1. Any outcome that wasn’t an unspinnable defeat was good for the Obama campaign. Ever since the first presidential debate, the Obama campaign has suffered from the media interpreting everything they do as a desperate and probably misguided attempt to deal with the consequences of Obama’s debate defeat. The VP debate has reset the story. I think nobody (or just about nobody) decided to vote for Obama yesterday, but the conversation is different from what it has been for the last week.
2. On Biden: I saw an emotionally unstable, windbag pol. We have to expect some of his type in a legislature, but the impression I got was of a guy who should not be allowed within a mile of government executive authority. Look back at the Biden who showed up yesterday. Would you want that guy as President? Would you want him as mayor or police commissioner? What would you think if your kid’s principal acted this way in front of you?
3. But Ryan came across as a well briefed guy applying for a job in which he had studied hard, but had no relevant experience. That isn’t entirely fair, but it was what I saw. He did come across as emotionally stable. Which is nice.
4. Republicans have a rhetorical and policy problem on foreign policy. There is a lot of policy continuity between the Obama administration and the last few years of the Bush administration. There would probably be a lot of continuity between the Obama administration and a Romney administration. The Republicans don’t have an obviously popular set of alternative policies to offer. Most people don’t want war with Iran (or more overt threats of the same) or extending the American military presence in Afghanistan. Romney-Ryan aren’t willing to invest the time and take the political risks it would take to make the case for such policies (possibly because they don’t support such policies.) So they are left with arguing for relatively small (but maybe important) policy changes. The problem is that the smallish changes are accompanied with fairly extravagant rhetoric. Ryan can talk about the “unraveling” of the Obama administration’s foreign policy, but the actual policy alternatives on offer don’t match up with the indictment. Maybe tougher sanctions against Iran’s central bank would be a good and achievable idea. That’s fine. It would be better if they dialed back the intensity of the criticism and offered a trade up instead of a big change. The Republican ticket’s current rhetoric comes across as both hostile and opportunistic and produces the political drawback of both approaches without the political benefits of either.
5. Liberals have created this fantasy world version of the Obama/Romney debate. Romney won the debate by dominating the discussion and interrupting. Not true. Obama actually spoke a few minutes more than Romney. Romney did talk over Jim Lehrer when Lehrer tried to cut him off. But here is the thing: Lehrer was spending more time trying to cut Romney off even though Obama was doing more of the talking. The complaint that Romney “bullied” Lehrer amounted to complaining that Obama didn’t have an even bigger share of the time and/or that Lehrer should have actively intervened on Obama’s side – perhaps to keep the debate “focused.” There is a reason why the Romney “bullying” stuff came almost exclusively from partisans of the President. They think that the job of journalists is to help them win and any effective Republican argument is either mean, a lie, or a mean lie. For this group it will always be losing = “were were robbed” + “we need to be even bigger jerks next time.” By way of comparison, criticism of Biden came from across the spectrum exclusive of those who are committed partisans of Obama. That is because the behaviors of Biden and Romney were qualitatively different. If Romney gesticulates like Biden at the next debate, there will be calls to have Romney medicated.
6. But there is more to the story than that. I think most mainstream media journalists are trying to do a fair job most of the time. That the vast majority of them are left-of-center produces blind spots, and I sense that they sometimes informally give each other permission to favor one side of a while, but I also think most of them want to be able to look in the mirror and tell themselves a story that they gave both sides a fair shake. The story might not actually be true, but they want to believe it and that places some constraints on their behavior. The problem is that I suspect the social circles of these liberal journalists intersect substantially with those of more explicitly and unreflectively partisan members of the upper middle-class. I don’t mean primarily left-wing journalists and activists (though there is some of that.) I’m talking more friends from college and other members of their nonprofessional social networks. A lot of those kinds of liberals were complaining about how unfair (to Obama) and weak (on Romney) Lehrer was. I think that has an impact even on people who are making some (though hardly strenuous) effort to be fair. Maybe my very liberal friends have a point. Maybe we should be tougher. And unspoken (but very much present) is the conviction that we need to be tougher on the Republicans.
