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Sunday, February 14, 2010, 11:32 AM
James Poulos

I want to sidestep the brief, silly article running in Esquire about the increasing number of “kaleidoscopically shifting arrangements” we honor with the name family, but I also want to use it to frame what I think ought to emerge as a new vein to be mined in the sometimes barren-feeling realm of political theory. As predictable and pat as the Esquire piece may be, there’s little doubt that the new consensus on family — “straight people blew up marriage a long time ago” — has powerful adherents quite a bit further up in the clouds than the average Esquire reader, or writer.

Political theory today is a friendly and welcoming place for scholars interested in blowing up — er, deconstructing — not only marriage but the authority of the family itself. Certain conservatives, meanwhile, have recently become able to carve out a space for the defense of the authority of the family on traditionalistic grounds, especially by way of natural law.

As instructive as it is to trace the logic of Sade, Emerson, Freud, and others into the post-Foucauldian territory we frequent today, and as worthy a task as it is to reemphasize the natural character of the traditional family, both these sides of the family debate seem to me to miss something essential: a special aspect or character of the family that is non-natural. Typically, those who defend the family on natural-law grounds are happy to further demonstrate the compatibility of the nature-based approach with a supernatural one, wherein the authority of the traditional family results from the imposition of sacred order upon the natural substrate or raw material of biological necessity on the one hand and possibility on the other. But the question of whether that imposition is soft or hard is an important one; at least some commentators, particularly on the left, will not tire of pointing out the potentialities, in Christianity, particularly, for a sacred order that imposes commanding truths against certain aspects of the traditional family. The pagan, republican, quintessentially Roman family — as Tocqueville took a moment to hint — runs fundamentally contrary to the typical sort of family lived and theorized by natural-law Christians.

There are a variety of ways in which this is so, but, at the same time, it’s clear that certain aspects of pagan familial virtue are not exactly incompatible with the Biblical sacred order that can check or overcome their excesses and pathologies — just as the Biblical order imposes powerful interdicts, not to be confused with taboos, against the kind of violent desires that, to the morbid fascination of the ancient Greeks, deconstructed and destroyed the identities of family-bound individuals. Above all, for individuals in families Biblical order interdicts two kinds of pride, which combine and culminate in aristocratic nobility: pride in the unity of bloodline and virtu. Nonetheless, Biblical order has been unable to destroy both pagan familial order and the residual pride in family identity and family accomplishment that persist, especially among ‘real Americans’, to this day. It is not too much to suggest that Biblical order, in practice, has been unwilling to destroy these things.

What is true in this respect about religion is, perhaps paradoxically, largely untrue about philosophy. Philosophers, as Nietzsche made powerfully clear, are some of the most anti-family people around. The practice of philosophy itself, Nietzsche posited, is virtually inimical to the practices required of family life, to say nothing of family creation or leadership. But it is strange and striking how little else Nietzsche has to say out loud about family, because the classical or pagan pursuit of what it means for a family to be great is perhaps the most significant and enduring example of noble values that a philosopher of noble values could hope to find. If Christianity is skittish at best about familial nobility and not just dignity, as a pridefully creative project of life-defining meaning, is it not remarkable that the most venomous and blatant of the anti-Christian philosophers is so circumspect and muted on the matter? Is there not an uncanny alliance between reason and revelation against familial nobility (and what nobility is not familial)? Is it not the case that religion and philosophy both urge individuals in families to fundamentally orient their souls away from their family as a foundational source of meaning?

Add to this the rise of psychotherapy, charismatic transgressivism, and the romantic notion that the experience of full individuality, not the knowledge of individual being, is the source of selfhood, and it’s no surprise that the authority of the family as a noble institution has been, if not ‘blown up’, significantly undermined. Yet, puzzlingly, the authority of the noble family stubbornly persists, in a way that cannot, I think, be chalked up to mere biology. More than a natural degree of loyalty, discipline, sacrifice, tenacity, and vision, I think, is required of anyone seeking to cultivate an authoritative family that presumes to offer its members a nobility beyond the simple dignity of a sentient animal, even a human animal. This ‘aristocratic’ ideal would seem to have been compromised or made ‘imperfect’ as it has been democratized. But perhaps its democratization, in conjunction with the persistence of Biblical faith among many of those who retain the ideal, actually points the way toward its further ennoblement. The lingering question is how this intriguing state of affairs should provoke us to view anew the past, present, and future of political thought. Assuming we are indeed stuck with virtue in a certain way, so too may we well also be stuck with a certain type of ‘noble values’…


Wednesday, December 23, 2009, 6:01 PM
Robert Cheeks

“In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was with God in the beginning.”

