When the Institute for American Values asked me to write a short response to their new report on marriage, I was happy to oblige and am grateful they posted it. It turns out the president of IAV, David Blankenhorn, is decidedly unhappy with what I wrote, replying in his own piece: “No thank you. And, no thank you. It’s time for a new conversation.”
In my response to the IAV report, I mentioned how odd it was that a report titled “The President’s Marriage Agenda” never once says what marriage is. I asked, “How successful can a ‘new conversation on marriage’ be when its leaders can’t even say what marriage is?”
Blankenhorn’s response fails—again—to say a word about what marriage is. So the question remains: What is marriage?
We have yet to hear how redefining marriage to include same-sex relationships provides a rationale for marital norms IAV seeks to promote.
Blankenhorn summarizes my argument thus:
Ryan Anderson’s core argument is that no one can do or say anything effectively to strengthen marriage without first agreeing with him that gay marriage is bad. How does that sound, as a basic idea?
He goes on to argue that he changed his position on redefining marriage so that he could
get out of the very box that Ryan Anderson wants to put me and everyone else in — the little box inside of which the culture war on gay marriage must precede and overwhelm and define everything else.
No thank you. And, no thank you. And I can report from personal experience that the air is much easier to breath, [sic] once you are outside that stifling little box.
Nothing good can happen until we all agree with him on matters of definitions and core principles? Really? I must have missed that memo.
Of course that’s not what I argued, and Blankenhorn quotes nothing I actually wrote to support his assertions. Instead he simply makes something up:
And for those who, like Mr. Ryan, can only say “Oh no! You must jump in my little definition box until I say it’s OK for to come out and do something else,” I say, no thank you. And, no thank you.
My piece on the report made arguments—something entirely missing from Blankenhorn’s series of bald assertions—about why not talking about what marriage is makes advancing a marriage agenda difficult, and why redefining marriage to exclude sexual complementarity is at odds with the goals that Blankenhorn and I both share as far as building a marriage culture goes.
I asked specific questions, questions that Blankenhorn never bothered to even attempt to answer:
The authors [of the IAV report] encourage President Obama to embrace his position as “a cultural leader who can inspire citizens, especially young people,” because “if we are to strengthen marriage and families in America, ultimately this will happen because young people want to bond with one another and give their children the gift of their father and mother in a lasting marriage.” But how can President Obama stress the importance of fathers and mothers while supporting the redefinition of marriage to exclude sexual complementarity?
And I added:
The authors propose that the United States ban anonymity in sperm donation “and reinforce the consistent message that fathers matter.” But how does marriage policy reinforce that message if it redefines marriage to say that mothers and fathers—one of each—are optional for marriage? How does redefining marriage to include lesbian relationships not further incentivize the type of anonymous sperm donation and resulting fatherless children that the authors protest?
Had Blankenhorn answered these questions and showed how the “President’s Marriage Agenda” is compatible with redefining marriage, he might have written a more constructive response.
Instead Blankenhorn engages in ad hominem:
Ryan Anderson wants to sit up in philosophical heaven and shout “Stop!” until until [sic] all definitions are agreed on and all principles are understood and accepted. And it just so happens that he already knows exactly what those definitions and principles are — so all we have do in practice is agree with him, and once we do, we can then (but only then) feel free to try to go to work in the real world to strengthen marriage. I view that as a fairly brassy and arrogant demand.
And he concludes:
The fundamental implication of Mr. Ryan’s argument is that by definition nothing can be said or done in the U.S. to strengthen marriage that is not premised in opposition to gay marriage. That’s the box that he wants us all to be in.
The argument I made in my piece responding to the report—like the arguments I made in the various linked articles such as arguments in my new book What Is Marriage?—are all at the service of discovering the truth about marriage and better understanding why and how that truth matters. It’s not about agreeing with me, it’s about discovering and understanding the reality about marriage, and then moving law and policy and culture closer to a better embrace of and adherence to that truth—because the truth about marriage matters for law and policy and culture.
David Blankenhorn is free to conclude that I’ve gotten it wrong, and he could help move the conversation along by pointing out the mistakes that I’ve made. However, that would require engaging with my arguments, countering the reasons I offered with reasons of his own, answering my questions to show how squaring this circle is possible.
Blankenhorn is also free to conclude that there simply is no truth about marriage, or that none of us can know the truth, or that the truth doesn’t matter for law, policy and culture. But then again, I’d want to hear arguments and reasons why—not just heated rhetoric.
December 21st, 2012 | 11:56 am
Well said as always. A very important section of this post is the following:
“It’s not about agreeing with me, it’s about discovering and understanding the reality about marriage.”
The sad truth is that postmodernism has done away with “realities” about anything. To academic elites — and probably to most everyone else — all we have in public discourse are value opinions and “consensus.”
How do we recover the language of essences and formal / final causes? I am often tempted to fear the bus has left town until I remember that reality is what it is, and it will always be so, whether we like it or not, whether one of us or none of us acknowledges it.
December 21st, 2012 | 12:19 pm
A frustrating exchange. It seems that what Blankenhorn might want from you is an admission that it is possible, at least in theory, to lower rates of divorce and illegitimacy while moving away from the notion that marriage that excludes sexual complementarity. Of course it is not actually impossible that you could see a decline in divorce and illegitimacy even as marriage is redefined, but (as you argue in your response) removing sexual complementarity from the definition of marriage undermines the justification for the norms of permanence and monogamy.
December 21st, 2012 | 12:20 pm
If the definition of marriage in What Is Marriage? is correct, then marriage is exclusive and permanent. I don’t know any way of accepting this definition without concluding that those who divorce and “remarry” are actually not remarried at all but living in adultery. If we must insist that civil law reflect the definition of marriage in What Is Marriage? I don’ see how divorce and remarriage can be tolerated. And even if every gay man and lesbian paired off and entered into a same-sex marriage, the number of heterosexual couples who were divorced and remarried would still far exceed the number of same-sex marriages.
