Alan Wolfe is director of the Boisi Center for Religion and American Public Life at Boston College. His latest book is further evidence of his right to be called the Alfred E. Neuman of the sociology of American religion. Like the mascot of Mad magazine, his all-purpose response is, “What, me worry?” The new book is The Transformation of American Religion: How We Actually Live Our Faith (Free Press, 304 pp., $26). The literal minded might claim that the “Our” in the subtitle is fraudulent since Mr. Wolfe is not a person of faith. But that is to miss the point. Wolfe writes: “Let me confess right off that I do not write about religion out of religious conviction. Although raised to be proud of my Jewish ethnic heritage—I still remember the names of the Jewish major leaguers of my youth—I am not, and never have been, a person of faith. When it comes to religion, I hear no inner voices, am attracted to no supernatural explanations of everyday events, look neither upward to heaven nor downward to hell, identify with no particular tradition, and feel no untoward guilt in having married a Christian (by birth, though not by conviction) and having, together with her, raised three children without benefit of confirmations or bar and bat mitzvahs.”
If all that is so, why is it not fraudulent for him to speak of how we actually live our faith? Because it is his position that American Christians, Jews, Muslims, and other religious folk—when it comes down to what they actually believe and live—share his faith. His faith and ours, Mr. Wolfe contends, is really in the American Way of Life. The summary argument of this book and Wolfe’s many other writings is put succinctly: “In every aspect of the religious life, American faith has met American culture—and American culture has triumphed.” Those familiar with the discussion will recognize that the argument is hardly original. The near classic reference in this connection is the 1955 book by the Jewish writer Will Herberg, Protestant, Catholic, Jew. Hundreds of others have taken up the theme over the years and, indeed, every year hundreds of books are published advocating an “authentic” Christianity or Judaism capable of resisting the ravages of American culture. They agree with Wolfe that much of American religion has been dissolved into a tapioca pudding of vague spiritualities pandering to a consumerist society. The difference is that Wolfe thinks resistance to the culture, never mind transformation of the culture, is a lost cause, and the bigger difference is that he thinks that is a very good thing indeed. The happy outcome, in Wolfe’s view, is that American culture has transformed religion.
A Clean Sweep
The title of Wolfe’s concluding chapter gets to the heart of the matter: “Is Democracy Safe From Religion?” His emphatic answer is in the affirmative. Again and again he tells his nonreligious friends, especially in the academy and the media, to lighten up about “the religious right,” conservative Catholics, and Christian “sectarians” who talk a hot game about the need to choose between Christ and the American Way of Life. Not to worry, says Wolfe. Even if they really mean it (and he seems doubtful about that), nobody is listening to them. Not, at least, when it comes to how people really live their lives. He writes: “Always in a state of transition, faith in the United States, especially in the last half century or so, has been further transformed with dazzling speed. Tracing the history of Christian thought from the New Testament to the twentieth century, the theologian H. Richard Niebuhr documented the many ways in which Christ could become a transformer of culture. But in the United States culture has transformed Christ, as well as all other religions found within these shores.” The game is over, and religion as traditionally understood has lost. Secularists do not need to work so hard at maintaining the naked public square, Wolfe says. The free exercise of religion poses no threat. Religion’s wings have been clipped, its rough edges smoothed. Religion in America has been unmanned, tamed, domesticated; it has been made safe for liberal democracy. And the wonderful thing is that the capitulation of religion to culture has been effected under the auspices of religion itself.
As I say, there are numerous Catholic, evangelical Protestant, and Jewish thinkers who agree with much of Wolfe’s diagnosis. What they lament, however, he thinks we should celebrate. His celebration is not unqualified. There are wistful moments when he says he misses what has been lost. He prefers Bach to rock, and the intellectual acuteness of Jonathan Edwards to the banalities of Willow Creek and the church growth movement. While it is a good thing, he thinks, that nobody today takes doctrine seriously, he is manifestly impatient with institutions such as Fuller Seminary in California, where, he says, nobody dares to give offense by disagreeing with anything. (Still the wittiest and most incisive, although sometimes outrageously unfair, description of the wimpish vacuity of American religion is John Murray Cuddihy’s 1978 book, No Offense: Civil Religion and Protestant Taste.)
