The really invaluable Yuval Levin has a post over at The Corner which shows that the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) allowed its position on partial birth abortion to be written by–Elana Kagan. From his post, “War on Science:”
It seems that the most important statement in the famous position paper of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists—a 1996 document that was central to the case of partial-birth-abortion defenders for the subsequent decade and played a major role in a number of court cases and political battles—was drafted not by an impartial committee of physicians, as both ACOG and the pro-abortion lobby claimed for years, but by Elena Kagan, who was then the deputy assistant to the president for domestic policy.
Kagan saw ACOG’s original paper, which did not include the claim that partial-birth abortion “may be the best or most appropriate procedure in a particular circumstance to save the life or preserve the health of a woman,” but, on the contrary, said that ACOG “could identify no circumstances under which this procedure . . . would be the only option to save the life or preserve the health of the woman.” She wrote a memo to two White House colleagues noting that this language would be “a disaster” for the cause of partial-birth abortion, and she then set out to do something about it. In notes released by the White House it now looks as though Kagan herself—a senior Clinton White House staffer with no medical background—proposed the “may be the best or most appropriate procedure in a particular circumstance to save the life or preserve the health of a woman” language, and sent it to ACOG, which then included that language in its final statement.
What’s described in these memos is easily the most serious and flagrant violation of the boundary between scientific expertise and politics I have ever encountered.
Astonishing. When medical or scientific groups are that politicized, they destroy all faith in their expert opinions. And what does it tell us about the Supreme Court Justice Select?
Update: Today (7/1), Kagan was asked by Senator Hatch whether she “wrote” the memo in question. She tried to skate away, for example saying she was “aware” of it. When Hatch kept pressing, Kagan finally said, “It certainly is in my handwriting.” Good grief.
June 29th, 2010 | 11:23 pm
[...] This post was mentioned on Twitter by Lisa, Wesley J. Smith. Wesley J. Smith said: Kagan Rewrote ACOG Partial Birth Abortion “Scientific” Opinion » Secondhand Smoke | A First Things Blog http://shar.es/mDEVV [...]
June 30th, 2010 | 5:05 am
Irresponsible behaviour, no doubt (one must always strive to preserve the perceived integrity of expert opinion by insulating it from the political process) – but we must ask ourselves an important question: Did the final document incorporating Kagan’s words express a point of view contrary to the ACOG’s position? I think not.
If the facts are as described, Kagan, realising that the bald statement that the ACOG “could identify no circumstances under which this procedure . . . would be the only option to save the life or preserve the health of the woman” urged that they included the factually correct admission that even though the procedure was never the only option available, it was in some cases the best of several alternatives.
Her amendment was consistent with the ACOG’s expert opinion and previous statements (and I don’t think they would have included it if it hadn’t been). I also think that it’s probably a bit inaccurate to describe a body like the ACOG as “apolitical”. It may be non-partisan, but since it is willing to endorse or oppose legislation it is an active participant in the political process. What they would probably argue (and what we would all hope) is that this political stance is informed not by partisan ideology but by scientific data and impartial analysis. Kagan here attempted to help them better express a conclusion they had already come to and they were foolish enough to include her suggestions verbatim and open themselves up to the charge of undue political influence. Unfortunate – but nothing like the Bush Administration’s alteration of the NCI’s fact sheet in 2002 (distorting their position on the ABC link).
June 30th, 2010 | 12:00 pm
[...] Medical Group Allowed Politics to Control Science Over Partial Birth Abortion - Secondhand Smoke [...]
June 30th, 2010 | 2:14 pm
“we would all hope…scientific data and impartial analysis.” Don’t count on it from ACOG. In 1968 they arbitrarily voted to change the definition of the beginning of human life from conception to completed implantation. Why did they take this unscientific stance? To preserve denial for doctors who wanted to tell their patients, that no, the Pill doesn’t cause abortions via the thinning of the endometrial lining, which typically results in the lack of a hospitable site for a 7-10 day old baby to implant.
Pure sophistry.
June 30th, 2010 | 3:57 pm
Raven,
So you see no problem with professional organizations purporting to hold themselves to the highest academic standards allowing campaign staffers and policy wonks to write their expert medical “opinion” for them? This clearly shows ACOG stepped into the realm of playing with language to get what they wanted. Why now should I take anything they say seriously without immediate suspicion that they are shading their views or having party operatives compose their thoughts?
Speaking of the illustrious NCI, a senior investigator there, Dr. Brinton, co-authored a study (Dolle J, et al. Risk factors for triple-negative breast cancer in women under the age of 45 years. Cancer Epidemiol Biomarkers Prev 2009;18(4)1157-1166) that clearly shows abortion increases risk of breast cancer, yet the NCI still says without a doubt that “having an abortion or miscarriage does not increase a woman’s subsequent risk of developing breast cancer,” the evidence for that based on a workshop convened earlier by the same investigator. Laughable. So will Dr. Brinton still stand by her workshop and denounce her recent findings, or continue to have it both ways? Perhaps she’s been working to change the NCI party line, but to no avail obviously.
At least the NCI is actually part of the executive branch and subject to presidential authority, which I don’t blame being exercised in this case since the NCI clearly pushes a political agenda on this issue. ACOG is a nonprofit and the President has no authority over them.
June 30th, 2010 | 4:34 pm
I know I’ve missed the point, but the American Congress of Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) was under no obligation to accept the White House language. ACOG is not a governmental body. (This differs from GW Bush administration’s strong-arming EPA, NASA and NCI). In addition, the Clinton administration supported a ban on partial-birth abortion, provided the life and health of the mother was protected.
Kagan has never denied that she was formerly an advocate, first as an adviser to President Clinton, then Dean of Harvard Law and most recently as Solicitor General in the current administration. Clinton nominated Kagan to the US Court of Appeals but her nomination was blocked by Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT).
June 30th, 2010 | 6:13 pm
Joe DeVet:
I was under the impression that the definition altered by ACOG in 1968 was that of “conception” (defined as occurring at implantation rather than fertilisation) – and not “the start of human life”.
JustChris:
On the contrary, there is a great deal wrong with this – it was irregular and irresponsible but (and this is important) it was not fraudulent. Kagan did not write an opinion contrary to ACOG’s view. She simply restructured its phrasing to make it more effective politically. Not a good thing, admittedly, but hardly the bombshell it’s being made out to be.
About the NCI and the ABC link: The Brinton paper (http://bit.ly/c161ie) which made such a big splash in pro-life circles actually contains no new data or research about the ABC link. Dolle and her fellow researchers returned to a previously studied population to re-examine possible risk factors for triple-negative breast cancer (with particular emphasis on oral contraceptive use). The abortion-breast cancer link presented in the table is an old finding (not a new discovery) made, I think, prior to the 2003 NCI workshop and included in its analysis. And it represents only one study (though, admittedly, there are several others with similar conclusions). When one seeks to prove a causal link of this sort, a mere handful of studies will not suffice (and neither will an avalanche of methodologically flawed studies). One looks at the preponderance of the evidence from papers investigating the issue, discards the methodologically flawed and comes to a conclusion. And in this case, all the relevant medical bodies (ACOG, the American Medical Association and the NCI) agree: all things considered, no link between abortion and breast cancer has been demonstrated.
June 30th, 2010 | 7:46 pm
There’s simply no medical reason for a woman to have a partial birth abortion. It’s obviously deadly to the fetus, but it also involves real health risks to the mother.
Kagan has demonstrated a contempt for the truth, in her willingness to alter this important medical statement. This certainly creates doubts, in my mind at least, that she as a supreme court justice, will adress abortion issues, or any issue, brought before the court, in an impartial fashion.
Frankly,there’s no evidence whatsoever, that this “procedure” is medically necessary. And, at the risk of sounding radical, but the truth sometimes is radical, this procedure is nothing less than a sanitized form of murder.
Due to my respect for decorum, i won’t descride the procedure here, but the 1996 congressional record, of the tesimony of a nurse who witnessed the partial birth abortion of a down’s syndrown fetus, whose brain was removed via a suction tube, and tossed in a garbage can, should be read by those concerned for the truth, which would exclude the proabortion community. Truth, for them, is one of those little pesky annoyances that interferes with their agenda.
