SUBSCRIBER LOGIN






Search First Things

Advanced Search

RSS

Postmodern Conservative
Archive

Categories

Monthly


Masthead

Founding Editor
James Poulos

Contributing Blog Editors
James Ceaser
Ralph Hancock
Peter Lawler

Associate Bloggers
Samuel Goldman
Jonathan Jones
Jason Joseph
John Presnall
Carl Scott
Pete Spiliakos

Blogroll




Sunday, November 14, 2010, 3:28 PM

Considering that many of the scholars that blog here are, to one degree or another, Straussians, I found this blog over at Spengler…well, informative.

http://www.firstthings.com/blogs/spengler/2010/10/22/leo-strauss-destroyer-of-judaism/

Because I’ve not read Strauss and what I know of him I’ve picked up here, I was wondering if any of our learned PoMoCon bloggers or ‘commentors’  might care to respond? Pick up the gauntlet as it were. 

Spengler, it should be noted, is a brilliant gentleman and scholar and not in the habit of disparaging Jews.


Wednesday, October 27, 2010, 8:53 PM

Here are some insightful excerpts from, “Secret Cinema: A Gnostic Vision in Film,”  a book by Wake Forest University English Professor, Eric Wilson:

http://www.voegelinview.com/secret-cinema-gnostic-film-pt1.html

Professor Peters, a clever writer and provocateur at The Front Porch Republic defines a ‘gnostic’ as an individual not very happy with reality. And, I like that definition very much, though it’s lacking in depth.

What has me pouring over my Stein is Voegelin’s comment in “The New Science of Politics” that:

“Gnostic movements were not satisfied with filling the vacuum of civil theology; they tended to abolish Christianity. In the earlier phases of the movement the attack was still disguised as Christian “spiritualization” or “reform”; in the later phases, with the more radical immanentization of the eschaton, it became openly anti-Christian. As a consequence, wherever gnostic movements spread they destroyed the truth of the open soul; a whole area of differentiated reality that had been gained by philosophy, and Christianity was ruined.”

The above strikes me as an explication or the denouement of (tensional movement?) evil in a derailed world-immanent reality, where that truth that addresses the question of the order of the soul is ‘repressed,’ and the spiritual effort as Voegelin says, is to destroy that order (soul). Perhaps, it is best understood as that pneumopathology, that infection of the spirit, that inhibits and interrupts and acts on the transition of the modes of being from potentiality to actuality revealed in the mode of ‘time and temporal existence.’ (See Edith Stein’s “Finite and Infinite Being 38-9). 

I’m going to take Martha and go see M. Night’s latest, “Devil.”

“All creatures,” St. Edith writes,”have a triune structure as substances that stand upon themselves and that are filled with meaning and power. And all self-dependent structures pertain to a triune (body-soul-spirit) unfolding of their being.”


Sunday, August 8, 2010, 9:18 PM

 Over the weekend, courtesy of my friends at Netflicks, the wife and I watched what may be the most under appreciated film in quite some time, The Last Station.

Beautifully filmed while adhering closely to period costume, architecture, and environment (1910 Russia) the drama examines both noetically and pneumatically the final year of the life of the great Russian novelist, Leo Tolstoi.

Christopher Plummer portrays Tolstoi, perhaps capping an illustrious acting career with a role that succeeds on every level in capturing both the writer’s genius and spirit. The man even looks like Tolstoi.

The English actress Helen Mirren plays Tolsoi’s wife with a vicious tenacity of a woman, not so much scorned, but rather reduced in her role as matriarch, lover, and wife by a spiritually absent and failed husband.  Reduced in circumstance, she is, in her dotage, determined to both protect her family and its place in society and to save her love for Tolstoi, her paramour and husband as he confronts and engages God.

Both Mr. Plummer and Ms. Mirren are deserving of Academy Awards. Unfortunately, Hollywood is a poor judge of such things.

Paul Giammatti plays the leader or the factor of a group, perhaps the Doukhobors (Spirit Fighters) that Tolstoi was helping at the end of his life, with a decided panache. Giammatti’s character, and I do apologize for not remembering his Russian name, manages to capture the fervor of the fanatical true believer who uses Tolstoi’s fame to gain money and power for his organization and who, never-the-less is also a man seeking God. He has a wonderfully written line, perfectly delivered, where he counsels one of his associates to keep the Countess Tolstoi away from her dying husband, because she’d try to bring a priest and “..we don’t need it to get out that he turned back to the church.” Giammatti’s acting talents provide the audience with some idea of the spiritual and political turmoil active in Russia during this pre-revolutionary period.