John 1:1,2.

Following Edith Stein in her discussion of Essential and Eternal Being we see that all “meaningful” existents are enclosed by the “divine intellect” and their “archetypal-casual ground” in the divine nature. The coherence of existents, of finite being, is incorporated within the Logos. The Logos, Dr. Stein tells us, is the divine nature as well as the “manifold” of all created things inherent in the divine intellect and “reflecting the divine nature in images and likenesses.” The Logos is the divine nature and the “manifold” of finite created “existents.”

The Incarnation, F.W.J.von Schelling writes is, “…the most important and most essential” element of his project. David Walsh tells us in his magisterial “The Modern Philosophical Revolution”that “autonomy” keyed the German Idealists from Kant’s insight that autonomy signaled the “supreme dignity of all rational being,” to Hegel’s “insistence that only a living out of the tensional demands of existence is adequate to the idea of autonomy”…to Herr Dr. Schelling’s idea that “the exercise of divine autonomy as the deepest revelation of its possibility. It is the freedom of Christ, he constantly emphasizes, that is the key to the entire process, for Christ was under no necessity to pour himself out on behalf of fallen humanity, to empty himself of the form of divinity in order to assume the form of sinner.” So this Incarnation is the Absolute act of the restoration of creation, the self-abnegation of Infinite Being in the Ultimate act of Love, immersed in Freedom, unconditioned. A gift offered in history.

Dear God, forgive me my sins.

Merry Christmas to all.


Saturday, December 19, 2009, 11:12 AM
James Poulos

Peter’s review of Avatar is a must-read:

Avatar isn’t much a movie: Instead, Cameron’s cooked up a derivative, overlong pastiche of anti-corporate clichés and quasi-mystical eco-nonsense. It’s not that the film’s politics make it bad, it’s that even if you agree, the nearly three-hour onslaught of simplistic moralizing leaves no room for interesting twists or ambiguity in the story or characters: corporations are bad, scientists are good, natives are pure, harmony with nature is the ultimate ideal — the only suspense comes from wondering what movie Cameron will rip off next.

Last week, Jeffrey Wells called Avatar “the most flamboyant, costliest, grandest left-liberal super-movie anyone’s ever seen,” and that’s true as far as it goes — but he forgot a word. It’s also one of the stupidest major movies in recently memory, blithely peddling a message that its entire production process actually undermines. That Avatar’s melodramatic attacks on corporate interests and its defense of simple, natural living come packaged as one of the most expensive, and probably the most technically advanced, corporate films in history would seem to indicate that only quality bigger than the movie’s stupidity is its head-in-the-clouds hypocrisy.

Yet the tension here is only to be expected, once you stipulate the philosophical premises. Though liberals criticize and mock conservatives for their unwillingness to embrace scientism and emotivism both, they act as if giving in to that embrace is without deep and abiding problems. Ironically, the characteristic liberal view of marriage between spouses is a fairly disenchanted one; but when it comes to the marriage of big brains and big hearts, liberals, like Cameron, succumb to the sappiest romanticism. It’s a romanticism in which even incommensurable differences, fundamental incompatibilities, and thoroughgoing contradictions are transcended — if not conquered — in a flourish of bad poetry.

Liberals like Amartya Sen have long been on record asserting bravely that multiple identities, however radically different, are noncontradictory. (In a world in which we believe we are all composed of a smithereens of protean, Pelagian subselves, this had better be true — at least if you like your noncontradiction served nonviolently.) The triumph of left postmodernity — its identity, if you will — was to render unanswerable the question of what our identities are. Natural? Nurtural? Supernatural? There is only interpretation; and the politics of interpretation, the only kind of politics available in bad postmodernity, are the politics of destroying liberalism’s venerable public/private distinction in favor of a new one between official and unofficial interpretations. So no one can say for sure whether anyone else’s plural identities are given by themselves or by other or things. In the place of certainty — of a truth about the matter — there can only be official interpretations of what various identities are.

Where official interpretation does not hold sway, unofficial interpretation takes on the character of poetry. But whatever resources poetic interpreters discover and use take on the character of nature. The natural is simply whatever is on the receiving end of interpretation — this is bad postmodernity’s ‘effective truth’. If interpretation that’s unofficial is poetry, interpretation that’s official is — ah, but here’s where it gets interesting.

