There is a compelling start of a conversation, I see, between Daniel Larison and Noah Millman. Noah began in reaction to Andrew Bacevich’s latest introduction to a book. Bacevich, of course, takes the anti-imperial position of William Appleman Williams to be a clarion wake-up call for any American who doesn’t want to see America (soon) go the way of all empires. Noah dissents:
Assuming it can be achieved, isn’t the world better off with a global hegemon – particularly one that seeks little in the way of outright tribute – than with a war of all against all? As I say, none of these propositions is crazy. And no doubt Britain saw things similarly before us.
The first question is whether such dreams are even possible realities. But the second, harder one is: assuming they aren’t, or that, even if they are, they are not the reality one wants, once you have taken this road, is it even possible to change direction? If Kennan and Williams – and other radicals like Daniel Larison, who I rather think agrees with them about the nature of the American state in its current form – are not wrong, why did previous leaders who, Williams thinks, saw the light, at least through one eye, prove so incapable of steering the land carrack as they listed? And what should give us any confidence that a new captain would prove more capable in such an endeavor?
Daniel responds as follows:
In a less extreme way, Kennan’s patriotism and his common-sense recognition of what Montesqieu and Antifederalists knew over two centuries ago–that an extended republic cannot survive as a genuine republic–required him to question the status quo of a continental nation-state that had grown too large for the kind of self-government that had once been ours. This is not a “critique of America itself,” but a critique of a kind of polity, one that is actually far removed from much of the American experience. “America itself” is different from and more than its polity. The nature of America is not in its government, or at least not entirely or primarily in its government. Indeed, “America itself” contains the elements of many different Americas that found greater expression in a more genuinely federalist system, and which might once again find full expression in a more decentralized political order. It is natural that regimes would want to define loyalty to country as disloyalty, because loyalty to country threatens the regime’s monopoly on loyalty, but it is not required that we go along with it.
Which led me to return to the quote from Bacevich that started Noah off:
Empire, Williams observes . . . “turns a culture away from its own life as a society or community.” This is precisely correct. Today, in the midst of what the Bush administration has labeled the “Long War,” the United States finds itself once again “transforming the realities of expansion, conquest, and intervention into pious rhetoric about virtue, wealth and democracy.” The effect is to divert attention from the fundamental issues confronting American society.
I’m going to try to clear a lot of brush quickly in order to get to my bottom line on this business, which I take to be much different from either Daniel’s or Noah’s. The place to start is with the observation that we all seem too ready to stipulate that there is a profound and necessary connection between an assertive, ‘interventionist’ foreign policy and an assertive, interventionist domestic one. I am not even convinced that someone with an imperial attitude about their regime is destined to take an imperial attitude to international affairs; the logic of total, internal mastery just isn’t the same as the logic of expansionism and conquest, although of course we’ve seen these two go hand in hand. Our vision here has been harmed, I think, by the spectacular failures of empires that spring to mind: Napoleon’s, Hitler’s, the Soviet Union. Empire, in fact, can be extraordinarily durable (Rome, China), and durable in a way that would be absolutely impossible without a robust culture and overarching social identity. I would daresay that it is precisely incorrect to see empire as destructive to the reification of imperial society and culture. Probably the British Empire — a spectacularly successful empire — is as potent an example of this as we might want, resonant as it is with our own wildly popular identity as Americans. ‘Community life’ as communitarians and traditionalists care to understand it — as situated necessarily in small, local associations — surely will be rejected in an imperial society that revels in its splendid universalism, but it’s precisely this society that Bacevich seems to be conflating with its virtual cultural opposite. Though even this is slightly misleading: empires are so universalist that their one great social culture is shown to be great in its very power to supervene upon quite enduring local cultures, identities, and communities. (Think of the Gurkhas fighting in Belgium.) All in all, that graf from Bacevich — and granted, I haven’t read the whole piece — strikes me as simply incoherent, despite its surface appeal, which after all is an appeal to the idea that political rhetoric is often corrupt and expansionist policies driven by special interests are often packaged and sold in identitarian terms. There’s little reason to believe that this situation, which I think Daniel would agree is true generally, is greatly amplified in empires.
At the heart of the problem is our total confusion about what empire is. Noah helps us see that if hegemony is the problem then criticizing it as hegemony, and not empire, ought to be good enough. And paleo-ish conservatives are often willing to go into some detail about how and why life was pretty good, all things considered, under, say, the Austro-Hungarian empire. On the one hand, critics of America today reach for the word empire much in the way we reach for an anatomical curse word when someone cuts us off on the road; on the other, critics of empire often appear really to be criticizing certain types of empires, or empires suffering from more general political maladies, than to be criticizing empires as such. A great litmus test here would be to ask all these people what they think of Hobbes’ Leviathan. But questions like these do not dominate the public discourse.