Why don’t those who feel that the true definition of marriage is found in What Is Marriage? follow it to its logical conclusion?
December 21st, 2012 | 12:41 pm
In his 2007 book, The Future of Marriage, David Blankenhorn provided a very clear answer to the question he now wants to dodge:
“In all or nearly all human societies, marriage is socially approved sexual intercourse between a woman and a man, conceived both as a personal relationship and as an institution, primarily such that any children resulting from the union are—and are understood by the society to be—emotionally, morally, practically, and legally affiliated with both of the parents” (p.91).
It is sad now to see how completely his thinking has degenerated into incoherence, as evidenced by his response to Ryan Anderson.
December 21st, 2012 | 1:00 pm
David Nickol,
Insofar as you are arguing that the definition of marriage in “What is Marriage” would oppose no-fault divorce and effectively mirror the traditional Catholic definition of marriage in many ways – you are correct.
I think that Anderson and his co-authors would agree with that. But no-fault divorce isn’t the policy issue on the table at the present. So what exactly is the point that you are trying to make? That opponents of same-sex marriage should stop fighting that legal and political fight and shift to trying to overturn no-fault divorce laws? Just wondering….
December 21st, 2012 | 1:19 pm
As always, David Nickol is cordially invited to specify his own definition of marriage and follow it to its logical conclusions.
December 21st, 2012 | 1:23 pm
Paul Adams,
Very well noted.
December 21st, 2012 | 1:34 pm
David,
Your argument seems to boil down to “Divorce and remarriage occur so ‘same-sex marriage’ should be a non-issue.”
In an ideal world, divorce will never be a consideration and re-marriage would only occur following the death of one’s spouse. However, we are not in a ideal world and some fail to maintain fidelity.
If the current state of marriage has come about due to cavalier attitudes about fidelity and the permanence and purpose of marriage, how does adding ‘SSM’ to the mix, do anything but compound the problems?
While definitely not a perfect analogy, let’s consider the current rate of infidelity and divorce as an expanding fire. Is ‘SSM’ an accelerant or a retardant?
December 21st, 2012 | 2:06 pm
“an institution, primarily such that any children resulting from the union are—and are understood by the society to be—emotionally, morally, practically, and legally affiliated with both of the parents”
No-one will deny that the state has a clear interest in the filiation of children being clear, certain and incontestable. It is central to its concern for the upbringing and welfare of the child, for protecting rights and enforcing obligations between family members and to the orderly succession to property. To date, no better, simpler, less intrusive means than marriage have been found for ensuring, as far as possible, that the legal, biological and social realities of paternity coincide. And that is no small thing.
For that reason, no discussion of SSM can overlook the implications for joint adoption and assisted reproduction. Surrogate gestation would also have to be addressed in those jurisdictions that permit such arrangements; in France, they are excluded by the general rule that only things in commerce can be the subject of an agreement and that trading in people or the parts and products of the human body is a crime.
December 21st, 2012 | 2:07 pm
Are the following legal unions “real” marriages? Why or why not.
1) The marriage of a man to a woman for the purposes of acquiring US citizenship.
2) The marriage of woman to a man whose lower body (including sexual organs) were damaged to the point of incapacity during war.
3) The marriage of an infertile man to a woman.
4) The third “marriage” of a career politician to his second mistress … and one that was willingly blessed by the Roman Catholic Church.
If we are to believe Mr Anderson, the answer is “yes” to all of the above. Why? Well, they all involve people who have (or had) opposing sets of genitalia (working or not).
Marriage is not some external reality to which people must conform. It’s a concept that involves both physical as well as spiritual considerations. It’s interesting that Mr Anderson can’t see beyond the physical.
December 21st, 2012 | 2:25 pm
Context. Without context we cannot know how to apply equality. This is why those in favour of redefining marriage very rarely forward an opinion of what marriage is. In the context of binding procreation to parenting, everything about marriage makes sense.
Marriage is legally defined according to the physical reality of parenthood – permanent, heterosexual, and exclusive. As international law correctly gives marriage as the right to found a family – and as nobody is campaigning to amend this right – genderless marriage entails divorcing legal parenthood from biological parenthood. The natural family is legally erased, and with it all natural rights.
December 21st, 2012 | 2:47 pm
“then marriage is exclusive and permanent. I don’t know any way of accepting this definition without concluding that those who divorce and “remarry” are actually not remarried at all but living in adultery.”
Wasn’t that much the ideal defined by Christ? Did he not add the qualification that Moses permitted divorce as a concession to human stubborness?
I suspect we are now seeing the culmination of the ideas that marriage is dissolvable and exclusive, with an adjunct that it is a state matter. (thank you very much, Henry VIII and Martin Luther). Devoid of these essential attributes, it’s becoming devoid of ANY essential attributes.
Now, the question is must we accept an absolute counterfeit because we have accepted a deformity or in other words (this is an imperfect analogy) having accepted invalid form, we now now accept invalid matter as well.
December 21st, 2012 | 2:51 pm
AGITPROP
Maybe three in a hundred are bent,
And one tenth of that number intent
On pretending to wed
Same-sex partners instead:
All this turmoil for three-tenths percent?
December 21st, 2012 | 3:12 pm
If the current state of marriage has come about due to cavalier attitudes about fidelity and the permanence and purpose of marriage, how does adding ‘SSM’ to the mix, do anything but compound the problems?
toddes,
My point is that those who use the definition of marriage in What Is Marriage? to oppose same-sex marriage have to use the whole definition. If a religious organization refuses to give spousal benefits to a legally married same-sex couple on the grounds that two people of the same sex cannot marry, then they must at least explain why they give spousal benefits to couples who are divorced and remarried.
