Ivan the K has a lot to say.
He’s got a lot of *words* anyway. But “saying”? I think The Poor K lost that ability a long time ago.
A mind once ruined by Strauss (or Hegel, or Nietzsche, or Rand, or Heidegger, to name a few)… is forever lost.
I found the piece instructive, and it ended, albeit too abruptly, with a noteworthy critique of Strauss. But then maybe my mind has been ruined with studying Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger and Strauss.
[...] Go to the Source: Postmodern Conservative [...]
So instruct me, John. What did he say? Can you give me a clear precis?
I have made several attempts to read Strauss, and I can’t see that he had any more than two ‘ideas’: (1) the ‘theologico-political problem’ and (2) esotericism. Neither of which amounts to a hill of beans.
I will contrast him with another recent philosopher I greatly admire, G. E. M. Anscombe, who was even a Catholic, unlike the atheist Strauss. She made deep contributions to our understanding of the fact/value pseudo-divide, the nature of time, causality and perception, various kinds of modality (i.e. kinds of ‘must’ and ‘can’), ethics, and even political philosophy. She steeped herself in Aristotle and Wittgenstein, enough to go beyond them in certain areas. She actually could do critical ancient philosophy that was productive of new ideas. Her writing was often dense in the way Aristotle’s is, but was never just a mish-mash of cheap cultural generalizations in the manner of the Straussians. But I guess I really should spend more time with Strauss’s early crush Heidegger, or with Nietzsche (whom C. S. Lewis, with some justice, called a ‘boy’s philosopher’).
Nice, HT! Elizabeth Anscombe is my homegirl too! (by that I mean, she’s my favorite philosopher of the 20th century)
To get even more specific with your contrast of Anscombe vs. Strauss, one can compare her groundbreaking essay “Modern Moral Philosophy” vs. Strauss’ chapter 2 of “Natural Right and History,” “Natural Right And the Distinction between Facts and Values.”
Both saw the fact/value distinction as problematic, but it’s perfectly clear to me from looking at those two writings that Anscombe had a much deeper understanding than Strauss on that issue. The chapter by Strauss rambles on and on without about Weber grasping the real issue; Anscombe’s essay is a slam dunk
HT, I appreciate the challenge to instruct because it forces me to think things through. I meant it semi-seriously when I said, quoting you, that my mind had been ruined by my study. But I am incapable at present, if ever, of giving a clear precis of Strauss. Furthermore, I can’t instruct–that’s why I found Kenneally’s post instructive. So instead of instruction, I’ll make some initial points (filled with “seems” and “perhapses” and “ifs”) that others might criticize and/or elaborate on for instruction. Perhaps some clarity could come from this.
In regard to Kenneally’s post, I suppose the importance of Strauss’ or Nietzsche’s thought (and others) depends on whether or not one thinks that there is a problem or crisis of “modernity” (modern philosophy and modern politics). Has there been a diminution of man (e.g., man as a rational animal capable of virtue) in the light of both modern thought and practice to such an extent that there is no longer any place for living a good life (or the best life) in the world? Do modern science and philosophy sever knowledge from the good and make impossible meaningful action? Do they establish themselves on unsustainable foundations? Kenneally claims that both Nietzsche and Strauss think so. Does the radical disjunction of speech and deeds in late modern times make the very question of the good life moribund?
Or as you suggest, is this crisis of modernity trope merely a cultural generalization made by restless, foolish, or cranky literary types? This critique stings a bit, given that I have spent so much time examining this sort of analysis myself. But it is well stated. That Kenneally takes this theme of modernity seriously is evident in his recent article on marriage in the Weekly Standard.
But maybe this crisis talk is pure puffery. After all, the good life itself might be impossible, just as the life of philosophy may not be possible, and just as the best regime may not be possible. Perhaps one ought not to assume the possibility of any of this. This is one reason why Kenneally speaks of Strauss’ account of “ancient utopianism” in contrast to Nietzsche’s “Caesar with the soul Christ.” To paraphrase a line from Strauss–it is “safer” to understand the low in light of the high than the high in the light of the low.