In light of all this, I think Noah’s remarks are best read as a reminder that a foreign policy to be despised by critics of ‘American empire’ might emanate from a polity that is not very imperial from the perspective of domestic policy. It seems to me that critics of ‘American empire’ are likely to compare America’s domestic political health very unfavorably to the domestic political health of, say, Britain in 1900, to leave alone questions of life under the Austrian or Holy Roman or whichever Empire. And in some ways, they would be right! But in others, they would be wrong. And they would think this is so for different reasons. A civic-republican critic can find an empire with better practices of citizenship than ours. A civil-association critic can find an empire to be praised for maintaining a far more holistic and unified society than ours. The imperial line of argument simply cuts across too many competing realities. In short, to spin Daniel’s remarks, a republic can ‘extend’ itself out of existence quite well without becoming either a domestic or international empire, although of course it can cease to be a republic in the process of doing both. Then again, simply because the United States ceased to be a ‘real’ republic does not mean that it ever became an empire. Of course, the United States did become an empire, complete with colonies, and from the perspective of the supposedly far more corrupt and imperial era we are now living in, it actually turns out that America is less of an empire now than it was then, which is to say not really an empire at all.
Atop all this is the fact that things arguably began to turn around in Iraq at the moment when the U.S. actually began learning imperial practices and implementing them. Viewing empire as a logic of relational structures helps us see how that plays out — but the key point here is that by ‘going more imperial’ in Iraq it appears we helped create the conditions that were apt to make leaving Iraq all the more favorable.
I should add in closing that I’m far more concerned about the prospect of America turning into a kind of Rortyan-Hobbesian ‘domestic empire’ than I am America destroying itself in reckless expansionist projects around the globe. Not, of course, that I have any great enthusiasm for more recklessness, or even further expansionism.
UPDATE: Daniel responds. Fair enough, but I’m still quite hesitant to deem ‘imperial society’ as parasitic upon local cultures and communities as Daniel does. It slips a bit too far into an artificial gemeinschaft/gesellschaft sort of analysis, I think. Our best and brightest are hardly siphoned out of the heartland and concentrated in Washington, D.C. Most of what Lasch describes as the cult of upward mobility has to do with the economic quest for status. This is bad, but it sends the best of local communities all over the place. Even in a broad, metaphorical sense, our ‘imperial centers’ are very dispersed. I suppose from one angle this is proof that the imperium has lots of parasites, but from another angle it’s proof that we really do have a national culture that’s emerged more or less naturally from our more local ones. I really don’t think our regional cultures are in danger of being destroyed by this national culture anytime soon (though each type of culture may busily be banalizing itself — another issue entirely). And we’ve got to acknowledge that a national culture must not automatically be imperial.
April 29th, 2009 | 2:54 pm
Both libertarians and liberals shrink back in horror at the very idea of America as a superpower or hyperpower or unipolar power, let alone an empire. Why? Their arguments seem hollow, more aesthetically displeased than anything.
But why would the idea of America as THE power in the world be bad? In fact, why would the idea of America leading a world empire be bad? Why do we assume our extended world anarchy of hundreds of nation states is the be-all and end-all of political evolution? Why not a world federation based firmly on American principles and backed by American military power against all tyrants and all wannabees?
I’m not at all convinced by Bacevich or his fellow anti-American-imperialists are right or are moral in their arguments. After all, “imperialist” in the sneering town was adopted by Marxists in their attacks on free Western nations. Why should we adopt their presumptions as to what is politically moral or not.
I can easily conceive of the world as an “extended America,” especially if said world had far more federalist features than most nations in the world have today, including America, with the happy result being billions of wealthier, freer people.
Now you or Bacevich or others may make a worthy argument against this vision, but that’s much different than Bacevich foreclosing all discussion with his “naughty, naughty, America.”
John Lennon was good at imagining. So am I.
Imagine all the tyrants
Gone from all the world
You may say I’m a dreamer
But I’m not the only one
I hope the world can join us
And the world and America would be one.
April 29th, 2009 | 7:34 pm
Dear Ms. Morem,
My personal opposition to the concept of the “American Empire” is that it is opposite that which the founders saw as “good,” namely that we should, as a nation, trade with all and treaty with none, for the simple reason that we would, soon enough, be expending treasure and sons in an effort to keep up with our obligations. I have no desire to see my son, or yours, die for “freedom” in Iraq, Zimbabwe, Tunisia, or France. Nor do I want to “take democracy to the Middle East” or anywhere else.
My second objection relates to the idea that if we have an “American empire” we no longer have an American Social-Democracy, or an Obamanation Socialists Workers Paradise. As horrid as the Obamanation Workers Paradise (OWP)ia going to be, we can still, theoretically, regain at least a movement back to the ideas brought forward in the ideal,an American Republic. It is much more difficult to do so within the framwork of an empire.
