[Note: Since its a holiday—and because I can't find much else to write about—I thought I'd post another thought experiment.]
In his collection of thought experiments, The Pig That Wants to Be Eaten, philosopher Julian Baggini includes the following excerpt from Douglas Adam’s sci-fi novel The Restaurant at the End of the Universe:
After forty years of vegetarianism, Max Berger was about to sit down to a feast of pork sausages, crispy bacon and pan-fried chicken breast. Max had always missed the taste of meat, but his principles were stronger than his culinary cravings. But now he was able to eat meat with a clear conscience.
The sausages and bacon had come from a pig called Priscilla he had met the week before. The pig had been genetically engineered to be able to speak and, more importantly, to want to be eaten. Ending up on a human table was Priscilla’s lifetime ambition and she woke up on the day of her slaughter with a keen sense of anticipation. She had told all of this to Max just before rushing off to the comfortable and humane slaughterhouse. Having heard her story, Max thought it would be disrespectful not to eat her.
The chicken had come from a genetically modified bird which had been ‘decerebrated’. In other words, it lived the life of a vegetable, with no awareness of self, environment, pain or pleasure. Killing it was therefore no more barbarous than uprooting a carrot.
Yes as the plate was place before him, Max felt a twinge of nausea. Was this just a reflex reaction, caused by a lifetime of vegetarianism? Or was it the physical sign of justifiable distress? Collecting himself, he picked up his knife and fork…
While the passage is ostensibly about the ethics of vegetarianism, I believe the questions it raises can be extended to other interesting areas. Specifically, I want to explore a theme that I believe is parallel to human experience.
Claim A — If one of the teleological purposes of pighood is to be eaten, then Priscilla is simply aligning her attitude with her reason for existence. Berger would arguably be doing nothing morally wrong by eating her. That point seems rather uncontroversial, at least to us carnivores.
Claim B — If pigs have no teleological purpose, then Priscilla’s desire to be eaten may be beneficial to her psychologically (if not necessarily physically) but her state of mind would not necessarily be the determining ethical consideration. The moral concern would shift to and be determined by other relevant factors and/or principles. For example, is Berger doing anything wrong in killing a creature that has no purpose? That question cannot be resolved simply by saying that the pig has a desire to be killed.
Claim C — Another variation, and the one that I am most interested in discussing, is the consideration that pigs might have a teleological reason for being that has nothing to do with being eaten. If this is the case, and fulfilling the purpose of the pig life requires its continued survival, then Priscilla’s desire to be eaten will prevent her from being a fulfilled being. Berger, as I see it, would clearly be wrong in eating her even though this is what she would choose of her own free will.
Am I wrong on this point? If so, what moral principle have I failed to consider?
Also, what are some of the parallels between Priscilla and humans? Is there a conflict between what some people freely choose and our moral obligation to reject their desire in favor of treating them according to their reason for being?
September 6th, 2010 | 9:41 am
Joe, it’s Labor Day. Take some time off. If you want pigs that want to be eaten, put some pork chops on the barbecue!
September 6th, 2010 | 9:42 am
Berger, as I see it, would clearly be wrong in eating her even though this is what she would choose of her own free will.
Is Priscilla choosing this of her own “free” will? I could go with, “she would choose this of her own will” but “free” seems a bit much, given the circumstances.
September 6th, 2010 | 9:52 am
Is it valid to say that Priscilla has chosen death of her own free will if she was genetically created to do so?
September 6th, 2010 | 10:12 am
Dear Joe Carter: To address only your very last paragraph: The obvious example that springs to mind is the law against suicide. Some people want to commit suicide, or be assisted in their suicide; laws against that show that we value their human lives even above their desire to end those lives by self-murder.
Your questions about teleological purposes are interesting. Does God value His creations, such as pigs–or do creations such as pigs have innate teleological ends–in ways that go beyond their usefulness as human food?
Instinctively, I want to say yes–maybe God creates them simply because they are interesting and valuable in themselves. But if so, should I be so nonchalant about converting them into pork chops?
September 6th, 2010 | 10:24 am
Response A. I note the protagonist of the piece is aptly named “Berger”–as in, “I’ll have a berger, fries and a chocolate shake.”
Response B. I think your claims are all morally correct. In the case of C, there are certainly times when humans’ reason for being, or their inherent dignity as humans, morally forbid us from complying with their own wishes. The temptation to assisted suicide is a case in point which comes quickly to mind. There are many others.
Response C. I think the decerebrated chicken offers another provocative analogy. If rational consciousness is what defines our dignity on a case-by-case basis, as some would say, then all sorts of evils can ensue, such as murdering Terri Schiavo.
September 6th, 2010 | 10:57 am
That was sneaky, Joe…well played.
However, I think that the whole argument would be rejected by the thanatocracy, since teleological arguments don’t seem to hold much water in that realm.
September 6th, 2010 | 11:30 am
I think the argument is complicated by the fact that Priscilla has somehow been rendered sentient, in order to appease Berger’s conscience. Thus it would appear that the thing that makes her consumption acceptable to Berger is the very thing that makes it sinful (in Narnian terms, at least).
September 6th, 2010 | 12:01 pm
“Also, what are some of the parallels between Priscilla and humans?”
Actually we can draw a rather direct parallel between Priscilla and Bernd Juergen Brandes, known for his peculiar association with Armin Meiwes…
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armin_Meiwes
I’d be surprised if you didn’t know about the case. It’s my go-to illustration for critiquing the “consenting adults” approach to morality.
September 6th, 2010 | 12:40 pm
“The pig had been genetically engineered to be able to speak and, more importantly, to want to be eaten.”