If people want to maintain that marriage is impossible for same-sex couples, let them do so. However, if people want to hold up What Is Marriage? as the definition of marriage, then I think they have to acknowledge that marriage is indissoluble. If they cannot roll back all divorce laws (which of course they can’t) then at least they should not hesitate to describe things as they are and acknowledge, for example, the John McCain, running for president, was not “really” married to Cindy McCain. They are in an adulterous relationship. The same was true of Ronald Reagan and Nancy. The same is true of many of our politicians and other prominent figures.
I am not so much objecting to the resistance to same-sex marriage here. I am objecting to those who would cite Girgis, George, and Anderson to justify opposing same-sex marriage when they would be unwilling to accept in full the definition of marriage in What Is Marriage?
By the way, I have read the essay version but have only begun the book. Perhaps the authors deal with the question of divorce and remarriage in the book in a way they did not in the essay.
December 21st, 2012 | 3:31 pm
But no-fault divorce isn’t the policy issue on the table at the present. So what exactly is the point that you are trying to make?
Steve Billingsley,
As I understand David Blankenhorn, he is saying that making same-sex marriage “the policy issue on the table” is getting in the way for those who wish to restore marriage to what it has previously been. I think Ryan Anderson is insisting that before there can be any forward movement, there must be a philosophical definition of marriage such as he, Girgis, and George have put forward. I think David Blankenhorn considers that not to be a path to progress, but a roadblock. And if he doesn’t, I do.
As I wrote in a message that mysteriously failed to appear in another thread, even granting that What Is Marriage? does an excellent job of putting forth a philosophical definition of marriage, that doesn’t mean it will be of any interest at all to, say, anthropologists, and it may not be of any use at all to those interested in public policy or crafting civil laws. The philosophical definition in What Is Marriage? bears little resemblance to actual civil marriage as legally defined in the fifty states (and all over the world). Why should it influence anyone in deciding whether civil marriage should be open to same-sex couples? It doesn’t define civil marriage as it stands right now, so why should it be of any help in deciding whether to “redefine” civil marriage?
December 21st, 2012 | 3:38 pm
Let me put it this way, and very briefly. Anyone who is divorced and remarried and cites What Is Marriage? to make his or her case against same-sex marriage is a hypocrite, since he or she is citing an argument that also defines the divorced and remarried as living in adultery. Those who accept divorce and remarriage are hypocritical to cite What Is Marriage? to oppose same-sex marriage, because they really don’t buy the authors’ argument (and probably haven’t read it).
December 21st, 2012 | 4:13 pm
Suppose we try to encourage the chances of agreement by asking: What is sexual/biological complementarity? If it is not male-female physiological complementarity, then what is it, and can whatever it is be a genuine form of sexual union? In other words, must a pro-SSM conception of complementarity be simply sexual contact (however “special” the sexual contact is alleged to be in cases of close relationships)?
I believe the only clearly correct answer to this question is that outside the “box” of the male-female conception of marrige, all there is, posing as sexual unity, is sexual contact as such. There seems to be no way to get around that. It seems to me that this amounts to a fairly devastating reductio argument against same-sex marriage.
December 21st, 2012 | 4:21 pm
@ James Bradshaw
Are the following legal unions “real” marriages? Why or why not.
1) The marriage of a man to a woman for the purposes of acquiring US citizenship.
Assuming you can peer into people’s hearts, if all other requirements are met, do you assume erotic love is the sole motivator for any marriage? My father worked with a man who married a prostitute (as I recall, that man’s consort)-by his accounts, the union was happy and productive. It very well may have resulted in two sinners ceasing sinful pursuits. If both parties give informed consent to a marriage that is made with specific consideration of this motivation, then it’s valid. How many marriages have been formed with social standing, economic security or other concerns as the principal concern-and flourish. Those that flourish do so because those petty considerations become subordinated to the needs of the spouse. Yet, how many couples “completely in love” crash and burn when the fire dims a just a little, because the only consideration was eros.
2) The marriage of woman to a man whose lower body (including sexual organs) were damaged to the point of incapacity during war.
Are you suggesting that injury or infirmity of the reproductive organs neuters an individual?
3) The marriage of an infertile man to a woman.
How “infertile” must that man be-there are men whose sperm generally lack proper development and motility, but not entirely. Generally speaking, even fertile men lose that capacity over time, and women invariably become infertile due to menopause. I had a widower uncle who remarried in his mid 60′s and his wife, nearly the same age was clearly infertile. The union lasted nearly 30 years until his death in his late 90′s. Then again, I knew a couple who were attempting conception for years, and resigned to failure began adoption proceedings. Their son was born with in a year and fifteen years later, they now have a family of seven, with one biological son and six children by adoption. Are they fertile or infertile?
4.) “The third “marriage” of a career politician to his second mistress … and one that was willingly blessed by the Roman Catholic Church.”
A lot of people marry people with whom they’ve had intimate relations prior to marriage.
As for his other marriages, were they witnessed and approved by the clergy or civil marriages which are mere legal arrangements without spiritual effect. Obviously, he either sought a declaration of nullity or did not require one. Perhaps the third time was the charm in assembling the proper elements of a valid marriage.
In short it seems you are proposing that all marriages be formed with two people each possessing working sex organs, not Anderson. Men and women marry, not their reproductive organs. The unions you described are valid, not because of working sex organs, but because they involve a man and a woman. I still find SSM the worst form of “sexism” (a word I use only for lack of another) in that it declares the opposite sex as superfluous.
