For example the great myth of the civil war (sic) is that it was to destroy African chattel slavery, and that that deed was the most important event of the ‘late unpleasantness.’

That myth serves to deflect the purpose of the progressives or the ever popular ‘Eastern monied-interests’ in eliminating the Southern agrarian political power and beginning the process of ‘modernizing’ the American central gov’t.

Those powerful American symbols, like state’s rights, federalism, separation of powers needed to be reduced in their effectiveness, and suppressed by a new cognoscenti determined to streamline the processes of gov’t and bring it into compliance with progressives, like Bismark, like Hegel, who dreamed of a new construct of existence.

The great purpose of the American secessionist war was not to free African slaves in the South, but to begin the process of destroying the constitutional, federated, American republic.

And, Peter is right, constructing ‘alternative histories’ is pointless.

Although it would be fun to post, in the spirit of Ben Franklin, about the general imprudence and dumb luck and French bailout in terms of both resources and strategy of the revolutionary war, the reputation of General Washington demands that I not go down that road.

It is endlessly diverting to think about the place of chance in the outcome of wars–and then to construct pointless alternative histories.

Peter: The Yellow Rose of Texas story is myth. The entire Mexican army taking a siesta without posting lookouts is fact.

For me, the more interesting alternative history is what if the Confederacy had won the war early–with a victory at Antietam (which would have occured if you replayed all the possible contingencies more often than not)? That, of course, wouldn’t have been so good for Lincoln’s rep. Neither would have been a McClellan victory in the 64 election, which might have happened had the Confederate troops in Georgia had decent leadership, all been mobilized into one army, and took a real stand around Cassville. There is of course the Agrarian myth of Lytle based on the alternative history of General Forrest cutting off Sherman’s rail supplies–the evildoer in that myth is Jefferson Davis refusing to give the appropriate order.

Arguably a good possible outcome would have been a negotiated settlement after McClellan had overrrun Richmond and forced the Confederate armies out of Virginia in 1862–which he should have–one that might have included a program for gradual, compensated emancipation.

But overall I sort of agree with the view that the history of the Confederacy might not have been so different from the history of South Africa.

Losing the war was the best thing to happen in the South, and someone might say that the war was embraced by southern gentlemen as the only way out. Better the myth of the lost cause–and the wonderful literature and countercultural narratives produced by dispossessed aristocrats–than, as Mr. Ceaser says, the tragedy of no cause.

Just as the best thing for Lincoln’s rep is to have been martyred when he was. There probably is no way reconstruction could have worked out particularly well. And certainly we’re happy not to have some clash between Lincoln and the Radical Republicans in our history books.

I don’t know my Texas history very well, but I can distinguish between a daily siesta and Christmas Eve.

I am not sure how to add up all the “costs” involved in his answer. He takes the view that the South, as an independent nation, would have given up on slavery at some point…after the South had been formed on the basis of the right or justice of slavery. One wonders then what kind of nation the south would have become, having no “higher” purpose to exist. I have my doubts about how easy it would have been to abandon slavery, especially after the South would have probably fought to expand it to the Caribbean and parts of
Mexico.

But maybe Robert is right. The scenario he then depicts is that the South would then have encouraged the freed slaves to rush north, say like the Haitian refugees. The North would not try to stop this (by some kind of sanctions or use of force), but would have allowed the flood to continue, with many of the free blacks being killed in the north in race riots. How much violence there would have been is left as an open question….

This is not a pretty picture at all, and Robert does not try to present it as pretty, though he choses to imagine that most of the likely violence would be in the North.

I am not sure how plausible I find the Cheeks’ thesis, or how much of it is meant just to score points against Lincoln….Maybe others will want to weigh in on this. What would the continent have looked like if the South had seceded in peace? The moral case against Lincoln needs to confront this question seriously, and Robert Cheeks has given it a try..