There are two competing kinds of official interpretation: political and scientific, or will-based and knowledge-based. Right now we can see the struggle for interpretive officialdom playing out in Copenhagen. Is the environment a question of knowledge, which allows us to act decisively and uncritically in whatever manner the scientists tell us is appropriate? Or is the environment actually a symptom of a deeper question of will, which requires us to recognize climate change as a consequence of deep-seated, systemic, and exploitative imbalances of power? (Another way of putting this is that the environment is not a question of science but of justice; Marx, the obvious touchstone here, is very conflicted about where justice ends and where power begins, because he lacks an adequate theory of authority.)

Liberals hate the idea that science is destined to be nothing more than a slave to the will. And lest we think that poetic interpretation is an exercise of the will, we should be clear that in liberal theory such creativity — no matter how unique, personal, or ‘individualistic’ — only makes sense as an exercise of whim. The distinction between will and whim, fine-grained though it may be under certain circumstances (think liberalism’s great nightmare, ‘oriental despotism’), is essential to the liberal embrace of artistic democracy. In Avatar, the official political interpretation of the Edenic moon Pandora is unobtainium repository, unobtanium being “a great whatsit” of a natural resource “that is an emblem of humanity’s greed and folly.” But Pandora itself, in its flourishing ecological balance, does not come with natural meaning built in. Paradoxically — and if Cameron is a Lockean, he is a most paradoxical Lockean — Pandora, which is to say nature, has no inherent meaning. It is simply a resource; the valuation which is to be mixed into it through the labor of interpretation must come from outside it.

Science is caught, then, between the possibility of slavery to will (in the person of stereotypically gruff kill-it-or-pillage-it space Marines types) and the hope of serving some other prime mover in its own mastery of nature. For make no mistake: nature is there to be interpreted. The great liberal hope, dramatized potently by Cameron, is that science will freely enslave itself to whim without will, which is love. Love — transcendent love, species-hopping love, galaxy-crossing love, love between beings who fully inhabit their own bodies and beings who pilot their semi-inhabited avatars from a ship somewhere not very nearby in orbit. Love is the magic word, the only key that can rescue science from will and so achieve the inescapable, otherwise impossible task of interpreting the inescapable, otherwise meaningless natural world. No hypocrisy needed.

But oh what a strain on the credulity of the audience. And, if the producer of such poetry himself is knowledgeable enough — as was Rousseau — oh what a strain on him. Of course, adding an adequate theory of authority into the mix — that is, a theology — audiences and authors alike wind up in a rather different situation. But that is a story for another day, and you will have to go see Avatar yourself in order to fully contemplate what kind of God lurks at the Rousseauvian heart of the inventor of the Terminator.


Wednesday, December 16, 2009, 8:33 AM
Robert Cheeks

Always illuminating, Fr. James V. Schall, S.J.  is a philosopher/priest who like Justin the Martyr might find wisdom in Eric Voegelin’s comment that “…Christianity is not an alternative to philosophy, it is philosophy itself in its state of perfection; the history of the Logos comes to its fulfillment through the incarnation of the Word in Christ.”

And, here a recent interview with this man of God.


Friday, December 4, 2009, 12:23 AM
Will Wilson

Longtime readers know of my obsession with mathematical beauty, so it should come as no surprise to find me hopping up and down most eagerly and pointing you towards Matthew Milliner’s very immodest proposal in Public Discourse. My only quibble with the article is that the proportion of mathematicians I know who view their field as “an escape from religious questions” is vanishingly small.

While you’re doing that, I’ll be putting Matthew’s suggestions into practice. You see, a long-awaited copy of Tafeln Höherer Funktionen arrived today, courtesy of Mr. Daniel Viertel of Leipzig, so I’ll be spending the next couple of days enmeshed in it. Here’s a little sample, taken from page 13:

GammaThere’s something so unspeakably charming about hand-drawn graphs. I should hope that some enterprising individual has written a chunk of code that can turn sterile computer-generated curves into faux-authentic computer-generated curves, but if it hasn’t happened yet then you all should consider this to be a formal request.


Tuesday, December 1, 2009, 5:38 AM
Will Wilson

There I was, quietly chuckling over Bryan Caplan and Robin Hanson’s back and forth (and forth) on the reasonableness of cryonics, when somebody decided to bring Derek Parfit into things.