This is an outstanding film that, I think, captures the essence of Tolstoi’s last days and his sundry relationships particularly with his wife. I think it might have better explicated or illustrated Tolstoi’s quest for the Divine, a quest that had elements of von Schelling’s explanation that love can only exist in a condition where both God and being are free to act independently, to freely choose to love, and to define a “free expression of self only if it respects the same in the other.” Perhaps, Tolstoi was on the right course, seeking the Whole through the fragments where “…being is not my being, for everything is only of God, or of the All.”

But, it is difficult for me not to think that, in the end, Tolstoi like all of us, is to some extent, Nekhlyudov, the primary character in his novel Resurrection. And, the movie succeeds in portraying the flaws of this literary genius who  abandoned his wife and family, turned to world-system philodoxers, and who, like Nekhlyudov, was eager to atone in order to achieve an existential “rush”, the gratification in the act of seeking forgiveness in the rejection of the material.


Tuesday, June 8, 2010, 10:06 AM

Let’s take the solemn dress code away from the Goths, the Rosaries away from the gangs, the blood & death fixation away from the scene-kids, the art away from the academics, the Latin away from the Harry Potter geeks, the bi-location away from Siegfried & Roy, the exorcisms away from Art Bell, the Angels away from Hollywood, the bling away from the players, the stigmatas away from the Arquettes, and the ghosts away from the new agers. In Denver there’s a beautiful downtown cathedral called the Church of the Holy Ghost. Who’s not curious about what goes on in there?

Read it all.


Tuesday, May 25, 2010, 10:21 AM

In response to the Rhetoric Society of America’s inquiry – what are Pope Benedict’s reasons for positioning the Catholic Church as an essential link between enterprise and justice, and as a significant voice in the public discussion of globalization – I suggest a “spiritual argument of restoration.”

Leaders of the Catholic Church since the rise of industrialization have affirmed the rights of labor. An argument could be made that without Pope Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical Rerum Novarum, which criticized communism and capitalism while supporting private property and the growth of unions, Western labor movements would have been weaker. Such teachings have strongly recurrent themes: an emphasis upon the human person, the dignity of work, and the importance of community. These take strong precedence over the state and market, which must possess the moral foundation of a dignity inherent to humanity, and gifted by the Creator, to properly function…..

(more…)


Sunday, February 14, 2010, 11:32 AM

I want to sidestep the brief, silly article running in Esquire about the increasing number of “kaleidoscopically shifting arrangements” we honor with the name family, but I also want to use it to frame what I think ought to emerge as a new vein to be mined in the sometimes barren-feeling realm of political theory. As predictable and pat as the Esquire piece may be, there’s little doubt that the new consensus on family — “straight people blew up marriage a long time ago” — has powerful adherents quite a bit further up in the clouds than the average Esquire reader, or writer.

Political theory today is a friendly and welcoming place for scholars interested in blowing up — er, deconstructing — not only marriage but the authority of the family itself. Certain conservatives, meanwhile, have recently become able to carve out a space for the defense of the authority of the family on traditionalistic grounds, especially by way of natural law.

As instructive as it is to trace the logic of Sade, Emerson, Freud, and others into the post-Foucauldian territory we frequent today, and as worthy a task as it is to reemphasize the natural character of the traditional family, both these sides of the family debate seem to me to miss something essential: a special aspect or character of the family that is non-natural. Typically, those who defend the family on natural-law grounds are happy to further demonstrate the compatibility of the nature-based approach with a supernatural one, wherein the authority of the traditional family results from the imposition of sacred order upon the natural substrate or raw material of biological necessity on the one hand and possibility on the other. But the question of whether that imposition is soft or hard is an important one; at least some commentators, particularly on the left, will not tire of pointing out the potentialities, in Christianity, particularly, for a sacred order that imposes commanding truths against certain aspects of the traditional family. The pagan, republican, quintessentially Roman family — as Tocqueville took a moment to hint — runs fundamentally contrary to the typical sort of family lived and theorized by natural-law Christians.

There are a variety of ways in which this is so, but, at the same time, it’s clear that certain aspects of pagan familial virtue are not exactly incompatible with the Biblical sacred order that can check or overcome their excesses and pathologies — just as the Biblical order imposes powerful interdicts, not to be confused with taboos, against the kind of violent desires that, to the morbid fascination of the ancient Greeks, deconstructed and destroyed the identities of family-bound individuals. Above all, for individuals in families Biblical order interdicts two kinds of pride, which combine and culminate in aristocratic nobility: pride in the unity of bloodline and virtu. Nonetheless, Biblical order has been unable to destroy both pagan familial order and the residual pride in family identity and family accomplishment that persist, especially among ‘real Americans’, to this day. It is not too much to suggest that Biblical order, in practice, has been unwilling to destroy these things.

