Michio Kaku, a theoretical physicist at C.U.N.Y., explains why he thinks quantum physics affects the debate about free will and determinism.
One of the problems I have with such physics-based explanations is that they do not address how the human will relates to physical matter. Without addressing that connection, the theory only touches on the question if we assume that the human will is reducible to matter (e.g., the brain). What do you think? How useful are such explanations?
April 14th, 2011 | 9:12 am
Quantum uncertainty does open the door to free will, but is not the same as free will.
If the natural laws of the universe really do follow a 100% deterministic path, then for free will to exist something non-material (eg. the soul) has to be able to create new energy ex nihilo to move around the already-existing matter of things like molecules in the brain.
On the other hand, if there is genuine uncertainty in the universe, then the non-material soul does not need to create energy, it merely needs to be able to “push” that indetermined state into a more determined state. In a sense, the soul is capable of “completing” the laws of physics surrounding quantum systems.
Translation of this second point: God, through an act of will, created the universe with general physical laws that create a kind of determinism, but created laws that left the actual resolution of this or that situation open. In doing so, he left the universe itself open to being “completed” by the acts of will other spiritual beings.
April 14th, 2011 | 9:13 am
Physics is the most useful of the sciences. Unfortunately, that has lead people, including scientists, to attempt to reduce everything to physics the science, not the reality.
The usefulness of science comes from reproducible results. If we do A, we know that B will happen because that is what has happened every time we try A. This is a simplification but I believe an accurate one. Somehow, in spite of knowing this, people forget that science is only looking for this reproducibility. That is, science is only looking for determinism. Is it any surprise that that is what science finds?
Does Quantum Theory change this? Put another way, does probability change this? I don’t think so. Now, at the subatomic level, if we try A, we look for B x percent of the time and C y percent of the time. This is a major simplification, as it is not B and C but a probability distribution over time and space. But that probability distribution is reproducible.
I don’t think science, by the very thing that makes it useful, has anything to say on free will.
April 14th, 2011 | 10:23 am
Joe, I think you are not looking at the issue the right way. (Fr. Thomas Dowd is.) The question is not whether quantum mechanics provides what you call a “physics-based explanation” of free will. The question, as Fr. Dowd correctly says, is whether quantum mechanics might create a space in which free will can operate — an opening for free will, not an explanation of free will. The mind is not reducible to matter, but matter had better be open to the influence of mind. Before quantum mechanics, it seemed that matter was closed off from any non-material influence — what philosophers call the postulate of “the causal closure” of the physical world. — Haven’t you read my book Joe? ;)
The point is that before quantum mechanics was discovered it appeared as though the laws of physics were deterministic. If they were deterministic, human free will (in the traditional “incompatibilist” sense) would require one of two things: either (a) an exercise of human free will would entail a violation of the laws of physics (a violation, in particular, of the law of conservation of energy and momentum, as Fr. Dowd notes); or (b) God, foreseeing from all eternity all our free choices, arranged the initial conditions of the physical universe so that what we choose to do is actually done by our bodies (a form of what philosophers call “occasionalism”). Both (a) and (b) seem rather awkward philosophical positions to be forced to adopt. But, as quantum mechanics suggests that physical determinism is false, we who believe in free will are not placed in that dilemma.
With regard to the observations of Mike Melendez, I would make two comments. First, while science is certainly useful, it does not have a merely utilitarian value: it also allows us to understand the world correctly. It is a path to truth — not ALL truths, not the most important truths, but truths nonetheless. I don’t think Mike Melendez would disagree with that. But there is a tendency among some theologians to pretend that science, while it may “work”, doesn’t really tell us about things as they are. I would assert that it does tell us about things as they are, though not everything about things as they are.
Second, scientists found determinism (in the pre-quantum era) not merely because they were looking for it. After all, Einstein, de Broglie, and Schrodinger were also expecting determinism, and were disturbed by the idea of non-determinism. And yet, the quantum mechanics that they helped to construct turned out (in the standard view) to be NON-deterministic. I think Mr. Melendez is wrong in thinking that physics must by its very nature find determinism. That is historically shown to be false by the fact that physics first found determinism and then found non-determinism.