While there is little that is new in Wolfe’s book, and his substantive analysis is derivative, taken from scholars such as Robert Wuthnow and Nancy Ammerman, Wolfe writes with a journalistic flair, lacing his text with anecdotes from “field notes” supplied him by his graduate students. It is not unimportant, however, that Wolfe is treated as an authority on these matters by, among many others, the New Republic and the New York Times. Most of the present book is devoted to evangelicals, who offer the richest and most uninhibited displays of entrepreneurial enterprise in pitching their products to spiritual consumers called “seekers.” Wolfe is not entirely free from the sneering snobbery that commonly marks discussions of evangelicaldom, but thoughtful evangelicals readily admit that their religious world offers a target-rich environment. Wolfe treats mainline Protestantism in a desultory fashion, except when it adopts evangelical tactics of self-promotion, in which case it is doubtfully mainline. He allows that Catholicism, with its belief in the Real Presence, and Orthodox Jews, who believe that God really did give the Law at Sinai, still offer a measure of cultural resistance, but they, along with the small Muslim communities, are coming around and will capitulate in short order. In sum, it is a clean sweep for the American Way of Life.
The anecdotes collected by Wolfe’s graduate students are employed to demonstrate the pervasiveness of the Religion of Me. Readers of Robert Bellah’s 1985 book, Habits of the Heart, will again and again recognize his Sheila, who practices her own religion of “Sheilaism.” Wolfe is definitely not, in the phrase of Max Weber, religiously musical. And most of the people his field workers talk to are hardly theologians, philosophers, or poets. So, when someone says he goes to church because “It makes me feel better,” Wolfe assumes he is saying pretty much what he would say about working out at the gym. In fact, were the fellow more theologically articulate, one might discover that what he means is something like this: “In church I am strengthened in my conviction that, through the Cross of Christ, I have been reconciled with God, the source and end of my life, and am sacramentally sustained in my struggle to love others as I am loved by God.”
But Wolfe does not entertain that translation of “It makes me feel better.” He insists that it is banality all the way down. And, of course, in many instances it may be banality all the way down. The striking thing is that from his perch at Boston College, reading books and field notes from graduate students, and making occasional personal forays to places such as Fuller and Wheaton, Alan Wolfe purports to know what is happening in the spiritual lives of millions upon millions of Americans. His writing is quite entirely untouched by curiosity about what William James called the varieties of religious experience.
The Transformation of American Religion is superficial sociology of superficial religion—or, more precisely, of religion that the author is determined to construe as superficial. Wolfe’s faith commitment is to American liberal democracy and expressive individualism, and he is pleased to report that religion in America not only poses no threat to that commitment but is happily captive to that commitment. What is distinctively religious about religion in America is, in his view, epiphenomenal. The reality is that—despite all the vestigial baggage about doctrines, biblical authority, eternal salvation, earthly duties, and divinely instituted structures and sacraments—religious Americans are pretty much indistinguishable from the rest of us, meaning Alan Wolfe and people like him. “What, me worry?” Upon finishing the book, one is left with a question: Why does Mr. Wolfe devote his time to a subject that is, by his account, so singularly devoid of interest or importance?
Conversations with Iris Murdoch
“I feel like somebody who’s living in a great big house and just occupies a tiny corner of it,” Iris Murdoch wrote to a friend. But what great things she did in that tiny corner. A noted philosopher, her real work was the novel, although the two are hard to separate, even if she did object, as she did vehemently object, to the idea that she wrote “philosophical novels.” I had quite forgotten how many of her twenty-six novels I had read over the years: The Sandcastle, The Bell, A Severed Head, The Italian Girl, The Nice and the Good, The Black Prince, The Philosopher’s Pupil (maybe my favorite), The Green Knight, and more. In part because she wrote so many, I may have read more novels by Iris Murdoch than by any other twentieth-century writer.
This was brought to mind by the engaging new book edited by Gillian Dooley, From a Tiny Corner in the House of Fiction (University of South Carolina Press, 300 pp., $34.95). It consists of twenty-three interviews with Iris Murdoch by sundry literary and media figures, dating from 1962 to 1996 when Alzheimer’s was, as she said, putting her in a bad spot she couldn’t get out of. Iris Murdoch died February 8, 1999. Among the most striking impressions is that of her unpretentiousness about her person and her work. In this, she puts one in mind of Flannery O’Connor. Writing is a gift and an art, the writer’s craft is to tell a story, and the goal is to tell the truth. The obligation is not to instruct or to advance a cause, such as justice. Attend to truth, Murdoch says at one point, and justice will take care of itself. That she learned from her disillusionment with Marxism, in which, as a young woman, she had been briefly ensnared. I was a bit disappointed that, in all the discussions of authors whom she admired and by whom she was influenced, Flannery O’Connor is not mentioned once. Perhaps she had not read her. She repeatedly says she did not read much contemporary fiction.
