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Saturday, December 19, 2009, 11:12 AM

Peter’s review of Avatar is a must-read:

Avatar isn’t much a movie: Instead, Cameron’s cooked up a derivative, overlong pastiche of anti-corporate clichés and quasi-mystical eco-nonsense. It’s not that the film’s politics make it bad, it’s that even if you agree, the nearly three-hour onslaught of simplistic moralizing leaves no room for interesting twists or ambiguity in the story or characters: corporations are bad, scientists are good, natives are pure, harmony with nature is the ultimate ideal — the only suspense comes from wondering what movie Cameron will rip off next.

Last week, Jeffrey Wells called Avatar “the most flamboyant, costliest, grandest left-liberal super-movie anyone’s ever seen,” and that’s true as far as it goes — but he forgot a word. It’s also one of the stupidest major movies in recently memory, blithely peddling a message that its entire production process actually undermines. That Avatar‘s melodramatic attacks on corporate interests and its defense of simple, natural living come packaged as one of the most expensive, and probably the most technically advanced, corporate films in history would seem to indicate that only quality bigger than the movie’s stupidity is its head-in-the-clouds hypocrisy.

Yet the tension here is only to be expected, once you stipulate the philosophical premises. Though liberals criticize and mock conservatives for their unwillingness to embrace scientism and emotivism both, they act as if giving in to that embrace is without deep and abiding problems. Ironically, the characteristic liberal view of marriage between spouses is a fairly disenchanted one; but when it comes to the marriage of big brains and big hearts, liberals, like Cameron, succumb to the sappiest romanticism. It’s a romanticism in which even incommensurable differences, fundamental incompatibilities, and thoroughgoing contradictions are transcended — if not conquered — in a flourish of bad poetry.

Liberals like Amartya Sen have long been on record asserting bravely that multiple identities, however radically different, are noncontradictory. (In a world in which we believe we are all composed of a smithereens of protean, Pelagian subselves, this had better be true — at least if you like your noncontradiction served nonviolently.) The triumph of left postmodernity — its identity, if you will — was to render unanswerable the question of what our identities are. Natural? Nurtural? Supernatural? There is only interpretation; and the politics of interpretation, the only kind of politics available in bad postmodernity, are the politics of destroying liberalism’s venerable public/private distinction in favor of a new one between official and unofficial interpretations. So no one can say for sure whether anyone else’s plural identities are given by themselves or by other or things. In the place of certainty — of a truth about the matter — there can only be official interpretations of what various identities are.

Where official interpretation does not hold sway, unofficial interpretation takes on the character of poetry. But whatever resources poetic interpreters discover and use take on the character of nature. The natural is simply whatever is on the receiving end of interpretation — this is bad postmodernity’s ‘effective truth’. If interpretation that’s unofficial is poetry, interpretation that’s official is — ah, but here’s where it gets interesting.

There are two competing kinds of official interpretation: political and scientific, or will-based and knowledge-based. Right now we can see the struggle for interpretive officialdom playing out in Copenhagen. Is the environment a question of knowledge, which allows us to act decisively and uncritically in whatever manner the scientists tell us is appropriate? Or is the environment actually a symptom of a deeper question of will, which requires us to recognize climate change as a consequence of deep-seated, systemic, and exploitative imbalances of power? (Another way of putting this is that the environment is not a question of science but of justice; Marx, the obvious touchstone here, is very conflicted about where justice ends and where power begins, because he lacks an adequate theory of authority.)

Liberals hate the idea that science is destined to be nothing more than a slave to the will. And lest we think that poetic interpretation is an exercise of the will, we should be clear that in liberal theory such creativity — no matter how unique, personal, or ‘individualistic’ — only makes sense as an exercise of whim. The distinction between will and whim, fine-grained though it may be under certain circumstances (think liberalism’s great nightmare, ‘oriental despotism’), is essential to the liberal embrace of artistic democracy. In Avatar, the official political interpretation of the Edenic moon Pandora is unobtainium repository, unobtanium being “a great whatsit” of a natural resource “that is an emblem of humanity’s greed and folly.” But Pandora itself, in its flourishing ecological balance, does not come with natural meaning built in. Paradoxically — and if Cameron is a Lockean, he is a most paradoxical Lockean — Pandora, which is to say nature, has no inherent meaning. It is simply a resource; the valuation which is to be mixed into it through the labor of interpretation must come from outside it.