Science found determinism pre-1920s, because the indeterminacy generally manifests itself at the subatomic level, and people had been unable to probe that level earlier. When they began to be able to study the subatomic level, they saw the indeterminacy that was there.
April 14th, 2011 | 10:39 am
Well, Michio Kaku is just saying that the science of quantum mechanics makes free-will possible. Quantum mechanics is a different area of physics from the so-called classical physics. Classical physics, as espoused by Isaac Newton and then later Albert Einstein, makes it look like the universe is a perfectly predictable machine. Quantum Mechanics says there is no way to perfectly predict the state of this machine, just assign chances to it. So really Kaku is saying that our free-will comes from this Quantum mechanics, rather than classical physics.
April 14th, 2011 | 11:23 am
Stephen Barr The question is not whether quantum mechanics provides what you call a “physics-based explanation” of free will.
I should have clarified that a bit better. I didn’t mean that it was a physics-based explanation of how free will occurs but only how it is possible.
The mind is not reducible to matter, but matter had better be open to the influence of mind.
The problem, in my opinion, is that the reductionist and non-reductionist are using the phrase “free will” in ways that are incompatible.
I suspect that Kaku believes that the mind is reducible to matter. In that sense his theory does open up the possibility for “free will” only in the sense that we could not determine with certainty what a person will do before they act. But that does not really address the point about whether we can have free will in the incompatibilist sense. If reductionism is true, then free will may be possible under quantum mechanics but is still nearly as unlikely as in a causally-closed universe.
However, if the mind is not reducible to matter, free will is possible in either a reductionist or non-reductionist system. Occasionalism may be, as you say, “awkward”, but it is still a live possibility. And before we could claim that the exercise of human free will would entail a violation of the laws of physics we would need to understand how the mind-matter system interacted. For instance, imagine a universe where the system seemed to be completely closed and yet acted like a quantum mechanical system in only one respect—the interaction between the mind and matter.
The point is that a reductionist explanation of free will must address how it can be compatible with physics before it can be coherent while a non-reductionist explanation is not so encumbered.
April 14th, 2011 | 11:33 am
Let me encourage everyone to read Prof. Barr’s book. I bought it recently after reading his comments on this blogsite, and it’s terrific. At the Templeton Foundation, I am exposed to a fair amount of really interesting physics, esp quantum physics, which has metaphysical implications. Anton Zeilinger, a Catholic and one of the world’s leading quantum physicists (and a Foundation grantee) said last year that the things quantum physics is learning now compels us to take the line “In the beginning was the Word…” with stark new seriousness.
What interests me in particular is what quantum physics may reveal to us about the relationship between mind (soul) and matter. I am barely literate in this area, obviously, but from what I’ve read, it appears to me that this field may be more reconcilable with an older Christian anthropology, rather than the dualism many of us have fallen into after Descartes.
The more I learn about what physicists, quantum and classical both, are discovering about the nature of reality, the more I wonder why so many Christians are so wrapped up in the subject of biology re: evidence for design in the cosmos.
April 14th, 2011 | 11:39 am
Oh, and there was one other point that I forgot to add. Dr. Barr said, “If they were deterministic, human free will (in the traditional “incompatibilist” sense) would require one of two things . . . an exercise of human free will would entail a violation of the laws of physics.”
My view on the issue is that while it might appear to be a violation of the laws of physics, if all factors could be fully known, we would recognize that there is no incompatibility.
Too often we try to shoehorn a philosophical position so that it is compatible with current scientific understanding rather than assuming that advancements in understanding will resolve the issue.
For instance, imagine that in the 1800s a mind-matter reductionist claimed that since free will is true, the material universe must not be deterministic. A physicist at the time would have told them that it wasn’t possible given the current scientific consensus. The reductionist could claim that maybe that Newtonian physics wasn’t the last word on the matter. They would have been right, of course, just not for reasons that they could have foreseen.