The problem with this is that the pig is still being treated as a means to ends, something that vegitarianism treats seriously.
It also plays upon desire theory, which also is flawed. Think of a genetically designed human who is given the inclination to want to be a sex slave. She grooms herself for that purpose her entire life. To not treat her as a sex slave would to fail to fulfill her desires. Is she really better off with her desires fulfilled? Obviously, not. Exploitation is still objectively wrong even if someone wants to be exploited.
September 6th, 2010 | 12:44 pm
@Craig Payne: if we had to do our own pig to pork chop conversions, I think we’d all be a lot less nonchalant about eating them.
September 6th, 2010 | 2:55 pm
The Max Berger story isn’t actually an excerpt from Adams; The Restaurant at the End of the Universe is just cited as the source of the idea — the story is Baggini’s. (In Restaurant it’s actually a talking cow that comes to your table as the Dish of the Day and makes recommendations about which part of its body you should eat. That would be a bit difficult to handle.)
September 6th, 2010 | 3:15 pm
correct me if i’m wrong but Priscilla is a Calvinist ?
September 6th, 2010 | 3:45 pm
Lois McMaster Bujold’s Mirror Dance involves a location where clones are raised to be full-body transplants. Most are ignorant, but one clone believes that prolonging my lady’s life is the very purpose of her existence.
September 6th, 2010 | 5:31 pm
Joe asks: “Is there a conflict between what some people freely choose and our moral obligation to reject their desire in favor of treating them according to their reason for being?”
The question is not well formed. That an act is freely chosen confers absolutely no moral standing on it. It is absurd to suggest otherwise. All wrongful acts are freely chosen; otherwise they would not be wrongful. Therefore, whether an act is freely chosen has no bearing on the pertinent question, which is: “Do we have a moral obligation to thwart certain acts because they conflict with the actor’s reason for being?”
To the philosophical materialist this question is meaningless, because the concept “reason for being” is empty. But the question is at the very center of the Judeo-Christian ethical tradition. What is our reason for being? I can think of no better answer than the answer given in the Book of Common Prayer. Our reason for being is to glorify God and enjoy him forever. And how do we glorify God? By following the two great commandments: You shall love the Lord your God and you shall love your neighbor as yourself. Therefore, every act that is contrary to either of the two great commandments is contrary to our reason for being.
Therefore, we can further refine the question as follows: “Do we have a moral obligation to thwart certain acts because they contravene one of the two great commandments?”
The answer, it seems to me, is “it depends.” Clearly, we should do everything in our power to prevent certain acts that run afoul of the great commandments (murder; rape; incest). Just as clearly we should generally mind our own business when it comes to other acts that arguably violate the two great commandments (eating too much salt; smoking in a room by myself). Reasonable people can disagree about preventing other acts (smoking in public).
So, the answer to your question, depending on the context is “yes, no and maybe.”
September 6th, 2010 | 7:49 pm
Is it possible to have a teleogical purpose not associated with some person? Or must something have a purpose to someone?
Is the teleological purpose of a chair to sit in? Or is it to ward off a lion? Or is it kindling for a fire?
Is saying, “a pig has purpose so-and-so” incomplete without referencing, at least implicitly, to whom it has that purpose?
September 6th, 2010 | 9:13 pm
“Is it possible to have a teleogical purpose not associated with some person?”
Dear Ray Ingles: Yes. Many teleological purposes are “discovered” by persons (humans), but not directed toward humans.
For a simple example, the innate purpose of an acorn is to produce a mature oak tree. Humans discover this, but are not directly affected by it.
September 7th, 2010 | 4:04 am
The standard discussion of this in the context of political liberalism is whether one can voluntarily give up one’s autonomy – i.e., whether it should be permissible in a liberal society for one to voluntarily become a slave to another.
September 7th, 2010 | 9:32 am
Craig Payne – The oak tree’s purpose for an acorn is indeed to make a new oak tree. The squirrel’s purpose for an acorn is to feed her young. Some species of ant purpose acorns as homes for their colonies. Humans have long used acorns for tanning hides or food or decoration.
Why is the oak tree’s purpose “the innate purpose” of an acorn?
September 7th, 2010 | 10:14 am
Craig,
How does it show respect for others to deny them the right to assisted death with dignity, to force them to suffer all of their last days or months before they die as we congratulate ourselves on our respect for human life?
Joe,
It seems to me that the restriction is on the slaveowner. In a healthy society, people do not want to be slaves. Any society that is so callous towards its poor that the poor might consider slavery as a reasonable alternative is a society that needs a great deal of reform.
September 7th, 2010 | 12:22 pm
“Why is the oak tree’s purpose “the innate purpose” of an acorn?”
Actually, it is the only innate purpose of the acorn you mention. The squirrell’s using it to feed her young is the squirrel’s purpose, not the acorn’s. The ant using it as a house is the ant’s purpose, not the acorn’s. There is no separation of the acorn’s purpose from that of the tree into which it will grow because they are, in a real sense, the same thing (the acorn IS the tree in seed form), so to say the acorn’s purpose is to grow into a tree and the tree’s purpose is to grow from an accorn is essentially to say the same thing.
September 8th, 2010 | 8:28 am
Fred – Is that really the acorn’s purpose? Or, a la Dawkins, is the acorn built by genes to preserve and propagate themselves?
Dennett and Searle have argued over “as-if intentionality” (where things act “as if” they had goals and purposes, but no conscious intent is actually present) and “original intentionality” (where conscious beings have intentions). I think we’d have to conclude that the acorn can be understood as “wanting” to grow into a tree, but that is on some level incorrect. A bit like thinking the sun really ‘rises’ when we talk about a sunrise…
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