Does God cause sin?

Does God cause sin? June 1, 2005

Aquinas de malo, Question 3, article 1: Does God cause sin?

One can be a ?cause of sin?Ein two ways, first by sinning and second by causing another to sin. God does not cause sin in either sense.

Regarding the first: Thomas describes sin as a failure to attain an end (?hamartia?E?Emissing the mark ?Eseems to be in the background here). A writer?s bad composition manifests a deficient skill; monstrous births in nature are the result of a ?deficient causal power of semen.?E Moral sin ?comes about because the will by tending toward an improper end fails to attain its proper end.?E But this cannot be said of God: His power is infinite, so he cannot be incapable of achieving His ends; and since His will is ?the supreme goodness that is the final end and first rule of all wills?EHis will therefore ?adheres to, and cannot defect from, the supreme good.?E


Regarding the second: Defining sin as ?the created will?s turning away from the final end,?EThomas argues that God ?cannot cause anyone?s will to be turned away from the final end, since he himself is that final end.?E A created cause imitates the first cause, in that, like the first cause, it ?through its activity in some way draws other things to its very self by making the things like itself.?E Created causes draw other things to themselves either by ?likeness of form?E(heat makes something ?like itself,?Ethat is, hot) or ?by directing other things to its own end?E(a human being moves another toward a certain end by issuing a command). The ?drawing to itself?Ein the latter case apparently involves conforming the one commanded to the will of the commander. God as the final cause of all things directs everything to Himself and doesn?t ?divert anything from his very self.?E Since He is the ?supreme good,?Etherefore ?he cannot cause the will to turn away from the supreme good, and the nature of moral wrong, as we are now speaking it, consists in turning from that good.?E

Aquinas deals with a good number of objections to this, of which I highlight a few. First, he quotes from Rom 1:28 and a supposedly Augustinian gloss (?God is evidently active in the hearts of human beings by inclining their wills to whatever he willed, whether to good or to evil?E. Since the inclination of the will is sin, God, by delivering men to their sins, causes sin. Thomas replies by making a distinction between active causation and lack of prevention: God delivers men to depravity and inclines their wills to evil by ?withdrawing his support or by not preventing evil.?E Similarly, ?we would say that a person who were to fail to extend a hand to someone falling would cause the latter?s fail.?E It is just that God ?does not bestow assistance on some to prevent their fall.?E God apparently does a bit of judo, using the momentum of his opponents to knock them over. This means, that in the sense that God ?withdraws support?EHe might be said to be a cause, though not an active one.

He gives the same answer to the second objection, which runs as follows: God punishes people by delivering them to an evil inclination of will. But a thing cannot be both punishment and moral wrong, since punishment runs contrary to the will and moral wrong is voluntary. So, if God inclines the will toward evil, he must be causing moral wrong. The point seems to be a question of classification: Is the inclination toward evil a punishment and a moral wrong? It cannot be both, on this argument. Since an inclination to sin is necessarily voluntary, then what God ?delivers to?Emust be a moral wrong rather than a punishment. God therefore causes a moral wrong. Thomas gives no detailed response to this, but asserts that the distinction in his first reply is sufficient. God ?causes?Ethe moral wrong in the sense that He withdraws His prevention, and lets the gravity of sin take over.

Objection 3 is this: Punishment goes contrary to a good of nature, withdrawing some good (eg, health, happiness, wealth, etc). God causes nature, and thus is not prevented from causing punishment. Likewise, moral wrong is contrary to the good of grace, and since God causes grace He may also, by analogy with the punishment/nature nexus, cause moral wrong. Thomas replies that ?punishment is contrary to a particular good,?Eand the removal of particular goods is consistent with the nature of God as supreme good, since ?the addition of other, sometimes better, goods takes away particular goods.?E A higher good might thus displace a particular good; Aquinas, interestingly, uses the example of the higher good of God?s established order of justice, saying that this might ?take away the good of a particular nature as a punishment.?E (Though he does not elaborate here, this enables Thomas to address the problem of hell and eternal punishment; hell is a matter of God putting a good in place of a good, not a matter of God putting an evil in place of good. The good in this case is the good of divine justice; and that good of divine justice replaces and trumps the good of a particular man?s existence.) Moral wrong is not like this; it cannot be construed as a ?good?Ereplacing a good because it involves turning away from the supreme good. God as the supreme good cannot turn away from it, or cause anything to turn away from it.

Objection 17 arises from 1 Kings 22:22. There God commands ?the spirit of lies?Eto go out and be a lying spirit in the mouths of Ahab?s prophets. He also mentions Yahweh?s command that Hosea commit adultery. Aquinas responds: ?We should not understand the statement ?Go forth and do so?Eby way of command but by way of permission, just like the statement to Judah, ?What you do, do quickly.?? On Hosea, Thomas claims that ?God?s command causes what would otherwise be a sin not to be a sin.?E He cites Bernard to the effect that ?God can dispense in regard to the commandments of the second tablet, commandments whereby human beings are directly regulated regarding their neighbor, since the good of one?s neighbor is a particular good. But God cannot dispense in regard to the commandments of the first table, commandments whereby human beings are regulated regarding God, who cannot turn others away from his very self, since he cannot deny his very self.?E

In the following article, Aquinas asks the related question ?Do acts of sin come from God??E Perhaps surprising, his answer is Yes. He cites Augustine?s de Trinitate 3.4 to the effect that ?God causes every species and movement,?Eand since acts of sin are ?movements of free choice?Ethey must come from God.

He notes that there have been two opinions on this point. First, some have argued that ?deformity of sin?Edoes not come from God and therefore acts of sin do not. Others have said that the ?very entity of the acts?Ecome from God. He holds the latter position, for two reasons. First, God?s essence is His existence, and everything else that exists derives from Him and is a being by some participation. Everything that is what it is by participation derives from something that is what it is in essence; thus ?everything on fire derives from what is fire by essence.?E Since ?acts of sin are evidently beings,?Ethey must be from God. Second, every movement of secondary causes is caused by the first mover. Since God is the mover of all movements, so acts of sin as ?movements of free choice?Eare from God.

Thomas clarifies the last point by noting that not all movement that is received from the first mover is received in the same way; rather its movement ?is received in each kind of moveable thing in its own way.?E The movements of heavenly bodies, which Thomas thinks cause the movements of earthly material substances, move inanimate things in one way and animate things in another. Thus, the movement from the first mover is not uniform or univocally received by human beings. When a human being is ?properly disposed to receive the causal movement of the first cause,?Ethen a ?perfect causal action?Eresults, one in accord with the first mover. If, h
owever, ?something is not properly disposed or fit to receive the causal movements of the first mover, imperfect action results.?E In such cases, we distinguish between the activity in the movement that is attributable to the first cause and the ?deficiency?Ein the activity that results of the person?s defection from the first mover. He uses the example of a limping animal (as he did in responding to one of the objections in Question 1): ?everything regarding the movement in limping is from an animal?s locomotive power, but everything in limping regarding deficiency is from the leg insofar as the leg lacks the aptitude to be moved by the animal?s locomotive power, not from the locomotive power.?E

With free beings, God moves in such a way that ?they also move their very selves.?E If the free choices of these beings are ?properly disposed and rightly ordered to receive movement by God, good acts will result, and we completely trace those acts to him as their cause.?E Yet, if the free choice is disordered, disordered acts of sin result. The activity in the activity of sin is caused by God; only free choice causes the ?deordination or deformity?Ein free agents. Hence, ?acts of sin come from God,?Eyet ?sin does not.?E


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