Science is caught, then, between the possibility of slavery to will (in the person of stereotypically gruff kill-it-or-pillage-it space Marines types) and the hope of serving some other prime mover in its own mastery of nature. For make no mistake: nature is there to be interpreted. The great liberal hope, dramatized potently by Cameron, is that science will freely enslave itself to whim without will, which is love. Love — transcendent love, species-hopping love, galaxy-crossing love, love between beings who fully inhabit their own bodies and beings who pilot their semi-inhabited avatars from a ship somewhere not very nearby in orbit. Love is the magic word, the only key that can rescue science from will and so achieve the inescapable, otherwise impossible task of interpreting the inescapable, otherwise meaningless natural world. No hypocrisy needed.

But oh what a strain on the credulity of the audience. And, if the producer of such poetry himself is knowledgeable enough — as was Rousseau — oh what a strain on him. Of course, adding an adequate theory of authority into the mix — that is, a theology — audiences and authors alike wind up in a rather different situation. But that is a story for another day, and you will have to go see Avatar yourself in order to fully contemplate what kind of God lurks at the Rousseauvian heart of the inventor of the Terminator.


Wednesday, December 16, 2009, 8:33 AM

Always illuminating, Fr. James V. Schall, S.J.  is a philosopher/priest who like Justin the Martyr might find wisdom in Eric Voegelin’s comment that “…Christianity is not an alternative to philosophy, it is philosophy itself in its state of perfection; the history of the Logos comes to its fulfillment through the incarnation of the Word in Christ.”

And, here a recent interview with this man of God.


Friday, December 4, 2009, 12:23 AM

Longtime readers know of my obsession with mathematical beauty, so it should come as no surprise to find me hopping up and down most eagerly and pointing you towards Matthew Milliner’s very immodest proposal in Public Discourse. My only quibble with the article is that the proportion of mathematicians I know who view their field as “an escape from religious questions” is vanishingly small.

While you’re doing that, I’ll be putting Matthew’s suggestions into practice. You see, a long-awaited copy of Tafeln Höherer Funktionen arrived today, courtesy of Mr. Daniel Viertel of Leipzig, so I’ll be spending the next couple of days enmeshed in it. Here’s a little sample, taken from page 13:

GammaThere’s something so unspeakably charming about hand-drawn graphs. I should hope that some enterprising individual has written a chunk of code that can turn sterile computer-generated curves into faux-authentic computer-generated curves, but if it hasn’t happened yet then you all should consider this to be a formal request.


Tuesday, December 1, 2009, 1:32 PM

The Climategate tiff continues to annoy me. I have serious concerns about the methodology that has been used in the mathematical models which purportedly “prove” that we need to spend trillions of dollars, keep the third world in poverty, and restructure the global economy in order to avert impending disaster. Such concerns are greatly amplified and exacerbated when I see something like this. At the very least, it seems reasonable to believe that advocates of Action Now (TM) carry a significant burden of proof.

What has been the response of those who have an interest in assuaging my concerns, heightened as they are by some of the non-email items in the Climategate Data Dump? They practice a preaching-to-the-converted style of rhetoric by attacking the weakest arguments of the skeptics. Hence the constant refrain of “look, there’s no conspiracy!” and “in whose interest would be a conspiracy?“. Julian Sanchez refers to this as the “weak man” argument. It’s lazy, intellectually dishonest, and doesn’t convince anyone who doesn’t already agree with you. Convincing people would involve directly addressing their arguments or attacking your own weakest points and then explaining why you still believe your position to be reasonable. There has been a palpable lack of this.

