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Monday, September 24, 2012, 11:04 PM

Most proper scientists regard publicity as something of an affliction. After years of specialized and outwardly incomprehensible labors, when it comes time to go public with their findings, their hard-won conclusions are always twisted by illiterate newsmen to fit the crass demands of sensationalism. Alcohol cures PTSD! Coffee is good for the spleen! Women are biologically programmed to be sadistic toward their partners—like some ex-wives I could mention, am I right? Poor science. It never actually said any of those things, but they are at the mercy of their idiot headline writers.

So National Geographic deserves three cheers for this header/teaser:

‘Liliger’ Born in Russia No Boon for Big Cats

A liliger—the offspring of a liger mother and lion father—born in Russia may be cute, but it has no relevance in helping save big cats, experts say.

So you want to see a freak-of-nature big-cat kitten, you peasant? Fine. But we’re not going to pretend it means anything. You don’t deserve the flattery.

The kicker quote at the bottom of the article is also a nice bit of science-article cynicism: “In terms of conservation, it’s so far away from anything, it’s kind of pointless to even say it’s irrelevant.” 


Monday, September 24, 2012, 7:01 AM

shkodra

The Roman Catholic archdiocese of Shkodra, in northern Albania, has declared that it will excommunicate anyone found to be participating in blood feuds, which are a something of a national sport in Albania, except that they are responsible for hundreds of deaths every month, which most national sports are not.

Westerners might not see anything remarkable in a Catholic archdiocese coming out against systematic fatal violence, especially when it has no political angle—these guys aren’t Zapatistas or Provos, they’re just following a savage and frustratingly persistent medieval honor code—but the Albanian church has always been weird. There was a time when Franciscans in Albania were given a papal dispensation to grow mustaches and carry sidearms. The rules governing gjakmarrja even specify how priests should be treated in blood feuds: If a priest is killed, the entire parish assumes responsibility for avenging him, but if a priest kills someone else, retaliation must be directed toward his family. I’m not sure what it says about Albanian Catholicism’s historical attitude toward blood feuds that such rules needed to be codified, but it is rather suggestive.

Really I’m just glad to see any signs of life at all from the Albanian church. During the forty-plus years of Enver Hoxha’s dictatorship, Albania was a religion-free zone. There were no priests, because they had all been martyred or sent to prison camps, and there was no home instruction, because a third of the country was being paid by the regime to spy on their neighbors and families, and an informal Sunday school would have led to the imprisonment or deportation of the offending party and his entire extended family. Religious services were completely outlawed, something that not even Stalin managed to do.

So we can hardly blame the Catholic priests of Albania for taking it slow with their catechesis. After so many decades of brutally enforced atheism, I’m impressed that they’ve gotten their parishioners to master the rudiments of the Gospel, never mind the Fifth Commandment.


Monday, September 24, 2012, 5:35 AM

It is impossible to tell from this short news item the exact religious affiliation of the man who unsuccessfully sued the city of Berkeley over its outdoor smoking restrictions on the grounds that they violated his free exercise rights. His complaint uses the phrase “indigenous faith, culture, and ancient social custom,” but for all I know that language is from some statute. His surname is Porter, which doesn’t exactly sound Chinook.

There is no earthly reason why this man’s ethnicity should matter, apart from a specific point of personal curiosity. You see, the person who said “Cigarettes are the modern equivalent of prayer” was French, and so was the smoking-themed magazine that bore the tagline “Qui fume prie.” The argument that French-ness qualifies as a deeply held worldview worthy of First Amendment protection is a fascinating one, and if this plaintiff gave that line a shot, I want a look at the transcript. I bet a good lawyer could get a judge to agree that smoking on the street is the French equivalent of a religious ritual.


Tuesday, September 18, 2012, 7:07 AM

I love Nick Lowe, I really do. In my benighted age bracket, my love for him is probably second to none. But Jiminy Christmas, how many tribute albums can one man’s back catalogue support?

First there was Labour of Love in 2001, and that was fine—we didn’t know what was coming. Then that was followed a mere four years later by Lowe Profile, which had two main problems: The covering artists were all nobodies, apart from maybe Ian Gomm; and for some reason, it was allowed to metastasize into a two-disc set. Thirty whole and distinct tracks. That alone should have been plenty, no? Considering that Nick was also well represented on the Stiff Records tribute album Stiff Generation?