So when I say that a “reductionist explanation of free will must address how it can be compatible with physics” I was presuming that the reductionist would feel compelled to make it compatible with the current understanding of physics.
April 14th, 2011 | 11:41 am
Just to confirm, Stephen Barr has my thoughts correct. Science is good but limited.
April 14th, 2011 | 11:49 am
R. Dreher the more I wonder why so many Christians are so wrapped up in the subject of biology re: evidence for design in the cosmos.
I think there are two reasons for that. The first is that evidence for design in the cosmos has always been around (as the Apostle Paul said) and yet it is becoming less rather than more convincing for nonbelievers. I don’t understand why that is the case, but despite the corroborating evidence (Big Bang, anthropic principle, etc.) non-believers are not, in general, becoming more convinced of the God hypothesis.
The second reason is that debates over biology are really about human exceptionalism. If humans are just a quirk of evolution then the only value that human life has is what we choose to give it ourselves. The debates about evolution are really just a side argument related to bioethical concerns.
April 14th, 2011 | 1:17 pm
I reread Barr and found I missed a piece: “I think Mr. Melendez is wrong in thinking that physics must by its very nature find determinism. That is historically shown to be false by the fact that physics first found determinism and then found non-determinism.”
The difficulty is that I don’t believe that science found non-determinism in the sense of non-reproducibility, certainly not in quantum physics. Major supercomputers use the reproducibility of quantum physics to predict things about subatomic particles. Is that non-deterministic? Not in my viewpoint. It is certainly much more complicated than Newtonian physics, but you can predict, just not much. Dice yes, but the laws of probability are still laws.
What laws can free will conform to? Not the decisions made with free will but free will itself? So, Barr and I have a semantic disagreement here, not an actual one, over the definition of determinism.
I hold that the simple determinism of Newtonian physics and the complex reproducibility of quantum probability distributions are much closer to each other than either is to the concept of free will. The major impact of the quantum side is not an end to reproducibility but a realization that Newton didn’t cover everything. There is no reason to believe that Newton and Quantum together cover everything either.
I may misunderstand Barr, but I think we agree that Free Will is outside the scope of science, even if Quantum “provides an opening” for it.
Now if Quantum had found only a possibility distribution rather than a probability distribution, the matter changes. But it was the probability that made it science.
April 14th, 2011 | 3:42 pm
The problem with probability is that it is not an exact science, since we often can not control all the conditions necessary for an event to occur, nor can we always know whether those necessary conditions exist since our understanding of the universe is evolving. How we interact within the universe is not always predictable simply because, although we are often creatures of habit, God Has given us the gift of free will, so we can always change our mind:-)
April 14th, 2011 | 6:27 pm
Part of the problem, before or after the discovery of subatomic indeterminacy, is the unscientific philosophical bias toward reductionism. Kant was a Newtonian through and through, but he also acknowledged the reality of free will in his philosophical system. Why? Because we could clearly intuit that it exists. Even though free will could not be discovered as an object of possible experience (which is the minimum requirement for knowledge in Kant), it is still real because… well, first of all because it is obviously real. Kant did not feel the need to reduce one order to another, or practical reason to pure reason, merely because there were competing methods for knowledge. He refused to say that one thing was really only a phantom and the other thing was the truly real. He refused to reduce things unnecessarily.
Whatever you think of Kant, I think this sort of openness to what we actually behold in front of us is important.
April 15th, 2011 | 5:59 am
The late neuroscientist, Sir John Eccles, wrote a book, called “HOW THE SELF CONTROLS ITS BRAIN”, which I think was his last book, before he died, in 1997. It’s an interesting read, where he argues that, on the microscopic, or submicroscopic level, the quantum activity, of particles, allows for the “self”, to control that portion of the neuron.