As Arnold Kling has pointed out, very, very few of the skeptics believe that a conspiracy exists. Rather, they see a small, insular group of well-connected people that has defined that which is science to be that which agrees with them; and have, perhaps unconsciously, but we now know very consciously, excluded all differing viewpoints from participating in the scientific dialogue. That isn’t hard to do; in fact, speaking as someone who’s currently involved in some scientific fights (regarding modeling of nonlinear dynamical systems, no less), it’s extremely common. Nor does it require a conscious conspiracy. It’s human nature.

And yet, those who have an interest in assuaging my concerns persist in spending all their time attacking a non-argument that neither I nor any other vaguely serious concerned person has advanced. It’s eerily similar to Democrats who think that they can “win” the healthcare debate by proving that death panels don’t exist or that comparing Obama to Hitler is a bad thing. They’re right: death panels do not currently exist, are unlikely to exist in the near future, and comparing Obama to Hitler is bad and stupid; but there are plenty of other perfectly legitimate reasons to oppose the legislation as it stands.

The tragedy of the thing from the perspective of the Action Now (TM) crowd is that I was a pretty committed believer in global warming and a believer that we had to do something big up until 6 months ago or so. Since then, I’ve become much more skeptical and conflicted. Not disbelieving, mind you, just skeptical, particularly with regard to the severity of the problem and the proposed solutions. A robust response to the leaked CRU emails by my former comrades could have done a great deal to rope me back into the fold. Instead, the utter lack of a serious response has driven me even further away. I imagine that I’m not alone in this.


Monday, November 23, 2009, 12:52 PM

Rod Dreher is concerned about certain trends in law enforcement. He quotes Reul Marc Gerecht saying:

For the FBI, religion remains a much too sensitive subject, much more so than the threatening ideologies of yesteryear. Imagine if Maj. Hasan had been an officer during the Cold War, regularly expressing his sympathy for the Soviet Union and American criminality against the working man. Imagine him writing to a KGB front organization espousing socialist solidarity. The major would have been surrounded by counterintelligence officers.

Dreher goes on to say:

We Americans, religious and secular both, have powerful fundamental views about religion that put radical Islam in a certain context, one that prevents us from understanding how unlike other American religious expressions it is — and how much of a threat it is to the civil order. If you think of radical Islam not as a religion, but as a hostile ideology (e.g., communism), its nature becomes clearer.

Dreher is broadly correct here. The issue is not so much one of political correctness and over-sensitivity, but rather that Americans are used to an environment in which religion has been profoundly culturally neutered. Bloom puts it well [emphasis mine]:

Hobbes and Locke, and the American Founders following them, intended to palliate extreme beliefs, particularly religious beliefs, which led to civil strife. The members of sects had to obey the laws and be loyal to the Constitution; if they did so, others had to leave them alone, however distasteful their beliefs might be. In order to make this arrangement work, there was a conscious, if covert, effort to weaken religious beliefs, partly by assigning — as a result of great epistemological effort — religion to the realm of opinion as opposed to knowledge.

Many observers neglect the fact that the United States government is unusually tolerant of religious sentiment by the standards of secular governments that lack established churches. Our “wall of separation” is nothing compared to that in France, in Germany or, until a couple of years ago and possibly even now, in Turkey. There are few places in the world, and there were even fewer prior to the current wave of Americanization, where religion is viewed so comfortably as a private affair. Concerns about “moralistic therapeutic deism” miss the point — MTD is not a terrifying new movement that has leapt out of a closet and is now poisoning our children; it’s as old as America, the culmination of a long tradition of the secular authorities tolerating religion so long as it is not threatening and religion adapting to this climate by becoming non-threatening.

One can hardly blame the FBI for failing to take Hasan’s religion seriously. Unlike the vast majority of nations, America has had no significant history of religious violence or fanaticism since its founding. Radical political ideologies, on the other hand, are a great deal more familiar. Our country was founded by ideologues (yes, I only partially accept Charles Beard’s Marxist interpretation of the Constitution) and continues to produce large numbers of them to this day.

I strongly suspect that the compromise whereby religion agreed to be politically and culturally neutered in return for state tolerance is beginning to show some cracks. Should this occur, it will be bad for public order but from a Nietzschean (Dionysian) perspective the cultural effects may be salutary.  Can we really expect the American volksgeist to become more passionate and less practical? Unclear, but I imagine that if stricter separation of church and state appears on the horizon, it will be a result not of the increasing secularization of our society, but rather of religion becoming a more serious threat to the political order.


