Comments on: Should Catholics Abandon Human Dignity?

By: Flotsam and jetsam (1/12) « scientia et sapientia

Flotsam and jetsam (1/12) « scientia et sapientia — Wed, 12 Jan 2011 16:23:35 +0000

[...] with his argument that human dignity should not be the ground of Christian ethics (see also here and here). I found the discussion particularly interesting for Miller’s argument that main [...]

By: Dignity and Virtue » First Thoughts | A First Things Blog

Dignity and Virtue » First Thoughts | A First Things Blog — Wed, 12 Jan 2011 15:32:01 +0000

[...] thank Joe Carter for noticing an essay of mine on Two Bases of Morality in Catholic Theology originally published in Dappled [...]

By: Botolph

Botolph — Wed, 12 Jan 2011 07:25:04 +0000

I too agree with those who believe it is a false problem and false dichotomy.

Jesus Christ is the norm of Catholic ethics. Through the Incarnation, the Son of God has in a mysterious way, identified Himself with each human being giving each human being a dignity surpassing anything imaginable. At the same time, ‘life with Christ’ remains our calling and goal

By: Miguel

Miguel — Wed, 12 Jan 2011 04:44:27 +0000

I’m coming late to the party, but I think Dr. Barr is on target with what he says there. Miller suggest as much in the following sentence:

“In particular, the concept of human dignity lacks definite content: It implies that we must treat others with respect, but it does not tell us which kinds of treatment are respectful and which not.”

which he then follows with this footnote, which I think directly addresses at least some of the criticisms raised here:

“Some Catholic theologians explain human dignity in terms of man’s being made in the image and likeness of God. E.g, May, op. cit. at 23. If the thought here is that God has, say, infinite intrinsic value, and man, being made in his image, thus has some finite intrinsic value, then this move only compounds the conceptual confusion: infinite intrinsic value is a concept with even less definite content than intrinsic value and so cannot be used to explain it. On the other hand, if by invoking the image and likeness of God, such theologians are appealing to the fact that man has a rational human nature and thus a particular final end that fulfills this nature, then invoking the image and likeness of God amounts to jettisoning the concept of human dignity and adopting that of the final end for man.”

This is not the only important footnote, by the way. You should go back and read some of the others if you have not, which clarify a few questions.

By: Mark

Mark — Wed, 12 Jan 2011 04:31:09 +0000

To Francis Beckwith: if you are going to take issue with Steven Pinker’s arguments against dignity, it seems only fair play that you offer a fully developed notion of dignity that explicitly answers his critiques. Otherwise, dignity becomes a moving target that is immune to any criticism thrown at it because its defenders are only willing to say what dignity is not, not what it is.

Without a definition of dignity, a passage like this one becomes an exercise in question-begging: “So, according that understanding, a violation of human dignity would occur if a physician were to discourage her patient to undergo a routine pelvic or rectal examination because of the “indignities” described by Pinker. This is because the good of the patient is compromised when he or she willingly abandons her own good in order to avoid a mild indignity that is by its nature not intrinsically immoral.”

By: Stephen M. Barr

Stephen M. Barr — Wed, 12 Jan 2011 02:46:21 +0000

I think some commentators here have misunderstood Robert Miller
to be saying that there is no such thing as human dignity, or that human dignity is unrelated to the question of how people should be treated or how they should behave. It is clear from his article that he is saying none of those things. I believe him to be saying merely that the bare concept of human dignity cannot serve as the “foundational principle” of an adequate moral system. Suppose instead that someone said that the concept of “duty” cannot
serve as the foundational principle of an adequate moral system. That would be recognized as simply a rejection of “deontological” ethics, and as such hardly a surprising or radical position for a Christian philosopher to take — on the contrary, it would be absolutely traditional. No one would imagine that such a person was denying that human beings have duties. No one would think it a sufficient rejoinder to say that the word duty appeared in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas.

It is clear that the concept of “duty” by itself is not enough. Pro-choicers think we have a duty to allow women to abort their children. Pro-lifers think we have a duty to protect the unborn from being aborted. Pacifists think we have a duty never to fight, just war theorists think we sometimes have a duty to fight. They
cannot all be right. So there must be some way to decide where duty lies. But the mere concept of duty does not give us a way to decide.
Therefore, such a decision has to invoke other principles. In that case, it is those principles that imply the existence of the duty — which is to say that those other principles are more fundamental.

The same seems to be true of the concept of human dignity. If in explaining why something is contrary to human dignity one is driven
ultimately to employ the more traditional analysis, it would seem that the more traditional principles are the truly fundamental ones.

To put it another way, suppose someone said that certain deeds were wrong because they are “NASty”. (Cf. first definition at http://onlineslangdictionary.com/definition+of/nasty) I might well be inclined to agree, but I doubt whether a satisfactory system of ethics can be derived from the no-nastiness principle.

By: Ray Ingles

Ray Ingles — Wed, 12 Jan 2011 02:24:20 +0000

Francis Beckwith – I’d actually seen that before. I think you come to some incorrect conclusions about the implications of materialism, which affects several of your points. Rather lengthy to tackle in the comments here, though…

By: Andrei Vyshinsky

Andrei Vyshinsky — Wed, 12 Jan 2011 01:42:11 +0000

I, too, think that we are dealing with a false distinction here, this business of a posited incompatibility between human dignity and the teleological aspect. It is a mistake to think of either apart from Christology in any case, so it seems to me that there is a certain merit in Joseph C.’s point respecting divinisation. All is a participation in the Son, nothing is excepted. Jesus Christ is both morality and the end of man. In my view, Henri du Lubac on the question of the ‘natural desire” can be instructive here, especially when considered in light of the theology of von Balthasar.

By: Francis Beckwith

Francis Beckwith — Wed, 12 Jan 2011 01:29:02 +0000

Thanks Barry!

Frank

By: Barry Arrington

Barry Arrington — Wed, 12 Jan 2011 01:03:46 +0000

@Beckwith: Great article even if, on balance, the world would have been a better place if Pinker had devoted himself to Cheetos and Springer instead of infanticide apologetics.