“Safer” than what? For one thing, the releasement of unrestrained will as a consequence of the bankruptcy of philosophy and the “death of God” that stems from such lowly understandings, as well as all the negative consequences that all this has for life–human life in its relation to politics, technology, nature, etc. Strauss’ aristocratic emphasis on the contemplative aspect of philosophy, and his description of zetetic philosophy, may serve as exoteric rhetorical defenses of the possibility of the life of philosophy against willfulness and the priority of action to contemplation. This is one (I’m not saying the only or the best) way to preserve some notion of human dignity and of the good life.
In order to see whether or not any of this crisis talk is true, one would need to examine modern opinion and practice. Are the claims of philosophy or revelation regarding the life rightly lived any longer credible? That these claims are inadequate, if not wholly empty, seems to be taken for granted, for instance, in the claims made by the sciences of technology, productivity, or evolutionary psychology, and these sciences seem to be proved true in the usefulness they allegedly provide in guiding current policy and institutional design. If true, is this situation indicative of a crisis of modern life? Well, if you’re concerned with the question of the good life, then it is. C.S. Lewis, for one, certainly thought this to be the case.
So if this is the case for modernity, then one might come to see it as a real crisis. Consequently, considerations of ways to reestablish some idea of human dignity and the good life become important. Unless, of course, one rests satisfied with the death (or abolition) of man at the end of history–the “last man” and the like. But again, these terms might simply be cheap philosophical and cultural abstractions. I suppose it all depends on giving an adequate account of the prephilosophic understanding of the world as it is experienced today.
Nietzsche certainly thought this crisis account of modernity the proper (not true!) understanding of modern life. But as Strauss says, this showed his “typical Continental Conservative” contempt for merely formal bourgeois “freedom from.” Yet, Nietzsche also had no desire to make a rearguard defense in the manner of sidewinding crablike conservatism. Strauss sees Nietzsche’s positive alternatives–the idea of the superman; the attempt to establish on a new basis of becoming the “rank order” of human types; the call for a great politics; the account of how the true world became a fable as the basis for action not bound by millennia of error–as only exacerbating the releasement of will and leading to the further diminution of man. If the world is will to power understood as the innocence of becoming–if the “truth” of the world is deadly–then the greatest “faith” of the most spiritual, the eternal return of the same, is riddled with deep contradictions and confusions. Tethered hearts and free spirits, where imprisonment gives birth to the greatest liberty, and other such amazing aphorisms, suggest as much. In this way, I think Strauss’ line about his own infatuation with Nietzsche from ages 22 to 30 aligns well with Lewis’ “boy’s philosopher” jab.
So Kenneally turns to Strauss’s account. Nietzsche is more tied to Christianity and modernity than he lets on or than he understands. The rigorous probity of conscience becomes the rigorous probity (Redlichkeit) of truth and morality. The full flowering of this new virtue reveals becoming and provides a basis for the transvaluation of all values, but the philosophy of the future can only emerge after the destruction of all that has come to be. Nietzsche offers another modern revolution all the while appropriating Christian themes. As Heidegger had it, Nietzsche’s was just another philosophy of “values.”
Strauss’ critique of Thomistic natural law in NRH as being ultimately tied to revelation and placing moral virtue (now gussied up as theological virtue) as necessary to intellectual virtue shows his own understanding as one which sees an extreme partition between the understanding the world as eternal and the understanding of it as created. Taking the former position (and thereby making himself open to the accusation of atheism as you say), Kenneally says Strauss severs logos from eros. If there is a god, then it is akin to impersonal noesis noeseos. The restoration of the dignity of the philosophic life contemplates that which is wholly indifferent to the fate of the one contemplating. So Kenneally places Strauss within the contradictions of modern thought–Spinoza’s understanding of freedom as knowledge of necessity.
Let me lamely add what I meant to add to my initial brief post. The articles on Father Schall in the new PPS and his account of the relation between reason and revelation offer a good contrast to the arguments about modernity and Christianity made by Strauss and Nietzsche.
Yes, but what about Public Policy?
“To paraphrase a line from Strauss–it is “safer” to understand the low in light of the high than the high in the light of the low.”
“Safer” than what?” Indeed.
With a slight adaptation of your paraphrase with rather blatant disregard for context or original intent, I am actually rather certain as a statement of “truth” that it is “safer” to understand the high in light of the low, than to understand the low in light of the high.
Of course since “high” and “low” for me are spatial terms designating something out of reach for toddlers and dwarfs…the word choice is as annoying as “left” and “right” applied to the political sphere. left, right, high, low, left, right, a,b, start… a rather standard Nintendo cheat code…
I think I can replace left and right with moving party and non-moving party, with plaintiff and defendant, in say a political context… why can’t I also replace “high” and “low” with “means” and “ends”?
