HN:
Fine contributions, lzzrdgrrl and Alexis.There is a similarity between Saudi/Rauf Cordoba Center and this incident: both instances of modified-WHAM and exhibition of Progressive claptrap. Said ZBW's insist Islamist hatred of West can be influenced by 'being nice' -- same logic as parental 'no hitting' (ever) guidance; fine for cloistered Upper West Side, but dangerous in real world. Note the complete lack of traction for ZBW narrative in Al Jazeera, Al Arabiya, BBC and their ilk. This is almost as pathetic as SoI thinking it can shape media efforts aimed at its destruction.
Why make costly public displays and symbolic overtures towards people who want you to ESaD? Granted, US Treasury needs (owing largely to R32 and J36 nonsense, inflated by O44 & Co) indicate some nominal level of genuflection required ...
Will suggest a corrective: representative sample of ZBW's visit AfPAK and 'Muslim world', wherever that nonsense term may be, on a "Healing through Hearing" town-hall style tour, sans security -- selfsame self-appointed mental and moral giants revile the PSC's and military, after all.
Net-net, not to worry in re: arousing anger of 'Muslim street' -- at worst, confirmatory of existing opinion: it's not as though wailing cut-cats can be further incited, despite what intellectually bankrupt Western 'leaders' insist. What we've witnessed over past decade is = NOT = restraint, but rather the best they have to offer.
As re: Petraeus;
Take a closer look -- in particular, the initials following his name and the career track: he is the object of secular hagiography, a
perfumed prince in the RAND mold, groomed for public presentation and consumption.
Besides being wrong in re: Petraeus, 'common coin' also errs re: 'The Surge' -- whatever success latter stages of OIF met, this owes to factors largely outside public discourse (on purpose; don't want to distract populace from their distractions, after all).
Please don't sick the SWJ crowd of true-believers in modified-WHAM ala-Petraeus on me ...See, for instance (apologies for block-quote):
I would be in that camp that argues for the Marine tactics being the necessary and sufficient root cause of the success in Anbar (even though the campaign would have been longer and bloodier without the tribes). But I would also give a moderately different take on what Matt calls the “ignition switch.” While acknowledging Patriquin’s service and sacrifice, I am told by Army intelligence that the ignition switch for the tribal evolution away from support to AQ was in no small part our kinetic operations against the smuggling lines of Sheikh Abdul Sattar Abu Risha, even killing members of his extended family. He sided with us in order to keep from losing everything.
I have been told by officers as high as Colonel (unnamed, in Iraq at the time) that the plan General Petraeus took to Iraq was dead on arrival because the logistics officers told him it was impossible. His genius was in his ability to quickly amend his plan. But as Colonel Gian Gentile and I have discussed, the success of the radical shift in strategy Petraeus brought to Iraq is the populist narrative. Many or even most of the things done in 2007 were being done prior to that, especially in the Anbar Province.
But what’s significant about the surge is the increase in troop levels. While al Qaeda fighters were being killed and chased from the Anbar Province, when they attempted to flee to Baghdad they found a heavy U.S. troop presence to greet them. Instead, they had to flee North to Mosul (with some to the Diyala Province), leaving the seat of power in place in Baghdad.
~ Herschel Smith,
Captain's Journal, 31 Aug 10
cf:
Forget the Lessons of Iraq~ MajGen CJ Dunlap, Jr (USAF), AFJ, Jan 2009
See also:
heremadafonos
Logistician, Plywood Trade Association of Mesopotamia