Apparently not, because a third Nick Lowe tribute album is coming out: Lowe Country (streaming here). I have no problem with the line-up or their song choices. Truthfully, of all the new songs I’ve heard this month, Caitlin Rose’s “Lately I’ve Let Things Slide” stands out as a great track. But that brings the total number of these tribute albums to three (or three-and-three-quarters, depending on how you count the two-disc set and Stiff Generation). In eleven years. That’s just excessive. If you traveled back in time to the ’80s and told the Stiffs regulars that in 2012 Nick Lowe would have more tribute albums than the rest of them put together, Elvis Costello would have slapped your face.

Then again, you’d also be forced to say that, out of all of them, the only one to have a movie made about his life would be Ian Dury, so they might just have assumed time travel had addled your brain.


Monday, September 17, 2012, 11:14 PM

I need to confess something about my contribution to the American Spectator’s young conservatives symposium. The two points I try to make are, first, that the Right should stop carping about relativism because practically no one on the Left is a relativist anymore, and second, that the next culture war should target technocratic utilitarianism, which dominates our political conversation and is slowly taking over our moral and cultural conversations too. I think I make I pretty strong case for relativism’s defunctitude, and I honestly do believe that particular enemy has been definitively vanquished, but—and this is my confession—my anti-anti-relativism broadside was partly motivated by self-interest. Sweet heavens above, I am so bored by arguments against relativism, and I would probably be bored by them even if relativism were still a threat worth worrying about. I come close to admitting as much in the article: 

There are traces of relativism in pluralism, freedom of speech, cosmopolitanism, foreign-policy realism, and a thousand other principles, including many that conservatives like. With the help of good judgment, these concepts have allowed the West to find a middle ground between nihilism and absolutism. Promiscuous use of the R word only makes that project more difficult. It is also—and this is a personal opinion—mind-numbingly dull. “Some things are good, others are bad,” has sometimes been an extremely important point to make, but never has it been an interesting one.

A cynic might say that accusations of relativism are so popular because they are just as evasive as relativism itself, and they end conversations just as abruptly. If relativism is an easy way to avoid saying why something is bad, calling your opponent a relativist is a way to escape explaining why your own opinion is good. It stacks the deck in the accuser’s favor: He doesn’t need a compelling position to win the argument; just having a position will do. Even when the Right’s opponents really were relativists, this looked like a lazy defense.

Readers who are skeptical that relativism is moribund should realize, first of all, that it seems much more influential than it really is. Those of its adherents who got jobs in our various cultural establishments over the last couple of decades are still there, only now they have seniority or, worse, tenure. But behind that veneer of power, relativism is doing no better than Communism was in Eastern Europe in the 1990s. After the Iron Curtain fell, the Polish and Czech bureaucracies were still staffed by the same apparatchiks as before, but only because no one, not even Lech Walesa, can conjure an experienced workforce out of thin air. The party itself was mostly defunct, its ideology even more so. The countries of Eastern Europe, like the last redoubts of relativism in the U.S., will find new ways to fail, but they won’t fail in that particular way again.

Those who enjoy a good bash of the TED-talk mindset will like page 2:

In the last culture war, relativism’s influence was evident in the stock arguments that kept appearing in magazines and op-ed pages: Breaking taboos is valuable for its own sake; people have a right to make their own choices and not be judged for it; what you call a social evil is really just a cultural difference; et cetera. But those articles are no longer seen so often. Now, the most annoyingly ubiquitous genre in journalism is the social-scientific analysis, as if a person can’t speak with authority without citing economics or sociology. This is bad enough in political conversation, but it has begun to affect people’s ethical thinking. Under the new cultural rules, moral condemnation is a legitimate thing to express, but only if you can demonstrate that the sin you want to condemn makes someone twice as likely to take antidepressants or 40 percent less likely to be promoted at work. . . .

