Last week the American Enterprise Institute’s Eric Kaufmann posted an article dissecting global demographic trends with an eye toward birthrates among the religious and the secular. His conclusion? The future is likely to be far more religious than many imagine–and not just because of the much-discussed ascendency of the southern hemisphere. Western cultures, where religious practice has long been in decline, will themselves see a revival of faith as a combination of immigration and consistently high birthrates among traditionalist believers simply outlasts the selfish ideals of sexual liberationism and perpetual singlehood. A culture with more leashes than strollers is simply unsustainable in the long run, Kaufmann argues. His essay should pique the interest of anyone concerned about these things, and it merits a careful read. Were it more widely circulated and digested, it would go a long way towards piloting the discourse on the future of religion and secularism away from intellectual shorthand and tired, simplistic tropes.
But there’s room for disagreement. AEI’s Andrew Rugg, in a response posted this morning, challenges Kaufmann’s thesis with data on “Milennial” religious practice, like frequency of church attendance. It’s important to note that Rugg’s rejoinder is specifically considering the American scene, while Kaufmann’s original piece looked at both domestic and international trends. In some of Kaufmann’s cases (the unnoticed steadiness of Christianity in Britain thanks to Eastern European and African immigrants; the resurgence of Orthodox Judaism in Israel’s army, schools, and public arena) both the data and the anecdotes are undeniable–religion is ascendent. But when it comes to the United States, Rugg thinks there may be an important difference:
While the PRRI survey shows a high degree of change among today’s Millennials, a Pew analysis of General Social Survey data shows they have a higher rate of unaffiliation than previous generations. Compared to their Baby Boom parents, Millennials (which Pew defines as ages 18 to 29) are twice as likely to list themselves as unaffiliated (26 to 13 percent). If the experience of early generations is a guide, levels of unaffiliation persist over time. The percentages of religiously unaffiliated members of the Greatest, Silent, Boomer, and Gen X generations have held remarkably constant over time. The level of unaffiliation among Millennials is therefore likely to remain high in the long run. [...]
In other words, movement away from frequent religious observance is accelerating. Whatever association holds between church attendance and certain demographic patterns such as high fertility is likely to be reduced as a result.
That seems to be Rugg’s strongest point: Demography need not be destiny–especially not in the United States, which surrounds the concepts of choice and individual identity with a quasi-sacred aura, and where material assimilation has had (at least until recently) an uncanny way of bringing cultural leveling along with it. In other words, the mere fact that a first-generation, religious Hispanic couple has four children in no way implies that all four of them will grow up to be practicing Catholics. Tempering this optimism would give us a clearer preview of the future, and of the work to be done.
Though Rugg’s analysis may initially dampen the enthusiasm of those of us eager for a religious renaissance in our country, perhaps we ought to think about what his conclusions do not imply. To be wary of temptations to determinism (not that Kaufmann is a determinist) is to be wary of a too-reduced version of a generally accurate tale: that secularism is exhausted, and in retreat, and it is only a matter of time before religion’s place is restored. But rejecting the simplest version of this story also means refusing to buy the narratives of hardline secularists and triumphant atheists: Christianity is outdated, and, like other illusions in Marxist thought, it is only a matter of time before it withers away and dissipates.
The Christian faithful cannot ‘run out the clock’ waiting for their worldview to triumph but are called to evangelize. Demography is a mighty force, no doubt, and it is one which must be reckoned with if a nation-state is to survive and perpetuate its identity. It may even be the necessary foundation upon which a religion’s cultural influence can then increase. But even a fruitful, multiplying, highly religious society is never more than one or two generations away from crisis if those whose task it is to pass on the faith rely on numbers alone and make no attempt to bring the faith of history into the present, no provision for active catechesis; for a prime example, see Ireland over the past forty years. The faith of the fathers no longer guarantees as much about the sons as it once did.
Thus, a statement on which both Kaufmann and Rugg might agree: Like the relative decline of faith in the twentieth century, secularism is tenuous, not inevitable. It is even reversible provided the requisite empirical scene-setting is capped with dramatic witness.
May 16th, 2012 | 4:09 pm
“It is even reversible provided the requisite empirical scene-setting is capped with dramatic witness.” But self evidently, that ‘witness’ has not come from existing tradition? What if it should come from outside the existing religious milieu? Has it already started?
May 17th, 2012 | 6:33 am
My sense is that there are a number of active Christian movements which have a long term view and will seek to ride this demographic wave with an intact “body of Christ”.