Says Julian:

In reality, our ordinary way of talking about this leads to a serious mistake that Robin implicitly points out: We imagine that there’s some deep, independent, and binary natural fact of the matter about whether “personal identity” is preserved—whether Julian(t1) is “the same person” as Julian(t2)—and then a separate normative question of how we feel about that fact.  Moreover, we’re tempted to say that in a sci-fi hypothetical like Bryan’s, we can be sure identity is not preserved, because logical identity (whose constraints we selectively import) is by definition inconsistent with there being two, with different properties, at the same time. And this is just a mistake. The properties in virtue of which we say that I am “the same person” I was yesterday reflect no unitary natural fact; we assert identity as a shorthand that serves a set of pragmatic and moral purposes.

In fact, pace Julian, there exists such a binary property which I would consider to be the only property that matters — in fact I suspect that it’s the one that most of our pragmatic and moral determinations end up piggy-backing off of — namely the property of it being me. Yes, I’m being cute; but I’m also making a serious point.

I’ve found that the favorite rhetorical trick of reductionists when they are confronted with the brute fact that the only question anybody actually cares about in the philosophy of personal identity, the question raised when somebody waves a gun in my face, the question of my survival, of whether I will experience the experiences of some hypothetical future entity, is to declare the question illegitimate in some way. This can take a number of forms. I’ve seen people claim (amazingly, with a straight face) that the only questions that have meaning are those which can be posited in a de-personalized vocabulary. I’ve seen people claim that since the concept of personal identity is poorly defined, we can ignore such questions, since there is no binary further fact in question, which leads to:

“Why is personal identity poorly defined?”

“Because reductionism is true.”

“Congratulations. Your position is self-consistent. Now were you trying to convince me of something?”

I am forever running across people who tell me that they were “convinced” by Reasons and Persons. Convinced of what? R&P convinced me of exactly one thing: you can’t half-ass reductionism. If you share a subset of Parfit’s premises, Parfit does a very good job of convincing you that you need to subscribe to some extremely counter-intuitive conclusions. I wouldn’t count the result as terribly surprising, but it’s nice to see it laid out in a well-organized fashion. What utterly baffles me, however, is that anyone could even conceive of this as a strategy for convincing somebody who is not a reductionist to become a reductionist. In fact, if you do not have a prior commitment to reductionism, Parfit should drive you away from reductionism. He shows us what the price of reductionism is, and part of that price is having to believe, as Julian appears to, that contrary to what every fiber of my being tells me the question of my survival is not binary. Julian’s prior commitment to reductionism must be very deep indeed.

In fairness, Parfit does make a token attempt at winning over people who do not already agree with him, though his heart is clearly not in it. This generally takes the form of thought experiments in which the question of my survival is very difficult, perhaps even physically impossible to know with certainty. Parfit then seeks to parlay this epistemological shakiness into ontological shakiness: “if you’re not sure whether you’d be alive or dead in this situation, perhaps this suggests that the question is meaningless”, goes the seductive whisper. In fact, it suggests the exact opposite to me: namely that while the question is of ultimate importance, the answers are not forthcoming, and therefore when I live in the universe of philosophy of mind thought experiments, I should act conservatively and avoid transporters and replicators even if by doing so I inconvenience myself.

Getting back to Bryan and Robin, I find Bryan’s position to be the more reasonable. Since we have no way of knowing whether we would survive cryonic freezing and unfreezing, we have no reason to seek out cryonics, and no reason to avoid it either. I do have a question for Robin however.

Question for Robin (and anybody else who wants to upload): Suppose that I tell you that I have perfected a method of uploading your brain onto a computer, destroying your original brain, and then writing the computer brain data into a fresh biological brain in a manner that achieves arbitrarily fine physical accuracy. My method is foolproof in the sense that the newly “printed” copy of you can be guaranteed to respond in an identical manner to the old you when presented with identical stimuli. If you are certain that you would survive uploading, then the compensation I would have to provide you to test my machine should approach the value of your time, plus a fair price for any pain and suffering incurred. If the process is painless, and I conduct it during a time when you are asleep, extremely bored, or otherwise unable to accomplish anything useful; then you should accept any amount of compensation to try out my machine.

Would you accept any amount? I suspect that you would demand significant compensation, and that this is related to the fact that you are uncertain as to whether you would survive uploading.


Monday, November 23, 2009, 12:52 PM
Will Wilson

Rod Dreher is concerned about certain trends in law enforcement. He quotes Reul Marc Gerecht saying:

For the FBI, religion remains a much too sensitive subject, much more so than the threatening ideologies of yesteryear. Imagine if Maj. Hasan had been an officer during the Cold War, regularly expressing his sympathy for the Soviet Union and American criminality against the working man. Imagine him writing to a KGB front organization espousing socialist solidarity. The major would have been surrounded by counterintelligence officers.