Now that Shakespeare is out of the dead-white-guy doghouse, perhaps colleges could reverse some of the damage they’ve done by teaching All’s Well That Ends Well, which opens with Parolles trying to convince Helena to change her attitude toward sexual continence:

Loss of virginity is rational increase, and there was never virgin got till virginity was first lost. That you were made of is metal to make virgins. Virginity by being once lost may be ten times found; by being ever kept, it is ever lost.

The idea that promiscuity would yield a net increase in virginity makes perfect sense quantitatively but no sense morally. It’s just the sort of thing an economist could prove.

Read more here. My fellow symposiast Dan Foster is a young conservative who can actually pull off starting an article with Replacements lyrics, and his contribution is here.


Monday, September 17, 2012, 12:03 PM

Everyone tends to make fun of the young conservatives who dress like dandies, drink port, go high church, and profess to be monarchists. Not me. First of all, in those rare souls who can pull it off, the effect is sublime. More importantly, even the most callow, self-parodic monarchist phase serves as an inoculation against thinking like this:

We on the Right have meritocracy as a cornerstone of our thinking. In a just society, we believe, a man should reap rewards according to his natural abilities and willingness to study hard, work hard, and sacrifice for his own advancement. I think most Americans believe that, but it’s more of an article of faith on the Right.

No, no, no, no, no. Meritocracy as we know it has only existed for about fifty years, which is definitely not enough time for it to have entered conservatism’s DNA. Perhaps Rod Dreher is conflating capitalism and meritocracy and assuming that conservatism’s faith in one must extend to the other. It’s an easy mistake to make at this particular moment in history. The Left has taken to arguing that the rewards of the market have zero relation to merit (“You didn’t build that”), which forces the Right to emphasize the fact that the two have at least something to do with each other. But at the end of the day, conservatism embraces capitalism for the same reason that Lord Salisbury said that British foreign policy should respect the right of conquest—not because it apportions rewards to the deserving, but because it’s just the simplest way to sort out who owns what. I have always found it odd that the same therapeutically minded liberals who put such stock in “closure” at the level of personal psychology fail to recognize the same principle in politics, where deciding a question with finality is often more important than deciding it rightly. At a certain point, people just need to move on.

Fifty years is enough time for meritocracy to have become irreversible, like the New Deal, but I don’t think it has. I mean, everybody seems to hate it. Soon people might stop trying to make the meritocracy work better and start thinking of ways to dismantle it.

So that’s what lame undergraduate monarchism is good for: At a time when most Americans are banging their heads against a wall, unable to fathom what it would be like to abandon the principle of meritocracy, it presents an alternative mental landscape in a way that is three-dimensionally vivid and, let’s be honest, quite appealing. What it can’t do, being so backward-looking, is offer intellectual arguments against meritocracy as it exists today. So here’s a few of those:

  • Any time you tell someone about a problem, their first instinct is to think of their own past problems and what they did to solve them. Tell a man your grandmother just died, and he’ll start talking about how when his own grandmother died, throwing himself into his lepidoptery really helped take his mind off it. It’s bad enough when we do this to our friends, but it’s ten times worse in politics, where the people whose problems we’re trying to solve have backgrounds and priorities radically unlike our own. Meritocracy gives free reign to this terrible instinct for projection, instead of treating this form of vanity the way it should be treated, by having our leaders write out a hundred times on the blackboard statements like “As an educated person, I vastly, vastly overrate the importance of education in the lives of other people.”

  • Politics works best when there are many different centers of power, but meritocracy concentrates power in a single ivied pipeline. This is obviously true geographically, with the brain drain out of fly-over country, but that’s not the only problem. You might suppose that young people with world-class potential would aspire to different colleges depending on whether their expertise is finance, short fiction, or figure skating. Today, all these different prodigies are being funneled to the same places. (In the bad old days, Yale was content to dominate Wall Street and the State Department.) The end result is that the country’s most respected economists have the same background and speak the same cultural language as its most respected journalists, diplomats, and poets. The top tier of any profession is inevitably going to be a bit insular and clubby, but various fields’ top minds shouldn’t all belong to the same insular club.
  • By sending everyone to college, we’re creating an electorate full of people who are just smart enough to trust experts but not smart enough to know when experts are spouting total bull. I don’t want to romanticize the down-to-earth skepticism of the noble unlettered, but let’s be honest: A lot of PhD’s say very stupid things about their areas of expertise, but an average person needs a heck of a lot of education before he feels confident enough to call them out on it. If we’re not going to educate people to the point where they can call BS on well-credentialed idiocy, I’d rather have a voting majority of people who raise their eyebrows, spit on the ground, and say they never much went in for book-larnin’.