Monday, November 2, 2009, 10:09 AM

Over at Secular Right, David Hume has words for our PAL:

Though the author of Atheist Delusions is an Eastern Orthodox theologian and philosopher, Lawler reports that his criticism of the New Atheists starts from a Nietzschian perspective. All I have to say is that homey don’t play that game. Friedrich Nietzsche was the product of a line of Lutherans pastors, so it should not surprise that his atheism engages so directly, and inverts so forcefully, the thrust of Christianity. As philosophy goes much of what Nietzsche had to say was captivating, but then I also find science fiction captivating, as well as some portions of the Bible.

The atheism of Nietzsche plays on the terms of Christianity, and that is why Christians often admire his work. It is entirely intelligible to them insofar as it operates in the same universe of morals, albeit characterized by inversions. So naturally Christians castigate atheists who are not Nietzschians, such a stance creates much greater difficulty in fashioning rhetorical thrusts. Too many presuppositions simply are not aligned. Where Lawler and many others declare that Christianity is a necessary precondition of humane values, I simply assert that humane values, or more accurately the values we hold today, used Christianity, as well as other religions and philosophies, as cultural vessels. Morality and ethics existed prior to religion, and the emergence of “Higher Religions” which fused a moral sense with supernatural intuitions was a process which occurred in the light of history [DH's bold]. It was no miracle, and may even have been inevitable once humans reached a particular level of organization.

Of course this sort of argument leaves many loose ends hanging. So be it. Those who believe that they have the Ultimate answer do not, and yet we continue to muddle on.

In comments, he states further that

i’m just really tired of christians telling me what i should believe [ditto] if i’m not going to be a christian.

The passage in which Hume thinks Lawler told him what he should believe seems to be this:

Nietzsche was right that secular Christianity or Christianity without Christ is unsustainable, and that the sentimental preferences of the new atheists are no more than that.

Now, I am all for religious/secular understanding, but I think Lawler’s key word, “unsustainable,” was really not intended at all to apply to individuals. At the level of the individual — that is, of at least some individuals — secular morality of the sort associated with Christianity minus Christ (and God, etc.) is often quite sustainable. Clearly even Nietzsche conceded that the sentimental bluestockings of the world — to use Nietzsche’s language — could carry on in fine post-Christian ethical style for a good long while: either until a world-historical poop-out at the exhausted and enervated end of history, or until some ruddier race or tribe came along and wiped Mr. and Ms. Well-Adjusted Secular Bourgeois into the dustbin of history that Machiavelli associated with the once-flourishing but now forgotten Etruscans.

The broader issue is that smart political theologists have always conceded the same point: there is always a more or less small number of individuals who are able to live pretty well on Earth without recourse to religion. Usually this has been on account of philosophy; but the idea developed that the philosopher could not secure the good life for the many without taking away their liberty. So a project emerged aimed at extending a reasonably good life to the many without imposing either religious or philosophical authority upon them. As far as this political project is concerned, the stakes are high indeed; the number of secularists who are content to secure a good life for themselves while consigning the rest of their fellow man to ignorance and false consciousness seems fixed at a lower level than the number of secularists who can secure a good life for themselves. In brief, ethically humanist secularists have to find it impossible to live well as self-realized parasites on a social order with religious foundations. The internal logic of their morality requires a mission, however incremental, to bring the good (secular) life to the masses.

Secularists of a more Nietzschean persuasion, of course, might find exactly this realization the very condition of possibility for living well. (Cesare Borgia as Pope — is he understood?) Hume’s assertion that our ‘religious phase’ may have been the “inevitable” precondition or ‘vessel’ of secular morality (it isn’t clear whether he means naturally or historically inevitable) can’t get the ethical humanist secularist around the more haunting question of whether the secular political project of mass ethical secularism is viable, much less sustainable — especially if that social order is not to be grounded in philosophy, and especially if the politics in question must, as apparently it must, be one grounded in rights to freedoms.