October 13th, 2012 | 1:35 am
Speaking personally, I don’t see why anyone should complain merely because they don’t like the result and I think most, if not all, of the complaints being made about everything by everybody from poll numbers to debates are just this.
We put our gladiators into the arena to see their strengths and weaknesses. We’ve been seeing both in all the men involved, so what is there to complain about?
As to fantasies, there are all sorts of flavors of them here as well as elsewhere. It takes a lot of work to sustain a sense of fact, particularly in the world of mediated experience. And the first step is to admit that all of us are fantasy prone.
For the most interesting fantasies are our own, if we can have the integrity and strength of mind to examine them. There is no such thing as an “objective” POV about political events and we see mostly what we bring to them.
We need to tend our biases carefully, for, in the end, they are all we have to make decisions with. In the end, you have to be clear about what you want, de facto if not de jure.
Ultimately, “buyers remorse” is ridiculous.
October 13th, 2012 | 1:39 am
So you have the difference between Biden and Ryan exactly right. Ryan seemed like a nervous rookie, and that’s not so bad.
But your bigger insight is on foreign policy. The last debate might be very hard on Romney. Ryan had mastered lot of stuff but had little to say. Biden’s “what would you do do differently?” hit home, and most Americans, unless tutored otherwise, just want to withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan.
October 13th, 2012 | 2:02 am
What would you tutor them about, Peter? Our situation is as untenable there as it was in Vietnam. Our problem is not in Afganistan, it is in Pakistan, and no matter how long we stay in the former, it will have no real impact on the latter.
Since 1945 the “power comes out of the barrel of a gun” fantasy that underlies all justifications of military force, no matter who makes them, simply does not work. The only true “military victory” is a nuclear first strike, and it is a phyrrhic one.
What is missing is what used to be called statescraft. Americans, on the whole, are too impatient to put up with it, and time after time make the same mistake of starting wars that only end in bloody stalemate.
What do you (or Mitt) have to tutor us to do but to accept and continue bloody stalemate?
October 13th, 2012 | 3:11 am
Point number 4 is the best analysis of the republican problem or difficulty regarding foreign policy that I have seen. It says it all. The saving point for the republicans and for mitt for the final debate might be the Lybia scandal. It would allow mitt to talk about something particular, where the administration is vulnerable. Mitt could present his major frame about strength, but not have to spend an hour and a half talking about it and running into the difficulties Pete notes in item 4. So, talk about Lybia, then run some clock on china, and then get off on a nice long discussion of trade policy, and why not five minutes on Gitmo and on national security views of attorney general holder ?
October 13th, 2012 | 4:06 pm
Quick interjection: I think JWC is on to something, especially the focus on libya.I agree with PS that, at the level of general foreign policy strategy, there is not much that distances Romney from Obama. However, that conception of strategy doesn’t exhaust what accounts for success or failure in the international theater. No set of general policies can succeed without the prudence of sound statesmanship: what is sometimes derisively referred to as rhetoric is the substance of diplomacy. So R could argue that instead of obsequious attempts at popularity, he’s actually make a principled case for American values, that’ll he’ll take a more aggressive negotiating stance with Russia and China, that’s he’ll lend more assistance, rhetorical and material to opposition forces when they stand against their oppressors (think of the missed opportunity in the Iranian presidential elections), that we will be safer if we give just a little free reign to some muscular swagger. Moreover, he could argue that the occasional saber rattling makes us safer, functions as a healthy deterrent to runs on our embassies, punctures the bubble of impunity so many of our enemies have obviously cultivated. I suppose this could all be formulated into some set of general principles but that wouldn’t do justice to the fact that it’s an argument from nuanced prudence. The country largely understands, in one way or another, that the debacle in Libya was the result of American incompetence (and then mendacity). No policy stewards itself, except in technocratic fantasy.