June 30th, 2010 | 10:26 pm
Partial birth abortion is horrible, and I am pro life. But Joe-I think your position is extreme. I would rather that an embryo not implant in a uterus than implant and be aborted eight weeks later. I also think it’s dangerous to call an embryo that hasn’t implanted in a uterus a “baby.” That adds fuel to the fire of those who like to argue that life begins at birth by equating ANY stage of life with a full grown fetus, which enables such individuals to compare that fetus to the embryo that hasn’t implanted.
Moreover, I must say that when I get married, I intend to use birth control as a way of planning my family, and that if I were raped, I would, without hesitation, take Plan B.
June 30th, 2010 | 10:28 pm
I love the way that somehow the ACOG’s independence of the executive branch is being used as an argument that something the Bush admin. did was _worse_. How’s that again? Hello? The whole reason why (as the NRO articles point out) the courts treated the ACOG statement with such veneration was _precisely_ the fact that ACOG is ostensibly a totally independent medical body, a medical professional association. They weren’t supposed to be strategizing with a political hack on how to write up their professional opinion! Just imagine if this had come out during the time it was being cited at such great length and with so much solemnity as the unquestionable professional opinion of a professional body. Do you think people could have said with a straight face, “Oh, okay, but the courts are still justified in taking this oh-so-seriously just as they were going to do, because after all, it _is_ the statement by ACOG, and they didn’t _have_ to listen to Kagan, etc.?” No, of course not. People would have realized that ACOG itself is not to be trusted, because it was colluding totally unprofessionally with politicians on what was supposedly an independent, scientific, _medical_ statement.
This isn’t rocket science.
July 1st, 2010 | 2:58 am
Bret: ACOG argued against a ban on partial birth abortions not necessarily because the procedures are necessary but because they felt that the decision (whether or not a procedure is in fact a useful addition to an arsenal of tools) ought to be a medical rather than a legislative one and should be made on a case by case basis by the health care professionals involved.
Kagan showed, not a contempt for the truth (as her inclusion was factual), but a contempt for procedure. As Lydia points out ACOG should not have been “strategizing with a political hack” and the assumption made by the courts at the time was that they weren’t. In spite of this egregious violation of procedure (or maybe because of it) it is important to note that the final document, though it contained a “political hack’s” words, expressed ACOG’s opinion. I guess I’m not as outraged by this as everyone else because (even though the courts regarded things differently) I considered ACOG more like an “expert witness” than an “impartial” commentator. Prior to their position paper they had expressed opposition to a ban on partial birth abortions so it was clear that even if they sought to be impartial about the facts they certainly preferred one political outcome to another. They would tell the truth, I expected, but it would be a truth tailored to predetermined ends. And that is, in fact, what happened.
And yes, the procedure is gruesome. A lot of medical procedures are. I am against a complete ban not because I think intact dilations and extractions are wonderful and we ought to have more of them but simply because a ban on IDXs would be arbitrary (in that it would still permit the same degree of trauma to the fetus as long as this all occurred within the uterus) and would take a (rarely used) medical option off the table simply because descriptions of it make us shudder. If the argument were that IDX caused a great deal more fetal suffering than other procedures I would understand – but as far as we know, it doesn’t.
July 1st, 2010 | 7:44 am
And John at Powerline blog makes exactly this point:
http://www.powerlineblog.com/archives/2010/06/026648.php
He quotes Judge Kopf as saying,
“In forming the task force’s proposed ACOG Statement on Intact Dilation and Extraction, the members relied on their own education and expertise, obstetrics and gynecology textbooks, CDC information, published information on the safety of D&E and the D&X subset of D&E, and information about the safety of available alternatives. The textbooks were referenced for information about specific abortion procedures. The task force did not rely on information received from the public, did not interview or receive testimony from doctors, and did not draft and circulate individual position papers or statements for review and comment by other task force members. (Ex. 115, Test. Dr. Cain 143-47, 149-50, 171-73.) Before and during the task force meeting, neither ACOG nor the task force members conversed with other individuals or organizations, including congressmen and doctors who provided congressional testimony, concerning the topics addressed in the ACOG Statement on Intact Dilation and Extraction.”
July 1st, 2010 | 8:19 am
Lydia: Can YOU say “Justice Kagan?” Better start practicing.
July 1st, 2010 | 9:43 am
Lydia: I understand where you’re coming from (and accept the validity of the points you raise) but I’m afraid I blame ACOG for accepting Kagan’s suggestions and including them verbatim in the final position paper – I do not blame Kagan for making the suggestions. After all, neither she nor the Clinton administration had any authority over ACOG or any power of compulsion. The committee members could have ignored her amendments if they felt they contradicted the medical evidence. They however chose not to. Unfortunate – but forgive me if I’m not outraged.
Wesley J. Smith Reply:
July 1st, 2010 at 9:51 am
Raven and Lydia: Congratulations on a civil and interesting discourse on a topic of great volatility. You make me proud.
July 1st, 2010 | 12:04 pm
Raven, it’s certainly true that in this case it took two to tango. And ACOG is much to blame. (Nor am I naive about ACOG, though I think the very fact that the courts were likely to give them such deference put a burden on them to live up to it. Privilege implies responsibility.) But Kagan was directly involved in the tango. I think the memos indicate that she knew well that the ACOG document would be taken as an independent statement by a medical professional body giving its medical judgment. That’s why she regarded it as “disastrous” for them not to include the statement that she ultimately suggested and that they adopted. In fact, she even pointed out that the earlier version would be particularly damaging to the Clinton administration’s goals because ACOG opposed the legislation. That is, ACOG’s political position against the legislation would give more weight to an admission that appeared to favor the legislation. (I think that’s very striking.)
What she was doing was therefore being done behind the scenes for a reason. It was an attempt to influence secretly the writing of a document that was meant to appear uninfluenced so that the goals of the Clinton administration (which she represented) could be advanced by presenting the ACOG document as independent. John at Powerline puts the point well:
“This misrepresentation of the ACOG report as a pure scientific product, entitled to privileged status by the courts, strikes me as a fraud of major proportions. In fact, it was a political document, intended to bolster the case for partial-birth abortion, under the false flag of scientific objectivity. And it was Elena Kagan who helped to perpetrate this fraud on behalf of the Clinton administration.”
July 1st, 2010 | 2:59 pm
On the abortion-breast cancer link (which I think there is evidence for):
http://aaplog.octoberblue.com/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Brind-on-Harvard-Nurses-Study-II-2007.pdf
http://www.aaplog.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/Brind-Prospective.pdf
July 1st, 2010 | 3:05 pm
Also, I spent quite a bit of time on ACOG’s site after reading about this Kagan issue.
Many links you have to be a member to access. However, it is clear that they are very political and liberal.
While I agree that it is ACOG’s responsibility as to what statements they release, if they are a special interest political group (which they are, because they have a PAC), the WH should not be collaborating with them like they did, as it’s a conflict of interest. I say a pox on both their houses.
I do not agree that the Kaganizing of the initial statement did not change its meaning. Maybe in a ‘definition of is’ type of way it remained logically consistent, but not if you are doing a common sense reading of it, which is what the public does.
Wesley J. Smith Reply:
July 1st, 2010 at 3:15 pm
They are very ideological. They oppose conscience clauses for their own members.
July 1st, 2010 | 3:08 pm
By the way – does anyone know of any watchdog organizations that track supposedly ‘independent/apolitical scientific groups’ for ideological bias?
July 1st, 2010 | 3:21 pm
I know, I read their ethics person’s testimony to Congress. The statement about how pro-life OB/GYNs may see not referring for abortions as consistent with their values, but that maybe they could think of it as respecting the values of others made me want to puke.
July 2nd, 2010 | 3:00 am
Raven: The principal reason that partial birth abortions need banning is most were done for “elective” reasons. That is, the fetus had some abnormality, that , apparently, was incongurent with the mother (and/or father’s) idea of a perfect baby. In fact, I cannot think of ANY documented case, where this procedure was medically necessary, in order to save the life/health of the mother.
