In a New York Times column today, Mark Oppenheimer reviews the controversy surrounding former Bush speechwriter Marc Thiessen’s efforts to square waterboarding with Catholic moral doctrine. Mr. Thiessen has some ill-informed views, and Mr. Oppenheimer seems to have failed to do his homework.
First error: Thiessen mishandles the principle of double effect.
The principle of double effect tries to distinguish the goal or intention of an action from its likely outcome. Let’s say that a woman’s life is threatened by a cancerous tumor in her uterus—and she is also pregnant. The principle of double effect allows us to distinguish between what the doctor intends to do as he removes the cancerous tumor, which is to cut it out, from what he foresees to be a result, which is not just the removal of the cancer but also the likely spontaneous abortion of the fetus.
St. Thomas applies this principle to self-defense, not because killing an unjust aggressor is wrong, but because Jesus seems to prohibit killing in self-defense when he tells us to turn the other cheek. Here is how the reasoning works. A man attacks me in the dark. In order to protect myself, I grab a pipe and hit him over the head. I intend to defend myself, but I foresee that the hard blow may well kill him.
There are two important constraints to the principle of double effect.
First, double effect can never be used to justify an intrinsically evil act, and for the obvious reason that intentionally undertaking intrinsically evil acts cannot, by definition, be justified. John Paul II was crystal clear on this point in Veritatis Splendor. So let’s go back to the examples. There is nothing immoral about removing cancerous tumors. There is also nothing immoral about killing assailants who pose an immediate threat to innocent life (again, the moral problem for St. Thomas rests in self-defense, not using lethal force against aggressors.)
Waterboarding? If it is torture, then it is immoral in itself. Double effect can’t change that fact.
Second, the key test for the proper use of double effect is to determine if it is possible to separate intention from outcome. What if the fetus is viable? If so, then the doctor can remove the child, send him or her to neo-natal care, and then turn to the job of cutting out the cancer. What if the assailant does not die? I can call and ambulance, and hopefully save his life.
On precisely the point of distinguishing intention from outcome, Thiessen gives double effect a bad name. As Oppenheimer reports, Mr. Thiessen argues, “the intent of the interrogator is not to cause harm to the detainee; rather, it is to render the aggressor unable to cause harm to society.” In effect, Theissen is saying, “I’m sorry to inflict pain on you my dear Sheik, but I’m not really intending to do so, I just want information.” The spurious reasoning is obvious. What is intended is exactly what is intended—to inflict pain for the sake of extracting information. Imagine an abortionist saying, “I didn’t intend to kill the fetus; rather, the procedure was done solely to render it unable to cause psychological harm to the mother by remaining alive.” Or closer to home: “We didn’t intend to kill tens of thousands of people in Hiroshima; rather, the nuclear blast was solely for the purpose of persuading the Japanese to surrender.” These are exculpatory pseudo-distinctions.
Finally, Oppenheimer lets a howler go by. “Mr. Thiessen points out, correctly,” we read, “that the church does not forbid specific acts.” Huh? Last I checked the Church forbids quite a few specific acts: abortion being an obvious example. Thus the Catechism: “Since the first century the Church has affirmed the moral evil of every procured abortion” (#2271). I find myself wondering: which part of every doesn’t Thiessen understand? It is true that the Catechism treats torture as contrary to human dignity, not specifying that all acts of torture are intrinsically evil (#2297). But the emphasis certainly falls on the side of prohibition, not permission.
The Catholic Church gives a great deal of leeway to public officials when it comes to the determining conditions for the legitimate use of force to forestall evildoers and protect the common good (see the Catechism, #2309), but the Church does not write a blank check. Intrinsically evil acts are never justifiable, and actions that assault human dignity are censured. Furthermore, the Church certainly does not endorse the corrupt use of double effect that Thiessen puts forward.
R.R. Reno, senior editor at large of First Things, is a professor of theology at Creighton University.
Comments:
If waterboarding is NOTt torture, then it is not immoral in itself. Nothing can change that fact.
It is unfortunate to have discussions of this sort without clear definitions. Reno seems to be adopting Judge Potter Stewart's famous pronouncement on pornography ( 'I know it when I see it'). He knows that waterboarding is torture, and that's that.