October 13th, 2012 | 6:15 pm
Dr. Ceaser, Thanks!
Ivan, I think that part of the problem is that Romney-Ryan haven’t (and maybe can’t) make the case for a how a different public diplomacy would lead to much better results. It was a mistake for the Obama administration to call Bashar Assad a reformer, but even if they hadn’t Syria would still be where Syria is today. Same thing with lending aid (for instance) anti-regime groups in Syria. I don’t know what aid various groups are getting from the US or through allies of the US. Maybe Romney-Ryan want more aid faster (that seemed like Ryan’s position in the debate), but what groups and what kind of aid? Prudence and the facts on the ground would dictate of course, but it wasn’t clear that Ryan (or anybody ) knows those facts on the ground and the Bush administration didn’t leave the median voter in the mind to give Republicans the benefit of the doubt on these sorts of issues.
I think that you might be right in everything you say, but that those policy differences would be better described as changes on the margin (with possibly big effects) or better versions of current policy rather than as U-turns.
October 13th, 2012 | 7:04 pm
I think it would constitute a u-turn to declare the attack on the libyan embassy a premeditated act of terrorist war as soon as they knew that was the case (which seems pretty quickly) and to respond militarily, swiftly. They had reliable, actionable intel within hours. And legally, if Obama had gone that route rather than weeks of dithering and dissembling, it would have presented him with a much larger array of military options under the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Terrorists. Then, we would have had immediate access to the site rather than FBI agents waiting for the go-ahead 2 weeks later. I don’t think, if presented properly, most American voters would see these differences residing on the margins. There are differences in policy, differences in world view, and differences in character on the part of Commander in Chief.. Part of the problem, I think you’re entirely right to point out, is that it is very difficult to adequately cast the last two in the language of the first one. But that doesn’t mean those differences aren’t real, or even, in many instances, decisive. Bret Stephens, writing for the WSJ, put it well recently: O is neither loved by our friends nor feared by our enemies. We’ve been both at different times in the past, and R could make a case that he intends t make us both again. It might make his case more powerful if he constructs that argument in something other than the often dry terms of foreign policy doctrine. There are ways to persuade, and honestly too, without getting bogged down in wonkish detail.
October 13th, 2012 | 7:10 pm
One other way of putting this is that undergirding any acceptable foreign policy is the power of symbolism, of rhetoric and precedent, of the strength that a CIC either projects or doesn’t. I’m heading out the door and intestinally lazy so I’ll lamely paste a paragraph I wrote more or less recently on this:
Also, and just as importantly, the world looks with wide eyes upon us for signs of moral lameness, for a dearth of fortitude in the face of unremitting threats, gathering about us like an angry swarm of bees. No one, including our enemies, doubts the unmatched power of the United States to project eviscerating force from one end of the globe to the other. However, there are grave, and not altogether unreasonable, suspicions about our steadfastness amidst national trauma, doubts regarding our courage when met by catastrophe. Our resources intimidate no one when delinked from resoluteness, and our fearfulness and languor is spiritual sustenance to those who pray for our demise. If we cannot muster the gumption to call terror by its name, we cannot be expected to vanquish it when it shows up at our door. When confronted by an act of war on what counts as American soil Obama blinked, our antagonists noticed, and now the world burns. This is the only true story, and unfortunately, the only one the world’s terrorists believe.
October 13th, 2012 | 8:17 pm
Ivan, I think the Libya consulate attack is a good example for how Romney could handle the situation differently in plausible ways. There were intelligence and security failures in Libya. Those aren’t unknown under any administration but it is the challenge’s prerogative to make them an issue and suggest how they might do better. Then there is the administration’s lying about what happened. I think we can come up with different theories of why they lied (none of them flattering to Obama.) I tend to favor the theory that they thought it would somehow be less politically damaging to them if it was seen as other than a terrorist attack. The closest analogy I could think of is when the Spanish government tried to suggest that the al Qaeda bombing attack was maybe the work of Basque separatists. This is an area where an alternative set of Romney policies would be right, obvious, and popular.