Repeatedly and with devotion she refers to, I believe, the greatest of novelists, Dostoevsky. He is, she says, one of the “gods,” and, while she knew she did not belong in that sparsely populated pantheon, his influence is, I think, manifest in her novels. She is God-obsessed, although she again and again says that she does not believe in God. At least not in the God of the Christianity that, she insists, she cherishes. One interviewer suggests that she is devoted to Christianity without God but has found that it doesn’t work. Murdoch doesn’t disagree. She cannot believe in a personal God, she says, because God cannot be “a thing among other things.” That is disappointing. One learns in Christian Theology 101 that God is not a thing among things, an existent among existents, but the Absolute Being of all that is, was, or ever can be. But apparently Iris Murdoch did not learn that in her Anglo-Irish Protestant childhood. It is truly disconcerting how often this happens. One encounters people who say they do not believe in God only to discover, upon examination, that the God they do not believe in I do not believe in either. But it is especially disconcerting in someone of the intellectual stature of Iris Murdoch.
She ended up, it seems, in flirting with some kind of Buddhism that she hoped was somehow compatible with the Anglican liturgy she continued to attend. From her novels, I thought she was considerably more theologically literate and orthodox. It seems I was wrong. In the late 1980s, I invited her to give our annual Erasmus Lecture here in New York. She wrote the nicest letter explaining why she had to decline. Perhaps it was just as well.
There is one more thing about reading Gillian Dooley’s fine book. It persuaded me that I was wrong to agree with those who charged her husband John Bayley with exploiting her and her final illness in his book Elegy for Iris. Iris Murdoch was a very private person, the critics said, and the book was a gross violation of her privacy. From a Tiny Corner suggests that she was not so private as some thought. As she relentlessly explored the inner life of her characters, so she was far from averse to speaking candidly about the complexities of her self. More important, from the touching glimpses one gets in this book of John Bayley’s care for her in her fragility, it is obvious that he could have done nothing that was not for the love of Iris. I don’t know when, there are so many things awaiting attention, but I have no doubt I will go back to read her again.
Then and Now
Both embarrassment and reassurance come from recalling what you said or wrote many years ago. The embarrassment is in recognizing how often you have repeated yourself over the years. The reassurance is in recognizing the continuity of your thought. A different embarrassment is in being reminded that you said some pretty dumb things. Recently I lectured at the University of Virginia under the auspices of the St. Anselm Institute, an organization devoted to promoting the Christian intellectual tradition. Professor Robert Louis Wilken introduced me. We have known one another for fifty years, since we were freshmen in college. In his generous, and delightfully extended, introduction, he quoted from an article I published in Commonweal in June 1967, “The Dangerous Assumptions.”
Speaking on the pro-life circuit, I have frequently alluded to that article, but I had not actually reread it for decades. In 1967, the Blumenthal bill, aimed at liberalizing abortion law, was a subject of heated contention in the New York legislature. Seven years before Roe v. Wade, New York, like most states, permitted abortion only in the instance of direct threat to the life of the mother. Until I read the article again, I had forgotten how much my concern was prompted by the ecumenical and interreligious rancor caused by the abortion debate. And I was reminded again how totally leftist was the religious leadership of the time, or at least the leadership deserving of notice in my world of discourse then. In the article, I deplored the conflict over abortion law between Commonweal and the now defunct Christianity and Crisis, a publication associated with Reinhold Niebuhr of the now almost defunct Union Theological Seminary. In fact, I noted, the entirety of the Protestant and Jewish religious establishments was arrayed against the Catholic Church on this issue. I expressed the hope that “perhaps the debate can be prevented from degenerating to the level of religious power politics.” “Without the mutual assumption of good faith,” I wrote, “there is little hope for anything but wasting polemics.”