Question presented: Is it safer to understand the “means” in light of the “ends”, than it is to understand the “ends” in light of the “means”?
I want to be able to answer such a question presented by saying that it is safer to understand the “ends” in light of the “means”.
It is a cost in terms of greatness or greatness in terms of cost question… It is neither prudent nor sensible, nor in any clear sense “safer” to understand a project in terms of its lofty aims/greatness without first taking into account its means/costs.
Indeed “safety” or “prudence” in modernity is an attempt to determine the cost of the means, and the value of an uncertain “ends”. A way in which monetary policy essentially aids in boosting the economy is simply by decreasing the cost of “means”, at say 9% interest for example all your means(low) would have to total together for an ends(high) that is greatly in excess of 9%, given all other uncertainties and risks. The benefit of the high/ends, has to exceed the costs of the low/means.
Freedom as knowledge of necessity (oh look, its Spinoza), might simply be Ends as knowledge of means, or determination of project costs as binding upon the prudence/desirability of the project itself.
In other words in order to be “free”, or to make the best decision, or the decision you would have made knowing all the relevant facts, you certainly have to have knowledge of necessity, or knowledge of the costs of the means.
Now I could go on from here, to show exactly how the Keynesian insight is that Strauss, or the flip side of my remix involving ends and means is actually correct for the economy as a whole when it is dominated by risk adverse Spinoza/judge learned hand clones, and we are already at a lower bound where interest rates can’t or don’t affect the bias towards valuation of the high(ends) in terms of the low(means).
CJ, you’ve got great taste in philosophers (if not, perhaps, in political mentors). Forget the Fesers and other neo-Thomist boneheads, who are happy simply to parrot endlessly something they found in a philosophy ‘manual’ (as if there could be such a thing). Even Maritain fell into that trap (e.g. look at his ludicrous logic textbook, which is an attempt to revive a 400-year-old corpse).
You really must look at Michael Thompson’s recent book Life and Action, if you don’t know it. He is a stunningly original guy who has built further on an explicitly Anscombian foundation; this is probably the single most important book of pure philosophy in the last 30 years or so, IMHO. Also, the still more recent collection of essays about Anscombe’s Intention has some very good stuff in it (including an essay by Thompson). I attended one of the conferences it is based on, at Chicago, which was quite stimulating. Some people are starting to take her seriously.
John P., thanks for the serious reply. (It is a bit long for a precis, though.) I hear what you’re saying about modernity and its crisis; I just question whether Strauss gives us any insights or technique (or style) to help us out there. Back when I first got interested in philosophy (and religion) in a self-conscious way, which I’m sorry to say is about 35 years ago, I was all caught up in this historical Master Narrative stuff. A couple of years later, I happened upon some books by Anthony Kenny and Peter Geach (thence I got to Anscombe) which showed me that there’s nothing *inherent* in the thought of our age that’s rotten to the core. In fact, if you know where to look there are a lot of very green shoots.
Kenny, in his excellent introductory book on Wittgenstein, lays out how if you appreciate the force of W’s ‘private language’ arguments and his language-game treatment of concepts, in one fell swoop all the dross of post-Cartesian and post-Lockean ‘modern philosophy’ (in metaphysics, mind and methodology) just falls away like scales from your eyes. (At least so I remember it; it’s been over thirty years.) And Wittgenstein was just as anti-science and anti-technology as Strauss or Heidegger, if that floats your boat. He also had sort of Spenglerian feeling about modernity, and said that in an earlier age he would have dedicated his Philosophical Investigations “to the glory of God”.
It’s funny you should mention Thompson, HT- I just bought his book this month and it’s sitting on my desk! You’re giving me the encouragement to pick it up and read it.
I’ve heard a lot of people I respect say the same thing you just did, that Thompson builds further on the foundation Anscombe laid in “Intention.” I suspect Anscombe will remain one of a kind in terms of the breadth and quality of the projects she worked on, which you indicated. Her thoughts about intention were key to many of those investigations, but not always (some of the most mind-blowing articles I’ve read by her are contained in her collection on theology/philosophy of religion, “Faith in a Hard Ground”).