“I think you’re entirely right to point out, is that it is very difficult to adequately cast the last two in the language of the first one. But that doesn’t mean those differences aren’t real, or even, in many instances, decisive. Bret Stephens, writing for the WSJ, put it well recently: O is neither loved by our friends nor feared by our enemies. We’ve been both at different times in the past, and R could make a case that he intends t make us both again.”
I think that part of the problem is plausibly explaining how American actions will much deter nonstate actors who are working in areas with weak state institutions. Maybe the US could do better (probably), but I also think it is good to explain an understanding that any course of action is going to have an imperfect record. Terrorists will still kill Americans, but X policies will secure Americans better and disrupt terrorist group activities more than the current set of policies. Same thing with making our enemies fear us again. The Iranians were still working on their nuclear program, the Taliban was waxing in Afghanistan, and Russia still invaded Georgia when Bush was President. That doesn’t mean that any course leads to futility, but it does mean that different policies will either yield limited (but still important) effects or else require either very large investments or risks (a bombing campaign in Iran for instance.)
You are right on questions about “our steadfastness”, but I wonder how much Romney himself shares those questions. Ryan surely wasn’t willing to commit to counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan past 2014 and he tried everything to give the impression that a more insistent critical rhetoric toward, and sharper sanctions against Iran would be the best way to avoid war. He came across like he was arguing that Romney would be better able to bluff our way to success in those places while telling everybody that he was bluffing. I don’t think that is just a rhetorical problem as it is also a demonstration that they aren’t willing to commit to a very different set of policies either because they don’t think those policies are saleable or because they find them undesirable. And so Ryan and Romney are in the box of trying to make both a harsh critique of Obama’s foreign policy while not offering a set of alternative policies that match the breadth of their critiques.
October 14th, 2012 | 12:10 pm
My instinct has always been to caste my vote on the basis of foreign policy and national security. This disposition is based on the premise that we are still, after all, a nation of consensus, and that the two parties at the end of the day are not that far apart. On domestic issues, the victory of either party, depending on your point of view, can make us marginally worse off, but it will not risk destroying the nation and the freedom it protects. On the other hand, a mistaken foreign and national security policy could put these things in jeopardy. I was Reaganite for lots of reasons, but above all because he was an anti-communist, and I thought his foreign policy would be much better. And I followed Republicans from 1968 on, sometimes reluctantly, for reasons of foreign policy.
Admittedly in the three elections of 1992, 1996 and 2000—the period of the “holiday of history” or the “end of history”—it was difficult, even impossible, to vote on the basis of foreign affairs and national security. In reality, there were no foreign affairs. I was tempted to endorse the suggestion of one my colleagues to eliminate all the positions in international politics in our political science department, but I held back because of an instinctive conservatism (the world can change!) and because some were my friends who still had children to feed. I concede I also supported the principle of tenure (in part for self-protection). So in those elections, I pretty much had no choice but to vote on the basis of domestic politics—so I voted Republican for reasons relating to domestic conservatism. In truth, foreign policy didn’t matter that much, and you had to admire a president who fought a war without ever even thinking of putting a soldier on the ground and who bombed an aspirin factory to smithereens. 2004 and 2008 brought foreign policy back in, and despite a lot reserves on a lot of point, I picked the party of strength. Even if you maybe shouldn’t have started a war—there is something to be said on both sides of that issue—a great power can’t afford to walk away and lose one. It has not only its honor to defend (an old concept), but more importantly its credibility. Walk away and you will be sure to be challenged again.
My concern for foreign policy is not a matter of mere nationalism or “national greatness.” Don’t get me wrong, I like that we are great and powerful: Would you really want to live in Luxembourg or Rome? I mean what would you talk about? But that’s just a trifle. The real reason is much simpler. Look at the world. It’s always filled with powerful nations or forces that are just wretched, that would destroy everything that makes life worthwhile, that would ruin civilization. That’s the biggest fact. And in this world, since I’ve been alive, pretty much one nation—that’s the good old USA—protects us and everyone else from being threatened or ruined by these other forces. To me that’s just the way it is. So for all the mistakes and errors we might and have made, it always boils down to the fact that I want a strong USA.
