Here is a bit more from the article I’m working on (slowly) on the defenders of the nation (such as Scruton and Manent) in Europe today. It has something vaguely to do with our president and his Nobel Prize and even Krauthammer’s article in THE WEEKLY STANDARD about the dangers in America becoming more like Europe.
Manent, for one, criticizes the European Union for not being properly territorial, for having no borders in mind, for, for example, contemplating expansion beyond the continent into Turkey. In that respect, it might be like the expansive United States, which took well over a hundred years to find definite borders. But the American principle of expansion remained political; the intention was almost always that new territory be incorporated into the nation and that its inhabitants take on the rights and duties of American citizens. A big war and constitutional amendments settled the issue of whether the American union was merely a voluntary or federal union of independent states. There’s real evidence that the European Union is evolving in the direction of our more perfect union.
It seems Europe means to become a kind of voluntary or postmodern empire based on the emerging primacy of geoeconomics over geopolitics. Europe, the thought is, can be held together by shared values and interests that would allow for the withering away of at least much of the nation-state. Military power can be gradually replaced by soft power. The political loyalty that used to reside with particular European nations can also largely wither away; it can’t and shouldn’t be transferred to Europe as a whole.
One irony, of course, is this sort of postnational dedication to the common values of liberty and dignity erodes the political institutions required for free citizens actually to govern themselves. Another, of course, is that this postnational spirit is parasitic on the military power of a relatively quite aggressive nation–the United States. American has to remain, in Europe’s eyes, rather repulsively nationalistic for the European experiment in postpolitical personal liberty to seem realistic. (President Obama please note: We do them no good if we become like them, and there is, of course, no other nation dedicated to liberty to fill what would be the resulting military/political vacuum.)
Today’s Europe, all alone, seems ill-equipped to resist or even understand the new nationalism of the Russians who could, whenever they please, plunge them into a very cold winter (and the Europeans have rather quickly become very used to being comfortable in all seasons). Postnational Europe, of course, is reacting against the horrific 20th century excesses of nationalism and ideological History. The newly nationalistic Russians are reacting against their libertarian or excessively voluntaristic period of the 1990s; History and the nation seemed to evaporate–to be replaced by the ruthless anarchism of the Hobbesian/Mafia state of nature. History, of course, is dead, but in the Russian mind Stalin is back in favor as a really successful expansive nationalist. And Putin is his brilliant and legitimate successor as national leader.
October 15th, 2009 | 11:27 am
I defended Krauthammer’s “Decline Is Aa Choice” against proclaimed strategist Thomas P.M Barnett the other day. He was vitriolic in his denunciation of Krauthammer largely because he senses geoeconomics as the future I believe.
He actually responded to my post, but then did not place my subsequent follow up. That prompted me to draft an op-ed of which part is below. I am waiting on it to be published at a couple of international relations commentary sites.
Cooperation, Global Order and Obama’s Intriguing Wager
In a recent speech by Charles Krauthammer before the Manhattan Institute, he outlines, I believe effectively, the synchronicity between President Obama’s foreign policy and his grand designs for domestic changes within the United States . If Obama is successful at home in creating a much more robust social welfare state, that success will inevitably force the US to make choices inherently limiting its capacity for response to potential unforeseen shifts in great power policy, not to mention threats nurtured in areas that have yet to become integrated into the rapidly emerging “globalized” system. Essentially, Obama is setting the stage for the classic “guns vs. butter” argument and is on the side of “butter.”
Of course, only those prone to hyperventilation would state that all of this is going to happen today or tomorrow. It won’t. The problem is more subversive and long-term than the President’s knee-jerk critics assert.
In twenty years, with our current trajectory, the US will not be able to underwrite global stability if its domestic financial situation remains as skewed (or even more so) than it is today. It is in this time period as America deals with the ramifications of its past profligacy where latent threats can materialize both within the globalized system as well as on the periphery…
October 15th, 2009 | 12:49 pm
I won’t challenge the overall thrust here, but how in the long run, can the current arrangement be sustained? Europe bridles at American unilateralism and America is contemptuous of European quasi-pacifism. There is an uneasy alliance still in existence, but, given the emergence of Asia as a geopolitical power, it seems that in the long run, America would find focusing exclusively on Europe less and less compelling.