Tuesday, October 27, 2009, 4:29 PM

Exciting news from the Bayside City Council elections:

the Queens Tribune reported that a conservative Republican was running a strong race in the 19th district and had a chance to win in the overwhelmingly Democratic city. But this was a conservative Republican with a difference: Dan Halloran is the spiritual leader of a local pagan group that worships Norse gods.

What’s the difference? Odin-worship just screams ‘conservative’ to me! Just look at the role model; I mean, you’ve got hanging from the world tree pierced by a spear (fiscal responsibility), plucking out an eye at the Well of Urd to gain wisdom (good education policy), not to mention rituals in which eight groups of eight animals were hanged on eight consecutive days, culminating with the hanging of eight innocent men on the eighth day (tough on crime).

Furthermore, we are told, Halloran is a real Odinist, not one of those sissy neo-Wiccans that you meet in head shops. Look:

When Halloran founded New Normandy seven years ago, he was looking for something much more formal and traditional. Sancio describes it as “definitely on the historically accurate end of the spectrum.”

Sancio and Bloch say that the ritual of “blot” can involve sacrificing a valued object, but sometimes it involves killing an animal. Bloch stresses that this happens only “on very rare occasions, and when it’s done, it’s done by someone who knows what they’re doing.” Bloch likens it to Kosher or Halal butchering. The animal — usually a lamb, pig or chicken — is subsequently roasted and consumed. Bloch calls it “a kind of sacral barbecue.”

Sometimes killing an animal? Wait a second! This doesn’t sound like any Odin-worship that I’ve ever heard of!

Odin, the chief god of the Norse, was associated with death by hanging, and a possible practice of Odinic sacrifice by strangling has some archeological support in the existence of bodies perfectly preserved by the acid of the Jutland (later taken over by the Daner people) peatbogs, into which they were cast after having been strangled.

Behold the Nu-Paganism! It’s like Eros lo volt, but with more tea-candles and some period garb. I’m reminded once again of this exchange from Neil Gaiman’s American Gods:

“… My friend and I were disagreeing over what the word ‘Easter’ means. Would you happen to know?”

The girl stared at him as if green toads had begun to push their way between his lips. Then she said, “I don’t know about any of that Christian stuff. I’m a pagan.”

“And tell me, as a pagan, who do you worship?”

“Worship?”

“That’s right. I imagine you must have a pretty wide-open field. So to whom do you set up the household altar? To whom do you bow down? To whom do you pray at dawn and at dusk?”

Her lips described several shapes without saying anything before she said, “The female principle. It’s an empowerment thing. You know?”

“Indeed. And this female principle of yours. Does she have a name?”

“She’s the goddess within us all,” said the girl with the eyebrow ring, color rising to her cheek. “She doesn’t need a name.”

“Ah, … so do you have mighty bacchanals in her honor? Do you drink blood wine under the full moon while scarlet candles burn in silver candleholders? Do you step naked into the seafoam, chanting ecstatically to your nameless goddess while the waves lick at your legs, lapping your thighs like the tongues of a thousand leopards?”

“You’re making fun of me,” she said. “We don’t do any of that stuff you were saying.”

“There,” said Wednesday, “is one who ‘does not have the faith and will not have the fun,’ Chesterton. Pagan indeed.

Somewhere, the students of Hampden College are slowly shaking their heads with dismay.


Sunday, October 25, 2009, 9:42 AM

I hoped I could prove this with a link, but back during the presidential primary race, I told at least one person that, when it came to the health care debate, not universality but comprehensiveness was the issue. You can imagine that a pomocon has an ingrained or inherent dislike for comprehensiveness; the logic of total systems points us ever deeper into the details of quantitative and qualitative knowledge in a way utterly unlike that recommended by Tocqueville, for whom plunging citizens into the tough daily details of active citizenship would in fact militate against the transformation of democratic governance into a top-down total system. This is to say nothing of my pomocon irritation with, say, algebra, where one tiny error in arithmetic renders an answer just as wrong as do errors produced by massive, drunken recklessness or even spitefully deliberate miscalculation. (Over to you, Will.) I might add on a final tangent that comprehensiveness in a religious key seems to me perhaps to point the anxious soul toward a therapy of doubt; attending to noncomprehensiveness could in this view actually build vital bulwarks of faithful conviction. For this to work, however, one would have to ‘make an exception’ and deeply love the comprehensiveness of God.