Which brings me to 2012, and Pete’s comments on foreign policy. I admit this time, of all the national elections I have vote in –setting aside the three of the holiday of history–I rank domestic politics this time very high, maybe as high as foreign affairs. I agree that this is a tipping point election, shaping the kind of domestic polity we will have. You are either for the “change” or against it; and I am against it. Still, foreign policy and national security is probably even more important to me. I thought during the first two years that the Obama presidency would fall on the basis of foreign policy and national security, not domestic policy. The reasoning was that the President, by choice, almost refused to speak of terrorism or seemingly to take it seriously. Trials in New York, a shooting in Fort Hood, an underwear bomber—go back and study these cases and you will see in all of them a pattern—to the point of duplicity and a closing of one’s eyes—to see the possible dangers that might confront this nation. If you could make something disappear by denying that it exists, by simply eliding it, that was the position of this administration. In the face of this position, one semi-serious terror strike would have left this administration so exposed as to have risked a huge domestic reaction. Well, that never happened.
Then the president sent the troops to Afghanistan in the surge. His leadership in this endeavor has been strange to say the least. He hoped no doubt for a quick turn around without any trouble. That didn’t quite happen. But the more strange thing is this: he has been a war president without really being one. We have been persecuting this war—the “good war” to use his earlier terms—but the President has managed almost to make it disappear. There is only one reason we are in it—Joe Biden said as much—and that is to be out of it, on any conditions and in any way.
There is no doubt that Americans are sick of these wars, the more so since the President who has committed us to the most important one in which we are engaged barely defends it. The opinion has turned so much against this involvement that there is no basis on which to say anything much in public. Biden, as part of an administration that has committed us to a war, taunted his opponent Paul Ryan, asking him if he really wanted to say anything in favor of accomplishing some objective, even at a small price (maybe staying longer, or keeping a residual force). The “war” President appeals to the anti-war sentiment. He has mastered the art of pandering against his own policy. As I said, Americans are sick of these wars; people today think the folks in this region are just plain hopeless, so it’s time to stop thinking about them. Americans on the right may still appreciate hearing some general words about strength, but under the circumstances today you don’t dare go further.
If there was any possible downside to the Obama policy, it was staved off by two things: Obama (well the USA) killed Osama, and there were no significant terror attacks, outside of Afghanistan, on US assets. For anyone who would complain about “weakness,” the President could also mention droning, which is the modern synonym for water boarding. And in truth, this part of the war has been persecuted with much vigor and efficacy. It has been a silent war, but a deadly one.
All this sets the context for Lybia. Perhaps the impulse to cover up was an effort to hide the mistakes in taking the proper measures to protect the Ambassador and his team. In retrospect, this looks bad and would have looked bad. It seems it is likely more than that, however. It was part of the public campaign of denying or soft-peddling a reality. Of course it was foolish, because at a small price the President could have taken charge, admitted some errors in not protecting the Ambassador, and then stepped up as a tough fighter or terrorism. Why not? He had enough credibility to follow this path and turn it to his advantage, as a resolute leader. Instead, we have seen a public display of weakness, excuse making and a failure of honor. Treating four fallen Americans as ploys for a political tactic is more than most can stomach.
Which brings me back to the election of 2012. It is a question of attitude and disposition. Romney talks a lot about exceptionalism, and he is in a party where the dominant voices are still ones of strength. When it gets to the particulars, he is not going to be able to differentiate himself from the administration on Afghanistan and Iraq in public discussion in the debates. Nor should he risk his chances by being too specific. I do have some confidence that he would have acted differently than the President and will act differently if elected.
Links
Blogs
Find Us
Contact