One of them, I think, is the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints. It is one of the largest single denominations and is growing through both family increase, with larger than average families, and even more through recruitment. One cynical historian who narrated “Ten things you didn’t know about the Mormons” for the History Channel said something strikingly true at the end: “Mormons are tough
!” They inculcate each generation with the understanding that being a Latter-day Saint means “doing hard things”, in much the same way that the US Marine Corps centers its own recruitment on transforming the person who joins into an accomplished and capable human being. Just as the Marine ethic of “Semper Fidelis”–always faithful–evokes a religious order of warriors, like crusaders and Knights Templar, Mormon youth are raised with the expectation and then the actual experience of sacrifice and self denial for two years of missionary service, challenged by learning new languages and cultures, and confronted often with indifference or hostility. Their religious experience is focused on training each man and woman with the capacity to lead and teach that is the foundation of a lay-lead church, without career clergy, which can respond to growth by splitting congregations and replicating all of the officers and teachers out of the body of each new daughter congregation, often sharing existing chapels in staggered Sunday schedules. It is not constrained by the need to maintain an elite corps of dedicated full time priests, who live lives apart from families in the congregation, but instead is the most literal implementation of Luther’s idea of a “priesthood of all believers” in which every male member begins experiencing ordination at age 12 and becomes a priest enabled to baptize and to bless the Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper at age 16, even as their female contemporaries are enlisted in service, teaching and leadership that is parallel in responsibility, and often culminates in full time mission service as well. A recent national study by the Pew Foundation found that nearly half of Mormon men had served two year missions, while about ten percent of adult women had done so, acting in a ministerial capacity out in the often hostile world of people who are not happy to talk to them.
So among the possible models for churches that has the character and capacity to take advantage of the demographic wave of growth among the faithful, one of them is surely the Mormons.
May 17th, 2012 | 8:06 am
I’m struck by how the phrase “Marxist thought” suddenly crops up in this essay. In my experience, even “hardline” secularists and “triumphant” atheists overwhelmingly reject Marxism.
May 17th, 2012 | 9:19 am
Eric Kaufman does have a good point. The Mormon’s TFR (Total Fertility Rate) is well above 3 children per female -almost 20% higher than the natiional average (1.9.-2.0). And our nation’s smallest TFR is located in the infamous New England Correigdor (one of the most liberal areas in the nation). When looking at the TFRs of regions that voted for Bush in 2004, statisticians noted that quite a few voting districts had TFR’s well above replacement levels (2.1 children per female). I think even Newsweek did a story on this by highlighting the subrubs of Denver and comparing them with the suburbs of New York City. Overall, the GOP did well with areas where the brithrates were high.
The bad news is that the indigenous birthrates in the US have been well below replacement levels for decades. Only immigration (both legal and illegal) have allowed our populations to rise. This is nothing new. With the exception of the period 1946-1963, the US pretty much grew because of immigration. But, as the demographic momentuem of the Boomers now fades, the US is left with a problem. The positive effects of illegal immigration is an attendent rise in TFRs. First generation Hispanics averaged a 3.6 TFR during the period 1998-2008. This offset the TFR of 1.7 for non-Hispanics during this same period. The resultant TFR for the US during the period 2000-2010 of 2.0 puts the US above most of the other G20 nations.
But, as the 2010 Census showed, the rate of growth of the US population for the period 2001-2010 was the slowest since 1930. The population is growing (just barely); but it is also rapidly aging. The median age in the US circa 1972 was 24.5 years. Today, it is around 37. In Europe and Japan, the median age is well over 40.
To exasperate matters, once you get beyond First Generation Hispanics, and look at the children of and grand children of Hispanics who emigrated here 20-30 years ago, the TFRs plunge to non-Hispanic levels. And the pool of available Hispanics is dwindling. Mexico, in 1970 had a TFR of about 6.1 children per female. By 2010, it had fallen to 2.4 children per female. If trends continue, Mexico will have birthrates below replacement levels by 2025. Ditto for Central and South America. What this means is that the US will no longer be able to count on immigration to grow its population.
From that perspective, the growth rates of demographic cohorts mean little when the entire society is growing older or dwindling in numbers. And because our population is so mobile, it is not unusual to see regional population fluxes from one region to another. We’ve seen this countless times in our history. Less fecund, but wealthier and more liberal New Englanders move to places like Texas or North Carolina. Within a few decades, not only does the politics of the regions change, but so does population and birthrate trends.
What appears likely in coming decades is a shift from New England and the Rust Belt to points South. The states losing population will see an attendent drop in political representation in the House. But, the Senate will changes little. And as more conservative leaning (and younger) people leave these areas, those areas will become older and more liberal.
May 17th, 2012 | 5:29 pm
Good to see these questions being debated. My point is not that the US is imminently going to become more religious. I acknowledge Rugg’s figures about the rise in the nones. But what Rugg fails to acknowledge – and which would become obvious on a closer reading of my published work – is that you can have a population where there is a net flow of people from religion to nonreligion, and yet that population could become more religious. So if you look at the US white population, it might appear that seculars have soared in number while Protestants have gained from Catholics. But this effect is essentially neutralized across the wider population by the immigration and fertility of Hispanic Catholics. Israel is becoming more religious by the day, but in the US, demographic forces will take longer to have an effect because seculars are still mostly young so their population momentum will move things in a slightly secular direction for a few decades. I would predict an aging of the US secular population, and a gradual flattening and then slow return of religion after 2050. Yet all the while more people will probably be leaving religion than entering it. The point, however, is that seculars with low birth and migration rates must ‘run to stand still’ and sprint to make yardage when it comes to maintaining their share of the total population. Demography can’t be bracketed out of the picture but must be fully integrated into the debate.
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