By the way HT, the professor at the University of Dallas who first taught me Anscombe’s work, Lance Simmons, recently published some of his thoughts on “Modern Moral Philosophy.” From what you’ve said you might be interested in reading it, here’s the citation:
“Pretense, Corruption, and Character in
‘Modern Moral Philosophy,’”American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 86, No. 2, 2012
So this is a really fascinating thread. I hope to get back to it soon. But meanwhile, keep it up, I’m learning stuff!
Warning, CJ: reading Thompson is sometimes about as difficult as reading Anscombe; he is an original. Read the first chapter “The Representation of Life” (which was originally a separate paper) first, then go back and read the introduction. Then take a breather. The second chapter, on action theory, is very thorny. And the first chapter should blow your mind by itself.
If you’re not familiar with Frege, you may have to acquaint yourself with some of his ideas fully to appreciate the introduction.
Thanks for the pointer on Simmons.
Those are good points you bring up from Kenny’s “Wittgenstein” book HT, I like that book too.
The one thing I would add is that as Anscombe said in her “Wittgenstein Centenary” essay, Wittgenstein was a bit of a “philosopher’s philosopher,” not an “ordinary man’s philosopher.” In other words, Wittgenstein left it up to his readers and students to come up with conclusions on ethics, metaphysics, and (to a large degree) epistemology that would follow from practicing his way of investigating. That’s why Anscombe is important! She’s more of an ordinary man’s philosopher than W.
His argument in Philosophical Investigations disproving the possibility of private language does dissolve many of the problems of modern philosophy- not only logical positivism but Descartes’ concept of the inner theater of the mind. But to play out all the applications of that insight for particularly contemporary theories wasn’t something Wittgenstein cared to spend his time on.
Anscombe was one of the best at doing that job, and she had the mind and the tenacious attitude to do it. She confronted the Oxford Moral philosophers (i.e. RM Hare) whom she famously said were “corrupting the youth”
Along the lines of John’s post up at the top, about what was ‘instructive’ in Ivan’s piece, I’d draw attention to the following passage, which is about 2/3 down the (somewhat lengthy) post:
For Strauss, the problem of technology at the crux of modernity can be understood as the prioritization of the will over the intellect, or of practice over theory, which ultimately has the political consequence of undermining moderation or prudence based on a recognition of human limitation. The nature of Platonic philosophy, which emphasizes our radical contingency and epistemological limitations in light of eternity, diminishes the hopes for can be accomplished on the basis of History. This is why Strauss finds a connection between Heidegger’s “explicit renunciation of the very notion of eternity” or his “contempt” for the “permanent characteristics of humanity” and an utter failure of political responsibility. Likewise, Strauss draws a genealogical line between Nietzsche’s celebration of the will and fascism. The danger of Historicism, or of the reckless liberation of the human will, is what Strauss sometimes refers to as “modern utopianism” which hubristically denies the natural political ends of man and therefore his natural limits. By way of contrast, “ancient utopianism” which takes its bearings by what is highest in man, understands the limits to the actualization of our grandest political hopes.
Ivan also draws attention to the tensions which remain in Strauss’ account of human dignity, esp. the distinction drawn between logos and eros. John, I haven’t looked at the Schall stuff in PPS, but I wonder if perhaps it falls into line with my thoughts upon reading Ivan’s conclusion, which are no doubt inspired by my working slowly through JPII’s Theology of the Body. I found the emphasis on human intellect, to the exclusion of considerations of human embodiment and the truth which is made manifest ‘in the flesh’, as it were, striking. We shouldn’t be too hasty to understand logos as in opposition to eros. I also have the sense, in writing this, that I’m swimming in the deep end and should probably stick to more shallow waters for the time being.
As for the comments on Anscombe, my thanks to both of you, HT and CJ, for reminding me of her work and its continued relevance. I’d also add Simone Weil to the list, though she writes in a different mode than A. and the others. I’ve learned a lot from these posts.
This is an outstanding thread! Bravo, and keep it up!
CJ, another note. Thompson, in the first chapter, doesn’t actually build on the specifics of the Intention arguments. He explains in the introduction, however, how he’s using her general explanatory *methodology* in Intention throughout his project. What’s interesting is that he uses some explicit insights about the ‘wider context’ of living organisms from her infamous birth-control paper (the only thing the “Anscombe Society” chastinettes read by her) to make a very general argument about our concept of ‘life form’.