I trust I haven’t been offensive. I do love your whimsical utopianism, unfortunately it’s that utopianism that’s gotten thousands of Americans killed and wounded in far off places, with strange sounding names.
April 29th, 2009 | 9:22 pm
It’s true that empire is an imprecise concept. And there is probably not a NECESSARY connection between external and internal expansion–although Britain in 1900 was an awful lot more centralized and bureaucratized than it had been in 1850. But administrative and economic requirements of an imperial policy, which usually include a large standing army, do tend to erode traditions of local control, limited government, and individual freedom. That’s certainly happened in the United States–and I don’t think it would have surprised any of our founders. More interesting, in my view, is the issue Larison raises of what it means to be patriotic but deeply critical, and even opposed, to the polity in which one lives. That’s a question I would have liked to hear Kennan and Rorty discuss!
April 29th, 2009 | 9:30 pm
“Hearken not to the unnatural voice which tells you that the people of America, knit together as they are by so many cords of affection, can no longer live together as members of the same family; can no longer continue the mutual guardians of their mutual happiness; can no longer be fellow-citizens of ONE GREAT, RESPECTABLE, AND FLOURISHING EMPIRE.”
– Fed. 14
At some point, don’t we have to say that if the wrong turn American made was in 1789, that the people making these criticisms are just unserious romantics who don’t really deserve our attention? I don’t take anyone seriously whose political ideal is the ante-bellum South (which, so far as I can tell, Larison’s is). I love empires of liberty; if the current iteration of our empire is not that, the solution is not a reversion to primitive communitarianism. We need to quit thinking in terms of false choices (rapacious empires or virtuous communities run by John C. Calhoun) and grapple with real complexity, realizing, as a wise man once said, that things are always getting better and worse at the same time.
April 30th, 2009 | 3:36 pm
Dear Mr. Cheeks,
Why do you assume the Founders assumed American expansion was bad? They didn’t. The enormity of the United States of America was the result of the most vigorous expansionist policy in the world. Robert Kagan’s “Dangerous Nation” illustrates the point superbly in his history of America’s 19th century foreign policy.
Libertarians ignore that most pointed of facts in American history when they argue that Americans just wanted to mind their business. Tell it to the Indians, the French, the British, the Spanish, the Mexicans, the Russians, the Hawaiians, the Filipinos…
In fact, America’s Founding Generation invented one of the true wonders of the world: The very first non-colonial system of political expansion. Almost simultaneously, the Confederation Congress and the Constitutional Convention laid out the plan in the forms of the Northwest Ordinance, and Article IV. Each new state was admitted to the Union free and equal to the older states, not as colonial provinces.
The only reason America didn’t expand further than it did was slavery. The Caribbean,Central and South America would have been slave states, Canada would have been composed of free states. Congress would not permit annexation of those territories for obvious reasons. Just think “Missouri.” After the Civil War, American energies turned inward as it industrialized.
I deliberately left the means open to how (if it ever happens) America would turn the world into an free and democratic American empire.
It’s possible (just barely) that no use of arms will be needed. Most of our states joined the Union at their insistence, not at Washington’s. And certainly not at the point of bayonets and cannon.
It’s also possible that it may happen very incrementally, and may have already begun. In “The Case for Goliath,” Michael Mandenbaum makes a convincing case for the fact that forms of American informal governance of the world already exist. Many leftists believe American empire already exists, also. Of course they are very much against it, but the points they make are suggestive.
Incrementalism may occur as the result of world demand and/or perceived dire necessity on the part of American leaders. (See the Somalian pirates for a good example.) In which case, it will be more of an evolutionary process than the revolutionary process involved in traditional national “unfriendly takeovers” that you have in mind.
The world empire I have in mind would be enforced judiciously by very high tech, pinpoint military operations, with little or no collateral damage. The idea that we are stuck with today’s military tech for tomorrow’s operations is laughable considering how fast our tech has developed during our wars (Iraq included) and between our wars.
Have you ever seen the world map of American military commands (SouthCom, CentCom, PaCom, EuCom)? Check it out here:
http://www.yes-dk.dk/YES/images/stories/Upload/uscom.jpg
This map is a map of world empire American style. Benevolent, kindly meant, but world empire just the same.
There are two things I worry about most. Both involve Obama. 1. He takes leftist pacifism seriously and seriously degrades our military. 2. He begins to envision a leftist takeover of the world, a la the Soviet Union. Disastrous.
I suspect (I hope) he’ll just let what has been evolving continue to evolve, cut back a little here and there, and then leave office in 2013 without doing too much damage.
April 30th, 2009 | 6:03 pm
Dear Sally (if I may),
Thank you for your wonderful and delightful letter.