I’ve got more, but let’s leave it there and move on to solutions. How can we have a post-meritocratic America that isn’t wildly, medievally unjust? Well, here’s one way to think about it. Jeffrey Hart once summarized a stable democracy is one where the average man “simultaneously does not participate in politics and assumes that he could if he wanted to.” He is “the potentially active citizen.” This makes perfect sense. No one actually wants the average person to have much political power, since (a) the average person is dumb and (b) asking sane people to follow politics that closely is asking them to volunteer for torture, incredibly boring torture.

Apply this to social mobility, and you get a world of potentially active meritocrats. People would assume that if their kid turns out to be an honest-to-goodness genius, he or she can go to Harvard and eventually run the IMF or something, but non-genius high-schoolers would no longer believe that their future success depends on attending the highest-ranked college they can get into. The ladder of meritocracy would remain in the realm of potential most of the time, and more men and women of talent would graduate to positions of power by other ladders than meritocracy. If more people went to college closer to home, that would be a step in the right direction. If fewer people went to college at all, that would be better.


Friday, September 14, 2012, 7:26 AM

“God,” I said, “like Alfred Hitchcock, vouchsafes us only glimpses of Himself. I have often thought of this. And also that we make a game of trying to spot Him in this scene and then that, till we’ve squandered the revelation of the whole instead of simply accepting and enjoying what He has created.”

From the short story “Overture” by Peter De Vries, available in Without a Stitch in Time.


Thursday, September 13, 2012, 12:47 AM

The murder of Bobby Franks by Nathan Leopold and Richard Loeb has been the subject of more novels, plays, and movies than any other murder of the twentieth century, and there is a good reason for this. There is also a bad reason. The good reason is that most noteworthy murderers work alone, but it’s hard for an author to move the plot along if his main character doesn’t have anyone to talk to. No creative workaround, whether monologue, voiceover, or the talking dog in Son of Sam, will ever be as satisfactory as a story with two killers in it to begin with.

The bad reason is that Leopold and Loeb’s high-IQ Nietzschean madness is exactly the sort that would appeal to the kind of man who writes plays and novels. It isn’t just that L & L allowed an entirely justified feeling of superiority to become dangerously exaggerated—brainy writers know what that feels like, but so do most people (a fact that intellectuals usually fail to grasp). No, the most appealing aspect of their madness, to an intellectual type, is its genesis in books. “Nathan Leopold is not the only boy who has read Nietzsche,” said Clarence Darrow in his closing statement on the boys’ behalf, “but he may be the only one who was influenced in the way that he was influenced. . . . Here is a young boy, in the adolescent age, harassed by everything that harasses children, who takes this philosophy and believes it literally. It is a part of his life. It is his life.”

Very few people restructure their lives and personalities based on something they have read, and with the exception of religious fanatics, intellectuals are the only people who ever do it. In their darkest mental recesses, I would bet that most of the artists who have written about L & L think to themselves: These boys took ideas that seriously? Well, I wish more people would.

As far as I know, Alfred Hitchcock’s Rope (1948) is the only version of the L & L story to put Nietzsche at the center of the story. It is in every other respect vastly inferior to Compulsion (1959)

1. Taxidermy.

Like Norman Bates in Psycho, Dean Stockwell’s character in Compulsion collects stuffed birds. This was not a Hollywood embellishment—the real Nathan Leopold was an accomplished ornithologist, the nation’s leading expert on the rare Kirtland’s Warbler, and kept over 2,500 bird specimens in his study. (After being paroled in 1958 and moving to Puerto Rico, he authored A Checklist of Birds in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands.) A novelist couldn’t have invented a better hobby for a refined young murderer. Little songbirds are beautiful and curious, but their black eyes, if you’ve ever looked into them, are emotionally dead. They have a sense of aesthetics but no ethics. Birds are exquisite sociopaths, is what I’m trying to say. 