That is, he points out, the brain, is composed of billions of microscopic neurons, that transmit the “messages, of our mental life, to each other. No neuron, actually touches, any other neuron. They communicate through submicroscopic spaces, called synapses. Throught these synapses, neurotransmitters, from one neuron, flow to the other, thereby allowing the information to flow.
So far, this account is accepted by the neuroscientific community, on the basis of sound empirical data, and deductions, derived from them. But Eccles, argues that, the “quantum activity”, at this level, is the interface of the self, and brain. And since quantum activity, has been shown to be probablistic, rather than deterministc ( as thought on the basis of classical, newtonion physics), this is how we’re able to be free beings. Free will, is “saved”, according to Eccles, by this quantum activity, that influences the neurotransmitter travel, across the synapse. “Psychons”, as Eccles calls the portion of the “self”, interacts, with the dendrons, portions of the dendrite (a part of the neuron receiving the message).
Needless to add, this is much more complicated than that, and this book, was for a popular audience. But could it be the sloution, to the freewill/determinism conundrum, that has possessed the philosophical, scientific, and religious areas of our lives?
Science, of course, is about replicating data, by independent researchers. As far as I know, these beliefs of Eccles, have not been reproduced, by other scientists.
April 15th, 2011 | 7:39 am
Just ordered Mr. Barr’s book on amazon. I’ve been looking for a book like his since reading John Lukacs’s At The End of An Age. I’m quite excited.
April 15th, 2011 | 9:59 am
OK that clarifies things for me, Joe. I had thought you were saying that quantum indeterminacy was irrelevant to the issue of free will unless one was a reductionist.
Now that I understand better what you were saying, I find that I am in complete agreement with you, Mike Melendez. Free will, by its very nature, is not law-like behavior, nor is it random behavior. It is a third thing. Science, however, by its very nature, can only find law-like behavior or random behavior, and so cannot tell whether something is the result of free will. Why is that? Because if one analyzes a set of events or phenomena mathematically (which is what physical science does), one either finds systematic patterns (laws) or lack of systematic pattern (randomness), or systematic patterns with deviations from them that are unsystematic (a combination of law and randomness). Free will, being neither random nor law-like, is invisible to such mathematical analysis.
April 15th, 2011 | 10:00 am
Dear Rod,
Thanks for the plug. Always like to sell more copies.
Steve Barr
April 15th, 2011 | 3:02 pm
A few additional comments for the sake of focus, not contradiction:
1. In quantum mechanics, the observed attributes of particles are probabilistic, but their underlying wave amplitudes are completely deterministic. It can be argued that the quantum randomness originates from the unpredictable manner in which these wave function ‘collapse’ into objects of different states when there are interferences with other waves or particles. There are many different opinions about the nature of this ‘collapse’, but it’s all speculative. Most professional physicists would not express a strong opinion about such things that cannot be explored quantitatively.
2. Randomness may be a necessary condition for the various categories of free will, but it cannot be a sufficient one. It does not address, even in the slightest sense, the idea of mental control.
3. Relating to the expression ‘may be’ in 2 above, there is only a heuristic argument that randomness must be a condition of free will. Such an assumption hinges on the validity of the following statement: If there is no determinism, then true randomness must exist*. That assumption rejects the possibility that non-determinism could be caused by other means. This is not splitting hairs; it is an important point.
4. Given 3, if randomness plays no role in free-will (assuming its existence), then the focus should be directed at the one aspect of it that we all accept IS a factor, namely the mental control — how the mind, a material object or not, impacts the expression of a wave function in a directed, but non-deterministic manner.
=== === === === === === ===
* Arises from a consideration of the contrapositive of, ‘If there is determinism then there is no free will’:
A: There is only determinism
B: There is no free-will
C: Randomness exists
~B -> ~A (If there IS free-will, then there is NOT only determinism.)