@Andrew/Lukas/Paul/Andrew/Toddes/gentlemind
All well said.
December 21st, 2012 | 4:46 pm
So the only people who have any right to oppose the codification of same-sex marriage (particularly citing the arguments put forth in “What is Marriage”) are those whose personal conduct conforms exactly to that definition of marriage.
Right…by that rationale President Obama (who admitted drug use in his autobiography) should stop all of his administration’s efforts to enforce federal drug laws.
Keep trying…there’s a coherent argument to be made somewhere.
December 21st, 2012 | 5:09 pm
As always, David Nickol is cordially invited to specify his own definition of marriage and follow it to its logical conclusions.
andrew,
It seems to me there are two ways (at least) to go about defining marriage. One is the approach taken by Girgis, George, and Anderson—an entirely philosophical approach—and the other is to do somewhat the same thing as anthropologists do and come up with an all-encompassing definition to include everything that, by a kind of common sense or intuition, seems “marriage-like.” The problem with the philosophical approach in What Is Marriage? is that it excludes a huge number situations in which we commonly accept people to be (or have been) married. David had many wives, including Bathsheba, from whom Matthew tells us Jesus was descended. Do we think of Jesus as being descended from an adulterous affair of David’s, or from a marriage? On the other hand, Mary and Joseph were not married (at least from the Catholic viewpoint), since for a man and a woman to be married, the marriage must be consummated. As I keep pointing out, the divorced an remarried are not “really” married, yet people in their second (third, fourth, etc.) marriages probably make up somewhere close to 40% of all married couples.
The point is that a huge proportion of married people in the United States aren’t “really” married according the What Is Marriage and yet the chief purpose of the book seems to be an argument against letting a fraction of 4% of the population from getting civilly married, which is utterly possible (in spite of the philosophical definition of marriage), since it is happening in nine states and eleven countries.
I think David Blankenhorn believes that resisting same-sex marriage takes away energy from other things that might better strengthen marriage, and that for practical reasons, it is not worth the fight even for those who do not approve of same-sex marriage.
December 21st, 2012 | 6:22 pm
The folly of David Blakenhorn is to believe that acquiescing to same-sex “marriage” means that he will be given the opportunity to renew our marriage culture as a whole and secure its goods for the much larger heterosexual population. I am sure that there are many supporters of same-sex “marriage” who believe that the new androgynous (arbitrary) two person model of “marriage” wont have any destabilizing effects on opposite sex marriage and forces on the left exist who are ready to throw their weight behind a renewed effort to strengthen marriage as a whole once gay “marriage demands are satisfied.
I find this contention to be folly in the extreme. There will be no new push to address issue’s like illegitimacy, divorce, co-habitation & the general decline in marriage rates over-all. The cultural left will continue to degrade marriage for opposite sex couples as just one lifestyle choice among many, as archaic and patriarchal and oppressive for woman, and deinstitutionalizing it and present it as simply a personal matter between the parties involved with no public significance for the wider society.
the new androgynous (arbitrary) two person model of “marriage” is incapable of inspiring young men and woman to make the sort of personal sacrifices necessary for a healthy marriage culture that demands responsible procreation. A society that says that two men or two woman are just as good “parents” cannot put pressure on young men to “man-up” and Mary the mother of their children because it has already said that neither male nor female is necessary for the institution as a whole, and that if children of lesbian couples don’t need Fathers than why should a man take-up the personal responsibility and self sacrifice to be Father to a son he never wanted and Mary a woman who may have been nothing more than a one night stand or perhaps a temporary girlfriend. This is one of multiple points along the same understanding that demonstrate how changing the definition of marriage underminds socieities ability to promote marriage or
The cutural left is not going to change its contempt for traditional marriage and family life. On the contrary, they will use the imposition of same-sex “marriage” as an weapon against those who support rebuilding and promoting marriage. They will teach the young that all family forms, of any discriiption are eqaully worthy of social esteem and those who promote traditional family life are bigoted and narrow minded; while lacking in rational motivation and genuine arguments for their efforts.
December 21st, 2012 | 6:52 pm
Re: David Nickol’s remarks concerning divorce.
Regardless of the high divorce rates marriage is still considered a lifelong institution. For decades social conservatives have championed more restrictive divorce laws as well as opposing no-fault divorce.
As a matter of law however marriage is still considered a lifelong institution.
Allow me to demonstrate. A few years back a bill was introduced in the German parliament that would have changed the law to make “marriage” a 10 year proposition. At the end of the 10 years couples would need to re-apply and decide if they wanted another 10 year extension.
Like same-sex “marriage” that bill was a direct attack on a core philosophical pillar behind the idea of what marriage is. Like same-sex “marriage” turns marriage into a new entity that is necessarily not linked with childbearing or sexual complementary.
Likewise the German bill was a direct attack of the idea Isle that marriage is a permanent institution by definition. Permitting divorce may end marriages, but its existence does not necessarily say to the public that marriage is not life-long, were as under that law it would necessarily NOT be lifelong.
December 21st, 2012 | 7:30 pm
david,
why can’t a person (1) “live in adultery” and (2) cite “what is marriage?” and (3) still be right about the definition of marriage? your comment is about as obvious an ad hominen as i’ve ever seen.
mr. anderson has given his definition of marriage. what is yours? and what are the logical implications?
December 21st, 2012 | 9:27 pm
So the only people who have any right to oppose the codification of same-sex marriage (particularly citing the arguments put forth in “What is Marriage”) . . .
Steve Billingsley,
How about this formulation: The only people who may reasonably cite What Is Marriage? as a persuasive argument against same-sex marriage are those who have read it and actually agree with it. Those who disagree that marriage is exclusive and permanent—that is, those who would defend divorce and remarriage—are rejecting the authors’ definition of marriage.