Dreher goes on to say:

We Americans, religious and secular both, have powerful fundamental views about religion that put radical Islam in a certain context, one that prevents us from understanding how unlike other American religious expressions it is — and how much of a threat it is to the civil order. If you think of radical Islam not as a religion, but as a hostile ideology (e.g., communism), its nature becomes clearer.

Dreher is broadly correct here. The issue is not so much one of political correctness and over-sensitivity, but rather that Americans are used to an environment in which religion has been profoundly culturally neutered. Bloom puts it well [emphasis mine]:

Hobbes and Locke, and the American Founders following them, intended to palliate extreme beliefs, particularly religious beliefs, which led to civil strife. The members of sects had to obey the laws and be loyal to the Constitution; if they did so, others had to leave them alone, however distasteful their beliefs might be. In order to make this arrangement work, there was a conscious, if covert, effort to weaken religious beliefs, partly by assigning — as a result of great epistemological effort — religion to the realm of opinion as opposed to knowledge.

Many observers neglect the fact that the United States government is unusually tolerant of religious sentiment by the standards of secular governments that lack established churches. Our “wall of separation” is nothing compared to that in France, in Germany or, until a couple of years ago and possibly even now, in Turkey. There are few places in the world, and there were even fewer prior to the current wave of Americanization, where religion is viewed so comfortably as a private affair. Concerns about “moralistic therapeutic deism” miss the point — MTD is not a terrifying new movement that has leapt out of a closet and is now poisoning our children; it’s as old as America, the culmination of a long tradition of the secular authorities tolerating religion so long as it is not threatening and religion adapting to this climate by becoming non-threatening.

One can hardly blame the FBI for failing to take Hasan’s religion seriously. Unlike the vast majority of nations, America has had no significant history of religious violence or fanaticism since its founding. Radical political ideologies, on the other hand, are a great deal more familiar. Our country was founded by ideologues (yes, I only partially accept Charles Beard’s Marxist interpretation of the Constitution) and continues to produce large numbers of them to this day.

I strongly suspect that the compromise whereby religion agreed to be politically and culturally neutered in return for state tolerance is beginning to show some cracks. Should this occur, it will be bad for public order but from a Nietzschean (Dionysian) perspective the cultural effects may be salutary.  Can we really expect the American volksgeist to become more passionate and less practical? Unclear, but I imagine that if stricter separation of church and state appears on the horizon, it will be a result not of the increasing secularization of our society, but rather of religion becoming a more serious threat to the political order.


Monday, November 16, 2009, 9:45 AM
James Poulos

The list is the origin of culture. It’s part of the history of art and literature. What does culture want? To make infinity comprehensible. It also wants to create order — not always, but often. And how, as a human being, does one face infinity? How does one attempt to grasp the incomprehensible? Through lists, through catalogs, through collections in museums and through encyclopedias and dictionaries. There is an allure to enumerating how many women Don Giovanni slept with: It was 2,063, at least according to Mozart’s librettist, Lorenzo da Ponte. We also have completely practical lists — the shopping list, the will, the menu — that are also cultural achievements in their own right. — Umberto Eco (via, via)

Talk about bad examples. Mozart’s librettist, an amazing and in some respects ominous figure, used the Don to dramatize very near the opposite of what Eco claims. Da Ponte was born and raised Jewish; before his Catholic conversion, his name was Emanuele Conegliano. He was well-educated. Any learned Catholic Jew writing a Don Giovanni libretto knows well enough where the Don came from — the Spanish priest Tirso de Molina, whose Trickster of Seville and the Stone Guest brought Don Juan into the world. Trickster is too coy a word for the Don, one the Don would use himself to mask what he is. The Don, with his lists, counts his conquests (i.e., rapes and cruel seductions) of women (and girls) as conquests of the world. But the Don’s conquests bring death, not life, to culture. The Don’s stone guest is the ghost of Don Gonzalo, the father of yet another poor conquest, who tried to avenge her honor but failed to kill the Don. But the stone guest is also Fate, whom the Don mocks and defies. Fate gets him in the end. The Don is an agent of destruction; to rebel against death and damnation, he deals death and dishonor. The Don is not trying to reconcile himself to the infinite but to use finitude as a weapon against that which endures. The Don must know his war on the very foundations of culture is ‘futile’ from his own point of vantage. He will mock and deride daughters, fathers, and Fate until whichever day, whether near or far, some combination of the three catch up with and destroy him. No matter how he lowers, parodies, and disgraces, order (and, in a Christian formulation beyond the pagan one of Fate, grace) will prevail. Yet the Don carries on. The Don is a nihilist. Masquerading as a great achiever of culture, he is actually a scourge of culture. His defense of his list is just as Eco hints — those seductions are, merely, ‘completely practical’. The achievement of that line of argument is not cultural but anti-cultural.

