Justification and Reformation

In two older articles, Alister McGrath examines the sources for the Reformation doctrine of justification, covering ground also covered in his 2-volume Iustitia Dei. The first article, published in the Harvard Theological Review in 1982 (75:2, pp. 219-242) examines the evidence for claiming that the Reformation doctrine of justification was anticipated by patristic or medieval writers ?Ethe issue of ?forerunners?Eof the Reformation. McGrath argues that the Reformation doctrine of justification is not simply identical with an anti-Pelagian doctrine; it is possible to be fully anti-Pelagian and hold to a non-forensic idea of justification (as the original anti-Pelagian, Augustine, did). He points out that by the 1540s, even an avowedly anti-Pelagian theory of justification such as Osiander?s was not acceptable, since Osiander had introduced inherent righteousness into a doctrine of justification, even though it was not introduced as the formal cause of justification (p. 227).

McGrath defines the Reformation doctrine of justification under three headings: ?E1) justification is the forensic declaration that the Christian is righteous, rather than the process by which he is made righteous, involving a change in man?s status, rather than in his nature; (2) a deliberate and systematic distinction is made between justification (the act by which God declares the sinner to be righteous) and sanctification or regeneration (the internal process of renewal by the Holy Spirit); (3) justifying righteousness, or the formal cause of justification, is the alien righteousness of Christ, external to man and imputed to him, not a righteousness inherent to man, located within him, or in any way belonging to his person?E(p. 223). The key issue (at least in the case of Osiander) that distinguishes Protestant from Catholic views of justification is whether or not the righteousness of justification is conceived ?extrinsically?E(p. 228).

McGrath claims that there are neither patristic nor medieval forerunners to this Reformation doctrine. Luther, he argues, comes the closest to Augustine, in that ?Luther himself did not teach a doctrine of forensic justification in the strict sense. The concept of forensic justification necessitates a deliberate and systematic distinction between justification and regeneration, a distinction which is not found in Luther?s earlier works?E(p. 225). Further, like Augustine, Luther understood ?righteousness of God?Ein a ?dynamic?Esense, as God?s active gift and action for man?s salvation (p. 230). And, if Karl Holl is to be believed, Luther was willing to speak of justification in analytic terms: The justification we receive by faith is ?a proleptic and analytic divine judgment?Ebased on ?the perfected real righteousness?Ethat God is working in sinners (p. 2310).

Yet, even Luther ?different sharply from Augustine in connection with the question of the nature of justifying righteousness, a difference which becomes clear in the explicit statement of the concept of iustitia Christi aliena in the Romans lectures of 1515-1516?E(pp. 225-226). And while imputation is missing in Augustine?s theory of justification, it is already evident in Luther?s early lectures on Romans (pp. 231-232). With Melanchthon, McGrathclaims, there is an increased emphasis on alien righteousness, and terms such as ?pronouncement,?E?acceptation,?Eand ?forensic?Ebecome common. For Melanchthon, ?the forensic act of justification, an act of God which is external to man, is to be distinguished from the process of regeneration, the work of God within man. The two are inseparable yet distinct: a wedge is driven between them, if only at the conceptual level.?E McGrath claims that this is a crucial shift in Western theology: even if the distinction is merely conceptual and not existential, ?it represents a distinction where none had existed before?E(p. 226).

One of the interesting features of this article is that certain Reformers were quite willing to admit that their ?Hebraic?Eviews on justification differed from the ?Latin?Eviews of Augustine. Martin Chemnitz wrote that ?Augustinus animadvertit hanc significationem non convenire doctrinae Pauli de iustificatione . . . involvit et obscurat mentem Pauli,?Eand Musculus noted that ?Latinis auribus iustificare idem est quod iustum facere . . . Augustinus quoque locis aliquot constanter verbum iustificandi exponit hox sensu, cum dicit, credentes in eum qui iustificat impium, id est, ex impio pium facit. Verum Apostolus Paulus, ex cuius potissimum scriptis doctrina haec justificationis desumpta est, usus est verbo iustificandi non eo sensu qui Latinus auribus probetur, sed quo utitur illo sacra scriptura secundum morem linguae sanctae, in qua fuit et natus et educator et a pueris institutus. Huic verbum, id est iustificare, idem est a culpa absolvere, et iustum pronuntiare?E(fns. 46-47, p. 233). One pauses at the intriguing historical irony that the Reformers, not unlike advocates of the ?New Perspective on Paul?Ewho frequently attack the Reformers for their ahistorical treatments of Paul, claimed to be putting Pauline theology back into its original Jewish setting.