But we were talking about health care. Would anyone really find great cause for upset with an arrangement delivering universal, but highly noncomprehensive, coverage? Such coverage would be far less inclined to seep or reach down into the minute details of our lives, making the sorts of micromanagement decisions we have associated, even before Tocqueville, with despotism. If you agree so far, Ross and Reihan have some, um, details.


Saturday, September 12, 2009, 2:27 PM

My review of Yuval Levin’s excellent and thought-provoking book, Imagining the Future: Science and American Democracy, is up now at First Principles. Yuval’s closing exhortation to conservatives, to write more clearly, probingly, and persuasively about human dignity, is problematic, but in a good way, and very important. A conversation about the way dignity figures into a tension in the conservative soul between visions of nobility and visions of solidarity might have to wait for another day, but in the interest of good blogging, here’s the most spirited or controversial part of the review. Yes, it’s about Strauss!

Levin acknowledges that the modern “lowering of aims” seems “as much a result of political as of scientific ideas.” But, he notes, “it is no coincidence that Hobbes and Locke were not only great philosophers of modern politics but also great enthusiasts of the new science, just as Aristotle was not only the great ancient philosopher but also the preeminent scientific mind of the Greek world” (11). Yet this analogy, like the insinuation it accompanies, obscures some important differences that bear directly on the future survival of self-government. To be sure, on Locke’s account, man’s relation to man derives from man’s prior relation to the natural world (though nature, as it is given, affords not a model of order but a lump of raw material). Yet Hobbes in no way grounds our social relations in our relation to the natural world. In vividly portraying human life at its extreme antisocial nadir, Hobbes appears to “lower his aims,” but not because he refuses to look upward or forward. Hobbes is at pains to show that the Lutheran vision of political authority, in which the New Covenant of Christ radically breaks from and replaces the Old Covenant of Moses, is actually apt to destroy all political authority. For Hobbes, the enduring authority of Mosaic rule in the wake of the Reformation is central to his claim that only the awesome spiritual and temporal reign of the Leviathan can save us from falling into the terminal disorder of the Jews who broke the Mosaic covenant.

This Biblical vision of the fundamental weakness of our human sociality is at odds with the Aristotelian perspective, in which the human species naturally orders its political life socially. In light of this tension, the “break” from the ancients in early modern political thought appears less a function of some enchantment with the modern scientific project than of the advent of Christianity and the Reformation. Despite some superficial similarities, putting Machiavelli with Hobbes and Locke into a first “wave” of modern thought conceals more than it reveals. Hobbes and Locke—and, afterward, the American founders who politically reconciled Calvinism and Deism—are concerned above all to achieve precisely what Levin advocates as our best hope for the future: a way of life fully open to human flourishing which remains fully cognizant of the limits beyond which our exercise of power becomes destructive to that end.

But in adopting the Straussian narrative of modernity that he does, Levin disposes us to view the early moderns as not just technophilic but technocratic—even while averting our gaze from the way in which a new Hobbesianism threatens to divest us of self-government for reasons conceptually prior to our whole attitude toward science. Hobbes teaches that individuals, including liberal democratic ones, may truly flourish only if they surrender their prideful claims of self-governance to the legal—not scientific—rule of a “mortal god.” If this argument retains any force in an age when individuals increasingly long for the apolitical comforts of Rorty’s bourgeois bohemian, content to outsource rule to legal experts, then Levin—and anyone sympathetic to his incisive portrayal of the current temptation to outsource rule to scientific experts—must be prepared to reach deeper than the traditional critical history of the “modern scientific project” can reach. Perhaps the threat science poses to self-government is so profound only because it supplements and reinforces a prior, more primal longing to be ruled.


Tuesday, August 11, 2009, 3:10 PM

John Schwenkler’s posting chapter-by-chapter commentary at Upturned Earth.

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