But to assume that the definition of torture can somehow be divorced from its context is absurd. Christians do damage to both Church teaching and to the English language if they abdicate the task of discerning what words like torture, necessity, and life really mean.
The end never justifies the means: we should never allow an immoral act for the sake of a good.
First the woman w/ the cancerous uterus and pregnant. Let's stipulate that the fetus is previable. Yes, the cancer may kill her, but there is a lag time between the diagnosis, and the time it no longer is curable by surgery. Can the surgery safely be delayed until the fetus is viable thereby saving both?
And what about the aggressor? Does the mugger only want the money, or is his intention rape? or both? The response, one could argue, should be proportionate, but how can one tell what the bad intentions are? Remember Bernie Goetz, the subway vigilante?
And then there's Hiroshima. Prof. Reno suggests that the bomb was dropped
to induce the Japanese to surrender. Well yes, but that's not all of it. The Japanese had proven that they would fight to the last man, literally, to defend useless spits of rock in the middle of the Pacific. What would be the human cost, American and especially Japanese, of the coming battle on Japanese soil? We may have forgotten, but they had mobilized every man, woman and child for the defense.
And finally we get to the torture question. Some have already pointed out the obvious: is waterboarding torture? How time sensitive is the information that the detainee possesses, and how destructive the plot? Is any torture permissible?
These are very difficult questions, and I'll freely admit to not having easy answers.
Reno, on the other hand, is trying to twist the Catechism into a pretzel to justify what is really, at heart, his political position. The leap from abortion, which is a true intrinsic evil, to "waterboarding" to demonstrate what he imagines "double-effect" to mean, is just too far fetched.
First, if torture is intrinsically evil it cannot be made permissible by its outcome. This just what it is for something to count as intrinsically evil.
Secondly,even if waterboarding isn't torture, it *doesn't* follow that its use in interrogation is ok. Nor does the fact that waterboarding someone can be permissible--as when its used to train military personnel--show that its use in interrogation is ok. Drilling a tooth is sometimes ok; this doesn't mean it's always ok, as if doing it to someone for fun is ok since dentists drill teeth all the time. It matters *why* we do things that cause people pain, and what counts as a morally sufficient reason is the underlying issue.
Thirdly, the point regarding Double Effect is that if the pain is the means by which the good is achieved, PDE does not help. PDE does not allow us to use an evil to achieve a good, and that is why it is simply irrelevant to the waterboarding debate. Drilling a tooth causes pain, but when the dentist does it causing pain isn’t the point. Pain is a side effect of a procedure that achieves a good, and that’s why PDE would apply. And that’s why painless dentistry is not for that reason less effective. With waterboarding, however, the point is *to cause suffering*--that how you get the guy to talk. The pain isn’t a side effect, it’s the intended means--painless waterboarding would make no sense.
The deliberate infliction of pain *can* be justified--that’s basically what punishment is all about. But punishment isn’t and can’t be justified by Double Effect. Nor would punishment seem to be the intent of waterboarding.
Secondly, even if waterboarding isn't torture, it *doesn't* follow that its use in interrogation is ok. Nor does the fact that waterboarding someone can be permissible--as when its used to train military personnel--show that its use in interrogation is ok. Drilling a tooth is sometimes ok; this doesn't mean it's always ok, as if doing it to someone for fun is ok since dentists drill teeth all the time. It matters *why* we do things that cause people pain, and what counts as a morally sufficient reason is the underlying issue.
Thirdly, if the pain is the means by which the good is achieved, the Principle of Double Effect is not going to help because it doesn’t allow us to use an evil to achieve a good. This is why PDE is simply irrelevant to the waterboarding debate. Drilling a tooth causes pain, but when the dentist does it causing pain isn’t the point. Pain is a side effect of a procedure that achieves a good, and that’s why PDE would apply. And that’s why painless dentistry is not for that reason less effective. With waterboarding, however, the point is *to cause suffering*--that's how you get the guy to talk. The pain isn’t a side effect, it’s the intended means--painless waterboarding would make no sense.
