I guess my question is whether you would counsel an Orthodox parishioner with questions as to whether he could serve as a soldier even in what you would consider a worthy cause (prevent an enemy from invading your country) By doing so, would you counsel him to do evil (kill an enemy combatant in that war) so that good (invasion repelled) may come?

If so, how is this view distinct from a utilitarian ethic, apart from the fact the soldier has to do confession and penance?

I also wonder, if there is no such thing as a “just war” how you might determine what constitutes an unjust use of force. If there is no standard or criteria for “just war” how can you render judgment on whether a nation’s resort of force is “unjust?”

http://www.historyguide.org/ancient/children.html

I know that was published in one of those right wing extremist magazines, but hey….. feel free discuss why Professor Cole is wrong. Or, why Calvin and Aquinas [or Ramsey, or Johnson] were wrong (or tell me why you think Cole has Calvin and Aquinas wrong).

http://www.firstthings.com/article/2007/01/good-wars-22

Fr. John W. Morris

And then read Paul Ramsey for the same reason.

The MORAL similarity is analogous because both involve the use of deadly force. This has nothing to do with “double effect” which relates to the forseen and unintended harm that might come to others as a result of this action. (eg. While I intended to kill the murderer, I did not intend to injure that bi-stander who got hit by the round that past though to intended target.) That issue is addressed by the principles of discrimination and proportionality and also applies in domestic police settings and in warfighting.

On Richard Hays’s chapter on violence. We are going to have to disagree if he presents a “compelling” case. I find his exegesis to be tendentious at best. To put it bluntly, that chapter is awful. Since you brought it up, however, I will note that in a public forum at the Evangelical Philosophical Society about a decade ago, I pressed him on the moral status of soldiers. My point (and it is far from novel) was that if we took his view seriously it would be hard to escape the conclusion that serving as a soldier is immoral and the “office” or “calling” of being a soldier is an intrinsically immoral profession, akin to serving as a pimp in a whore house.
Hays not only did not repudiate this notion, he responded by saying that when military Chaplains were on Duke’s campus recruiting for the military chaplaincy it was, indeed, akin to prostitution. If he thinks that about chaplains, who do not bear arms, it seems clear what he thinks of those of us who have (and do). Needless to say, I disagreed, but I understand where he is coming from.

Again, since you brought it up, let me call your attention to a sustained critique of Hays’s exegesis I co-authored with James Skillen in the Philosophia Chrsti–the journal of the Evangelical Philosophical Society here: (I don’t think it is available online.)

James Skillen and Keith Pavlischek, “Political Responsibility and the Use of Force: A Critique of Richard Hays,” Philosophia Christi 3/2 (2001), pp. 421–445.

You can, however, find the table of contents for that issue here:

http://www.epsociety.org/philchristi/tocs/pc_toc_3-2.pdf

I would also recommend to you some of the fascinating recent work done by Erica Chenowith of Wesleyan University on the effectiveness of organized nonviolence. Within Christianity there are two traditions regarding the morality of the use of force: Christian Pacifism and Just War Theory. Two of the criteria of traditional just war teaching are that war (1) must be a last resort and (2) must have a probability of success in order to be just. Chenowith’s research shows the low success rates of war compared with the significantly higher success rates of organized non-violent resistance in resolving conflicts and bringing about social change. This research should factor heavily in weighing the probability of success of a given conflict. It should also push us to make more concerted efforts at nonviolent conflict resolution before we conclude that we have reached our last resort and must pursue war.

Lastly, in response to Keith, while it is tempting to make analogies between individual police actions and state sponsored war, they are actually quite different. In order to incapacitate a dangerous criminal, a police officer might morally take actions that carry a high risk of killing the criminal. In certain circumstance this would be morally legitimate under the principle of double effect. However, in a war you are talking about two parties directly and intentionally trying to kill one another. Moreover, these two parties in most circumstances will be low level soldiers who bear little or no responsibility for the decisions that have brought their two armies into conflict. Even further, the conflict between these two armies will almost certainly result in more civilian casualties than combatants. These factors (and more like them) make the situation of organized war very different from the case of emergency police intervention that you describe.