December 21st, 2012 | 9:39 pm
why can’t a person (1) “live in adultery” and (2) cite “what is marriage?” and (3) still be right about the definition of marriage? your comment is about as obvious an ad hominen as i’ve ever seen.
andrew
Hypocrites can be right. In fact, probably more often than not they are. “Hypocrisy is the homage vice pays to virtue.” People who are divorced and remarried, sincerely believe all the arguments put forward by Anderson et al., and argue that the reasoning in What Is Marriage? requires denial of marriage to same-sex couples would be hypocrites, because they would believe same-sex couples should be prohibited from doing the very same thing they are doing. When you espouse moral principles but exempt yourself from them, that is the very definition of hypocrisy.
December 21st, 2012 | 9:53 pm
If it is not male-female physiological complementarity, then what is it, and can whatever it is be a genuine form of sexual union?
Ken Zaretzke,
If you make “male-female physiological complementarity” an essential element of marriage, then obviously there can be no same-sex marriage. The question is why must “male-female physiological complementarity” be an essential element of marriage, and particularly civil marriage?
If you define marriage to exclude same-sex couples, then obviously same-sex couples cannot marry. But a number of states and a number of countries have chosen to define marriage differently. And in those places, same-sex couples do get married. Maybe in your eyes it is only civil/legal marriage. But nevertheless, I have never heard it argued that same-sex couples who live in jurisdictions where same-sex marriage is legal and have done the paperwork and had the ceremony aren’t legally married. They are legally married, and philosophical arguments can’t change that.
December 21st, 2012 | 10:40 pm
“Those who accept divorce and remarriage are hypocritical to cite What Is Marriage? to oppose same-sex marriage, because they really don’t buy the authors’ argument (and probably haven’t read it).”
David, we are all sinners. There are statistics that something like 95% of all men have viewed pornography at some point in their life. Would it make a man a hypocrite if he then reasoned that legalizing prostitution is inadvisable, socially destructive or not a legitimate action of the state (yes, I am aware that Nevada allows the oldest profession)?
If you are saying that maintaining the present definition of marriage will not completely repair an institution that has been badly abused, I agree. For many people, this dispute isn’t the end, but a beginning.
Now, that having been said, consider what historical and industrial preservationists do when attempting to engage in a preservation of a historic structure or artifact. The first step, before restoration is stabilization, i.e, preventing further physical degradation.
December 22nd, 2012 | 3:02 am
Nickol wrote: “When you espouse moral principles but exempt yourself from them, that is the very definition of hypocrisy.”
Like when the Bible says that homosexuality is an abomination and people with a homosexuality problem say that they are Christians/Catholics but they are exempt any time they feel like it regarding what the Bible says, that is pretty hypocritical.
In fact, that is the very definition of hypocrisy.
December 22nd, 2012 | 6:49 am
David Nickol said: ” They are legally married, and philosophical arguments can’t change that.”
Your emphasis is on the law. You might agree that sometimes the law gets stuff right and sometimes it gets stuff wrong.
How do you determine when the law is right or wrong unless you have in mind the justification for marriage law based on the reality of what marriage is independent of the law?
Marital status in the law is for marriage and not for nonmarriage. So the place to start is the question, what is marriage.
December 22nd, 2012 | 7:12 am
Anyway, the topic is not David and his notions but rather Ryan’s point that,
“We have yet to hear how redefining marriage to include same-sex relationships provides a rationale for marital norms IAV seeks to promote.”
And:
“It’s not about agreeing with me, it’s about discovering and understanding the reality about marriage, and then moving law and policy and culture closer to a better embrace of and adherence to that truth—because the truth about marriage matters for law and policy and culture.”
Moving law and policy closer to the marriage idea does not mean that the supposed unattainable perfection of marriage law is the enemy of what marriage is.
No SSM supporter could withstand the application of the perfection standard when defending the SSM idea and its rather sloppy and arbitrary imposition or enactment in this or that jurisdiction. SSM law is the manifestation of a falsehood written into the law as rejection of the truth of marriage.
December 22nd, 2012 | 7:19 am
Marriage is not defined to exclude “same-sex couples”. It is defined — or delimited with boundaries — around the core of the type of relationship for which marriage law is an attempt to protect and promote.
Minus that core, what would the SSM supporter propose to draw boundaries around?
The first thing is for the lines to be justified by societal regard for what marriage is rather than placing a higher priority on some subset of non-marriage as the “exclusion” that defines marriage.
The marriage idea is very inclusive but not infinitely so. The SSM idea is so vague as to include most, if not all, of non-marriage. The gay emphasis of the SSM advocates does not translate into a gay requirement for those who’d SSM. Minus that gay emphasis there is nothing there to distinguish SSM from non-marriage. So pressing that lack of distinction into the law of marriage would mean abolishing marriage and replacing it, in the law, with something else.
Within the one-sexed scenario, what is there to justify marital-like norms? If SSM is marriage-like, then, what are the norms that the law and policy would promote across the board?
I ask these questions of the same-sex scenario only. Start there. Then, we can proceed to how that fits the two-sex scenario.
If the SSM idea does not inherently exclude some types of relationships and some kinds of living arrangements, then, SSM cannot do as a stand-in for defining — or delimitiing — the law around a clear and public meaning.
December 22nd, 2012 | 12:09 pm
David Nickol’s treatment of permanence as an essential quality of the marriage agreement appears to overlook the distinction between a term of a contract and a remedy for its breach.
A liferent is none the less a grant for life because it can be irritated for breach of condition
Rescission of a contract may be available as a remedy, even though it contains no provision to that effect.