UPDATE: Read Alan’s selections from Auden’s “Infernal Science”! The difference between an itemized list of provisions or words and a list of conquests or captives or kills is a difference between the life and death of culture because it is the difference between not cursing and cursing unique persons and souls. The Don curses by reducing persons to numbers — and there is no consolation in the ’specificity’ of being, say, the 7th victim of a rapist, the 284,341st victim of a Great Leader, or the 1,984th score of a sexual athlete.


Tuesday, October 27, 2009, 4:29 PM
Will Wilson

Exciting news from the Bayside City Council elections:

the Queens Tribune reported that a conservative Republican was running a strong race in the 19th district and had a chance to win in the overwhelmingly Democratic city. But this was a conservative Republican with a difference: Dan Halloran is the spiritual leader of a local pagan group that worships Norse gods.

What’s the difference? Odin-worship just screams ‘conservative’ to me! Just look at the role model; I mean, you’ve got hanging from the world tree pierced by a spear (fiscal responsibility), plucking out an eye at the Well of Urd to gain wisdom (good education policy), not to mention rituals in which eight groups of eight animals were hanged on eight consecutive days, culminating with the hanging of eight innocent men on the eighth day (tough on crime).

Furthermore, we are told, Halloran is a real Odinist, not one of those sissy neo-Wiccans that you meet in head shops. Look:

When Halloran founded New Normandy seven years ago, he was looking for something much more formal and traditional. Sancio describes it as “definitely on the historically accurate end of the spectrum.”

Sancio and Bloch say that the ritual of “blot” can involve sacrificing a valued object, but sometimes it involves killing an animal. Bloch stresses that this happens only “on very rare occasions, and when it’s done, it’s done by someone who knows what they’re doing.” Bloch likens it to Kosher or Halal butchering. The animal — usually a lamb, pig or chicken — is subsequently roasted and consumed. Bloch calls it “a kind of sacral barbecue.”

Sometimes killing an animal? Wait a second! This doesn’t sound like any Odin-worship that I’ve ever heard of!

Odin, the chief god of the Norse, was associated with death by hanging, and a possible practice of Odinic sacrifice by strangling has some archeological support in the existence of bodies perfectly preserved by the acid of the Jutland (later taken over by the Daner people) peatbogs, into which they were cast after having been strangled.

Behold the Nu-Paganism! It’s like Eros lo volt, but with more tea-candles and some period garb. I’m reminded once again of this exchange from Neil Gaiman’s American Gods:

“… My friend and I were disagreeing over what the word ‘Easter’ means. Would you happen to know?”

The girl stared at him as if green toads had begun to push their way between his lips. Then she said, “I don’t know about any of that Christian stuff. I’m a pagan.”

“And tell me, as a pagan, who do you worship?”

“Worship?”

“That’s right. I imagine you must have a pretty wide-open field. So to whom do you set up the household altar? To whom do you bow down? To whom do you pray at dawn and at dusk?”

Her lips described several shapes without saying anything before she said, “The female principle. It’s an empowerment thing. You know?”

“Indeed. And this female principle of yours. Does she have a name?”

“She’s the goddess within us all,” said the girl with the eyebrow ring, color rising to her cheek. “She doesn’t need a name.”

“Ah, … so do you have mighty bacchanals in her honor? Do you drink blood wine under the full moon while scarlet candles burn in silver candleholders? Do you step naked into the seafoam, chanting ecstatically to your nameless goddess while the waves lick at your legs, lapping your thighs like the tongues of a thousand leopards?”

“You’re making fun of me,” she said. “We don’t do any of that stuff you were saying.”

“There,” said Wednesday, “is one who ‘does not have the faith and will not have the fun,’ Chesterton. Pagan indeed.

Somewhere, the students of Hampden College are slowly shaking their heads with dismay.


Sunday, October 4, 2009, 9:56 AM
James Poulos

to all for making September our biggest month of visits ever.

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