Also, by the way, Thompson expresses what he’s doing in Fregean terms, but it could just as well be articulated as a late-Wittgensteinian project (as Anscombe herself would have done).
CJ, LOL at the idea of Anscombe as an ‘ordinary man’s philosopher’! Jenny Teichman, her friend, once told me that someone had commented about Anscombe’s “Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Tractatus” that it was even more difficult than the Tractatus. One of the reasons she’s so little read is that she’s so hard.
But Wittgenstein was a large-scale singularity in philosophy. Anscombe was *in a way* more conventional, but also pretty singular.
The antidote theme is where it’s at, but it’s not quite fair to say of Strauss that his main weapon in tempering the immoderation of mod politics is by appeal to Plato’s cave like description of the darkness of political life. There are plenty of instances in Strauss in which the return to the “ancients” has as much to do with restoring the dignity and abiding character of man’s moral and political experiences than pointing out the superiority of philosophy to politics (e.g. see the discussion of political man’s “reserve” in Rebirth, and repeated references to the awarness of “sacred restraints” in NRH). In this sense Strauss is not so anti-Christian or completely on board with the first wave of modernity as Ivan makes him out to be.
Point taken, HT. Her “Intro to the Tractatus” book was very hard slogging for me to read. But mind you, I said Anscombe was “MORE” of an ordinary man’s philosopher than Wittgenstein… that’s pretty easy to do!
I’ll definitely give Thompson’s book a try in the way you suggest I proceed. Your point about the need to understand Fregean terms is really important for understanding any of these books we’ve been discussing. The first time I tried to read Wittgenstein it was on my own and I had to give up. The second time was in a class where we had already read Frege’s “The Thought,” “On Sense and Meaning,” and The Foundations of Arithmetic; that of course made a huge difference.
But to defend my earlier point a little, I think that just about anyone could read and get something valuable out of Anscombe’s articles, even if they don’t fully understand what’s going on and don’t know the whole history of 20th century analytic philosophy. That’s why I called her MORE of an ordinary man’s philosopher
One does wonder whether Strauss, and Ivan the K (and Nietzsche?), have appreciated the elegant treatment of creation and eternity in Aquinas.
To bring the discussion back around to what everybody else has been talking about, I think Anscombe teaches a good lesson for those who insist on only studying the history of philosophy: there really are some good contemporary philosophers out there, and it would be silly to ignore what’s going on. Additionally, Anscombe shows that real ADVANCES in philosophy and knowledge can occur, beyond what truths Aristotle and Greek philosophy may have discovered (Aquinas proves this point too, I would add).
That is not to say that the history of philosophy is worthless; Anscombe was steeped in it, and writes on it alot. One (and perhaps two) of Anscombe’s three theses in “Modern Moral Philosophy” I think encourages the historical study of how moral philosophy has changed over the years. But at the same time, there is also her thesis demanding an adequate “philosophy of psychology,” which I take it Michael Thompson and other contemporary philosophers in Anscombe’s footsteps are trying to advance.
Not really disagreeing with you at all, CJ, on
Anscombe’s being in some sense more accessible than Wittgenstein. Glad to see you’re reading the good stuff. Keep it up, man! I think you’re in for a real treat with Thompson.
I’ve been hanging around CUNY’s Kripke Center off and on for the last few years. He’s finally starting to publish again, thank God. The Locke Lectures (nothing to do with Locke in content) from 1973 just came out. He gave a great seminar a couple of years ago on some of Wittgenstein’s later views about the natural numbers and Principia-type formalisms, which I hope he publishes very soon–very original and only something he would have thought of. Anscombe and Geach had a VERY high regard for Kripke, personally and philosophically.
HT, Thanks for the response. I am ignorant of Anscombe–other than what I have read about her. I know she had a famous debate with Lewis and that she edited Wittgenstein’s Philosophic Investigations. What of hers would you recommend for a beginner?
Despite my presentation, I think Strauss understood “modernity” to be a more or less permanent human possibility in thought and action, and so not necessarily HISTORICAL. So there was an “ancient” modernity, and all the other permutations you could make of that, e.g., a “modern” modernity. This is one reason Strauss puts so much emphasis on RHETORIC, whereas, Anscombe, et al., seem to put much emphasis on LOGIC. I know that many “Straussians” understand the the “three waves” of modernity essay as exoteric.