True, this “procedure” is probably no more or less gruesome than any other late term abortion. but that’s not an argument for banning the partial birth abortion. You have to start somewhere.
July 2nd, 2010 | 8:28 am
Ideology: “The body of doctrine, myth, symbol, etc., of a social movement, institution, class or large group.”
Wesley: trying to make “ideology” into a bad word (as in “[t]hey are very ideological. They oppose conscience clauses for their own members.”) is downright laughable. Michelle can puke until her eyes bug out, but the fact remains that ACOG has their ideology, she has her own, and never the twain shall meet. If she’s an OB/GYN and doesn’t like ACOG’s position she’s always free to go and form her own organization. This is America, after all.
Wesley J. Smith Reply:
July 2nd, 2010 at 10:10 am
I don’t make it a bad word. Hello, “human exceptionalism.” But when ideological groups pretend not to be, to be merely “scientists” or dispassionate professionals, that’s when I think it is worth pointing out. I also think it is worth pointing out that groups like C & C are ideological as they pretend to just be about patient empowerment.
July 2nd, 2010 | 9:15 am
Raven,
So, will Brinton withdraw her name from authorship of the new paper? If the data was flawed enough to be ignored for one conclusion, how can the researcher go back to the apparently flawed data to do another study and then say with confidence the other conclusion is true? Her study, now revisited, again provided evidence of an association of breast cancer and abortion. How can she simply ignore that? The only reasonable conclusion I can reach is because she wants to ignore it. She can’t have it both ways, emphatically denying a link despite authoring studies specifically showing a statistically significant link, and then going back to the same data to do another study and reaching a conclusion with confidence.
July 2nd, 2010 | 12:44 pm
JustChris:
Actually I think the paper published showed a correlation between abortion and breast cancer (and not a causal link). I didn’t really mean to imply that the data itself was flawed.
Bret:
I am opposed to the procedure myself. I agree that (1) “partial birth abortions” are disturbing to read about or watch (2) they are almost never medically necessary and (3) it’s a procedure we as a society would be better off without – but I’m uncomfortable with the whole idea of selectively criminalising medical options. My unwillingness to support a complete ban is probably based on the fact that I feel the procedure does not cause undue suffering to the fetus and that the allusions to “infanticide” are more semantic than anything else.
July 2nd, 2010 | 1:49 pm
Raven,
Undue suffering? If we stabbed inmates at the base of the skull and suctioned out their brains, anyone would call that undue suffering, indeed cruel and unusual punishment. I suppose it’s better than tearing a “fetus” limb from limb with forceps, but the entire reason pro-life groups highlight it and that we in -general find it so disturbing is that it’s unnecessary violence to a child likely able to survive outside the womb. You say it’s not very much like infanticide, but let me ask you, at what point is the baby far enough outside the birth canal that the procedure or something similar would not be considered infanticide? If the baby still has her arm in, does that still justify stabbing her in the head? At what arbitrary point do we say enough of the baby’s body is visible that a procedure turns from an exercise in rights to an exercise in barbarism?
July 3rd, 2010 | 2:22 am
Raven: This procedure is usually done after the fetus is six months old. Therefore, the nascent components of the nervous system are formed, particularly the thalamus, which is a sensory relay station, but also, is capable of perceiving pain signals. Consequently, it’s reasonable to believe that the fetus does experience at least some pain, during this procedure.
The nurse, who was pro-choice, who testified before congress, in 1996, when they originally were deciding whether to pass the ban, provided chilling testimony of her experience, witnessing the procedure done on a Down’s syndrown fetus. This fetus, was completely healthy, with the exception of down’s syndrome. She stated that when the fetus’s head was punctured, the fetus’s hands, grasped, or clenched, as if to protect himself from falling. Not only is this heartbreaking, but it shows that the fetus may have experienced pain. She stated that the fetus was then caulusly tossed in a nearby garbage can. She said the fetus had the most “angelic face” she had ever seen. Reading this had a profound affect on me. I realized that what they did to this child was evil.
I’m going by memory here, so i may be leaving some details out, so please conside reading the congressional record.
July 3rd, 2010 | 3:58 am
JustChris:
My point is that “undue suffering” is not based on a physical description of the act. It’s based on the subjective experience of the individual on whom the procedure is performed. Prior to the 24th week for instance, fetuses are incapable of feeling pain (http://bit.ly/aZToJs) so even the most barbaric looking surgical procedure would cause no suffering.
When it comes to “infanticide”, I fail to see how the “visibility” of a fetus makes a philosophical difference. Murder is murder even if we hide our victim from view before killing him and similarly killing a fetus as it emerges from the birth canal is morally indistinguishable from killing it just prior to this event (even though these might have different legal consequences). The infanticide argument is either based on general considerations of fetal maturity (in which case it would apply to all post-viability abortions and only post-viability abortions) or on our regarding a partial expulsion for the purposes of termination as a “birth”. If the fetus in question is in fact viable (capable of survival outside the womb), I would agree that the doctors are duty bound to treat it as such and take all steps required to ensure its survival – and I think some states already have laws to this effect (and more should). The mother may have a right to end her pregnancy but she has no further right to ensure the death of the child. If, on the other hand, the expelled fetus is non-viable, termination ought to proceed without legal sanction.
July 3rd, 2010 | 10:29 am
Bret: Intact dilation and evacuation is usually performed from the 16th week of gestation onwards. The corticothamalic tracts which (connect the thalamus to the cerebral cortex) are not sufficiently developed prior to 24 weeks for conscious pain perception. And EEG studies suggest the fetus is unable to perceive pain before 30 weeks. http://bit.ly/9jOt8n
I read the heart-rending story you cite (http://bit.ly/o49uj). It does sound terrible but you must understand that reflex responses (hands clasping and unclasping etc) are not evidence of conscious pain perception. They occur even in individuals neurologically incapable of feeling pain. The whole procedure is more traumatic (psychologically) for those who witness it than for the fetus itself.
IDX is gruesome – but we ought not to ban a procedure simply because witnessing it would make us uncomfortable. There has to be a stronger argument (e.g. it is murder, it causes undue suffering, there are unacceptable consequences for society in the long term). The “doesn’t it sound terrible?” argument on its own is insufficient.
July 3rd, 2010 | 6:35 pm
Raven: Thanks for your response. True the “corticospinal tracts” are not sufficently developed. I didn’t say they were. (not to quibble, but I think that, to be technical, they’re called thalamocorticol tracts, to reflect that the sensory information is traveling from the thalamus to the cerebrum.This reflects the thalamus’s sensory relaying function).My point, which I should have clarified better, was/is that,the thalamus is capable of perceing pain, even without the interpretation modification of the cerebral somatosensory cortex. It’s a primitive type of pain, but just as real, nonetheless.
You’re correct, that the grasping of the fetus’s hands could be best explained reflexively. But on a phemenological level, we don’t know what it was like for the fetus, but it, seems, considering the thalmaus, and its nascent pain perception, that it wasn’t enjoyable.
But, in a sense, it’s irrelevant. Certainly, no one could reasonably argue that painlessly murdering someone is all right!
July 4th, 2010 | 10:57 am
The relevant tracts are indeed thalamocortical rather than corticothalamic. Duly noted.
You say that the thalamus is capable of perceiving pain and I wonder what this claim is based on. I certainly don’t recall seeing anything in the literature which would indicate that a decorticate creature with a functional thalamus is capable of conscious perception of any sort. All the evidence suggests that regardless of how traumatizing the events might have been for the attending nurse, for the fetus itself it wasn’t “like” anything at all.
How could anyone suggest that painlessly murdering someone is alright? I would assume that those who feel IDXs are “alright” (and I do not place myself in that category, in spite of my opposition to a complete ban) do not think it actually is “murdering someone”.
July 4th, 2010 | 6:30 pm
Raven: I was not suggesting that you thought that murdering someone was allright. I was addressing what seemed to be implicit in your assertion, probably without you intending it, that as long as pain is taken care of, the partial birth abortion is of little, or no moral significance. You certainly seem to me to be someone of high moral character. I’m sorry, how that was worded. I should have thought how that would sound.
