Unnatural?

In a 2010 article in the Journal for the Society of Christian Ethics, natural law theorist Jean Porter probed the question of same-sex marriage, and concluded that there were no objections in natural law to same-sex sex or to same-sex marriage as such. The article is excerpted here.

At one point Porter raises the question of whether same-sex relations are “intrinsically unnatural because they represent a violation of the natural complementarity of man and woman.” She responds, “The difficulty with this claim, it seems to me, is that it moves too quickly from the recognition of the naturalness of the distinction of sex, with its innate orientation towards reproduction, to the assertion that the gender roles through which we construe masculinity and femininity are immediate and inevitable expressions of our nature as a two-sexed species.” Porter wants to distinguish between the natural sexual distinction and the varying cultural formations of “gender roles” and the “conventions of marriage” that determine those roles. It’s not the case, she argues that “our practices of marriage represent the only possible framework within which human reproduction can take place,” and this means that we can’t take our view of the complementarity of men and women as the only possible framework either. Given the cultural variability of marriage practices, and hence of sex roles, our particular understanding of these issues cannot form an independent argument against same-sex relations: “ideals of the complementarity of the sexes will depend on a particular view of marriage, one in which clearly marked sex differences are central to the formation and strength of the marriage relation, and by the same token these ideals cannot provide an independent argument for the claim that marriage must consist in a heterosexual bond.” In another marriage regime – say, one in which same-sex marriage was permitted – gender roles would presumably be more flexible, and that would mean that same-sex sexuality would no longer be deemed “unnatural.”

While Porter recognizes that sex is naturally ordered to procreation, she argues that this is not the only natural purpose of sex. And given the variety of ends that sex serves, same-sex relations can fulfill at least some of them: “there can be no real doubt that same-sex couples can and do experience deep interpersonal love which they are moved to express sexually. The real question that arises at this point is whether we have good grounds, in natural law terms and theologically considered, for affirming and seeking to protect this love. I want to argue that we do.” Porter argues that Christianity itself altered Western understanding of the purposes of sex: “the Christian conception of marriage as an expression of a sacramental bond between two persons has transformed our sense of the value of the personal bond itself – and eventually, of the value of the sex act as an expression of that bond.” The “romantic” notion of marriage that is behind the same-sex marriage argument is an offshoot of Christianity.

In sum, she concludes that “a natural law analysis of the purposes of sex and marriage does not foreclose the possibility of recognizing unions which are by their nature non-reproductive, but which allow for the expression of the mutual fidelity and interpersonal love of the partners.” Yet she doesn’t think this recognition should be accorded in a way that undermines marriage’s “fundamental purpose as a framework for reproduction.” Natural law rules out “an interpretation of marriage according to which the expression of love should be the primary and regulative purpose of marriage as a social institution.”

Porter’s suggestion that we can stretch the definition of marriage to include same-sex partnerships while maintaining the priority of marriage as a “framework for reproduction” is exceedingly naive. If we call same-sex relationships marriage, then the definition of marriage has not been expanded but changed.

What interests me is a “methodological” point, the fact that Porter is unable to find natural-law support for the conclusion that same-sex relations are “intrinsically unnatural.” Other natural law theorists, of course, think otherwise. But Porter’s reasoning is pretty compelling, and leaves me wondering whether we can say certain sexual acts are “contrary to nature” without having some insight that comes from outside nature. Say, from revelation.