Lastly, the deliberate infliction of pain can be justified--that’s basically what punishment is all about. But punishment isn’t and can’t be justified by Double Effect. Nor would punishment seem to be the intent of waterboarding. I suspect that it's the understandable desire to see would be terrorists punished that leads many to think it's ok to torture them, but these are two different things.
First, if torture is intrinsically evil it cannot be made permissible by its outcome. This just what it is for something to count as intrinsically evil.
Secondly, even if waterboarding isn't torture, it *doesn't* follow that its use in interrogation is ok. Nor does the fact that waterboarding someone can be permissible--as when its used to train military personnel--show that its use in interrogation is ok. Drilling a tooth is sometimes ok; this doesn't mean it's always ok, as if doing it to someone for fun is ok since dentists drill teeth all the time. It matters *why* we do things that cause people pain, and what counts as a morally sufficient reason is the underlying issue.
Thirdly, if the pain is the means by which the good is achieved, the Principle of Double Effect is not going to help because it doesn’t allow us to use an evil to achieve a good. This is why PDE is simply irrelevant to the waterboarding debate. Drilling a tooth causes pain, but when the dentist does it causing pain isn’t the point. Pain is a side effect of a procedure that achieves a good, and that’s why PDE would apply. And that’s why painless dentistry is not for that reason less effective. With waterboarding, however, the point is *to cause suffering*--that's how you get the guy to talk. The pain isn’t a side effect, it’s the intended means--painless waterboarding would make no sense.
Lastly, the deliberate infliction of pain can be justified--that’s basically what punishment is all about. But punishment isn’t and can’t be justified by Double Effect. Nor would punishment seem to be the intent of waterboarding. I suspect that it's the understandable desire to see would be terrorists punished that leads many to think it's ok to torture them, but these are two different things.
There may exist cogent arguments in favor of the proposition that waterboarding is not torture, but the fact that waterboarding is used in military SERE training is not one of them. Soldiers waterboarded as part of SERE training have consented to participate in the training, and they know that the training exercise is under the ultimate control of their fellow-soldiers, who care for them deeply as comrades in arms. Waterboarding in the context of "coercive interrogation" occurs without the prior consent of the victim, and in a context where the victim has no has no reason to believe that those inflicting the waterboarding have his best interests in mind, and will stop short of any action that will truly result in physical harm or death. To suggest that the two situations exist on a similar moral and legal plane makes no sense.
To use an R-rated analogy - A husband and wife may disrobe and engage in consensual activities involving bondage and infliction of some physical pain. But if a suspected female terrorist were stripped, bound, and whipped, would you suggest that she had not been tortured? I truly hope not.
If waterboarding cured cancer, then the torture of waterboarding would be justified, because the patient may well survive. The patient, however, gets to decide if they want to be waterboarded (euphamistically speaking). But, if waterboarding were to take an unborn child's life, then the mother would not be justified in choosing such an option to cure her cancer.
So, the only proper use of waterboarding, assuming that it is torture (which is debatable by some), then those who perform it simply need to tell the patient (er, terrorist) that they will survive this experience. Plus, they need to ask the terrorist if they would like to choose such a technique for their torture. All this, of course, in the name of successfully extracting information that the terrorist has chosen not to give to the authorities. Ergo, the torture.
Of course, no torture may actually be delivered, since the terrorist may decide to tell them everything, once the options are clear.
I think, then, if the terrorist chooses the waterboarding, knowing he'll survive, then we just may have a moral application of torture.
Of course, the torture is probably useless, so then now unnecessary, but that's what this is all about!
of the prisoner? I am not better than that.
If I believed doing so would save the lives of other Americans, I would take my
sidearm and cap my prisoner in his knees. Would that be just? Probably not. But I
love the lives of my brothers more than I love justice.
"R.R." Reno implicitly posits, for moral reasoning purposes, "pain" as equal to "killing". In fact Reno goes even further by explicitly categorizing "waterboarding" as an intrinsic evil. Without ever defining Waterboarding, torture, or pain. They are just thrown out there as understood.
This is all asserted while explicitly stating that "killing" is not inherently immoral given his undefined "immediate threat" to "innocent" people.