2. Chicago.

The Windy City, capital of gangsters, corruption, and slaughterhouses—why wouldn’t you set your murder story in Chicago? Thanks to Carl Sandburg, its most famous nickname has the word “butcher” in it. I don’t know why Hitchcock put himself on the wrong side of historical accuracy once again and moved the setting to New York City. If I had to guess, I would blame the author of the play on which Rope was based, Patrick Hamilton. As an Englishman, he might not have been quite up on the cultural resonances of various American metropolitan areas. He was also a drunkard who was said to “consume whiskey as a car consumes petrol,” but that’s hardly an excuse. There is no such thing as too drunk to appreciate Chicago.

At the end of Rope, Jimmy Stewart summons the police by shooting a gun out the window. That never would have worked in Old Chicago.

3. Less campy, more straight-up twisted.

Yes, Leopold and Loeb were gay, but that’s no excuse for Farley Granger’s overacting. The boys’ sexuality was certainly an important part of their dynamic, but any writer who ignores the sadomasochistic side of their relationship is telling less than half the story. Nathan Leopold never would have said to his master, as Farley Granger says to John Dall, “Don’t you ever again tell me what to do and what not to do.” Nor would Dickie Loeb have had this conversation with his slave:

“You’re not frightened anymore, are you?”“No.”“Not even of me?”“No.”“That’s good.”

No, that’s not good, not to you! These lines from Compulsion are much more faithful, both to the historical Leopold and Loeb and to human psychology:

“When we made the deal, you said you could take orders. You said you wanted me to command you.”“I do, as long as you keep your part of the agreement.”

“Please, Artie, I’ll do anything you say.”“Anything?”

“You want me to order you to, Judd?”

4. Clarence Darrow.

Clarence Darrow was an odd person. For one thing, he was a hard-core determinist, which is why he was such a good defense lawyer—he literally did not believe in the concept of guilt. He didn’t necessarily think that, in different circumstances, his clients would have been angels, but at least they would not have been criminals.

Apart from the master-stroke of casting Orson Welles, I don’t think Compulsion necessarily handles the Darrow character very well. The script preserves his impassioned courtroom peroration against the death penalty (YouTube), but fails to mention that he still thought Dickie Loeb ought to have been put to death: “For the good of society and for the good of the boys . . . Loeb would be quietly, painlessly put to sleep—not as a punishment, for he is already doomed and life holds nothing for him. Death would be a merciful release.” (Determinism has a dark side.) But Rope does not have Darrow at all, and the philosophy professor is a poor substitute. Jimmy Stewart has only one moment half as compelling as anything Orson Welles does, and that is his interview with Farley Granger when he keeps stopping and releasing a metronome.

5. Dean Stockwell.

Did you really think Blue Velvet was as creepy as he could get?


Tuesday, September 11, 2012, 11:59 PM

Viscount Milner writing to a friend in 1903 about his reason for leaving politics, one of few such explanations not to sound either self-righteous or self-pitying:

I am too far, too increasingly out of sympathy with our political system, and with the political attitude of the bulk of my countrymen, to be a successful politician in the ordinary sense. I am an anachronism. It may be I was born too late, it may be I was born too soon. In the latter, I think the less probable case, I may be of some use in politics—as an outsider, though, never again as an active participant in the fray. But I am not going to make myself miserable any more, or to embarrass any Ministry or party, by holding office on the terms, on which under the conditions of our day it can alone be held. Every man can afford to hold some unpopular ideas. But I have amassed all the most unpopular. I hold, with real conviction, a whole posse of them, and I mean to allow myself the luxury of holding, perhaps even of occasionally expressing them.

Quoted in Edward Crankshaw’s The Forsaken Idea: A Study of Viscount Milner (1952)


Tuesday, September 11, 2012, 3:55 AM

Film noir is the easiest to identify and (as these things go) easiest to define of all the genres in cinema, yet it developed quite unintentionally—it wasn’t until well into its maturity that anyone realized it was a genre at all. The term film noir originated in postwar France when their theatres were glutted with all the American films they had missed during the German occupation. Seeing them all in one go, the French found in films like Laura, The Maltese Falcon, Double Indemnity, and Scarlet Street commonalities that had escaped the notice of the filmmakers themselves. Robert Pippin detects a metaphor in this: It is true, both in noir and of noir, that no one understands what is happening to them until after it has finished happening—or as Orson Welles says in The Lady from Shanghai, “I never make up my mind about anything at all until it’s over and done with.” Until it’s too late to do anything about it.