I took some swipes at the Catholic bishops for failing to condemn the Vietnam war as clearly as I thought they should, and for confusing the issues of abortion and artificial contraception, but on the Blumenthal bill I suggested the bishops were right. I wrote of the logical extension of the pro-abortion logic to euthanasia, eugenics, and a war against the poor and “unwanted.” While advocates of liberalized abortion denied they had such things in mind, I wrote, “Measures of social change are reasonably evaluated in view of their probable end results. Our century has witnessed the demonic consequences of man’s distorted definitions of himself along racist, nationalistic, and utilitarian lines. Nothing can be taken for granted in terms of society’s understanding of human rights. In our valuations of human life, to be civilized is to be conservative.”
I am not sure, but that may be the first time I intimated in print that I might be, in some significant sense of the term, a conservative. There is no doubt that the question of abortion, more than any other single factor, precipitated my breaking ranks with the leftist liberalism of my youth. “How flexible can we be with regard to abortion,” I wrote, “is tantamount to asking how flexible we can be with regard to taking human life. . . . Roman Catholics, Protestants, and Jews have much to discuss before abortion is debated again in the legislative arena. I have attempted to suggest a few items for the agenda and to make clear that abortion is not a peculiarly Roman Catholic hang-up. The abortion question goes to the center of our vision of man and of the human community for which we hope.”
Of course the legislative debates in the several states—which, contrary to what is usually claimed, were moving against liberalized abortion law—would soon be nullified by the imperial edict of the Supreme Court. But my argument in that article, as in countless articles and speeches since then, is that liberalism had planted its flag on the wrong side of the divide over abortion. In the last half century, nothing has had more momentous consequences for the reconfiguration of our public life, including the moral and political decline of what is now called liberalism.
So I’m grateful that my friend Wilken went to the university library to pull out that ancient article. Reading it now, I’m a little embarrassed, particularly by my dumb dismissal of the importance of defending “conventional sexual mores.” But mostly—about liberalized abortion law and what it would entail for society, and especially for the poor—I am reassured. Not, to be sure, reassured about the subsequent influence of the argument I tried to make then. But reassured that, with some minor editing, it is the argument that I want to make, and must make, until my dying breath.
East Meets West, Sort Of
I first met the Dalai Lama in 1979. He was not then the celebrity that he is now. In 1950 the People’s Liberation Army of China had invaded Tibet and brutally subjected its people, while the Dalai Lama fled to Dharamsala in northern India where he set up a Tibetan government in exile. A few of his Tibetan followers had established a Free Tibet committee here in the U.S. and came to see me at what was then called the Council on Religion and International Affairs, where I served as Senior Editor of Worldview, the council’s magazine. They asked if I would help bring Tibet’s plight to public attention, and suggested that a service at St. Patrick’s Cathedral with the then Cardinal Archbishop, Terence Cooke, might be one way to do that. I took the matter up with Monsignor James Rigney, the rector of the cathedral, who obtained the agreement of Cardinal Cooke.
A few days before the scheduled event, there was a flurry of communications between Rome and New York. The Holy See was understandably concerned that the service not suggest a false “syncretism” between Buddhism and Catholicism. With precisely that in mind, we were assiduously careful in planning the songs, ceremonies, and forms of prayer, and Cardinal Cooke’s address, while very gracious, explicitly underscored the fundamental differences between Buddhism and the Catholic faith. The cathedral was packed and two ornate chairs were set in front, one for the Dalai Lama and one for the Cardinal. To the obvious embarrassment of the Cardinal, the Dalai Lama reached over and grasped his hand, which he held throughout most of the two-hour event. The photo of the two sitting together and holding hands graced the top of the front page of the New York Times the next day. He did not tell me so, but I was given to understand that Cardinal Cooke was not entirely pleased by the occasion.
Later, John Cardinal O’Connor, then archbishop, invited me to breakfast with the Dalai Lama, and we had an extended and wide-ranging discussion about America, the situation in Tibet, and his hopes for his people. By then the Dalai Lama was becoming, somewhat to his discomfort, I believe, the Dalai Lama Inc., surrounded by movie stars and other celebrities basking in what they had turned into the designer spirituality of Hollywood’s version of Tibetan Buddhism. The Dalai Lama in person is anything but overwhelming, unless, of course, one believes he is the incarnation of the Buddha and, as many of his followers say, “a living god.” He is very modest, polite, and given to interspersing his usually broken English with what are best described as self-deprecating giggles. One senses an inner peace combined with a view that the ways of the world are inexhaustibly funny.