~A -> C (a commonly held belief)
—————-
~B -> C (If there IS free-will, then randomness exists)
But how do we justify ~A -> C? The set (ND) of all possible non-deterministic universes is a union of two exclusive sets:
ND_R: The set of possible non-deterministic universes that DO allow randomness
ND_NR: The set of possible non-deterministic universes that DO NOT allow randomness
To say ~A -> C, is equivalent to saying that ND_NR is empty.
So far, no case has been made for that. And that’s a bit surprising – it might have been expected that supporters of free-will would posit that mental control allows, in a non-accidental and non-random way, the manipulation of neurological levers deep within the brain. Such would cause ND_NR to have at least one member. Then again, maybe it’s not so surprising after all; it would undermine the efforts to leverage the randomness of quantum mechanics in support of free will.
April 15th, 2011 | 9:37 pm
The word “universe” implies totality, as in all that is, seen and unseen, or visible and invisible, if you prefer.
April 19th, 2011 | 11:43 am
Atheistic materialists who believe that free will does not exist because our minds are just neural networks that function according to physical laws, then have to admit that they really have no choice but to think that. If they are right, then “thinking” is really no more than a biological computer running in a deterministic manner over which we have no control. If that is the case, then there is no way to be certain of the truth: One has no choice but to think whatever it is one is thinking, regardless of how contrary one’s thoughts may be to the truth.
Truth is immaterial. While it can affect an immaterial, rational soul as an immaterial reality, immaterial truth can never be genuinely seized upon by, nor can it affect, that which is strictly material. A strictly materialistic experience of “certainty” is an effect that can only have a materialistic cause, a biologically generated experience that may or may not really logically follow from the thoughts that led up to it, and may not conform to reality in any way whatsoever.
The free will denying, atheistic materialist leaves us with nothing of which to be absolutely certain, outside of our own existence, except this: we have no free will with which to control our thoughts. On the other hand, if an immaterial, rational soul animates our material body and is indeed an integral component of the whole that is one’s self, then it is possible for one to get a genuine grip on immaterial, objective truth.
The difference between an uncontrolled, unmanaged mind and a mind controlled and managed by a free will is the difference between those in asylums and those who aren’t. If we don’t take seriously one who has lost control of his mind, why do we take seriously the free will denying, atheistic materialist who insists he does not and never did have a free will with which to control and manage his mind, and that neither do we with which to manage ours? They are taken seriously because it doesn’t appear that their minds are out of control. We say one has “lost his mind” not because he has lost it, but because he has lost control of it. His mind has, for one reason or another, become unmanaged; that this is so is revealed by its necessary consequence: incoherence – his thoughts are disconnected, incongruous and inconsistent. The free will denying, atheistic materialist insists he has no free will with which to manage his own mind at all – yet it does not appear at all that his mind is unmanaged. He still appears to be coherent. What are we to make of that? If one insists he is not controlling his mind because he has no free will with which to control it, yet it appears that his mind is well managed, who is managing it?
If a mind is indeed being controlled by someone other than its owner, reasonable speculation as to who is controlling it requires considering what that managed mind is proposing for our belief, and asking ourselves, “Who would want us to believe that?” A clue is provided by the atheistic materialist’s submission to the world for belief a proposition which has disastrous consequences if accepted. The belief that we have no free will with which to manage our minds, if accepted, destroys moral accountability and denies it is possible to be certain of immaterial, objective truth. Who would propose such things? One who wants us to believe seeking immaterial, objective truth is a hopeless endeavor, who wants to take away our freedom by convincing us we really don’t have any to begin with, who wants us to believe we are not really responsible for our actions. Who would that be?
April 20th, 2011 | 9:37 am
All good questions from Harry, but I’m not sure if the implied conclusions are refined yet. Because morality and freedom are consequences that arise from free will, we really should not use them in an argument to support the existence of free will. Such circular arguments are too easily unraveled.
May I suggest finding an explanation (need not be materialistic) for free-will that:
(A) Is independent of the down-stream implications such as freedom, morality and accountability.
(B) Shows unambiguously how the mind has the ability to act counter to the direction that the materialistic environment demands of it.
