Medicine of Words

In her comparative study of Julian the Apostate and Gregory Nazianzus (Sons of Hellenism, Fathers of the Church), Susanna Elm devotes a long chapter to Gregory’s Oration 2, which is concerned with the philosopher’s practice of soul care. 

It is not an easy task: “As difficult as it may be for the physician to acquire and practice the medical science, his labors and skills pale in comparison with those required of the philosopher. Whereas physicians treat primarily the material, physical body, which will ultimately perish, the philosopher’s medical art cares for the soul . . . ‘which originated with God and is divine, partaking of and striving toward the nobility that stems from above, even though it is bound to what is inferior’” (168).

The philosopher’s most important skill is skill with words, and Gregory borrows from Stoic and Epicurean concepts of linguistic therapy in developing his sophisticated theory of pastoral care. Words are “effective agents of change and transformation” because they help to bring the passions under the control of reason. Disorders in the soul are caused by misjudgments and false beliefs. A man’s logos is supposed to shield him, but sometimes that inner logos/reason is too feeble to accomplish the task. External stimuli imprint their representations on the soul, and these phantasiai “counteracted the positive actions of the logos and caused maladies of the soul, pr passions, upsetting its harmony.” The philosopher’s work was “to aid the logos, word or reason, in maintaining a harmonious balance in the soul: that is, to cure it of the maladies resulting from a disturbed affect caused by ignorance and falsehoods. Philosophers must remove the imprints of erroneous words or teachings and overwrite them and the beliefs they express with good ones” (173-4).

Logoi rebalance the logos by resisting the imbalances cause by false logoi. Of course, not just any words would do; the philosopher/pastor had to be skilled in choosing the right linguistic medicine: “some must be praised, others exhorted; some publicly shamed, and others admonished in a private colloquy; but in all cases the philosopher must speak at an opportune moment (kairos) so as to avoid damage. Some persons must be observed attentively, even to the level of what we today know as micromanagement; others may respond well to a certain laissez-faire; here it is best to observe while pretending not to see and to listen while pretending not to hear.” The principle rule is that “no single cure is appropriate to all and sundry; no set words, harsh or mild, are applicable always and to all persons” (174-5). Only someone with pneuma, spirit, is equipped to know what to say to whom and when.

Of course, Gregory gave this pastoral psychology a Christian orientation: The logos that needed to be implanted to “affiliate man with God” is Christ Himself (176), not bare reason. But Christ the Word is mediated by words, by accurate words that dispel the lying idols and turn men to the living God.