With respect to the thalamus. Some unfortunate individuals have tumors exclusively in this region, producing a “thalamic pain syndrome” which results in pain originating from the thalamus. Now, in fairness, these people have functional somatosensory corticies. So one could argue that the latter are essential for the pain detection. But this is a non localizing pain. That is, the patient is unable to decipher, where in the body the pain derives. Since the somatosensory cortex (like its motor cortex counterpart) is topographical, meaning (as you probably know) that its constituent neurons are arranged, in such a way, to represent the body, one might conclude that if this area was involved, one would have something analogous to referred pain, where pain is thought to arise from a region where it’s not. But ther is no localizing here. Just pain. Therefore, it’s not proved, but it seems at least probable that the fetus has some pain, when this awful “procedure” is done. The source for this, if I remember correctly, is “neuroanatomy made ridiculously simple”, by Stephen Goldberg,M.D. He provides the information concerning the “thalamic pain syndrome” but does not get into abortion, or the fetus. That the fetus feels pain at all is my own extrapolation, which could be very wrong.
But, you stated, regarding animals, that if we’re unsure which ones are conscious, we should give them the benefit of the doubt, and treat them accordingly. Why not assume the fetus is in the same category?
You seem, maybe I’m wrong, but you seem to believe that personhood is not reached until birth. Where/when does personhood come into play for you, vis a vis the fetus?
July 5th, 2010 | 1:11 pm
All pain perception (all perception of any kind) requires a functioning cerebral cortex. Tumors or disorders in the thalamus may cause pain (as may abnormalities at any other point in the pain pathway) but for these feelings to rise to consciousness they need to be processed by the cerebral cortex. Without a cortex there is no “I” to perceive anything. Non-localised pain is no exception.
We all agree it’s better to err on the side of caution. But we are not, based on our present understanding of fetal neurology, unsure about fetal pain perception prior to 24 weeks. It is, the authorities agree, not something to worry about. After about 24 weeks, things are less certain. However, as I stated earlier, all the evidence suggests that even at 30 weeks the fetus is still unable to consciously perceive pain (apart from its neurological immaturity, the intra-uterine environment also contains chemicals which sedate the fetus). EEG studies also show no evidence of conscious awareness at this gestational age. And even if these findings happened to be in error, what the fetus would possess would be more akin to the sleepy half-consciousness of a child emerging uncomfortably from sleep than the vivid horror of a man screaming in a torturer’s chair.
The cases which concern me are not so much those in which the fetus dies prior to (or immediately after) its removal from the sedation of the uterus but all those instances in which living infants (of varying degrees of neurological maturity) are tossed in linen baskets and trash cans to die slowly. These are conditions in which there is a real possibility of suffering for infants with suitably developed neural pathways.
I always find the “personhood” question, with respect to abortion rather unhelpful. It usually comes after all parties have expressed an opinion about fetal consciousness, legal personhood, pain perception etc – and one is left wondering what extra bit of information the declaration “the human being becomes a person at this point” provides (apart from indicating that one feels we ought to regard a creature at that stage of development as one possessing “rights” of its own). Questions about whether this or that organism is a “person” in the philosophical sense (as distinct from questions about its possession of specific mental, neural or legal properties) are not questions about fact but rather about how we feel we ought to behave towards the creature given the facts at our disposal.
I’ve already stated, as part of our discussion about animal rights, that I think birth is quite a useful (if arbitrary) dividing line – but I was referring to legal personhood (and, further, I do not regard a partial extraction for the purpose of termination as a “birth”). About the philosophical concept of “personhood” I really have nothing to say.
July 5th, 2010 | 3:29 pm
The point of bringing up ACOG’s ideology in terms of conscience clauses is to illustrate that they are committed to a particular moral philosophy and political agenda, not necessarily exclusively to science.
I am not an OB/GYN, but pro-life OB/GYNs at AAPLOG are defined as a special interest group under ACOG, while ACOG’s pro-abortion political agenda is not defined as special interest.
There are websites that claim no stance on ethical questions – I notice they have much more science on their sites than ACOG.
Obviously I have my own ideology? If you mean honesty and full disclosure of conflicts of interest, then sure. You don’t have to be pro-life to notice philosophy paraded around as science.
July 8th, 2010 | 2:35 am
Raven: Based on what you’ve said, can I assume that you would be against abortion after 24 weeks, or at least 30 weeks?
I would agree with you that a functional cerebral cortex, at least for humans, is essential in order to have the full attributes that we associate with consciousness. But it’s still quite possible that the fetus experiences some rudimentary pain, after the thalamus is formed, but it really would not matter if you’re completely right, concerning the morality of late term abortions.
After all, no one, you, or any other morally serious person would argue that, as long as someone is painlessly killed, that, therefore the killing is morally permissible. What’s really at issue, is the personhood of the being in question.
Some might argue, based on the nascent level of cerebral cortical development of the fetus, that the fetus is not capable of consciousness, and therefore is not a person, and therefore, abortion is all right.
One problem, among many, is that the newborn baby, is no more conscious than the developing late term fetus. So, to be logically consistent, one must accept infanticide. Except for Peter Singer, and other rigorous utilitarians, this is hardly a view one could sleep well at night with.
But clearly, one must come up with a view of personhood, in order to protect those beings, that need protection. You seem to take a view that’s essentially agnostic, regarding personhood. I’m more optimistic here.
Consciousness is essential to personhood. But must one exhibit conscious traits, at all times to be a person? If the answer is yes, then sleeping persons, those under anesthesia, etc., due to their current lack of consciousness, would no longer be persons.
If a person has all of the digestive organs necessary to digest food, but is not digesting food currently, we would not say that the person is incapable of digesting food. Likewise, a person who jogs, but is not currently jogging, is still a jogger, by virtue of possessing the muscles and neural circuits that produce the jogging.
One can still possess a quality, even if one is not manifesting that quality, at all times, the quality is there, otherwise, how does one explain how it arises, again, after being latent.
The situation, with the fetus, is unusual, but analogous to the sleeping, non eating, non jogging person. The fetus has all of the properties necessary for consciousness, all that is needed is time, a few months, for the consciousness to manifest itself. Just like a sleeping person, has all of the properties for consciousness, it just needs time, (a few hours, say), to manifest itself (i.e., consciousness). The only difference between it, and the fetus, is the time necessary for consciousness, to arise, but it WILL arise, if left undisturbed. The fact that one will take longer to arise, (the fetus), is irrelavant. The point is it will. So if, one is willing to grant personhood to sleeping adults, one should be willing to grant personhood to fetuses.
Look at it this way: the sleeping person possesses the neural structures necessary for consciousness. It takes time for them to “wake” up. The fetus, possesses the genetic code, that controls the production of the neural structures necessary for consciousness, it merely takes longer to “wake” up.
The only difference is time. One takes longer. It’s imcumbunt on those denying personhood to the fetus, to say why a longer time is relavent here.
So, to sum up, a fetus, is in a personhood state analogous to a sleeping, or reversibly unconscious adult.
July 10th, 2010 | 6:04 pm
One problem we have here is that you feel that if an action is philosophically acceptable it should also be legal (and vice versa). I disagree.
I, for instance, support restrictions on elective late term abortions – as opposed to banning specific procedures (in spite of the fact that I feel they are, in a sense, philosophically acceptable) and oppose banning IDXs (though I find them aesthetically displeasing). My opposition to late term electives is not however based on any considerations of fetal personhood but on more pragmatic “slippery slope” arguments.
Newborns may be non-rational and barely conscious but a legal system which relegated them to the status of non-persons would be reprehensible not because of any suffering it would cause to infants themselves (there would probably be very little) but because of the society it would help create. We have a natural tendency to react to infants in a certain way (evolution has made them adept at arousing our affection, at fooling us into believing they have complex inner lives) and a law which encourage parents to act against this natural impulse would, I feel, corrode our humanity. There would also be the practical problem of placing another arbitrary dividing line at some point during infant development beyond which personhood would be granted. What would that achieve?