This was evident at the late September gathering with 65,000 admirers in Central Park, where he was introduced by actor Richard Gere, who pronounced him to be “one of the great beings ever to walk on this planet.” The Dalai Lama began his informal remarks by saying with a chuckle, “I have nothing to offer, no special thing. Just some blah, blah, blah, blah.” He went on to say, “More compassion automatically opens our inner self. Too much self-centered attitude closes our inner door.” The crowd cheered lustily when he observed, “The very concept of war is out of date. Destruction of your neighbor as an enemy is essentially a destruction of yourself.” Earlier in the week, he had told the editors of the New York Times that it is right for a country to defend itself against attackers who are driven by “negative emotions.” And an op-ed article in the Times by a supporter of Tibetan freedom was implicitly critical of him for letting himself be used by admirers who have no serious interest in either Buddhism or the welfare of Tibet. Patrick French, formerly a director of the Free Tibet Campaign, wrote, “Some of the books that purport to be written by the Dalai Lama are scarcely by him at all, but have his face on the cover to increase sales.” He also wrote that “the Dalai Lama explicitly condemns homosexuality, as well as all oral and anal sex. His stand is close to that of Pope John Paul II, something his Western followers find embarrassing and prefer to ignore.” French says that the Dalai Lama agreed to the publisher’s excising from the book Ethics for the New Millennium his strictures against homosexuality lest they offend American readers.
The Dalai Lama was unusually straightforward, however, in a recent conference in Madrid. He had just met again with Pope John Paul II and was asked whether they discussed creating some kind of synthesis between Christianity and Buddhism. Nothing of the sort, he said. “People from different traditions should keep their own, rather than change. However, some Tibetan may prefer Islam, so he can follow it. Some Spanish prefer Buddhism; so follow it. But think about it carefully. Don’t do it for fashion. Some people start Christian, follow Islam, then Buddhism, then nothing. In the United States I have seen people who embrace Buddhism like they change their clothes. Like the New Age. They take something Hindu, something Buddhist, something, something. . . . That is not healthy. Having one truth, one religion, is very important. Several truths, several religions, is contradictory.”
There is no doubt that the Dalai Lama is an important religio-political phenomenon. While the U.S. and other nations are not likely to risk serious trouble with China over it, the Dalai Lama has succeeded in keeping the oppression of Tibet on the international agenda, even if at the margins. And I am sure that, among all the glitterati and spirituality groupies surrounding him, some people have been led to an authentic engagement with Tibetan Buddhism. From the Dalai Lama’s viewpoint, that would, I suppose, be no little achievement.
No End of Debate About the End of Democracy
When, in November 1996, we ran a symposium on the judicial usurpation of politics, Commentary magazine countered with a symposium on the symposium, with most of their contributors suggesting that we had gone over the edge. Now the October Commentary has another symposium, “Has the Supreme Court Gone Too Far?” The introduction notes that “the editors of First Things were suggesting that the process had reached crisis proportions and was leading to ‘the end of democracy.’” In light of subsequent decisions and especially this year’s rulings on affirmative action (Grutter v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinger) and sodomy (Lawrence v. Texas), the editors of Commentary write, “The specter has been raised of, if not the end of democracy, at least the end of constitutional law.”
The new symposium includes constitutional scholars and commentators reflecting a broad spectrum of views. Robert Bartley, Editor Emeritus of the Wall Street Journal, compares the abortion decisions with the infamous Dred Scott decision and writes, “In those cases, the Court no doubt sacrificed some of its legitimacy, and no doubt the high ideals of the law were besmirched. But somehow the Republic survived.” He thinks the remedy is to be found not in limiting the judicial branch but in the general political process. “By the nature of lifetime tenure, the judiciary is often the last branch to register a new era in society’s opinion. That is why the judiciary is the last hope of the liberal consensus that prevailed from FDR through JFK.” But those days are now over. “Critics intent on changing the judiciary should put their efforts into changing the balance of public opinion and of political power.”