December 22nd, 2012 | 2:03 pm
I am surprised no account has yet been taken of Anderson’s point regarding fatherhood. Blankenhorn says that “fathers matter” and claims that promoting marriage advances that argument. But then he insists that fatherhood is entirely optional for children when he speaks of same-sex marriage, the majority of whom are lesbian couples.
So fathers matter, except when they don’t. It would be helpful if Blankenhorn elaborated on the question of when fathers do and do not matter, and why children of lesbians can get along fine without them while children of heterosexual women cannot.
December 22nd, 2012 | 2:51 pm
David Nickol’s treatment of permanence as an essential quality of the marriage agreement appears to overlook the distinction between a term of a contract and a remedy for its breach.
Michael PS,
I think you are equating marriage itself with the legal aspects of civil marriage—the legal marriage contract. It seems to me that for Girgis, George, and Anderson, the “permanent and exclusive commitment” of marriage is not the legal marriage contract. This would be the Catholic understanding as well. Two persons who enter into a conjugal marriage—say in a Catholic wedding in the United States that is appropriately registered with civil authorities—may obtain a legal divorce, but that does not erase their wedding vows, that is, their permanent and exclusive commitment. (For Catholics, “What God has joined together let no man separate.”)
Taking conjugal marriage as “real marriage,” the question is to what extent civil marriage law should implement “real marriage.” Girgis, George, and Anderson would certainly say that civil marriage must reflect “real marriage” by excluding same-sex couples. Same-sex couples can’t enter into “real marriage,” consequently they must not be allowed to enter into civil marriage. The question I am raising is that if “real marriage” is indissoluble, and already married (and divorced) people can’t enter into second marriages because they are already married, to what extent should civil law reflect this fact? And to what extent should those who believe marriage is indissoluble let that belief enter into their attitudes and dealings with the divorced and “remarried,” who are in actuality living in adultery?
Is it just for civil law to allow some people (the divorced) who cannot enter into “real marriage” to enter into civil marriages, while barring others (same-sex couples) who allegedly cannot inter into “real marriage” from entering into civil marriage?
December 22nd, 2012 | 4:33 pm
But the Church has always taught that some valid marriages can be dissolved – a marriage contracted before baptism can be dissolved under the Pauline Privilege (1 Cor 7:15) but they are valid, for the Christian spouse can remain in them (vv 12-14)
I am sure the learned authors are not confounding “permanent,” with “indissoluble.”
December 22nd, 2012 | 4:57 pm
Neither marriage nor marriage law excludes the “same sex couple”. The choice to form a type of relationship that is nonmarital is a choice for a nonmarital type of arrangement.
David Nickol, not all two-sexed scenarios are eligible to marry. Put that aside for the moment, please, and we’ll return to it later.
Presumably some one-sexed scenarios would not be eligible for SSM. In your view, what is at the core around which the boundary is drawn between SSM and the rest of the types of relationships and living arrangements that are one-sexed but not SSM?
Would it be perfectly encoded in SSM law — has it been, in any jurisdiction in which SSM has been enact or imposed?
At this point, entry into SSM would not be unconditional because no SSM law has excludedthose who have SSM’d, dissolved their SSM, and re-SSM’d.
Of course, no SSM law has a required gay identity, same-sex sexual attraction, same-sex sexual behavior, nor same-sex sexual romance. So no SSM law can limit eligibility on the basis of such features that some — perhaps yourself included — have in mind when arguing for pressing into law a distinction between SSM and non-SSM within the population of one-exed arrangements and relationships.
Would that qualify you and other SSM supporters as “hypocrits”?
Such a charge of hypocrisy is not the product of the defence of marriage, David Nickol, but it may well be the outcome produced by your own stated standard. I think you misunderstand good lawmaking and are instead stuck on the impossibility of perfect implemetation of reasonable laws.
December 22nd, 2012 | 4:57 pm
So fathers matter, except when they don’t. It would be helpful if Blankenhorn elaborated on the question of when fathers do and do not matter, and why children of lesbians can get along fine without them while children of heterosexual women cannot.
Darel,
It seems to me that fathers matter statistically. I am not saying that’s unimportant—some of the statistics are very disturbing—but it simply is not the case that a live-in father is essential to every child’s wellbeing. Most children raised by single parents will do just fine, and many children raised in intact families will have serious problems.
If it were a fact that all children raised by lesbian mothers did poorly in school, took drugs, committed crimes, and ultimately wound up in prison, it would be very important to see that lesbian mothers didn’t raise children. But that is not the case. Meanwhile, we have a 41% out-of-wedlock birth rate in the United States (a staggering 72% for African Americans) which seems to me a much more serious problem than children being raised by “two mommies” or “two daddies,” the numbers of which are so small that no one can even produce good statistical studies about them.
It would seem to me a practical problem involving a determination of what steps will yield the best overall results. For those who believe the widespread acceptance of same-sex marriage will have ramifications well beyond the relatively small number of same-sex couples who will marry and raise children, then I suppose it makes sense to declare total war on same-sex marriage. But to those who see what may be perhaps a 2% rate of lesbian parenthood as a minor matter when there is a 41% out-of-wedlock birthrate, then waging total war against same-sex marriage seems like folly, particularly when, just like any other women, lesbians do not need to be in same-sex marriages to have children.
If every child must have a father, then there are a number of things that can be done immediately that, it seems to me, do not infringe on anyone’s natural rights. As one example, single-parent adoptions (at lest by women) must be prohibited. (They are legal in all 50 states.) As another, unmarried women should not be permitted to undergo fertility treatment, or at minimum, insurance should not be allowed to pay for it. These are perfectly reasonable proposals if one believes that every child must be raised in a home with both a mother and a father. How popular do you think they would be, however?