Sleeping adults are different from fetuses in that they have personal psychological histories. They have previously had thoughts and dreams and expectations even if those mental processes have sunk into dormancy. This is relevant because when you think about “taking someone’s life” there has to be a pre-existing person to take that life from i.e. there has to have been, prior to that point, a psychological entity with an interest in its life continuation.
A fetus is not a conscious person who is temporarily unconscious – it is a creature which will eventually achieve consciousness, all things being equal. A jogger who pauses to rest is still a jogger but a two month old who will eventually become an Olympic gold medallist is not, in his infancy, an athlete.
I am not agnostic with regard to “personhood”. I just feel that (apart from in the legal context) it is a concept which has lost its usefulness. Why speak of something as nebulous as personhood when we can talk about (the slightly less nebulous concept of) consciousness and pain perception. Saying “X is a person” in the philosophical sense is not a statement of fact (unless all parties have already agreed on a rigorous definition of the term) – What it says, primarily, is “I feel we ought to treat X in a certain way.”
It is also useful to note that, as Judith Jarvis Thomson famously pointed out, even if one does concede that the fetus has an independent “right to life”, abortion is not ruled out – though elective terminations might be (The “right to abortion” does not rest on denying fetal personhood).
July 11th, 2010 | 3:20 am
That last sentence should have read “though the range of elective terminations may have to be curtailed“.
One of the major thrusts of JJT’s famous “In Defense of Abortion” was, of course, that elective abortions are permissible even if we concede fetal personhood.
July 11th, 2010 | 11:06 pm
Raven, thanks for your thoughtful comments. In this wonderful new blogworld, anyone can say pretty much anything, regardless of the level of stupidity. Thanks for helping to reduce this.
Providing a strong rational basis for are legal system, is, in my view, essential. It’s essential, because laws without a basis in truth, are meaningless, or at best, merely pragmatic. Pragmatism has its place, no doubt, but only when we’re unable to provide a firm, axiomatic basis for our beliefs, that formulate our laws. Clearly, we want, to the best of our flawed ability, to have only laws that can be philosophically supported. Otherwise, they’re laws in name only, and one has no basis for arguing that people have an obligation to support them. How could you retort to the person who says:”they’re only made up by legislators, who have no rational basis for them, so I have no rational or moral reason to follow them”.
My analogy, between the sleeping adult human, and the fetus, essentially revolved around time. That is, they’re both unconscious, they’re both going to be conscious, at a particular time. The only difference, between the two, with respect to time, is that one will take longer to become conscious than the other. The challenge for you, or anyone who wishes to refute my argument, is to show why a longer wating period, should be morally relevant. Since they’re both going to be conscious, and they both have the genetic code, that’s human, that causes one to be human, it’s simply irrelevant to say one has more moral status than the other.
You argue that the sleeping adult, had a mental life prior to the sleeping period. This is true. But, a person prior to dying, had a mental life as well, but no one would argue that a corpse is a person, by virtue of his previous living, and mental life.
Some might say that the fetus, is in the same category, only in reverse. But that’s not really the case. The fetus has all of the genetic information that makes her human. If left unharmed, she will fully realize her consciousness. She’s no different than the sleeping adult, in that they will both be conscious, except one takes longer.
Neurons, that form the brain, produce consciousness. Each of the billions of neurons, that constitute the brain, have genetic information, in the form of DNA that was present at conception. The DNA in the neurons controls the proteins produced in the neurons, that will produce consciousness. So, the DNA is the ultimate controller of consciousness, and it’s present in the fetus. My argument is, that since the fetus possesses the DNA necessary for consciousness, she’s in an analogous state, to the sleeping adult, who has the DNA,that causes the neurons to be produced, and that causes these neurons to produce consciousness. Why should the latter have more moral standing, merely because it’s in a later stage of development. With this logic, one would be commited to saying that a fifty year old human, would have more moral standing than a sixteen year old human, by virtue or the former having more developed frontal lobes (in the brain). That is, both groups (fetus juxtiposed with sleeping adult, and teenager juxtiposed with fifty year old) are analogous in the sense that they are all human, but merely in different stages of develpoment. Since all are human, it’s incumbunt on the sceptic, vis a vis fetal personhood, to come up with a reason for why stages of develpoment are germane to human moral standing.
It’s impotant to make some philosophical distinctions. You state that the fetus is not a conscious person who is temporarily unconscious, it is a creature that will eventually become conscious. I agree. I never stated otherwise. You seem to be assuming that I’m speaking of fetuses and sleeping adults in a univicol fashion, as opposed to what I was doing, which was speaking of them in an anological fashion. They’re similar, but, in relevant ways, but not the same in every respect.
Thompson, is a respected and intelligent philosopher. She presents a respectable argument. For those unfamilar, I’ll briefly summerize/paraphrase her argument: We have two adults. One is completely healthy, one needs to have his blood filtered by by the former, in order to live. Now, this will only need to occur for nine months. Surely, she contends, this would be a very kind thing for the healthy person to do, but it’s not morally mandatory for her to do so, and therefore the law should never command her to do so. Since most people will concede that the healthy woman should not have to do this, since it would violate her liberty rights, if it’s against her will, certainly, to be logically consistent, one should not mandate that a woman should carry a fetus to term, against her will.
Incidently, this is an analogous argument, like my own, about the sleeping adult and fetus.
This looks pretty solid, but there are problems. Since personhood is conceded, for this argument, there would be NO restrictions on any woman obtaining an abortion, up to the moment of birth. Even a week or day before delivery, for example. After all, it’s her body, and she should be able to do with it as she wishes, to do otherwise would restrict her liberty?
And, even after birth, the mother’s liberty is compromised. The mother must nurse, change, feed, have sleep interupted, etc., all restrictions on her liberty. We could say, well, if she’e had enough, put the baby in a foster home, or up for adoption. But what if NO ONE wishes to care for the child? To force them, would be a restriction on THEIR liberty.
A more practical objection might be, that a mother does not want to care for her ten year old, but lives in a reletively uncivilized area of the world, so there are no adoption services, or no foster services. Thomson’s argument would entail that this mother could morally choose to not care for her child, by say, killing the child, or abandoning the child, which might be even more cruel, since the child would surely die of starvation, or other horrible things.
Also, you state that killing newborns, although not intrinsically wrong, because of their lack of “awareness”, is wrong in the sence that society will be corrupted. But how could this be, unless one PRESUPPOSES the personhood of the baby? After all,no one argues that breaking objects, say ones possessions, would have a corrupting influence?
July 27th, 2010 | 6:14 pm
Replying late (have only just discovered, while trawling through the SHS archives, that you left a comment to which I unaccountably failed to respond).
You raise a number of interesting points and I shall attempt to address them in no particular order.
(1) Clearly, we want, to the best of our flawed ability, to have only laws that can be philosophically supported.
In a general sense, yes. Our laws are merely tools by which we try to create certain types of societies. Although our philosophical principles determine what goals we ultimately strive towards, what sorts of societies we intend to craft, these principles may not be directly reflected in the laws themselves. We might, for instance decide for “philosophical” reasons that we would like a world with fewer abortions but might come to the pragmatic conclusion that enacting laws completely outlawing the procedure would not bring that world about (or would do so at too great a cost).
We might accept that philosophically some animals may be said to (in some sense) possess inherent rights to life or liberty (or at least as much right to these desirables as the less cognitively developed members of the human species) but this acceptance does not compel us to grant these animals rights in the legal sense – for it is by no means certain that this step results in the creation of a world in which both humans and animals are better off.
(2) How could you retort to the person who says [of the laws]:”they’re only made up by legislators, who have no rational basis for them, so I have no rational or moral reason to follow them”.
The integrity of the legal system does not rest on the idea that each person regards the individual laws as representative of his or her moral outlook. All that’s required is that most people accept the pragmatic foundation of the laws enacted. A law which, on the face of it, runs against ones philosophical principles may be recognised as rational. For instance, the decriminalisation of prostitution may be rationally supported by someone who regards it as sinful and a law deepening the separation of church and state may be ardently supported by someone who truly believes that the world would be best served by a Christian fundamentalist theocracy. This is because we increasingly realise that laws are instruments of social engineering rather than merely indications of our moral or philosophical preferences.