William J. Bennett, former Secretary of Education, notes the ways in which the Court has undermined the family and the constituting principles of the society. He observes that Jefferson and Madison called the Declaration of Independence the first “act of Union” and recommended its study in law schools. “As far as I am aware,” writes Bennett, “no elite law school today teaches the Declaration as ‘organic law,’ even though its understanding of equality and freedom is central to any proper appreciation of the Constitution.” It is a mistake, he says, to nominate for the courts people who can be easily confirmed. “It is a mistake to shrink from a fight over a confirmation—after all, it is the Constitution we are fighting for.”
Robert H. Bork develops arguments he has made in FT, and also in his most recent book, Coercing Virtue (on which more later in these pages). “Judicial invention of new and previously unheard-of rights accelerated over the past half century and has now reached warp speed,” he says. He notes the growing tendency of the Supreme Court to cite decisions by foreign courts. “That, to put it gently, is flabbergasting. What the decisions of foreign courts have to do with what the framers and ratifiers of the U.S. Constitution understood themselves to be doing is not explained, and cannot be explained.” The left cites Bush v. Gore, the decision that overruled the Florida Supreme Court in the 2000 presidential election, as an instance of conservative judicial activism. To which Bork responds, “Correcting a constitutional error is not judicial activism.” The judiciary, he says, is “an untethered power that overrides democratic governance whenever the mood strikes it.” He sees no remedy in Article III’s provision that Congress can limit the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. That would only leave jurisdiction with the states, and “many state courts have become as unrestrained and trendy as the federal courts.” His conclusion: “In short, there appears to be no way to contain the imperial judiciary.”
Pervasive Hypocracy?
Alan Dershowitz of Harvard says the discussion of the imperial judiciary is marked by “pervasive hypocrisy on all sides.” Liberals and conservatives alike are more interested in the results of a decision than in whether it was decided on legitimate constitutional grounds. An instance of “judicial activism” is any decision one dislikes. “There is no perfect solution to the paradox of judicial review, the conundrum of states’ rights in a federal republic, or the mystery of original intent.” The paradox, conundrum, and mystery have been with us from the beginning, so we might as well get used to it.
Lino A. Graglia of the law school at the University of Texas is exceedingly impatient with such suggestions of symmetry between right and left. In instance after instance, he writes, the Court is addressing not constitutional law but “policy choices,” and, in instance after instance, the Court decides that it knows best. Here is Graglia at cruising speed: “Virtually every one of the Court’s rulings of unconstitutionality over the past fifty years—on abortion, capital punishment, criminal procedure, busing for school racial balance, prayer in the schools, government aid to religious schools, public display of religious symbols, pornography, libel, legislative reapportionment, term limits, discrimination on the basis of sex, illegitimacy, alien status, street demonstrations, the employment of Communist-party members in schools and defense plants, vagrancy control, flag burning, and so on—have reflected the views of this same elite. In every case, the Court has invalidated the policy choice made in the ordinary political process, substituting a choice further to the political left. Appointments to the Supreme Court and even to lower courts are now more contentious than appointments to an administrative agency or even to the Cabinet—matters of political life or death for the cultural elite—because maintaining a liberal activist judiciary is the only means of keeping policymaking out of the control of the American people.”
Graglia notes that in some of its most controversial decisions, the Court appeals to an “emerging democratic consensus.” But, by preempting the role of the legislature, it prevents that putative consensus from being put to the test of democratic debate and vote. Surveying the ways proposed for countering the imperial judiciary, Graglia thinks it comes down to political will: “The system of checks and balances set up by the Constitution has broken down where the Supreme Court is concerned; that institution now checks but is not checked by the other branches. President Lincoln dealt with the abuse of judicial power by announcing that although he would not defy the Court’s Dred Scott decision, neither would he accept it as settling the slavery issue. Congress and the President could similarly make clear that contemporary Supreme Court rulings of unconstitutionality without basis in the Constitution deserve not respect but censure. If the political will were there, means could be found to return the country to the experiment in popular self-government in a federalist system with which we began.”
William Kristol, editor of the Weekly Standard, also looks to politics for “a revival of constitutionalism.” He notes that at least two appointments to the Supreme Court will be coming up in the fairly near future. “Could a Bush second term transform the judiciary in the way FDR’s second term did? Not likely. But, perhaps, possible.” Sanford Levinson, also of the University of Texas, speaks about “catholic” and “protestant” approaches to constitutionalism. The current Court is “papalist,” issuing edicts from the top down, and he suggests one remedy is for Congress to be more assertive in giving definition to the Constitution. Another is to limit justices to nonrenewable eighteen-year terms, which would mean a new appointment every two years. Dahlia Lithwick is legal correspondent for Slate, and she suggests we stop worrying: “Indeed, judges have been deciding cases without regard for the law ever since King Solomon ruled that the contending parties should split that baby. What aspect of today’s crisis over the ‘imperial judiciary’ is, therefore, new and terrifying? Nothing, it seems, but the nomenclature.”