Re: “American expansionism” I do think there’s a significant difference in converting contiguous territories into states and inserting troops in the Philippines in 1898 who would eventually slaughter a quarter of a million islanders bravely fighting for their independence.
As far as the Big “O” is concerned, I’ve been rather “sharp” with my criticisms of his philosophy and policies. However, I don’t see a significant difference in his approach to the military than that which the previous adminitration exhibited. I think Dr. L agrees with that (or I agree with him). Also, I don’t think you need to fear “a leftist takeover of the world,” simply because He Who Speaks the Truth will be too busy with his internal progroms..i.e. dictating who will receive health care,ect.
Re: your idea of “…how America would turn the world into a free and democratic American Empire,” I must confess to finding it, well,
frightening! But, hey, people have differences of opinion. In the spirit of full disclosure, and in an effort to provide you with some ammunition in which to fire back-should you feel the need-I have to confess to being inclined toward secession.
Can a “postmodern conservative” support secessionism…sounds like a blog to me?
Peter, oh Peter, wha..da you think?
April 30th, 2009 | 7:27 pm
[...] http://www.firstthings.com/postmodernconservative/?p=404 [...]
April 30th, 2009 | 7:30 pm
[...] is not a criticism of the writers involved (Millman, Poulos, Larison)–rather it’s my lack of processing capacity on this one–but as I [...]
April 30th, 2009 | 7:52 pm
Dear Bob, (sure you may).
I hope you’re just whistling Dixie. Pun fully intended. :)
April 30th, 2009 | 8:19 pm
Oh, and how could I forget my favorite metaphor for what would have happened to the United States in an alternate universe if the South had won the Civil War.
South America.
Think about it. [shudder]
April 30th, 2009 | 9:31 pm
Dear Sally,
Question: “What would have happened…if the South had won the Civil War (sic)?”
Answer: We’d have had someplace to flee.
Have a nice day!
May 1st, 2009 | 1:40 am
Dear Bob,
Unless you were black! Then you probably wouldn’t have wanted to flee to a victorious South. See Alexander Stephens’ Cornerstone Address for the premises of what would have been the Confederate regime you find so lovely.
May 1st, 2009 | 1:00 pm
Dear Matt,
In speculating on the War Between the States and the related post-war racial history we have to be rather careful, because everyone is rather “goosey” and fearful of being charged with “insensitivity” or harboring racist views (see, TheFrontPorchRepublic’s recent discussion on Lincoln).
It’s been my experience that PoMoCon leans toward a more “open” discussion and a broader interpretation of speech.
With that in mind, I think you may be wrong in the sense that we don’t know (we may speculate) the course of history in a post-war Confedrate States of America. Certainly following the war blacks would be “fleeing” northward across the Ohio River and we might speculate on how the Confederacy would address that problem, and what the effects of blacks moving toward freedom would have politically on the Confederate administrations.
Also, it’s interesting to speculate about black participation in the war. If Pat Cleburne’s suggestions been adhered to, there would have been emancipation following the Confederate victory.
We are also aware that “racism” was truly a problem in the North (see the New York Draft Riots) and has seldom been examined by objective historians. What effect, in the North, would the sudden presence of hundreds of thousands of southern blacks, all needing food, shelter, and a job have on civic order?
As you can see, and as I’m sure you know, there are many, many variables and possibilites here and it is interesting to speculate what may or may not have happened. In the end, we do know that the Confederate States of America would have been constituted as a republic, and that could only, in the long run at least, bode well for blacks and whites.
May 1st, 2009 | 4:16 pm
Kagan (cited in above post) described the Confederacy as embodying the world’s very first totalitarian ideology. (He didn’t consider the French Revolution to have a full-fledged ideology, 20th century style.) So, not only did Lincoln save the Union by winning the Civil War, he saved the world from suffering from 20th century tyranny 50 years early.
May 2nd, 2009 | 3:19 am
More on Kagan’s description of Southern aims and beliefs. Southern leaders, even before secession, dreamed of a slave empire encompassing the Caribbean island states, Central America and South America. His detailed pull quotes from Southern writings on this, both antebellum and during the Civil War were truly chilling.
The ideology was based partially on racism, partly on literal Bible readings, and partly on notions of the “purity” of an agriculturally based economy and society.
No telling how long it would’ve lasted or how big it would’ve gotten if the South had won the war.
BTW, you can have something called a republic, but it also can be one of the most ruthlessly repressive regimes ever existing. Read Madison and Tocqueville to find out how this could even be possible.
The Roman Republic was not all sweetness and light before Caesar and his adopted son Augustus turned it into Empire.
May 7th, 2009 | 12:37 pm
[...] light of my earlier post conveying a certain imperio-skepticism, I think Christian’s comments are worth excerpting at length. Also, I agree with them. But [...]
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