But modernity and its consequences end up being a theme that “modern” modernity pushes in your face.
On the reason and revelation front, Strauss emphasized the “mutual influence” of “Athens and Jerusalem,” and he saw this as “tension” indicating the heart of what is called the West. Time restraints and the limits of any particular brain make it almost impossible to grasp the whole as East and West. Though Herodotus does provide one account (logos) of the whole from the center to the antipodes and all kinds of ways in between.
Ramsey, I can’t say about JP II because I don’t know, but Nate Schlueter has a good essay on the “reason/revelation” and “modernity” questions in both Strauss and Benedict (Ratzinger) in the most recent issue of Modern Age.
Perhaps the division is that between those who understand reason and revelation as ineradicably incompatible and those who don’t.
Very enjoyable thread. But I now have a whole new list of names to add to my reading list to taunt me.
I should have become a hermit…
Regardless, great article by Ivan and very stimulating thread.
John P: I don’t know what your philosophical interests are outside what you’ve talked about, but the best place to look is her 3-volume Collected Papers. I don’t think it’s in print in full anymore, but any university library should have it. The last volume has a couple of papers on political philosophy, which I don’t consider her very best work, but everything she wrote has something of value in it. Try the paper in vol. 3 “On the source of the authority of the state”. Browsing in the Collected should throw up something of interest. Or, as a gentler and more religiously inclined intro, try the recent collection Faith in a Hard Ground. You might also look at a nice collection of papers by her husband, Peter Geach, called God and the Soul.
What a fascinating discussion. I never would have guessed my article would have inspired a spirited and impressively learned discussion of Anscombe’s thought. I would agree with HT et al that she is a serious philosopher who warrants careful study. I always found Intention an important and unjustly neglected contribution to modern ethics. That being said, I would caution against being casually dismissive of any philosopher before undertaking a serious engagement. One can certainly argue the merits of Strauss’ philosophy–but HT’s comments don’t speak to such an encounter with Strauss. Tom H: I would argue Strauss understood Aquinas’ account and rejected it, although maybe unjustly so. I would argue FN did not fully understand it and rejected it. I do, in fact, think that a searching reconsideration of Aquinas on eternity would be philosophically fruitful today. It wouldn’t be an exaggeration for me to say his account is always at hand while I study either Strauss or Heidegger on that score, or Plato and Aristotle for that matter.Thanks to all for giving me so much fodder for thought.
Ivan, I’m always ready to be proved wrong. What I’ve looked at by Strauss so far looks utterly trivial, but if you can point me to one book or collection that ought to reveal Strauss’s genius in a coup de grace, I’m all ears. (If you had asked me that about Anscombe, I’d have pointed to Intention or her paper “The question of linguistic idealism”.) I read German, so you’re not limited to translations or later stuff he wrote in English.
I think the difference is one of substance; if you think profundity in philosophy consists in making notes in the margins of the canon and coming up with windy pronouncements about Our Age vs Their Age and how we have fallen ineluctably from Their Height or are instead flying (also ineluctably) much higher, or some such, without actually ever getting one’s hands dirty with the analysis of particular philosophical problems (perennial ones, usually), you’re going to gravitate to to Hegel, Strauss, Heidegger etc. If you think that repeatedly addressing the old questions with full seriousness is always possible and may even lead to corrections and augmentations that are new insights, you might be more inclined to read Geach, who showed that any naive neo-Thomist ‘we abstract our ideas from perception’ idea just won’t fly, for example, or Wittgenstein, who lays waste to the idea that we start to grasp reality through sensation and perception, in some sort of brute way, and then fashion a sort of ‘private language’ about it, which later can be mapped into public English.
I’m waiting for your Strauss recommendation.
Thanks for your remarks. D you find evidence in Strauss that he viewed Aquinas’ thoughts on creation and eternity to be anything special, or does he just assimilate Aquinas to other, voluntaristic, revelational accounts as a preference for nomos over theoria and the will over reason?
Isn’t the problem with creation a problem of knowledge? Isn’t this Strauss point here.. that what we best have about the question about Creation and Heaven are at best doxa and only doxa, none of which are prove or disprove by logos..
I recall that John Danford of Loyola Univ of Chicago wrote Wittgenstein and Political Philosophy in the mid 80s.
Also PSR had this about Wittgestein:
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