What is true in this respect about religion is, perhaps paradoxically, largely untrue about philosophy. Philosophers, as Nietzsche made powerfully clear, are some of the most anti-family people around. The practice of philosophy itself, Nietzsche posited, is virtually inimical to the practices required of family life, to say nothing of family creation or leadership. But it is strange and striking how little else Nietzsche has to say out loud about family, because the classical or pagan pursuit of what it means for a family to be great is perhaps the most significant and enduring example of noble values that a philosopher of noble values could hope to find. If Christianity is skittish at best about familial nobility and not just dignity, as a pridefully creative project of life-defining meaning, is it not remarkable that the most venomous and blatant of the anti-Christian philosophers is so circumspect and muted on the matter? Is there not an uncanny alliance between reason and revelation against familial nobility (and what nobility is not familial)? Is it not the case that religion and philosophy both urge individuals in families to fundamentally orient their souls away from their family as a foundational source of meaning?

Add to this the rise of psychotherapy, charismatic transgressivism, and the romantic notion that the experience of full individuality, not the knowledge of individual being, is the source of selfhood, and it’s no surprise that the authority of the family as a noble institution has been, if not ‘blown up’, significantly undermined. Yet, puzzlingly, the authority of the noble family stubbornly persists, in a way that cannot, I think, be chalked up to mere biology. More than a natural degree of loyalty, discipline, sacrifice, tenacity, and vision, I think, is required of anyone seeking to cultivate an authoritative family that presumes to offer its members a nobility beyond the simple dignity of a sentient animal, even a human animal. This ‘aristocratic’ ideal would seem to have been compromised or made ‘imperfect’ as it has been democratized. But perhaps its democratization, in conjunction with the persistence of Biblical faith among many of those who retain the ideal, actually points the way toward its further ennoblement. The lingering question is how this intriguing state of affairs should provoke us to view anew the past, present, and future of political thought. Assuming we are indeed stuck with virtue in a certain way, so too may we well also be stuck with a certain type of ‘noble values’…


Saturday, December 19, 2009, 11:23 AM

Over at the Voegelin View website, Fritz Wagner has the first two parts of a four part essay titled, “Medieval Rationalism or Mystic Philosophy” by Dr. Ellis Sandoz the editor of the Collected Works of Eric Voegelin. The essay originally appeared in a compilation of essays titled, Faith and Political Philosophy: The Correspondence Between Leo Strauss and Eric Voegelin: 1934 to 1964, and is a delightful and interesting conversation between the two philosophers dealing with the one point that “separated” them.


Saturday, December 19, 2009, 11:12 AM

Peter’s review of Avatar is a must-read:

Avatar isn’t much a movie: Instead, Cameron’s cooked up a derivative, overlong pastiche of anti-corporate clichés and quasi-mystical eco-nonsense. It’s not that the film’s politics make it bad, it’s that even if you agree, the nearly three-hour onslaught of simplistic moralizing leaves no room for interesting twists or ambiguity in the story or characters: corporations are bad, scientists are good, natives are pure, harmony with nature is the ultimate ideal — the only suspense comes from wondering what movie Cameron will rip off next.

Last week, Jeffrey Wells called Avatar “the most flamboyant, costliest, grandest left-liberal super-movie anyone’s ever seen,” and that’s true as far as it goes — but he forgot a word. It’s also one of the stupidest major movies in recently memory, blithely peddling a message that its entire production process actually undermines. That Avatar‘s melodramatic attacks on corporate interests and its defense of simple, natural living come packaged as one of the most expensive, and probably the most technically advanced, corporate films in history would seem to indicate that only quality bigger than the movie’s stupidity is its head-in-the-clouds hypocrisy.

Yet the tension here is only to be expected, once you stipulate the philosophical premises. Though liberals criticize and mock conservatives for their unwillingness to embrace scientism and emotivism both, they act as if giving in to that embrace is without deep and abiding problems. Ironically, the characteristic liberal view of marriage between spouses is a fairly disenchanted one; but when it comes to the marriage of big brains and big hearts, liberals, like Cameron, succumb to the sappiest romanticism. It’s a romanticism in which even incommensurable differences, fundamental incompatibilities, and thoroughgoing contradictions are transcended — if not conquered — in a flourish of bad poetry.

Liberals like Amartya Sen have long been on record asserting bravely that multiple identities, however radically different, are noncontradictory. (In a world in which we believe we are all composed of a smithereens of protean, Pelagian subselves, this had better be true — at least if you like your noncontradiction served nonviolently.) The triumph of left postmodernity — its identity, if you will — was to render unanswerable the question of what our identities are. Natural? Nurtural? Supernatural? There is only interpretation; and the politics of interpretation, the only kind of politics available in bad postmodernity, are the politics of destroying liberalism’s venerable public/private distinction in favor of a new one between official and unofficial interpretations. So no one can say for sure whether anyone else’s plural identities are given by themselves or by other or things. In the place of certainty — of a truth about the matter — there can only be official interpretations of what various identities are.