Still worried, however, is Jeffrey Rosen, who writes on legal affairs for the New Republic. He generally agrees with the Court’s decisions but thinks they are often made on doubtful grounds. Yet a judicial retreat can be forced when the Court gets too far ahead of the country. “The conservative counter-reaction to Roe,” he writes, “ultimately failed in its attempt to force such a retreat because, by 1992, a majority of the country had come to accept the moderate compromise that Roe represented—namely, that early-term abortions had to be protected and late-term abortions could be restricted.” In fact, and as Rosen should know after three decades of public discussion, Roe decreed a de facto unlimited right to abortion for any reason at any point of pregnancy, and the Court later made explicit that this includes killing a child in the very process of being born. But Rosen does think judicial imperialism is a problem, and he opines that the Lawrence decision on gay rights may force the kind of retreat that Roe failed to effect. “If the country cares enough about an issue,” he writes, “the Court will retreat on its own.”
Cass R. Sunstein teaches law at the University of Chicago and he agrees that the Court overreached in Lawrence, although he celebrates the result. Such overreaching is bad, “But it would be hysterical to suggest that the Court has subverted the constitutional order, and there is no reason to take new steps to reduce its authority.” So the Court has erred from time to time. To which Prof. Sunstein remarks, “To err is human.” Like other contributors, George Weigel of the Ethics and Public Policy Center cites the Court’s “sweet mystery of life passage” from Planned Parenthood v. Casey of 1992: “At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of life.” That passage, cited by the Court again in Lawrence, declares, says Weigel, that “the state’s sole interest in sexual matters among consenting adults is to protect the unfettered expression of personal autonomy.” It puts faithful Christians and Jews on notice: “There is a new and jealous god in the land: the imperial autonomous Self.” Those who serve another God, such as William Pryor who has been nominated for the federal bench, are disqualified by what Senator Charles Schumer calls their “deeply held beliefs.” Weigel, unlike Bork, thinks a remedy might be to limit the Court under Article III, which could restore “a measure of robustness to the noble American experiment in democratic self-governance.”
Marching to the Netherlands
Finally, the distinguished social scientist James Q. Wilson weighs in with particular attention to Lawrence. He notes that the decision invoked the European Court of Human Rights, which involves twenty-one European nations, in support of an international consensus on gay rights, but “it chose to ignore the hostility to sodomy in nations with far larger populations like China, India, Korea, and most African countries.” Wilson doesn’t say so, but the Court seems to suggest that an international consensus means a consensus among “our kind of people,” and then only the enlightened elites among them. He does say that the Court majority backs “the libertarian view that no state has the authority to restrict conduct affecting only one’s self and one’s consenting partner.” It follows that “there could be no state law against prostitution, bestiality, heroin consumption, physician-assisted suicide, or gay marriage.” Wilson thinks that banning or restricting prostitution is good public policy and wonders what the Court would have done in the Texas case had one gay man paid the other for his services.
Beginning with the Griswold contraception case in 1965, the Court’s sex-related decisions, Wilson writes, have usually gestured toward the importance of marriage as an institution. “The Court held that the state could still treat extramarital sex and nonmarital sex as evils. After Lawrence, all of those genuflections toward marriage have become moot.” On all the policy choices he mentions, Wilson notes, the Netherlands has adopted the above-mentioned libertarian principle. He thinks the odds are against the passage of a Federal Marriage Amendment. A successful amendment requires not just a majority but an overwhelming majority. Which leads him to his final and doleful thought: “The Court is marching us toward the Netherlands—only there, at least, politicians and not six robed jurists made the decisions.”