Toward the end of the essay, McGrath raises the question of the origin of the Reformers?Eforensic understanding of justification, suggesting that ?it is possible that Melanchthon may have derived the idea from Erasmus?ENovum Instrumentum of 1516, in which the forensic overtones of the notion of ?imputation?Eare specifically noted, using Roman jurisprudence as a model.?E Quoting B. Moeller, McGrath notes ?Ohne Humanismus, keine Reformation?E(p. 241). McGrath pursues this point a bit further in a second 1982 article, published in the Achiv fur Reformationsgeschichte (73, pp. 5-19). There he points out that Melanchthon referred to some classical sources to explain the meaning of forensic justification in the Third Article of the ?Confessio Augustana?E ?Melachthon illustrated the conception of imputation with a classical analogy, recalling how the people of Rome declare Scipio to be free,?Eand points to the use of the notion of ?acceptilation,?Ea ?purely verbal remission of a debt, as if the debt has been paid,?Ein both Luther and Reformed discussions of justification. As he notes, ?It is significant that this term is derived from classical Roman legal practice. It therefore appears that the doctrine of forensic justification itself may have a humanist background, as is suggested by the frequent use of classical analogies (e.g. the people of Roman declaring Scipio to be free) and classical legal terms (e.g. acceptilation) in its articulation?E(p. 18).

The sources of these, he suggests, is likely Erasmus. In his 1516 printed Greek NT, which included a Latin translation, Erasmus chides earlier translators (Valla in particular) for inconsistency in the translation of the Greek LOGIZOMAI. Valla had translated the word as imputatum in some cases, but also as reputatum. Erasmus consistently opts for the former: ?In the 1535 edition, Erasmus expanded on this: ?reputare?Eis to be understood as ?animo confiderare, imputare as acceptum ferre.?E However, the potentially forensic implications of this translation are indicated by Erasmus, even in the 1516 edition, when he points out that the Jurisconsults used the term acceptilation in this sense.?E Erasmus?Euse of classical sources ?could have considerable influence upon those Reformers seeking to expound the true meaning of St. Paul?s teaching on justification.?E McGrath concludes that ?if the emergence of the concept of forensic justification at the time of the Reformation cannot be attributed to humanist influence, and supremely to that of Erasmus, then its sudden appearance in the third decade of the 16th century must be regarded as one of the greatest riddles in the history of thought, whose solution we may eagerly await?E(p. 19).

Much of the rest of this article is taken up with a review of the humanist influences on the early Reformation efforts to formulate the doctrine of justification.

One thing that emerges clearly from this survey is the diversity of ?Protestant?Etheologians on this issue. Zwingli operated with a high doctrine of predestination and an Augustinian doctrine of sin and grace. He insists that justification is by grace alone, but he refers to justification only rarely, and prefers to speak of regeneration. McGrath concludes that Zwingli ?makes justification dependent upon regeneration. Zwingli frequently refers to the renewing work of the Holy Spirit as being the basis of man?s justification?E(p. 9). Oecolampadius is similar. His ?chief concern seems to have been the ethical activity of the church,?Eand he on justification he emphasizes ?its ethical manifestation in good works, so that justification ultimately depends upon regeneration?E(p. 9). Oecolampadius, unlike Zwingli, develops an Abelardian subjective theory of the atonement in which the example of Christ inspires efforts to moral excellence (p. 10). Neither Zwingli nor Oecolampadius have a clear statement of imputed righteousness (p. 10).

Martin Bucer famously developed a theory of double justification. The primary justification is purely forensic, involving the forgiveness of sins and the imputation of righteousness; but along with this primary justification comes the gift of the Spirit, who produces good works in the believer, so that in the end there is a iustificatio pii in addition to a iustiticatio impii. The law plays a prominent role in the secondary justification, in that the Spirit produces a filial obedience that fulfills the law. Bucer?s goal apparently was ?to forge a sound theological link between man?s totally gratuitous justification and the effect that this must have on his life. The righteousness and the good works which are wrought by the Holy Spirit within man are to be seen as the visible evidence of our unmerited acceptance in the sight of God?E(p. 11). In a sense, this is not, McGrath argues, a strict idea of double justification; in a strict doctrine of double predestination, there would be a double ?formal cause?Efor justification, the imputed righteousness of Christ on the one hand and the inherent righteousness produced by the Spirit on the other. Bucer instead sees the two justifications are a dual consequence of eternal election, ?two aspects of the same event,?Eand ?in this sense Bucer cannot be said to have taught a doctrine of double predestination?E(p. 12).

Bucer?s doctrine is well summarized in a statement he attempted to append to the fifth Swabach Article in 1529. He objected to the statement because ?It speaks as if God accounted us righteous and holy if we believe, and we, on the other hand, did not have to become such men.?E Bucer wanted to add: ?To them (i.e. to justified sinners) he also gives his Spirit, who constantly contends against the flesh and makes them conform to the image of the first-born, our Lord Jesus, who does not rest until he has made their disposition and life wholly conform to the divine Law ?Efrom which no jot or tittle may fall away ?Ejust as the same Spirit will revivify their bodies, and make them like the glorified body of Christ . . . But this is the only way to righteousness and to redemption from sin and death, if without merit or works on believes in the Son of God, who suffered for us, etc, and such faith is our righteousness?E(p. 12).

As elsewhere in McGrath?s work, he commends Calvin?s doctrine of justification, which roots both justification and sanctification in union with Christ. This Christological center, he argues, is preferable to Bucer?s rather abstract attempt to ground primary and secondary justification in election (p. 16; though this election is hardly abstract if it is itself an election in Christ, Eph 1), and he also sees Calvin?s position as overcoming the moralistic strains of Bucer?s formulation, since sanctification is not primarily a matter of obedience to an extrinsic law but a realization of union with Christ, a coming-to-be of what one already is (pp. 16-17).