Harry – If you can refine the argument, I think you’re on to something really strong.
April 20th, 2011 | 5:21 pm
Hi, J. Murnane,
You wrote:
“All good questions from Harry, but I’m not sure if the implied conclusions are refined yet. Because morality and freedom are consequences that arise from free will, we really should not use them in an argument to support the existence of free will. Such circular arguments are too easily unraveled.”
You make a very good point. While it doesn’t prove the existence of free will, I thought it would be good to point out that if we accept the belief that we have no free will due to our thoughts being strictly materialistic and deterministic, we must also give up all hope of ever having certainty regarding objective reality.
As for my asking just who is managing a mind that appears to be well managed, yet the owner of which insists he is not managing due to his not having a free will with which to do so: I was just wanting to provoke thought in those who believe in spiritual realities and for whom the difference between a managed and an unmanaged mind is evident.
If you want a few more thoughts from an amateur, read on. ;o)
You also wrote:
“May I suggest finding an explanation (need not be materialistic) for free-will that:
(A) Is independent of the down-stream implications such as freedom, morality and accountability.
(B) Shows unambiguously how the mind has the ability to act counter to the direction that the materialistic environment demands of it.”
I think the mind is essentially spiritual. So I don’t think we will ever demonstrates how it “acts” in the way we demonstrate how material things must act. Somehow, in a way we do not understand, the mind, or if you will, the rational soul, is integrated with our material body, constituting a whole. That there is an immaterial component to the mind is evident in that the mind can grasp and be affected by that which is immaterial, as in its ability to grasp immaterial abstract concepts which can never be seized upon by or affect that which is strictly material.
Another example: the electrochemical reactions in the material brain, like the electrochemical reactions in a recording video camera, are both brought about by photons. The material video camera does not “see” anything. It just reacts to photons. In the same way, the material electrochemical reactions in the brain do not “see” anything. There is nowhere to be found in the material brain a display of what is being seen, yet there is a display being seen. Where is that display and where is it seen? In the immaterial soul.
It is the same with our other senses.
So, if free will resides in the immaterial soul, or in the immaterial component of the mind if you will, we can’t show, in terms of the material brain anyway, “unambiguously how the mind has the ability to act counter to the direction that the materialistic environment demands of it.” We have to demonstrate the existence of the immaterial soul and its attributes, those being at least rationality and free will, like we demonstrate the existence of other realities that are unobserved, yet the existence of which is demonstrated by their visible effects (like gravity).
What do you think about people freely doing things that they know will be extremely painful? Does that demonstrate the existence of the reality of free will in that there is action “counter to the direction that the materialistic environment demands of it”?
You also wrote:
“Harry – If you can refine the argument, I think you’re on to something really strong.”
You are very kind. ;o)
April 21st, 2011 | 8:18 am
Above, where I said
“Another example: the electrochemical reactions in the material brain, like the electrochemical reactions in a recording video camera, are both brought about by photons.”
I should have said, “Another example: In the case of vision, the electrochemical reactions …”
April 21st, 2011 | 3:12 pm
From Harry: “What do you think about people freely doing things that they know will be extremely painful?”
A: If they are ‘freely’ doing it, it is clearly a demonstration of free-will. I don’t think I had a choice (:)) in answering that question any other way.
April 21st, 2011 | 5:12 pm
Hi, J. Murnane,
You are quite right. ;o)
That was a poor choice of words on my part. Let me try again.
Consider the case where where one does something that is extremely painful and that takes a long time, something that would cause others to remark that such a one must have a lot of “will power.”
Does that demonstrate the existence of the reality of free will in that there is action “counter to the direction that the materialistic environment demands of it,” the continued action being counter to the materialistic environment created by the person’s nervous system and brain signalling extreme pain?
April 24th, 2011 | 9:06 am
Happy Easter everyone,
An Easter morning revision of my last post:
Consider the case where where One did something that was extremely painful and took a long time, something that should cause others to realize that such a One must love mightily.