Russia is of course fundamentally an imperial, expansionist power, but isn’t it living through a demographic catastophe? How does it retain great power status in such a condition?
October 15th, 2009 | 5:33 pm
In his book, Gnostic Wars, Stefan Rossbach remarks that George Kennan refused to describe Soviet ideology at face value. He believed that Soviet ‘communism’ did not represent a ‘new’ philosophy but was the “latest manifestation of a historical tradition which in earlier times had celebrated Russia as “Holy Russia” and Moscow as the “Third Rome.’”
Kennan, Rossbach, tells us, explained that Russia was never a territorial notion, rather Russia stopped where the infidel began…the Russians “saw no final limit to the possible extension of power.”
Your final paragraph is insightful.
October 15th, 2009 | 7:42 pm
Oskar is right. For the US, Europe is an increasingly irrelevant nuisance and it may be in our interests to let the Russians and the Muslims fight it out over what is pretty much a museum that produces hot air and nothing of value.
October 16th, 2009 | 2:58 am
I wonder why no one has mentioned Christopher Caldwell’s recent book regarding the ways in which immigration in Europe–and in particular Muslim immigration–is fundamentally changing each and every European nation (if Caldwell is to be believed). Meanwhile native Italians, French, German, Dutch, etc. have allegedly stopped having babies (surely they’ve not stopped making them–I guess they’re too busy makin’ whoopie). Caldwell sees a major shift in the entire culture that may have little to do with Manent’s and Scruton’s defense of the nation.
As the Lisbon treaty gets voted on, it does seem that Europe is open to the future that America has always been. Benedict may wish to exclude Turkey from the EU, but on the EU’s terms why should it? What makes Europe Europe these days–let alone each nation a nation? And this is why Krauthammer’s essay is on point–as the US fulfills its domestic agenda of “general welfare” (50 years too late by many liberal standards), who will offer the “common defense” of Europe?
Let’s hope Putin is not that smart–though I doubt he’s that dumb. Unfortunately, at times, I do wonder about Obama.
October 16th, 2009 | 8:54 am
All these comments are great. On Turkey: We conservatives might say that Europe is a Christian whole composed of national parts. Turkey, let’s say, is a relatively stable nation, but not Christian… But before I go on to make this close call, I have to remember that few Europeans want to think of themselves as Christians or national citizens these days. So a problem, as you guys cruelly point out, is that Manent, Scruton, even Ratzinger etc. are verging on being utopian reactionaries. Europe is likely cultural and demographic toast. Why dwell on it? To remember why Europe is not a model for us and that our future depends on our “difference.” (So we shouldn’t, to begin with, become more social or socialist in our democracy, as the president wants.) We’re pretty good at reconciling being citizens, being Christians, and being liberals in the personal/individualistic sense. And it’s we postmodern conservatives who offer the “building better than they [our Founders] knew” principles that account best for the genius of who we are.
October 16th, 2009 | 9:14 am
“And it’s we postmodern conservatives who offer the “building better than they [our Founders] knew” principles that account best for the genius of who we are.”
Yes, maybe but is that enough to divert Obama’s political trajectory. Aren’t we faced with the phenomenon of the lowest common denominator where as more and more people eschew the hated and despised northern European work ethic and line up for the dole, the nation collapses into a Romania West, and all that that implies?
October 16th, 2009 | 10:04 am
Bob, It’s certainly not something that’s going to impress Obama, and maybe you’re right about the LCD and all that. But let’s keep hope alive. And I hope that you Voegelians aren’t going to follow the advice about no longer dissing Gnostics and all that–even if Eric was wrong on Joachim and may other details. Kennan, we can say, unreasonably ignored the importance of Gnostic IDEOLOGY in distinguishing the Soviet Union. And to be fair, nationalist Russia is not universalist and at war with the truth about our souls and all.
October 16th, 2009 | 10:35 am
“And to be fair, nationalist Russia is not universalist and at war with the truth about our souls and all.”