Where official interpretation does not hold sway, unofficial interpretation takes on the character of poetry. But whatever resources poetic interpreters discover and use take on the character of nature. The natural is simply whatever is on the receiving end of interpretation — this is bad postmodernity’s ‘effective truth’. If interpretation that’s unofficial is poetry, interpretation that’s official is — ah, but here’s where it gets interesting.

There are two competing kinds of official interpretation: political and scientific, or will-based and knowledge-based. Right now we can see the struggle for interpretive officialdom playing out in Copenhagen. Is the environment a question of knowledge, which allows us to act decisively and uncritically in whatever manner the scientists tell us is appropriate? Or is the environment actually a symptom of a deeper question of will, which requires us to recognize climate change as a consequence of deep-seated, systemic, and exploitative imbalances of power? (Another way of putting this is that the environment is not a question of science but of justice; Marx, the obvious touchstone here, is very conflicted about where justice ends and where power begins, because he lacks an adequate theory of authority.)

Liberals hate the idea that science is destined to be nothing more than a slave to the will. And lest we think that poetic interpretation is an exercise of the will, we should be clear that in liberal theory such creativity — no matter how unique, personal, or ‘individualistic’ — only makes sense as an exercise of whim. The distinction between will and whim, fine-grained though it may be under certain circumstances (think liberalism’s great nightmare, ‘oriental despotism’), is essential to the liberal embrace of artistic democracy. In Avatar, the official political interpretation of the Edenic moon Pandora is unobtainium repository, unobtanium being “a great whatsit” of a natural resource “that is an emblem of humanity’s greed and folly.” But Pandora itself, in its flourishing ecological balance, does not come with natural meaning built in. Paradoxically — and if Cameron is a Lockean, he is a most paradoxical Lockean — Pandora, which is to say nature, has no inherent meaning. It is simply a resource; the valuation which is to be mixed into it through the labor of interpretation must come from outside it.

Science is caught, then, between the possibility of slavery to will (in the person of stereotypically gruff kill-it-or-pillage-it space Marines types) and the hope of serving some other prime mover in its own mastery of nature. For make no mistake: nature is there to be interpreted. The great liberal hope, dramatized potently by Cameron, is that science will freely enslave itself to whim without will, which is love. Love — transcendent love, species-hopping love, galaxy-crossing love, love between beings who fully inhabit their own bodies and beings who pilot their semi-inhabited avatars from a ship somewhere not very nearby in orbit. Love is the magic word, the only key that can rescue science from will and so achieve the inescapable, otherwise impossible task of interpreting the inescapable, otherwise meaningless natural world. No hypocrisy needed.

But oh what a strain on the credulity of the audience. And, if the producer of such poetry himself is knowledgeable enough — as was Rousseau — oh what a strain on him. Of course, adding an adequate theory of authority into the mix — that is, a theology — audiences and authors alike wind up in a rather different situation. But that is a story for another day, and you will have to go see Avatar yourself in order to fully contemplate what kind of God lurks at the Rousseauvian heart of the inventor of the Terminator.


Wednesday, December 16, 2009, 8:33 AM

Always illuminating, Fr. James V. Schall, S.J.  is a philosopher/priest who like Justin the Martyr might find wisdom in Eric Voegelin’s comment that “…Christianity is not an alternative to philosophy, it is philosophy itself in its state of perfection; the history of the Logos comes to its fulfillment through the incarnation of the Word in Christ.”

And, here a recent interview with this man of God.


Friday, December 4, 2009, 12:23 AM

Longtime readers know of my obsession with mathematical beauty, so it should come as no surprise to find me hopping up and down most eagerly and pointing you towards Matthew Milliner’s very immodest proposal in Public Discourse. My only quibble with the article is that the proportion of mathematicians I know who view their field as “an escape from religious questions” is vanishingly small.

While you’re doing that, I’ll be putting Matthew’s suggestions into practice. You see, a long-awaited copy of Tafeln Höherer Funktionen arrived today, courtesy of Mr. Daniel Viertel of Leipzig, so I’ll be spending the next couple of days enmeshed in it. Here’s a little sample, taken from page 13:

GammaThere’s something so unspeakably charming about hand-drawn graphs. I should hope that some enterprising individual has written a chunk of code that can turn sterile computer-generated curves into faux-authentic computer-generated curves, but if it hasn’t happened yet then you all should consider this to be a formal request.

Older Posts »

Links

Blogs

Find Us

Contact