December 22nd, 2012 | 5:26 pm
I am sure the learned authors are not confounding “permanent,” with “indissoluble.”
Michael PS,
Perhaps the word indissoluble should be reserved for a valid marriage between two baptized persons. It is true that the authors always use the word permanent and never indissoluble.
However, I would point out that to invoke the Pauline Privilege (i.e., dissolve a marriage between two unbaptized persons), a Catholic Bishop must approve, and to invoke the Petrine Privilege (i.e., dissolve a marriage between a baptized person and an unbaptized person), the pope personally must approve.
It is difficult to see much practical difference between saying conjugal marriage is permanent and indissoluble unless at least one of the two spouses is Catholic or converting to Catholicism. Bishops and the pope do not dissolve marriages for those who are not Catholic or converting to Catholicism. So while conjugal marriage may be said to be permanent but not necessarily indissoluble, only the Catholic Church has the authority to dissolve a permanent marriage.
So in all but the most extraordinary cases, conjugal marriages are permanent, lifelong commitments. Civil divorces do not undo those commitments, and second “marriages” after a civil divorce are no more conjugal marriages in the sense that Girgis, George, and Anderson conceive of such marriages than are the civil marriages of same-sex couples.
Also, since Girgis, George, and Anderson make no appeal to religious concepts, they can hardly declare that although marriage is permanent, some marriages can be dissolved by a bishop or the pope! I think they would have to maintain that natural marriage is permanent. Period. They cannot argue that God has given the Catholic Church the (supernatural) authority to dissolve some marriages.
December 23rd, 2012 | 2:44 pm
Such a charge of hypocrisy is not the product of the defence of marriage, David Nickol, but it may well be the outcome produced by your own stated standard. I think you misunderstand good lawmaking and are instead stuck on the impossibility of perfect implemetation of reasonable laws.
Chairm,
I really am not understanding your point, but I will restate mine. As I read What Is Marriage? it rules out same-sex marriage and remarriage after divorce as both simply impossible. By its definition of marriage, only a man and a woman can marry. A marriage between two people of the same sex is by definition impossible. But also, only a man and a woman who have not been married previously (and whose discarded spouse or spouses are still living) cannot marry. It is impossible. The civilly divorced are still “really” married, and married people cannot enter into additional marriages.
My point is that those who are divorced and remarried are hypocrites is they use What Is Marriage? to argue against same-sex marriage, because they are unwilling to abide by the same rules they claim are binding on others. That is hypocrisy.
For others who use What Is Marriage? to argue that civil law must not permit same-sex marriage, they are obliged to explain why civil law must not also prohibit remarriage after divorce. I am not saying no good explanations are possible. I am just saying that according to my reading of What Is Marriage? it says two kinds of “marriage” are simply impossible—same-sex marriage, and remarriage (after divorce, when the divorced spouse is still alive). Why, then, should one kind of impossible marriage (remarriage) be legally permitted while another kind of impossible marriage (same-sex marriage) not be legally permitted? The answer might be as simple as saying, “Because the right to ‘remarry’ after divorce is so firmly established in law that it is futile to try to do anything about it, even though it is legal permission to live in adultery.” But it is not up to me to come up with the answer. It is up to the people who use What Is Marriage? as a good argument against same-sex marriage.
December 24th, 2012 | 7:28 am
David Nickol,
If you have in mind a type of one-sexed relationship for which SSM law would be enacted to protect and to promote, then, please state the essentials of that type of relationship such that it is distinguishable from the rest of the one-sexed types of relationships.
Please explain if you think that SSM law would perfectly encode that type of relationship. Has any jurisdiction perfectly encode the type of relationship you have in mind?
This query merely tests the SSM idea against the stated standard you put forth in your own query. If you insist on a double standard, then, that standard is not applicable and your query needs adjustment. If you insist on using a double standard, then, does that make you a hypocrit?
December 25th, 2012 | 8:30 am
I am almost finished reading What Is Marriage? and I fail to see how the definition of marriage advanced in the book excludes divorce in an absolutist sense as David Nickols seems to claim it does. It is one thing to hold up the ideal of permanency as the book does and another to hold that every failure to live up to the ideal must be penalized, something the book does not do.
December 25th, 2012 | 1:08 pm
It is one thing to hold up the ideal of permanency as the book does and another to hold that every failure to live up to the ideal must be penalized, something the book does not do.
David Alexander,
I have read the paper but only begun the book, so you have an advantage over me at the moment. But the way I read the authors, they are saying what marriage is, not what it should ideally be. The authors say:
It seems to me that permanent and exclusive commitment can’t be limited to what is on the minds of the spouses when they make their wedding vows. It is not good enough for spouses after five, or ten, or fifteen years to say, “Well, when we took our vows, we meant what we said about permanent and exclusive commitment. But things have changed. Marriage requires an ongoing commitment to exclusivity and permanence. It still requires that even when both spouses no longer desire it and could mutually agree on an amicable divorce. If that is not the case, then the commitment of spouses at a wedding and vows of permanence and exclusivity are really commitments and vows to remain together as long as things are going well, with the understanding that if they cease to go well, those commitments are no longer binding.
I am also assuming (and perhaps it is not correct of me to do so, although I think it is) that the authors are essentially describing the Catholic view of marriage, which I am sure they sincerely believe can be arrived at through the used of reason alone and without referring to Catholic doctrine.
December 25th, 2012 | 8:19 pm
David Nickols,
It seems to me that what you suggest is specifically Catholic has the same basic form as traditional Western marriage vows.