Actually, a Russia that is secularist/Orthodox and dominating a Europe declining into chaos presents an interesting scenario.
I admire Dr. Voegelin for two reasons: his erudition, and his public and oft stated belief that his analysis was a function of the materials. Considering his broad sweeping inquiries, it amazes me the depth of analysis he consistently produced.
And, what of Dr. Strauss, did he admit the possibility of mistakes?
I am greatly interested in the idea of gnosticism so if you’ve addressed the question I would appreciate it if you might point me in the proper direction.
October 16th, 2009 | 12:20 pm
Peter, I’ll take the bait. Manent is right that either the EU should push ahead to full union-hood, in which case it must exclude Turkey (and tighten immigration laws) lest it have absolutely no remaining denominator that defines it, OR it should retreat back into Common-Market-dom , perhaps with the Euro intact and thus limited confederal rules on things economic, and in the latter scenario it COULD include Morocco, Turkey, Ukraine, Russia, Argentina, New Zealand, Singapore, really perhaps anybody short of the U.S., India, and China.
But instead, it adopts this passive faith in development, which only empowers undemocratic elites, i.e., insulates all real power from the divided electorates. This means real action to stop the muslim demographic threat to its cultural coherence is impossible, which eventually may well lead to racist/fascist reactions.
We do have an interest in disengaging in Europe if its leaders continue to be such a nuisance to our interests, SO THAT better leaders/parties arise who WILL BEG US TO COME BACK, as they did in the late 40s and early 50s. Oops, gotta go…but hell yeah, Europe matters.
October 16th, 2009 | 12:20 pm
The idea of the “West” is declining in terms of its cultural identity even as its economic mindset continues to dominate (even Socialism is, in my estimation, a deviant form of Western thought).
The problem now is that without a common cultural foundation, there is no mooring to restrain economic excesses, nor to invigorate people to look upon aspirations higher than materialism.
“The culture wars” in America still remain important because the alternative is a steady decline into deviancy (ie. at least soft socialism, if not soft fascism) that will permanently yield an inability to confront real danger until its too late.
My fear is that Mr. Cheeks is on to something and it will take something dramatic to offset this general trend that Obama is only a reflection of.
October 16th, 2009 | 8:13 pm
I’m less concerned about Russian imperialism/expansion per se than I am about the way it is often specifically designed to counter our influence where it counts: for eg. pressuring Kyrgyzstan to shut down a base important as an avenue to Afghanistan for Nato, reasserting itself in the muslim belt directly north of Afghanistan by establishing a rapid reaction force, opposing what was essentially an anti-Iranian missile defense citizen in Poland and the Czech Republic, etc etc. And Carl is on the money regarding the significance of Europe: it certainly does provide us with an important object lesson but also Europe’s failings and inadequacies impact us pretty directly–our military force and committments have to fill the space created by their own pusillanimous neglect. AND if it is the case they eventually get run over by an angry and rapidly increasing Muslim population we will surely have to confront that situation as well. And as Europe fades the responibility to deal with a more aggressive Russia, or a more aggressive Russia closely aligned with an ambitious China,will also be our problem. Whether their example is instructive or not, we don’t have the luxury of just sitting back and watching Europe’s decline.
October 17th, 2009 | 9:53 am
Ivan, have we totally abandoned “…trade with all, treaty with none?”
Carl Scott, given this statement, “This means real action to stop the muslim demographic threat to its cultural coherence is impossible, which eventually may well lead to racist/fascist reactions.” I’m curious as to what “real action” that would not have at least, a religious component you’d recommend for France/Europe (USA?)?
October 17th, 2009 | 10:39 am
Carl suggests that Europe’s postwar secular, foundationless, increasingly apolitical liberal period has a definite shelf life. And Europe, as Benedict gingerly suggests, must become either more Christian or more open to fascism to recapture its identity and the spirit required for self-preservation. But maybe it can still become more national or think in terms of national futures, as Scruton hopes. All this suggests that pure “liberal democracy” is not an sure foundation for human satisfaction and the end of history. So we need to think more about WHAT America is and WHO we are. And Bob, I wasn’t mocking you anti-Gnostics. I was urging to stay the course against the young Vogelinians who think they have surpassed the master on the basis of inconsequential details.