The best rational reason for obeying a law is usually that there are punitive consequences if one does not. One would hope that most citizens would recognise the rationality of individual laws but failing this one would hope that most would accept the rationality of generally obeying laws which do not appear to be immoral. The moral reason would be an implied commitment to the social contract, to the collaborative and imperfect project of building a stable society.
(3) The only difference, between the [sleeping adult human and the fetus], with respect to time, is that one will take longer to become conscious than the other. The challenge for you, or anyone who wishes to refute my argument, is to show why a longer wating period, should be morally relevant.
Time isn’t the only difference. The sleeping adult is a creature that is functionally capable of consciousness but happens not to be conscious at the moment of inspection. A fetus is a creature that will eventually become capable of consciousness after it has undergone a long process of development. The moral difference doesn’t lie in the interval to conscious awareness – it lies in the nature of the creatures themselves.
Also think about it pragmatically. If we had a general rule that ran “kill all sleeping humans with impunity – they are unconscious” we would immediately have billions of individuals who would feel themselves personally at risk. They identify with the sleeping selves they will become. They have an interest in the persistence of their sleeping selves (in their survival to their next awakening). A similar law condemning fetuses would have no such individuals who would even theoretically object due to an interest in their own lives. Prior to the first flickering of self-consciousness, no such interests exist. This is the sense in which a personal history of conscious awareness is important.
(4) My argument is, that since the fetus possesses the DNA necessary for consciousness, she’s in an analogous state, to the sleeping adult
DNA is just the recipe, just the instructions from which the fully functional human will eventually be created. A man may eventually construct a computer from a rudimentary kit, an assembly manual and odds and ends he buys from various electronics shops over the course of several months but this whole assemblage (hobbyist, kit and instruction manual) is not equivalent to a man poised before a functional computer he is about the turn on. One may say that the only thing that separates both these men from playing Minesweeper is “time” but that would be to overlook the very real differences between the situations.
Consciousness is about functional organisation. A creature which possesses a set of instructions which will eventually lead to its acquiring this property is nonetheless, prior to the emergence of this functional complexity, no more conscious than a rock or a toothbrush or a leather shoe and has no greater moral standing. (Actions relating to this creature may nonetheless still be of moral significance as may actions directed at other non-conscious objects such as flags, images, public buildings etc).
(5) Concerning JJT’s “abducted violinist” argument: “Since personhood is conceded, for this argument, there would be NO restrictions on any woman obtaining an abortion, up to the moment of birth”
Not really. The nature of philosophical thought experiments is such that they never compel you to take a certain position. They just present you with a scenario usually expecting that you will respond in certain way and hopefully see the (arguably logically isomorphic) main problem in a new light.
The whole point of the violinist argument was that one individuals right to life did not necessarily preclude another from taking an action which inadvertently albeit foresee-ably resulted in the former individual’s death. The power of her thought experiments rests on our tacit agreement that while it would be a good thing to grant the ailing violinist use of your kidneys for nine months you would be under no obligation to do so. This argument is powerful only in the sense that you are compelled to apply your conclusions to all logically isomorphic cases. Not all instances of pregnancy are analogous to the violinist thought experiments and, I would argue, our intuitive preferences shift as the circumstances change (if the woman in question is being asked to make a relatively minor sacrifice for instance or if the state has greater interests in the welfare of the dependent person – as it does in the case of a pregnancy approaching term). For these and other reasons, all JJT’s seminal paper proves is that most people’s moral intuitions are consistent with the idea that an independent fetal right to life does not necessarily rule out elective abortions.
(6) Also, you state that killing newborns, although not intrinsically wrong, because of their lack of “awareness”, is wrong in the sence that society will be corrupted. But how could this be, unless one PRESUPPOSES the personhood of the baby?
We have certain biologically determined reactions towards babies that have nothing to do with their mental lives or their “personhood”. Millions of years of evolution have made us “care” very deeply about babies in manner which is, in my opinion, inextricably linked to our feelings about family, society and human kinship. “Humanely” killing a newborn (you will, I trust, forgive the oxymoronic phrase) may not be philosophically significant if the newborn is devoid of self-consciousness but it will always be emotionally significant.
(7) You argue that the sleeping adult, had a mental life prior to the sleeping period. This is true. But, a person prior to dying, had a mental life as well, but no one would argue that a corpse is a person, by virtue of his previous living, and mental life.
I do not speak of philosophical persons at all. The whole concept of philosophical personhood, as I’ve stated before, is one which has outlived its usefulness. I spoke more directly of how we ought to treat certain classes of individuals (based on the characteristics that these individuals possess). Corpses once had psychological histories (or, are the remnants of individuals who had histories of consciousness) – but they are themselves functionally incapable of conscious awareness. A “history” is important in that it represents the fact that there was a pre-existing individual (capable of re-emergence) who would have expressed an interest in the corpse’s/sleeping person’s/fetus’ welfare. How should we treat corpses? With respect – but obviously you don’t have to worry about causing a dead person physical pain or emotional anguish. The question of philosophical “personhood” doesn’t arise at all (and the legal position is unambiguous)
[All this talk about the personhood of corpses and the attempts to ascribe to entities attributes they do not yet posses reminded me of a poem by Ezra Pound:
O woe, woe,
People are born and die,
We also shall be dead pretty soon.
Therefore let us act as if we were
Dead already.
from "Song in the Manner of Housman"]
July 30th, 2010 | 5:43 am
Thanks, Raven, for your response. Don’t worry about responding late.
I, too, will respond in no particular order. Let me take Tompson’s argument first. My point, was to show that, if her argument was taken seriously, indeed, given the respect that it deserves, it would lead to some disturbing ramifications. No one, who’s a person (She concedes personhood, in the case of the fetus, for her argument), who’s dependent on another would be safe. The only way to save her argument, is to, oddly, claim, that her argument is not as strong as it appears. I think she deserves more credit than that. I think she was attempting to refute the notion that people should ever be compelled to use their bodies, agianst their will, to save any life. Her argument is with two grown human persons. If the argument is compelling against the notion that one should never be forced to help someone else, even an adult, a fortiori, it would refute the notion that a mother should ever, in any circumstance, be forced to carry ANY pregnancy to term. to state otherwise, is to assume more moral standing to a fetus than the adult, in her argument. a rather ironic conclusion, for one, who supports her view to take.
Her argument is serious, deserving respect, by a noted philosopher, but since, as i provided in my previous comments, counterexamples, it cannot be sustained.
With respect to my argument that the fetus, is in an analogous state to the sleeping adult, DNA, is not just a blue print. After conception, the DNA, and associated structures, are alive, they require nutrition, elimination of waste, in short, no different than you or I, except in a radically early stage of development. DNA is a biological structure, that’s dynamic, and working toward the full development of the organism. The analogy to a blue print, for a house, say, is not apt. The DNA is interwoven, with the whole “house”, in that it’s constantly giving “directions” to the cells, for their proper production. The same is happening with you and I, Raven. The DNA, that controls our cells, is the same DNA, that was present at conception, is controlling the cellular machinery, that constitutes you and I, as I write this. For your argument to work, you would have to assume that, the beginning, or early stages, of our existence, has no relavence, to our moral standing. But why would merely the beginning, or early stages, of an organism, somehow mean, that it has no moral standing, that we both agree, has moral standing later in its development?
there’s certainly an emotional component to the death of a baby. And, yes, you’re right, evolution has predisposed us to be disinclined to kill infants, but there’s a cognitive element, as well. Philosophically, this “evolutionary predisposition” toward feelings for the infant, has not rational basis, UNLESS one presupposes that the baby has as much worth as an adult. Otherwise, we could discount, rationally, these feelings of evolution, as not being worthy of adherence now. And, we do this with many things, that, in our evolutioary history, were advantageous, to our survival, but are no longer needed.
I like the Ezra Pound poem!
July 30th, 2010 | 4:16 pm
Bret,
I’ll respond to this first because it struck me most forcefully. DNA is not alive! It’s just a macromolecule. Its associated structures are structural proteins (histones) which ensure that DNA segments are properly configured as chromatin threads etc. Nucleic acid can not be considered “living” by any stretch of the imagination.