Sad to see such muddled reasoning from a PhD.
For the record, I do not agree with the argument Oppenheimer and/or Thiessen put forth... at least as far as I know it from R.R.'s description.
Sad to find such mud on the pages of First Things....
HCS Knight
If the act in and of itself of waterboarding (whatever that specific act is - I honestly don't know the process) is evil then PDE cannot be used. If it is evil intrinsically then you are up against some sticky issues about using it as training for soldiers. Then it becomes the analogy discussed earlier about husband and wife using bondage and sado-masochism in their relationship. I have problems with the bondage between husband and wife case because some of those acts are not acts that should be done even when there is "consent" If I consent to have my arm ripped off that would still be an evil act because I am destroying a perfectly good body part. These are questions for another time maybe but the point is that we need to get some better definitions of waterboarding materially and see if the act itself is evil. Again, I don't know what exactly the act is so this is for others to investigate.
If causing a state of great fear for the sole purpose of confession and information gathering is intrinsically evil, I am guilty. I have been known to hold the fear of failure over the head of a suspect in an academic honesty case. I think one may sensibly argue, and many have, that exacting fear of dire consequences without precipitating excruciating physical pain or permanent disability falls short of torture.
Finally, the analogy between military training and sado-masochistic behavior is a poor one. In the former, a soldier has to pass through extreme hardship to achieve the goal of becoming a fully equipped soldier. Entering into the process, he can't imagine the pain he will go through; he chooses the goal, and endures the pain. In the S-M case (so I am given to understand), the pain itself and the resulting high is part of an addiction, and becomes a goal in itself.
The example of military training falls short of torture, not because the punishment is less severe, but because of the choice of the soldier. Killing a soldier in training, or rendering him disabled, would clearly be evil.
Which simply reinforces the point that an act that falls far short of killing or producing debilitating pain cannot simply be declared intrinsically evil without careful definition and context.
But . . ,
There are times I tire of it . . . especially when the debate heats up when larger issues (re: the impending economic chaos, the religious war imposed on us by Islam, horrific acts of slaughter of christians, and the frightening rise Jew-hatred around the globe).
Not that any of that lessens the urgency of the nuances detailed in this post, and elsewhere.
But . . .
Maybe it is a distraction, like taking your wife to dinner , in 1994, when a million folks where hacked into bloody ribbons; or when my grandparents celebrating the birth their daughter, my mother, early in the last century, when a few miles (yards) across the Mexican borders, nearly that many Catholics were hounded and shoved against adobe walls to be shot.
To me, if a bit of placid torturing could have stopped any of those horrors - so be it.
And, what about the coming terror detailed here (which our political betters brought upon us). Could it be that, in this case, overturning the dialogue table into a rack - putting the likes of President A., Little Man upon it - would have staved off the horror now upon us.
Or, shall we let such happen so the likes of Mr. Shea can continue the pleasures of this Catholic torture debate.
http://www.americanthinker.com/2010/03/does_ahmadinejad_want_a_radioa_1.html
Without a doubt.
Perhaps confusion on this issue has as much to do with society's slide to moral relativism as it does to anything else.
I have a hard time believing most of those committing the practice take any pleasure in the pain or discomfort inflicted. I think if given an alternative means of obtaining the necessary information, most would leap at one that didn't cause pain. And as far as government policy goes, waterboarding is not done for the sake of itself.
Does "torture" constitute such a loaded word that its use taints discussion of anything linked to it? I'm beginning to think so. Some of my students have accused me of "torture" when I assign them a research paper. Guess they forget I spend 10-14 hours correcting said papers.
PDE can make gifted philosophers' heads spin. A morality that isn't easily understood by the common man is next to worthless. How do we KISS (keep it simple, stupid) this issue?
Regarding waterboarding:
1. Is the harm "severe and lasting", and devoid of positive benefit that outweighs its effects?
2. Is it caused intentionally, for the sake of itself?
If the answer to question two is "yes", it doesn't matter if the answer to the first is "no"--it's an evil act. But in all these discussions, it's seldom argued the answer to question #1 (does waterboarding cause permanent or lasting harm) is "yes".