The Commentary symposium is a valuable contribution. Among other things, it indicates that since the 1996 FT symposium, and with generous assistance from sundry court rulings, more thoughtful people are beginning to ponder the end of democracy. Or at least “the end of constitutional law,” which is another way of saying the end of democracy. For many on the left, the view seems to be that judicial imperialism is a myth (except for Bush v. Gore), or, if not a myth, a debatably legitimate way of producing happy results. Conservatives, they say, would drop their complaint if the results went their way. So face it: we’re all hypocrites. On the right, there is deep despondency mixed with spurts of cheerleading for the next election. I agree with James Q. Wilson that there is not now an overwhelming majority for the Marriage Amendment, but that campaign is just starting and will likely be accelerated dramatically when a court, federal or state, invents a right to gay marriage. And I’m inclined to favor a closer look at Article III, the invocation of which would serve as a sobering reprimand to the Supreme Court, with reverberations throughout the judicial system.
Our 1996 symposium used the phrase, “the judicial usurpation of politics.” The answer to the usurpation of politics is the reassertion of politics. Abraham Lincoln understood that when, in his First Inaugural, he said that Dred Scott may have settled a particular case but it in no way settled the principle. The Supreme Court may have made its peace with slavery, but it did not and could not speak for the people. As the discussion of the threatened end of democracy continues and intensifies, we would all be well advised to commit to memory the words of Lincoln: "The candid citizen must confess that if the policy of the government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court . . . the people will have ceased to be their own rulers, having to that extent practically resigned their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal."
While We’re At It
Those living in or around Boston or Wellesley, Massachusetts can contact:
David W. Zizik
One Hollis Street
Suite 400
Wellesley, Massachusetts 02482
Phone: (781) 263-0201
e-mail: dzizik@zlplaw.com
In Atlanta, Georgia, contact:
Richard Schaefer
3275 Lenox Rd., #410
Atlanta, Georgia 30324
e-mail: shinfox@joimail.com
In Pensacola, Florida:And William W. Eberwein has established an e-mail discussion group called ROFTERS@Yahoogroups.com. Those interested may enter the discussion group by sending a blank message to: ROFTERS-Subscribe@yahoogroups.com. If you have questions, e-mail Mr. Eberwein at wwe@xc.org. Whether you are part of a ROFTERS discussion group or savor your issues in splendid solitude, please note that this is the time of the annual fund appeal for FT. You will soon be receiving a letter on that in the mail. We do this only once a year, and we do it because we must. Please be generous. And please be assured of my prayers that the coming holy days will be filled with grace and glory for you and yours.
The Rev. Clint McBroom
Cokesbury United Methodist Church
3300 Summit Boulevard
Pensacola, Florida
Phone: (850) 432-1396
e-mail: clint@cokesburyumc.org
Sources: East Meets West, Sort Of, New York Times, September 19 and September 22, 2003. No End of Debate About the End of Democracy, Commentary, October 2003.
While We’re At It: Mt. Athos, Catholic World News, September 11, 2003. Papabile, John Allen, “Word from Rome,” National Catholic Reporter, September 26, 2003. David Warren on becoming a Catholic, Ottawa Citizen, September 9, 2003. Bruderhof, www.bruderhof.com. Pryor on Christian duty and the law, Cumberland Law Review, December 2003. Guolo, Xenophobes and Xenophiles, www.chiesa, September 9, 2003. Griswold, Episcopal News Service, August 25, 2003. ELCA on eucharistic prayer, Forum Letter, October 2003. J. Bottum on poetry, Weekly Standard, June 9, 2003. Derbyshire on Christmas, National Review Online, December 19, 2002. Catherine of Siena, Theology Today, April 2003.
Sources: Secular City Redux, Lakeland quotes from The Liberation of the Laity and “Does Faith Have a Future?” Cross Currents, Spring 2002. While We’re At It: September 11th and New Yorkers, New York Times, September 8, 2003. WCC on Hussein, IRD release, September 5, 2003. On RAEL, Religion in the News, Summer 2003. Kirsch on Holifield, New York Sun, September 10, 2003. Chretien, Mail-Star, Halifax, Nova Scotia, August 11, 2003. Bishop Dolan, Catholic Herald, September 4, 2003. Seiple on Bush, Brandywine Review of Faith & International Affairs, Spring 2003. Existential America, Weekly Standard, April 21, 2003. Covenant House, New York Times, June 20, 2003. Church Growth Movement, Nicotine Theological Journal, April 2003. Rabbi crisis, Commentary, May 2003. Bishop Sprague, IRD, June 26, 2003.
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