If American conservatism is inauthentic but intersecting with ideas of postmodernism through a (non-right liberal) distaste for ideology and incredulity toward meta-narratives, then it is useful to consider some of its rhetorical features. The definition of rhetoric will vary because of the diverse natures and biases of the definers of this puzzling term. The relationship of the rhetorician to communicative practice is even more complex. A “postmodern” rhetorical construction, however, presents a useful means of exploring this relationship. I take the term “postmodern” to mean a criticism of modernity and of modernity’s attempts for certainty; it is not a denial of truth but a skeptical inclination toward socio-political totality. This definition is sourced in an unknowable order and set against ideology in a preservation of worthy customs and conventions – a “humble attitude” favoring cautious change – and overlapping with a postmodernist distrust of legitimating knowledge through an overarching system of thought. All human narrative, then, is inauthentic insofar as narrative makes a large claim. The incompleteness of human knowledge and inexperience can allow for no other alternative.
The legitimacy of a narrative should be tied to the willingness of the rhetorician to humbly qualify truth claims. In “postmodern” discourse, self is displaced as the central presence of experience. This refutation of self creates space for rhetoric to best discuss how opposing ideas and people relate to one another in discourse. This rhetorical space does not only spurn “utopian and total” doctrines. It will also shape the form and manner of intellectual activity. Humanity, I think, cannot easily dissociate socio-political principles from the methods of persuasion. There is a genuine connection subsisting between the order of rhetoric and the order of society. Totalizing rhetoric opens the way for totalizing, and perhaps totalitarian, measures. An abuse of language can in fact be reciprocal to an abuse of authority. As communicated by words and actions capable of attracting the likeminded, ideas do not stand alone free of value. For example, a holy text that “created” a language in reference to a transcendent order is not an ethically neutral activity. But it is not always a way of manipulation either. The imaginative text can become a way of conforming, and transforming, a character. This is the power and danger of narrative, and the primary reason why narrative legitimacy should exist from a place of humility. Through a skeptical persuasion, there is a willingness to listen, exchange, and build. This effort serves well the cause of mutual inquiry toward truth. It is a preservation of rhetoric. Because human knowledge and experience are limited, a basic function of rhetoric, both in application of the resources of persuasion and in more difficult to determine effects, is the application of inventive narratives most defensible to those of a similar inclination of sentiment. The small, social “communities” of persuasive listening and readership, varying greatly by their very nature as they came from messy, conflicted, mysterious beings, are present outside the scope of rational inquiry. For this, all communicative creatures should be grateful. Imagination, inventiveness, and a humble approach to truth claims will, across time and environment, facilitate the acquiring of knowledge and the expression of meaning.
April 7th, 2011 | 8:12 pm
Could you translate this into ordinary language for ordinary human beings?
April 10th, 2011 | 11:26 pm
I think what Jonathan is getting at is contained in his statement–”There is a genuine connection subsisting between the order of rhetoric and the order of society.” The prevailing modes of discourse reflect the prevailing orders of society, and I would guess that the the unspoken orders affect the prevailing modes of speech.
In this post, Jonathan argues for the appropriateness of some sort of humility when making a narrative that includes beginning-middle-end. I think he means humility in making narratives that give meaning to human life and a good life whether political, philosophic or theological. Insofar as one makes such a narrative with confidence, it automatically becomes a “meta-narrative” and is thus worthy of incredulity as Lyotard informs us is the claim of postmodernity. I think Jonathan accepts this version of both modernity ( as “meta-narrative”) and postmodernity (as a stance of “incredulity”–is it a “moral stance” or simply an “attitude”?).
In this way Jonathan seems to advocate a humility cum skepticism which recognizes the inability to know the whole before one speaks and as one speaks. In this view, one comes from a whole place of unkowability which may not even be a whole in the first place. At best, one (as an individual human being) is a part within a larger whole that can be acknowledged but of which nothing meaningful can be said. Even if one posits that the part which knows it is a part is the only part that is aware that it is a part–and hence is the only part aware of the question of the whole (philosophy or science)–this does not guarantee a true knowledge of the cosmos. Is the person who knows simply one being amongst other beings that have no distinctive qualitative difference? Jonathan allows that the text of Holy Scripture is not merely one text amongst many, so perhaps he likewise thinks that the human being is not simply one amongst other beings.
Nonetheless, frank acknowledgment of the world outside of one’s self and its sheer this-ness and there-ness (i.e., Dr. Johnson’s kicking of the stone in refutation of Berkeley)–even an understanding of an ordered and created world in which one finds oneself–does not make the basis for a fully transparent account that could be in accordance with reason. Jonathan is a radical skeptic.
As a consequence Jonathan argues for a kind of humility in speech.
I think he goes too far in saying that excessive speech as in the case of science and philosophy (or even as the certainty of theology as divinely revealed and understood as faith?)–if it is indeed such excessive speech–is some kind of abuse of language and hence a violation of the the political order and law. The political order might correspond (or ought to correspond) to orders other than the logocentrism or logographic necessity of some versions of philosophy. Even as rhetoric–in part a means of persuasion and a kind of speech not reliant upon the discursive logic of mathematics–the suggestion that the political order well-ordered is reflective of the kind of prevalent rhetoric of a given society at a given time is asking too much. It seems to silence speech simply–whether philosophic or poetic. It appears to be indicative of a kind of antipathy to speech–i.e., misology.
Politics is not simply rhetoric and vice versa. Knowledge of the nature of things is also key, even if the motivation for seeking that knowledge of nature is determined by the pre-philosophic political rhetoric from which one comes and with which one is invariably a part.
Speech transcends the deeds of politics. The pure conformity of deeds to speech is probably impossible–and perhaps undesirable. However, a conservatism that makes speech impossible is not very good. It is true that the “metaphysical” politics of modern literary types who proclaim atheism from the rooftops is problematic, but an aversion to narratives as exemplary of the very same excessiveness, seems to undercut any valid criticism (in speech) that can be made of such excess and danger and gutter subversiveness.
April 10th, 2011 | 11:49 pm
Let me add, that Jonathan puts forward a talking and listening point. A kind of community, but a kind of community that is rhetorically established and perpetuated. This is good, but what limits the power of speech here. How is this not another version of the communicative discourse in an ideal speech situation? Words no doubt speak of things–whether inherited tradition or nature or revelation. These things certainly place limits on what can be said, and Jonathan is smart to speak of his doubts regarding narratives.
Communicative action–no matter how rational or no matter how far the ordered consensus goes–makes it difficult for speech to account that which it does not anticipate, i.e., the other. So I guess I side against the public reason of Habermas or Rawls (not that this is what Jonathan is arguing for) in any communitarian attempt to limit what is sayable.
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