October 17th, 2009 | 2:43 pm
Russia is far too close to China in ruling personality to develop a strong alliance. Theirs is a fractious alliance of arranged marriage by parents who don’t trust themselves any more than they do another. They both also possess a strong xenophobic narcissism that tells them they are the preferred model of envy by all and in many ways, from a pure power-politics standpoint, they do seem to possess an efficient model for this new phase of labor exploitation and resource competition between nation states that is now playing out. The more we fritter away our treasure and military projection, the more we draw radicalized muslim attention away from them and toward us, the more we gut our domestic industrial capacity…. the more their potential advantage accretes.
If history is dead, why does the Marquis de Custine’s narrative seem so relevant today?
Bob, we have not practiced that advice in Washington’s farewell address since, well…about 15 minutes after it was given…unfortunately.
Peter, if we are to better the genius of the Framers, we should first establish a better understanding of some of their genius which, by all rights, needs no improvement. There are ample mistakes over the years to act as fodder in this analysis.
October 18th, 2009 | 1:23 am
Bob, by real actions by the Europeans (either separately, or as a tighter EU) I mean things like the following, enacted with the assumption that those who are already legal citizens must remain so and that all relevant anti-discrimination laws will continue to be enforced, and even enforced more rigorously if fear of street-level discouragement of immigration or encouragment of emigration thru violence/etc. is real. I do not know the ins and outs of European law on this, but here’s what I have in mind:
1) general rejection of family-reunification-gets-you-immigration-eligibility policies.
2) crack-down on illegal immigration.
3) curtailment of welfare-type benefits for immigrants who have not obtained citizenship; parallel curtailment of various litigation rights for same.
4) crack-down on illegal marriages or domestic violence; total rejection of sharia law or community liasons as having any governmental status.
5) adjusted quotas that tend to diminish the number of accepted immigrants, on the principle of seeking greater cultural affinity, from:
a) origin nation of different religious background, with lesser barriers facing Christian-background ones, greater barriers for non-Christian ones. Politically dicey here to give Jews (or even Hindus, Confucians) a lesser barrier than Muslims, so probably have to define in this legalistic manner. I suppose Europeans could even score nations that are more post-Christian than “present-Christian” as preferable in the name of cultural affinity.
b) origin nation of obviously more primitive civilizational level or of ongoing chaos. I.e., citizens of Papua New Guinea score lower than Argentinians for entry into Europe. I.e., literacy rates considered. I.e., immigrants from criminal-dominated failed states like Somalia or the Liberia of not too long ago, face higher barriers. Defined correctly, criminal-dominated states would include things like Hamas-ruled Gaza or present-day Afghanistan.
You can see that these are hard sells politically. But when Muslim populations hit 20-30%, for the original-stock Europeans it’s either 1) accept future Islamization, 2) turn to racist parties, or 3) adopt these sorts of policies.
In the U.S.A., we are by no means facing the crisis Europe is. Our problem is with illegal immigration, and what it’s doing to our labor markets, our schools, etc., and what it’s doing to Mexico. It’s a very different sort of problem–it does not pose an existential threat to us the way the Muslim demographic/immigration problem does to Europe. We don’t need to do any of the above, except 2). And if we never really do 2, we will still be basically okay. Not that I’m with McCain/Bush and presumably Obama on the awful Amnesty proposals…
I would support an adjusted (i.e., to reflect the affinities of our ornate ethnic history) version of 5) for the U.S.A. in general and particularly for purpose of diminishing the comparatively small numbers of Muslim immigrants we receive, but I do not think these policies are that important a priority, and many Americans would be deeply opposed to them.
October 18th, 2009 | 2:47 pm
Well, Peter thanks for the encouragement re: the Great Gnostic Analysis. The ‘young’ Voegelinians may well be suffering from a feeling of allotriosis (alienation) and want to play in the big sand box rather than continue the search for and analysis of truth, reason, and the Divine.
DW, well it lasted significantly longer than that, but you’re not all that far off and ding-dong it does seem difficult to recapture. Now why is that?