It certainly would be a redefinition of marriage to say they are to be understood as meaning “as long as things are going well” instead of “in sickness and in health” “’til death do us part.” Vows to have any meaning must imply a persevering stance in the face of what comes in the unforeseeable future. They are specifically meant to address and overcome challenges to the union and are performed with ceremony because of their weight. If you mean to say this is a narrowly Catholic-only view, I think you are wrong. It is the traditional view of marriage in the West.
December 26th, 2012 | 11:27 pm
Readers might fairly note the stated standards that SSM advocates, such as David Nickol, invoke as they attempt to deconstruct the argument provided in the book, What Is Marriage.
Holding these advocates to their own stated standards when testing their SSM idea is fair and reasonable. However, they would very likely object and display deep obstinancy as they eschew the very reasoning they had invoked.
Note these standards. Keep them in mind as you assess the revisionist assertions about SSM.
December 26th, 2012 | 11:48 pm
The law needs to be drawn close to what marriage is.
There is a conflict of ideas. The SSM idea is an ourtright rejection of the marriage idea and, as such, would move the law farther and farther away from marriage.
The SSM advocate relies on marriage meaning less and less until it is as superficial and unjustified as SSM is. That means marriage would move away from its preferential status and be demoted to a merely protective status that is probably unsistainable. Indeed, add the gay emphasis and the accusation of bigotry and the marriage idea would be reduced to a barely tolerative status.
In its place would be a conceptual mess — the SSM idea is a pale imitation of marriage — and a preferential status for gay identity. Marriage would exist in law (and in culture under force of law) as a hollow label and unjustified special status.
The tragic irony is that this anti-marriage project would directly contradict the proSSM call for fairness and for justice. It would marginalize the societal regard for procreative justice — the birthright due the human child and incumbent upon us to uphold, protect, and promote. Gutting marriage of its meaning would destroy the cultural capacity to talk of such things plainly and civilly.
The IAV espouses norms that cannot be reconciled with support for SSM idea.
In the absence of Blankenhorn’sanswer to the query posed to him here, one might take those AV supported norms as their intended meaning of SSM/marriage. Hence the tragic irony is the elephant in the room.
December 27th, 2012 | 3:00 pm
“It seems to me there are two ways (at least) to go about defining marriage. One is the approach taken by Girgis, George, and Anderson—an entirely philosophical approach—and the other is to do somewhat the same thing as anthropologists do and come up with an all-encompassing definition to include everything that, by a kind of common sense or intuition, seems “marriage-like.””
This merely begs the question, since if marriage is left undefined, how are we able to even determine what is marriage-like? The difference between marriage and a marriage-like relationship is that a marriage-like relationship is different in some significant sense from marriage; that is, it lacks one or more characteristic or purpose that is indicative of the marriage relationship. And unless you know what these characteristics are concerning marriage, you cannot know what is a marriage-like relationship.
December 27th, 2012 | 10:34 pm
There is another problem with that snippet you quoted, dover beach.
It misrepresents the approach taken by Girgis, George, and Anderson. They do not leave out anthropology nor social-scientific evidence nor political utilitarianism. They examine the revisionist view (the SSM idea) by standing in the shoes of the SSM advocates. They are generous in accurately representing the strongest arguments of the revisionists. They fairly acknowledge potential shortcomings in the conjugal view.
They certainly do not begin with opposition to the SSM idea as a gay-defined idea. Yet they deal forthrightly on that aspect as well.
They begin with the question that Blankenorn examined in his own book. What is the nature of marriage? They came to a conclusion that meets Blankenhorn’s own conclusion at the same crossroad we face when considering the future of marriage. The historical and anthropological records are not at odds withGirgis, George, and Andersen. Blankenhorn’s book tells us so.
No, this is not about setting anthropology against philosphy; nor is it about setting religion against good governance; but it is about the coherency of the marriage idea across these disciplines.
A reader of Girgis, George, and Andersen might readily agree that, based on their argument for marriage and against revision, they have illustrated that Blankenhorn was correct when he described the SSM idea as a conceptual mess and when he openly acknowledged that the SSM idea is an effacement of the marriage idea.
December 27th, 2012 | 10:44 pm
Apologies for typos. (I’ve a slight handicap with my hands.)
“No, this is not about setting anthropology against philosophy; nor is it about setting religion against good governance; but it is about the coherency of the marriage idea across disciplines.”
December 28th, 2012 | 3:11 am
dover_beach
As Wittgenstein argued in the Philosophical investigations, there is no reason to look, as we have done traditionally—and dogmatically—for one, essential core in which the meaning of a word is located and which is, therefore, common to all uses of that word. We should, instead, travel with the word’s uses through “a complicated network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing” [Philosophical Investigations 66]
He demonstrates that it is impossible to devise some definition of “game” that includes everything that we call games, but excludes everything that we do not. Might not the same be true of the way we use the word “marriage”? I do not say that it is so, but the possibility has to be addressed.
It is perhaps important to note that this is not always a conscious process — generally, we do not catalogue various similarities until we reach a certain threshold, we just intuitively see the resemblances. Wittgenstein suggests that the same is true of language. We are all familiar (i.e. socially) with enough things that are games and enough things that are not games that we can categorize new activities as either games or not.
December 28th, 2012 | 12:23 pm
Might not the same be true of the way we use the word “marriage”? I do not say that it is so, but the possibility has to be addressed.
Michael PS, yes, that may be true, but it seems to me this argument is either not being made, or that it has unsuccessfully been attempted. Girgis, et al make quite a compelling case that marriage, lacks the requisite ambiguity to include, in this instance, a relationship that in and of itself, cannot involve a transaction between the generations because it is non-procreative.
January 3rd, 2013 | 3:40 am
Typo correction: “… the basis for eligibility to marry be justified. But they flee their own demands for justification when it comes to their desired imposition of the SSM idea.”
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