Did that demonstrate the existence of the reality of free will in that there was action “counter to the direction that the materialistic environment demanded of it,” the continued action being counter to the materialistic environment created by that person’s nervous system and brain signalling extreme pain?
Yes it did. And the reality of love. He is risen. May His love rise up in all of us.
April 24th, 2011 | 11:49 am
“The central message of the creation account can be defined more precisely still. In the opening words of his Gospel, Saint John sums up the essential meaning of that account in this single statement: “In the beginning was the Word”. In effect, the creation account that we listened to earlier is characterized by the regularly recurring phrase: “And God said …” The world is a product of the Word, of the Logos, as Saint John expresses it, using a key term from the Greek language. “Logos” means “reason”, “sense”, “word”. It is not reason pure and simple, but creative Reason, that speaks and communicates itself. It is Reason that both is and creates sense.
“The creation account tells us, then, that the world is a product of creative Reason. Hence it tells us that, far from there being an absence of reason and freedom at the origin of all things, the source of everything is creative Reason, love, and freedom. Here we are faced with the ultimate alternative that is at stake in the dispute between faith and unbelief: are irrationality, lack of freedom and pure chance the origin of everything, or are reason, freedom and love at the origin of being? Does the primacy belong to unreason or to reason? This is what everything hinges upon in the final analysis. As believers we answer, with the creation account and with Saint John, that in the beginning is reason. In the beginning is freedom.
“Hence it is good to be a human person. It is not the case that in the expanding universe, at a late stage, in some tiny corner of the cosmos, there evolved randomly some species of living being capable of reasoning and of trying to find rationality within creation, or to bring rationality into it. If man were merely a random product of evolution in some place on the margins of the universe, then his life would make no sense or might even be a chance of nature. But no, Reason is there at the beginning: creative, divine Reason. And because it is Reason, it also created freedom; and because freedom can be abused, there also exist forces harmful to creation.
“Hence a thick black line, so to speak, has been drawn across the structure of the universe and across the nature of man. But despite this contradiction, creation itself remains good, life remains good, because at the beginning is good Reason, God’s creative love.
“Hence the world can be saved. Hence we can and must place ourselves on the side of reason, freedom and love – on the side of God who loves us so much that he suffered for us, that from his death there might emerge a new, definitive and healed life.”
– The above is from the Pope’s Easter Vigil homily
Reason and freedom began spiritually and remain essentially spiritual. They are supernatural. They are impossibilities in a strictly natural, materialistic Universe.
Immaterial, abstract concepts can never be seized upon by, or affect, that which is strictly material. Reason must be essentially spiritual.
The concept of randomness has been invented by Man because of his inability to understand the cause of some events. Our inablility to predict some events does not mean they had no cause and is not the basis of free will. Our freedom, being essentially spiritual, cannot be observed scientifically, yet can be shown to exist by its effects in the same way other realities than cannot be observed scientifically are demonstrated to exist by their observable effects.
April 26th, 2011 | 10:05 am
In reply to harry’s 21 April question…
In short, no, it is not enough. I have to put my faith in check for a moment to consider the situation objectively. There is no way for the observer to distinguish between choice and non-choice in this configuration. There is only the opportunity to see what one already assumes true.
Please don’t assume that I don’t have faith in choice. I am simply separating my faith from an analysis of my faith which you asked for. I am very conservative with respect to how I draw my conclusions.
April 26th, 2011 | 2:27 pm
Hello, J. Murnane,
You wrote:
“I have to put my faith in check for a moment to consider the situation objectively. There is no way for the observer to distinguish between choice and non-choice in this configuration. There is only the opportunity to see what one already assumes true.”
There is also no way for the observer to detect gravity in itself. There is only the opportunity to see (in its effects) what one already assumes true: that gravity is a reality.