From the introduction to Fatalism in American Film Noir (2012):

The brilliant achievement of the core group of great noirs is to show how terribly limited explanations that focus on the moral psychology of individuals turn out to be, given how little of the future they can actually effect as individuals. The explanation of what happens does not finally lie with what they do and why they try to do it, given how unstable, provisional, and often self-deceived are their claims to self knowledge, and given how little in control they are of their criteria for deliberation. . . .  

At some level, on some description of not knowing what one wants, or having a poor idea of what exactly it is that one wants . . . my wanting X can come to seem in some sense strange to me, “not really my want,” and the whole notion of agency can come to look thinned out and formal.

There aren’t many books about fatalism, probably because the people who would write them get to chapter three and start asking what’s the point. There isn’t much art about fatalism, either—plenty about fate, but that isn’t the same thing. In a Greek tragedy like Oedipus, the revelation that no amount of careful planning can stop the inexorable pull of fate is saved for the end as the big climax. Characters don’t act as if they knew from the start that destiny trumps decision. Noir, on the other hand, depicts what it’s like to operate in a world over which you know you have little control. Fatalism isn’t a revelation, it’s a lifestyle.

The last place one would expect to find fatalism in fiction is the mystery genre, where noir has some obvious ancestry. Detective work depends on motive being a reliable clue to human behavior, and on a personal conviction that there is a satisfying and coherent story out there to be discovered. In Britain, the underlying message of their entire detective-story tradition is that the truth can always be uncovered if you are observant and clever enough, which gives even weak and humble figures—a little old lady, an ineffectual English professor, or a fastidious Belgian—some power over the world. American hard-boiled detective stories are just the opposite: The toughest guy in the city is still powerless in the end, because even if he reconstructs a perfect blow-by-blow of what happened, he can never force the facts to yield up consolation or even make any satisfying kind of sense.*


It’s rare for an academic book to have too little gender theory rather than far too much, but there’s is something important that Pippin oddly fails to notice. The first chapter of his book, after the introduction, is on Out of the Past; the second chapter, The Lady from Shanghai. In both of those films, the main romance is between a woman who believes in fatalism and a man who does not and who, frankly, would prefer it if the woman he loved had a little more faith in human agency. In Lady from Shanghai, Rita Hayworth lives by an old Chinese proverb from her childhood, “One who follows his nature keeps his original nature in the end.” Orson Welles asks, “Haven’t you heard ever of something better to follow?” In Out of the Past, Jane Greer tells Robert Mitchum, “You’re no good for anyone but me. You’re no good and neither am I. That’s why we deserve each other.” Not only does Mitchum not believe her, he has already proven her wrong. Back in Bridgeport, at the beginning of the film before trouble found him again, he had successfully turned himself into a good man with an honest business and a good woman who loves him—a woman Jane Greer can prevent him from being with, but can’t force him to betray.

It makes sense to me, if not to Pippin, that the women would have a more extravagant view of human helplessness than the men. It has something to do with how much more discouraging it is to be Rita Hayworth than simply to be in love with Rita Hayworth.

I wish that Pippin had discussed the difference between fatalism and other forms of philosophical pessimism, especially the difference between existentialism (the world doesn’t matter and my actions don’t affect it) and fatalism (the world does matter, but I can’t affect it much). Existentialism is not compatible with Christianity, but fatalism is—at least I assume it is, since the Irish are Catholic and no one is more fatalistic than those guys. I don’t suppose there’s a film that puts a Christian spin on the usual noir themes, is there? Eve, Robby, film-buff readers I am unacquainted with, help me out. But only if you feel like it, since it doesn’t really matter in the long run. If I am fated to find such a movie, it’ll all come together eventually.

* This theory of the difference between British and American detective novels comes from Colin Watson’s Snobbery with Violence: Crime Stories and Their Audience. I dont know if Pippin has read that book, but he is welcome to borrow my copy if he hasn’t.

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