DNA in living animals is obviously part of living cells but it really does no work. All the work is done on it. It’s unpacked, unzipped, translated etc but it is not the “central spark” that animates a cell or anything like that.
The moral significance lies in the creature that emerges during the process of development. This emergence is partially dependent on genetic information contained in DNA and partially on environment influences including the cellular machinery passed on from the gametes independent of DNA. To say that a creature will achieve moral significance in the fullness of time (partially via the translation of a blueprint encoded in that creature’s DNA) is not to say that it is morally significant – it is rather to imply that it is not.
With regard to the Thompson argument I would agree that if we accept the conclusion she intends us to there is a sense in which no dependent person in an analogous situation is safe.(and remember once again that moral thought experiments acquire their force from an expectations that we will intuitively respond in a certain way. If someone were to say that he feels that the violinist in the hypothetical situation had every moral right to the use of the abducted person’s kidneys there is nothing in Thompson’s argument to compel him to change his mind).
However we need to focus on what JJT’s primary thrust here is. The argument shows only that any attempts to compel assistance in these cases (or protect the dependent person) may not be based on the right of the dependent person to this assistance. This argument does not preclude the possibility that there might be a wider societal interest in regulating these interactions.
Hence if(and only if) we view the violinist problem in the intuitive light which JJT expects of us we may not go on to claim that an argument against abortion could be made at any gestational age based on the rights of the fetus. Now this does not mean that we can’t regulate abortions it just means that we have to find other arguments to do so – and we do.
I actually do believe that our inordinate emotional attachment to babies is an evolutionary relic which we would be better off without (in it is, to use Dawkins’ phrase, a “poorly applied rule of thumb”) but, unlike many others, do not feel that this casting off is something we may attempt with impunity. I honestly believe that any attempt at this sort of psychological engineering (at surgically excising entangled emotional tendencies bred into us by millennia of evolution) will never be entirely successful. We commendably try to suppress other unhelpful Darwinian tendencies (irrational greed, tendencies towards in-group favouritism and out-group aggression etc) but our feelings about infants are, I feel, too closely connected to our feelings about families and love and kinship to bear with much fiddling.
Not much harm is done when we set the “personhood” line at birth and pretend that the non-rational, barely self-aware neonate is as worthy of moral consideration as a switched-on two year old. A great deal of harm would be done however if we got into the habit of peering into each infant’s eyes with our scalpels raised wondering “Is there anyone in there yet or may I end its life with impunity?”.
July 31st, 2010 | 2:13 am
thanks, Raven, for your, as always, intelligent response.
you’re absolutely right, about DNA, itself, not being alive. I composed my comments, quite late, last night (or rather early this morning),and rather quickly, I should have proofread my comments, and I meant to say that, DNA is part, of a living organism, that controls the activity of the cell. My apologies.
One of the attractive features, on an intellectual level, of concluding that a human being possesses moral status, at conception, is that if one tries to find another point, in human development, one ends up being arbitrary. One simply cannot come up with a rational basis, for choosing any other point. At conception, we have a new human organism, with a full 46 chromosomes, and now we just wait for this human organism to mature. The fact that it’s small, does not look like a human, is in a different environment than us, is irrelevant to its moral standing. for those who doubt its humanity, I would point out that, after conception, all one has to do is wait, and give it proper nutrition, and it will reach full human maturity. The only logical conclusion, that one can derive from this information, is that it’s as a young a human as there is. But why should its youth, affect its moral standing?
A sperm cell, or an ova cell, if given time, and nutrition, will become very old sperm and ova cells, then die. The zygote, has to be considered human, because it behaves, as humans behave, in a developmental sense, it matures, until it becomes an elderly man or woman, making it essentially distinct from an ova, sperm, or other cell.
An essential component of moral philosophy, is to have sound, and precise reasons, for moral positions. To state a human somehow reaches moral standing at birth, or at one month, or when language arrives, seems morally irrelevant. It seems that you’re trying to say that, at a particular, developmental milestone, such as leaving the womb of its mother, or after rationality emerges, that, now, its moral standing is achieved. Why? These traits, seem to have nothing to do with its moral standing. What would be your argument against someone, who, taking a page from your human developmental approach, claimed that “personhood” was not reached until a person reached age eighteen, or so, due to their not fully formed frontal lobes?
I believe that JJT provided her argument, with the intent, that people would be convinced, that even if one accepts that the fetus is a person, one still can accept abortion. The fact that, taken to its logical conclusion, it leads to some disturbing implications, strikes me as rendering it fatally flawed. She does, however, tap into some intuitions that many people have. Many, would be very troubled, to be forced to help the violinist, even if the violinist’s life was at stake. But, on balance, given its flaws, the argument is a failure. That’s not to say that I don’t have the greatest respect, for her, and her work. I definitely do.
You claim that “not much harm” is done by claiming that birth is when “personhood” is reached. I respectfully disagree. If it’s wrong, then much harm is done to those beings who fall outside that category. Ill let you speak for yourself, you certainly do so with much eloquence, and creativity, but it seems to me, that you seem inclined to view beings as having moral worth, if they’re capable of exibiting certain neurobiological traits, such as consciousness, and rationality. That’s understandable, but I would retort, if that’s your position, that the fetus, will display these traits, if given time. That makes it fundamentally unlike, say, a toothbrush, that given time, will only be a very old toothbrush. This fact strikes me as very morally relevant. One is depriving the fetus, of its future life.
One of the atractive features, on an intellectual level,
July 31st, 2010 | 2:16 am
Sorry about that last line, it should’nt be there!
August 1st, 2010 | 4:35 pm
Bret,
There is indeed something intellectually appealing about saying that the human being ought to be protected from the moment of conception. We avoid boundary issues and any complaints about “arbitrary” dividing lines. Simplicity is, however, its only appealing feature. It commits us to acts that actually increase rather than decrease human suffering, and compels us to waste our energies protecting unconscious creatures who neither desire nor benefit from our efforts. If I felt there were compelling societal reasons for this stance (as there are in the case of newborn infants) I would be all for it – but as things stand I think it would be the wrong perspective to adopt although I understand its undeniable appeal.
All boundaries drawn beyond conception are, we agree, arbitrary (for no morally relevant criterion will be universally present on one side of it and universally absent on the other) but birth is, far and away, the least arbitrary of these lines. It has the weight of history and tradition behind it, it has a great deal of intuitive appeal and ultimately (in my opinion) it is the best pragmatic choice.
An unconscious fetus is unlike the equally unconscious toothbrush in that it may become, in the fullness of time, conscious. As a consequence it is immeasurably more important to us – but this importance doesn’t rest on the fetus’ moral considerability. We owe it no moral duties though our actions towards it may be morally significant. The fact that a certain creature is incapable of suffering and has no interests means it has no “moral status” even if it will eventually acquire a capability for suffering and interests of its own.
It’s a thing we keep coming back to (One of our irreconcilable differences, if I may say so). You somehow believe that it’s ethically meaningful to speak of depriving a non-conscious being of its future life- and I do not. If we prevent a creature with no prior history of consciousness from coming to self-awareness, how, pray, have we harmed it? A creature’s youth or immaturity, as you rightly point out, does not affect its moral standing. It’s inability to suffer in any way, however, does.
[I've noticed that I've fallen into the habit of describing the fetus, without qualification, as "unconscious". This is likely, but, as we both know, by no means certain. The medical evidence doesn't rule out the existence of rudimentary fetal consciousness in the last few weeks of pregnancy. This uncertainty is usually not reflected in my comments]
August 2nd, 2010 | 12:03 am
Your intelligent responses are very helpful, Raven, and add considerably to the richness of the intellectual atmosphere, her in the blogosphere.
you’ve hit, I think, on the fundamental difference, between us, not just on abortion, but morality, generally. I think that it’s fair to conclude, that, you are more inclined toward a consequentialist approach, to ethics, whereas I’m more inclined toward a deontological approach to ethics. your question, can a being suffer, seems very germane, to how we approach that being, morally. To be indifferent to suffering, is in NO way morally acceptable.