Why was it so easy for materialistic science to accept the reality of unobserved gravity due to its observable effects and so difficult for it to accept the reality of unobserved free will due to its many, many observable effects? Ultimately, is materialistic science taking the reality of gravity on faith? It seems to me that the reality of free will is no more a matter of faith than is the reality of gravity.
Yes, one could argue that the “observable effects” of free will really just provide the appearance of free will. And one could also argue that gravity may, for all we know, stop working. That its effects seem to have been and continue to be consistent is not proof that it will continue to have those same effects or any effect at all. Since we don’t really know WHY it works, we don’t know that whatever causes have made it work in such a reliable fashion won’t come to an end. If that sounds unreasonable, so should assuming that what so plainly and blatantly appears to be the consistent effects of free will are only the appearance of free will. I think that is a religious/philosophical assumption, not a scientific one.
I say “religious/philosophical assumption” and not just “philosophical assumption” because the atheistic materialist cannot prove God and immaterial realities do not exist. He must take that belief on faith. Belief regarding the existence of God and immaterial realities which one must take on faith is clearly a religious belief — even if the belief is that there are no such things. (Which, by the way, is an irrational belief since it is evident that immaterial abstract concepts exist, since we can grasp them and communicate them to others. Or are we to assume “abstract concept particles” of some kind, like the hypothetical gravitron, are sent by one mind and received by another in that case? I hereby coin the term “absconitron.” ;o) And even if belief in the non-existence of God and immaterial realities is not a religious belief, still, even though some philosophical assumptions are necessary for science – like the assumption that the Universe is intelligible – other philosophical assumptions cease to be scientifically valid if they result in a departure from the relentless objectivity necessary in order for science to seek out the truth by following the evidence wherever it leads, regardless of the philosophical implications of the evidence and the truth to which it leads. The assumption that the “effects” of free will are just the illusory appearance of its reality and do not demonstrate its reality until proven otherwise springs from a philosophy that is unfit for science in so far as it is in opposition to the relentless objectivity science requires. Or is it scientifically valid to claim the effects of gravity do not demonstrate its reality?
April 29th, 2011 | 2:53 pm
Sorry – I’m absolutely bewildered by that essay.
I can see where you’re going with it, but it’s burdened by a strange interpretation of natural philosophy.
Unless I’m mistaken, you questioned not just the future magnitude of gravity but its future existence(!) and then used that to support a free-will argument. Harry, that was truly awesome.
Let’s just leave it at that. We might not be on different sides regarding the final conclusion, but we speak a COMPLETELY different language.
Best of luck – JM.
April 30th, 2011 | 12:16 pm
OK. Let’s leave it at that, my friend.
As I am sure is evident, I am not one trained in the language of natural philosophy as you are. I appreciated your consideration of my thoughts.
If anyone cares to answer my basic question, I would sincerely appreciate it. Let me put it more concisely:
We don’t know why gravity works. I expressed what seems to me to be the implications of our not knowing how it works, and pointed out that, “If that sounds unreasonable [as I realized it would], so should assuming that what so plainly and blatantly appears to be the consistent effects of free will are only the appearance of free will.”
If science is convinced of the reality of unobservable gravity due to its observable effects, and is not claiming there is only the “appearance of gravity,” why does it not do the same for unobservable free will due to its many observable effects?
I suggested that was due to a religious (atheistic) / philosophical bias in contemporary science. If there is a better reason I would be delighted to hear it. It seems to me that bias falls far short of the relentless objectivity that is essential for science to remain science and not become a forum for a particular religious/philosophical viewpoint.
One final thought: Why is an apple falling to the ground from a tree more convincing than one deciding to tap the tip of one’s nose with one’s finger and then deciding to stop doing that, or deciding not to do that at all, or deciding to start doing that and not stop (which would become awkward during a job interview, even if one explained this one being done in the interests of science ;o) In other words, it seems to me things like Newton’s apple falling were there for everyone to see all along, as is the everyday application of our free will. Have we missed the obvious? Or has atheistic science simply not liked the obvious, with the rest of us going along with that so as not to appear to be “unscientific”?
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