this issue, utilitarians have the moral high ground. A certain kind of non-consequentialist could say that you are not morally blameworthy for walking away and saving your shoes but most people would find that absurd. To say that you were not responsible for the person going into the water and drowning in the first place seems like a particularly self-centered and offensive abrogation of responsibility and duty.
And indeed it is. Singer’s point is that there is less moral distance between someone who refuses to ruin an expensive pair of shoes to save a person’s life and someone who simply kills another person for money than most people imagine. How close together they are depends on how far you are willing to take your utilitarian intuitions. When cases like this come up in real life, there are plenty of calls for the “bad Samaritan” to be prosecuted (generally unheeded) so most people have this basic intuition.
Then once you have conceded that point, you have to consider that there are people half-way around the world who are close to death or suffer some horrible disability because of lack of financial resources. Almost everyone agrees that physical proximity should not play a big role in moral obligation or duty.
The inescapable conclusion is that most people should do far more than they do right now to help those in need and may, indeed, be morally blameworthy (like the bad Samaritan) for not doing enough.
June 9th, 2010 | 4:07 am
I had to read Singer when I did my degree in Philosophy (as a mature student). He was, of course, entirely logical. But the fact that he ends up with such extraordinary conclusions shows that he starts off from the wrong place.
It also struck me that despite the fact that mankind has been thinking about morality for thousands of years we have not yet been able to come up with a definite method of working out what is good and what is not. It just shows what a mess we have been in since we ate of the “tree of the knowledge of good and evil” – we just don’t seem to be able to handle this knowledge.
Most modern moralists seem to see a continuum from bacteria at the bottom of the scale right up to human beings at the top of the scale. We then move to definitions of “personhood” which take in increasing numbers of animals.
For me, this was the crucial difference because we don’t see this continuum. We see creation and mankind as part of that creation – we are made of the dust of the earth. But we are the only bits of creation “made in the image of God” and into which God breathed in order to give us life. There is therefore a continuum up to but not including man. I think any moral code that ignores that will logically end up with something like the conclusions that Singer comes to.
June 9th, 2010 | 9:47 am
Re: Mark “The inescapable conclusion is that most people should do far more than they do right now to help those in need…”
Why should they? Because Singer says so?
June 9th, 2010 | 9:58 am
“We see creation and mankind as part of that creation – we are made of the dust of the earth. But we are the only bits of creation “made in the image of God” and into which God breathed in order to give us life.”
Remember that this claim comes from religious writings that also say that a small tribe is God’s chosen people and the rules in that text make it very clear that there is no universalism of rules — or morality. Initially, the text is not concerned with the rest of mankind, except to remind the small tribe to avoid them and their poisonous activities and gods. Just as Christianity modified and universalized the Jewish conception of God, so we see modern philosophers universalizing morality to all living organisms.
June 9th, 2010 | 11:41 am
Why should they? Because Singer says so?
Talk about out-of-context quoting. Considering the fact that those several paragraphs before this quote contain a series of propositions, why don’t you simply point out which proposition you disagree with and why.
June 9th, 2010 | 12:10 pm
One of Singer’s basic problems is that his conception of personhood, taken out of context from Locke, demands a certain level of functionality in order to attribute “personhood.” Specifically, it demands the functionality of having preferences.
This means simply that a human being is not necessarily a human person.
However, this is only a philosophical position among others, and not a scientific or necessarily logical one at that. Scientifically, there is no “human being / human person” demarcation in human development. The better definition of personhood is the older Boethian definition, which simply requires a rational nature in an individually developing substance. The rational nature doesn’t even have to be functioning; it’s just part of humanity and will thus flower into functionality as part of the human’s continuous development.
As Andrew Peach has pointed out, it seems the only real reason for the “human being / human person” distinction, practically speaking, is so that some human “persons” can kill the human “beings” they want to kill.
June 9th, 2010 | 12:23 pm
I’ve noticed a PROBLEM WITH FIRST THINGS. I am writing in BIG LETTERS so that someone will PAY ATTENTION.
You get an interesting topic–in this case, Peter Singer’s latest insanities–and then promptly turn it into 3, 4, maybe 5 different threads.
We readers and posters CANNOT KEEP UP WITH THE ARGUMENT ON ALL OF THEM. Plus, the arguments CRISS-CROSS each other, as witness the recent threads on Calvinism and free will.
I know you all get enthusiastic over there at FT about your topics, but I HOPE YOU ARE LISTENING.
There. I feel better. I really mean it–I feel BETTER.
June 9th, 2010 | 2:41 pm
Are you going to do a follow-up article on The Mere Stupidity of Jesus with a paragraph titled
Why Personal Coat Ownership Should Be Capped At One?
June 9th, 2010 | 10:16 pm
I think the right way to look at Singer is to think of him as a good logician reasoning from really faulty premises. If you adopt his premises there’s no reason why you cannot accept his conclusions as reasonably plausible.
That said, one can only hope that more work can be done at the level of the fundamental levels of these moral premises, which would have to involve dialogue between theology, science, and philosophy. It is at this level which I think Singer’s reasoning can be dismantled.
June 10th, 2010 | 1:02 am
a few thoughts regarding mark’s comments on faculty hiring. he is probably correct on the details, but let me explain further.
at least in the fields of medicine/basic sciences, my impression from my time at various “elite” institutions is that “the new york times effect” carries quite a bit of weight among university PR departments. in other words, universities in general seek publicity, and “controversy” is often good publicity. whether this effect is significant remains open to debate; nevertheless, it definitely exists.
i agree with mark that it is important to have people of differing opinions on faculty. yet i recall my philosophy professor honestly wondering whether or not bestiality and necrophilia were morally praiseworthy…. at which point i lost respect for him as a scholar. for anyone who arrives at such perverse conclusions about human sexuality and its purposes has been confused for a long time about certain fundamental truths; i’m not sure we need such folks at all in order to sharpen our students’ and our own minds.
finally, i second joshua’s comment. c. s. lewis once wrote about the analogy of making a single mistake on a math problem and continuing logically forward into further error…. sometimes, one cannot get the problem right by going forward, but only by going backwards. in this case, it seems professor singer (and all of us) might do well to examine more deeply the foundations of his own thought.
June 10th, 2010 | 11:42 am
To tie two of Singers ideas together I have decided to take his directive about giving more to the poor(wow, how original) and adding certain caveats to it. I would need certification that those who would receive my largesse meet certain minimum requirements to qualify as rational beings and if they do not then their portion would be skipped and given to someone who did qualify. Furthermore any children whose demise would increase someone elses happiness would of course be denied my money. Retarded children who could be used for experiments to help humanity would receive that portion required for them to serve our purposes. the unused part of their portion would then be distributed to more worthy beings. I think that if we all put our minds to it we can come up with what I like to call a new constitution of caring, subtitled “I’m in your out.” Of course when and if we eliminate those who by todays standards fall below an acceptable level of rationality and the world still doesn’t meet Singers standards then we will need to create an even higher level to demarcate those worthy of life from those whose best feature is their utility.
June 21st, 2010 | 2:19 am
If there anyone here who gives even a tenth as much of his or her income every year as Peter Singer does to alleviate human suffering? Is there anyone here who has done, or is ever likely to do, as much as Peter Singer to mobilize others to alleviate human suffering? I doubt it.
But you can make a start. You can go to Singer’s site The Life You Can Save — http://www.thelifeyoucansave.com/ — and take action to help end world poverty.
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