This is, I think, what makes consequentialism so attractive, is that it addresses, what seems to be, the primary, even exclusively relevant moral factor: suffering.
But there are some concerns, though. Clearly, we all are aware, that suffering is sometimes unavoidable, and even necessary, to reach a moral good. A parent, will suffer, perhaps, by caring for her/his child, by caring for her. The child may suffer anxiety, by going to school, when he would derive more pleasure by staying in bed. A child will suffer, to have a medical procedure done, for her benefit. A prospective doctor will suffer financially, emotionally, socially, to get through medical school.
So the notion of “suffering”, and its reduction or elimination, seems highly plausible, as the criterion for determining the morality/immorality of an action. But as the very small list above indicates, there are many cases, where suffering is essential, to derive some greater good. So, the ” elimination of suffering”, as the criterion for determing whether an action is moral, is ambiguous.
I think a better approach, is to view all conscious beings, and beings that are destined to be conscious, (e.g., fetuses, newborns) have rights, that cannot be invringed on. The right to life, which in my view, takes the highest priority, since all other rights are purely theroretical, without the right to life.(no corpses have ben known to complain about their freedom of speech being infringed upon, except, perhaps, in some really bad “B” horror movies). Also, but not limited to, the right to liberty, the right to happiness, the right to be free of suffering, etc. Of course, all of thee rights are contingent, for their legitimacy, on not infringing on any other beings rights, to the same.
Now, you state, that the fetus, due to its lack of consciousness, cannot experience any pain or suffering, therefore what we do to/with it, is immaterial, morally, to it. that certainly follows from a consequentialist approach to ethics. but if one takes into account that, beings, conscious and preconscious, have rights, congruent with their natures, it matters a great deal.
i know that you think that there’s a moral distinction, between a being, presently unconscious (such as a sleeping adult), but previously conscious, and a being not previously conscious, but will be conscious later, but I don’t. I’ts my point that they’re both unconscious, and if being unconscious, is what renders aperson expendible, then logically, one is commited to favoring the permissibility of killing the sleeping adult, as clearly outrageous as that sounds.
At least, one could argue, if the above is too much, to a “tie”, if you will. That is, both of us, are appealing to a period in time, to justify our positions. Let me explain. You claim that, although the sleeping adult is unconscious now, what justifies his right not to be killed is the fact that he was conscious IN THE PAST. I, claim that, what gives the fetus it’s right not to be killed, is that, although currently unconscious, it will be conscious IN THE FUTURE. So, we’re both appealing to either side of the timeline, for our justifications, that the beings in question should NOT be killed.
You say that it’s not morally impermissible to kill an unconscious fetus, even though one is depriving it of its future, because it doen’t know any differently. But what one’s doing, is preventing it, the fetus, from having a full life, whatever that may entail, because it will be deprived of EVERY circumstance, including all acheivements, happiness, pleasure, etc.
At least the sleeping adult HAD some life experience, which is better than the fetus, that will get NONE.
August 2nd, 2010 | 4:35 pm
Bret,
There is indeed an almost unbridgeable gulf between our ethical approaches but allow me to suggest (somewhat arrogantly) that deep within each deontologist lurks a consequentialist who assumes that Someone or Something has already performed the consequentalist calculus.
When you speak of suffering being sometimes necessary to reach the moral good I suspect that you mean on our path to ultimate well-being we sometimes have to endure a great deal of hardship and pain and if we set our ethical compasses to tend directly towards “pleasure” we would have neither the fortitude nor indeed the foresight to seek out and find these difficult “moral goods”.
Your examples illustrate this. A reluctant patient goes through a painful procedure but his persistence is to be encouraged because the consequences are desirable. A doctor in training endures the required privations to achieve a worthy end.
You are a consequentialist without realising it. What you deplore is the utilitarian calculus which you feel (with some justification) prioritises the promotion of short term pleasures and the reduction of superficial suffering over the longer-term perspectives presumably enshrined in our deontological prescriptions.
And if, in the final analysis, these deontological precepts do not have better consequences, why should we obey them? If at the Last Judgment, when all our days are done and all the books are opened, it is discovered that there would have been less suffering in the world if we had dispensed with the very idea of “rights” would it not be fair to say that it would have been “better” if we had, in fact, done without them?
A deontological perspective is only defensible if we believe that someone (preferable God) has reliable worked out all the consequences for us (and reliably passed on the resulting ethical rules). If we do not have this theological backing, deontology is indefensible (unless one is comfortable with Kant’s amazing statement: “Better the whole people should perish than that injustice be done”)
When it comes to fetuses, sleeping adults and psychological histories, the one thing you leave out is other people. A psychological history is important because it indicates that other conscious people could find themselves in that situation and hence have an interest in establishing the principle “do not kill anyone in th1s state”. No conscious person will ever become an unconscious fetus. That is a morally relevant distinction. You say that we ought to accept that the fetus has a right to life. Why? What purpose does that serve? Who benefits? Killing a creature that has never been self-aware is not curtailing its psychological existence – it’s preventing the existence from beginning in the first place. It’s, in effect, morally indistinguishable from contraception.
And even if I, or anyone else, were to accept the deontological perspective, what would lead us to the specific idea that the fetus has a “right to life”? It is not a fact which is apparent to me and I cannot, for the life of me, see how anyone could come to that conclusion via logical argument. How is such a thing to be demonstrated?
Have we come to an impasse? Probably. But how intellectually stimulating it has been, this walk to a brick wall :). You have been, as always, wonderful – tolerating my occasional lapses into ad hoc sophistry while responding thoughtfully to my serious arguments. I am open to the possibility that you may yet, at some point in the future, change my mind – or at least nudge me slightly in a different direction (as you done several times already) but it appears that on this one issue (the “rights” of the fetus and whether the concept has any meaning at all) we have dug ourselves into our respective trenches and are unwilling to budge.
August 2nd, 2010 | 8:42 pm
It’s a rare treat to interact with soneone, whos’s intelligent, and honest. Thanks, Raven, for displaying these great traits, of yours.
I think that we probably have hit an impasse. But let me exibit a little arrogance of my own. One could, also, assert, that the utilitarian, presupposes the validity of the rights based approach. How? If one argues that the greatest good, or happiness, for the greatest number, makes sense, then, how could this be coherent, unless, one presupposes, that EACH person, has the right to have happiness, and pleasure?
You have stated that, a pragmatic solution, regarding when rights arise, makes sense. that is, you say, that birth is a pragmatic demarcation point for when, we, as a society, should grant humans rights. But you also, reasonably, state, that in our fog of uncertainty, we should always be on the side of caution. agreed. Since the fetus, prior to birth, is morphologically, and otherwise, so indistinguishible from the newborn, why not, pragmatically, argue for legal protection for all third trimester fetuses, since the only distinguishing characteristic, between them, and newborns, in location?
August 3rd, 2010 | 6:27 pm
Bret,
I do feel that we ought to have much stronger legal protection for third trimester fetuses (with exceptions made for cases in which the mother’s health is endangered or there are severe congenital anomalies). My earlier arguments were against selective bans of individual procedures (which would establish an undesirable precedent and wouldn’t reduce the total number of late-term abortions performed).
I hold this view (that third-trimester fetuses ought to be granted greater legal protection) even though I feel that birth is already a very “safe” point of demarcation when it comes to self-consciousness. There are, as we have previously discussed, other considerations – and I think the pro-choice crowd places far more emphasis on a right to “privacy” and personal convenience than is compatible with the health of society as a whole.
There is some truth to your observation about utilitarianism. Many utilitarians accept the deontological duty to improve the total well-being of conscious creatures (though this is not, I think, based on any idea that these creatures have a “right” to their well-being). Singer himself admits this much (though not in so many words) at the end of one of his TV interviews.
Other utilitarians, I would argue, do not have this deontological core and are pragmatists all the way through. The ethical systems built on this starkly utilitarian core are simply means to creating stable societies, advocated because they are presumably the only ethical systems to which a group of rational agents committed to building shared societies (while operating under no external moral constraints) are likely to grant assent.
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