Carl, thanks for your insightful analysis. BTW, didn’t the USA restrict immigration throughout our history? And, I believe you’re right about “many Americans would deeply oppose(d) to them.”
October 19th, 2009 | 11:27 am
Bob, it is hard or perhaps impossible to recapture because of the percentage of the budget consumed by a Standing Army arrayed across the planet coupled with the financialization of the economy and the subsequent export of industrial capacity which, in turn, demands “entangling alliances”.
Opponents of this view might point to the impracticality of re-ordering our priorities in a global and dangerous world. This assumes the practicality of ignoring the foundational tenets which got us this far. It also assumes that there is a consumptive infrastructure of organizations attached to government that make their living in chaos. Frequently, the best of intentions is a sure bet toward chaos.
Lawler is correct that a conversation of “who we are” and “what America is” remains a long overdue agenda item but I am not sure we are prepared to actually accept the answer arrived at. That is, unless the conversation resorts to the same tired balderdash of jingoistic piety or sentimentally obscurantism that normally occurs when we speak of the “American Way”. The old mores still reside within the citizenry but I am not convinced that the political expression and realpolitik of the government really gives a damn about the historic mores of the citizenry any longer. The welfare of the citizen and their pursuit of happiness have been subsumed by a National Expression which appears to like eating fistfuls of irony like they were chocolate bonbons.
October 19th, 2009 | 6:43 pm
So Postmodern Conservatism manifests itself from the belief that the disorder of the world cannot be transcended by extraordinary insight, learning, or knowledge?
October 21st, 2009 | 2:00 pm
That’s generally true, but not in my case.
October 29th, 2009 | 9:47 pm
The Caldwell book for all that is good and true in it, still relies too heavily on Pierre Manent’s view of the problematic character of the European project. This nation-state worship is as problematic as polis worship of the Arendtians. There is a twofold difficult with nation-state worship, or the privileging of it. The first is the fact that the very concept of the nation-state and the political viability of the nation per se rests upon the concept of the modern state. This is to say that without the modern state the nation would have been unviable as a political unity, as it was throughout most antiquity and through most of the middle ages.
The second is that the problematic understanding of the concept of the nation as a political concept in light of the evolution of that concept after the 19th century. I think any discussion of the ‘nation’ in Europe today must address the problem that what defines nation-hood in post 19th century understanding of the ‘nation’ and what the ultimate expression of both the German nation and German nationalism led to. The very notion of the homogeneous nation resting on the concept of race/ethnicity/identity perhaps is something that ought to be overcome.
The connection between the nation and the modern state is accidental and not essential. The problem with this reasoning can be clearly seen if one looked at Huntington “Who are We”.. and the Hispanic panic that book presents. This concern with ethnicity and race is something Alien (imported into America in the mid19th century from Europe) to the character of the American nation as seen by our key national documents.
The 16th/17th century usage of nation lacked both the earlier roman idea of the nation as a people–people as understood as what the Greeks called ethnos and the later mid19th concept of the nation of those of the same blood or ethnicity/race, which in the later 20th century calls identity. This (the difference in the 19th century understanding of the term nation) is probably the outcome of the Modern and ultimately the Hobbesian attempt to reduce the political community as a voluntary body as a product of human willing and not natural necessity. The voluntary and willing aspect of the modern state bring forward a concept of homogeneity that was absent from the Aristotelian teaching of a political community (aka the polis)… and the negative implications of this revealed itself most clearly and most radically in the German case.
The Russian nationalism of Putin is only slowly revealing its ugly nature. The failure of western Media to cover the murdering and killing both in Russia and Eastern Ukraine of those want to look westward and toward liberal principles of liberty, democratic rule, free and fair elections, individual rights and the rule of law are given the same treatment they got in Franco’s Spain or Mussolini’s Italy… and Hitler’s Germany before 1937. The rise of Han nationalism in China as the reason raison d’etre of the continuity of party-state rule by the CCP, very much echoing what Slobodan Milošević did to keep his rule in Yugoslavia/Serbia.
Links
Blogs
Find Us
Contact