An estimable poet in his own right, C.K. Williams has written an accessible, short study of Walt Whitman’s poetry. Part of a writers-on-writers series recently launched by Princeton University Press, On Whitman is a slight book, an appreciative meditation rather than a critical study. Williams helps readers see Whitman’s genius, especially his intuitive grasp of the existential and metaphysical demands of a radically democratic culture.
“I celebrate myself,” writes Whitman in a characteristic line of self-exaltation. For readers raised on the self-abnegating ethic of the New Testament (“He must increase; I must decrease,” says John the Baptist when he encounters Jesus), the poet seems a hopeless egotist: “In all people I see myself.” “I am large, I contain multitudes.”
First impressions aren’t always accurate. Whitman’s hymns to the self do not reflect an inwardly turned selfishness. On the contrary, as he recognized, a democratic culture requires a self-enlarging sensibility. A society of peons cannot rule itself. Thus the assertive moment: My voice should be heard! My vote counts!
Whitman’s enlarging self-importance also expands toward an all-encompassing solidarity. “A Song for Occupations,” like so many of Whitman’s poems, evokes humanity in its great diversity: to see and identify with the great variety of working men and women confers dignity on their lives, and brings us into solidarity with them.
Whitman’s solidarity even reaches the point of a poetic empathy akin to Christian ideals: “If you become degraded, criminal, ill, then I become so for your sake.” It was not an empty literary gesture. While trying to find his brother among the Civil War’s wounded, he was so moved by the scenes of suffering that he devoted himself to visiting the war-torn soldiers then languishing in the military hospitals in and around Washington.
Whitman’s songs of social solidarity suggest such a limitless universality that boundaries become invisible, and the effect is to evoke the disposition of expansive inclusion that we find so prevalent these days: “The Asiatic and African are hand in hand, the European and American are hand in hand.” At such a great distance from life solidarity can seem thin and imaginary.
The same holds for Whitman’s eschatological hopes: “The felon steps forth from prison, the insane becomes sane, the suffering of sick persons is reliev’d.” Today we coin euphemisms (“mentally ill,” “differently abled”), and explain crime as a socially caused pathology. They are gestures of solidarity, efforts to extend the circle of inclusion, but at the cost of honesty about reality.
It is a noble vision—a sense of self at once exalted and at the service of others, at the center and in solidarity, assertive and empathetic—but it is very difficult to sustain, especially in the radical ambiance of Whitman’s universalism. There is an appalling lack of institutional and historical reality in Whitman’s poetry. He races through great lists of places, vocations, and states of life, but rarely lingers lovingly over anything other than bodies and their arresting sensuality. This absence in his poetry evacuates life of sustaining forms and enduring loyalties.
Whitman’s antipathy to the arresting power of place and history reflects a perennial feature (and weakness) of the universal aspirations of modernity. Rousseau was a kindred democratic soul, more theoretical but equally radical. He saw that metaphysical significance must be drained out of the richly populated and historically saturated topography of culture.
The commanding authority of historical particularities, and the mediating social institutions that minister to them, powerfully impedes the enlargement of the self and expansion of solidarity. For particularity limits the self with demands for loyalty, as well as preventing us from fusing ourselves to our common humanity in a universal “yes.” This is why Rousseau winnowed down social reality to the singular individual and the all-encompassing state that expands to an all powerful Leviathan, fusing them together in the social contract.
A metaphysical savant, Whitman was more radical than Rousseau. He intuited that a purely democratic culture requires an impoverished universe: the Regal Self on one side and the metaphysical Leviathan of an Absorbent Cosmos on the other.
The order of concrete things we inherit—our family backgrounds, our social classes, the limitations of our vocations and the doctrines of our faiths—must be drawn inward or thrust outward into larger, more universal processes. An institution such as marriage must be a function of my choices, preferences, or desires (the Regal Self) or made part of a larger logic of historical development or explained in terms of scientific principles (the Absorbent Cosmos).
Whitman’s poetry expresses the inward and outward modes our now common modern strategies for diminishing the power of particular loves. He consistently turns all his experiences into moments of an almost sensual embrace, as in the lines from his famous poem, “I Sing the Body Electric”: “The armies of those I love engirth me and I engirth them.”
He also seeks to be absorbed into the cosmic process. In a particularly fine evocation of the psychological enlargement, he writes:
Me inpertube, standing at ease in Nature,
Master of all, or mistress of all—aplomb in the midst of irrational things
Imbued as they—passive, receptive, silent as they,
Finding my occupation, poverty, notoriety, foibles, crimes less important than I thought.
Walt Whitman remains the great word weaver of the American experience, our poet national, which, given the conceit of our democratic ideals, really means our poet universal. If anything, his relevance has increased, and I’m thankful to C.K. Williams for guiding me back to Whitman. For as I re-read Whitman I see more clearly what I fear about a radically democratic culture.
The ancient Greeks and Romans cherished the cosmic perspective because it makes our loves and loyalties—and all the tensions associated with them—small and insignificant. Whitman, however, saw something different and very modern. Radical individuality and radical solidarity require the same capacity to put the concrete commitments of our lives at a distance. The world must be at our disposal (the enlargement of self) so that we can be unhindered and uncommitted, and precisely as such are we free to be at the disposal of the world (radical solidarity).
Nature abhors a vacuum. As the ontological density of social institutions diminishes, naked necessities come to predominate; instinct and impulse circulate unhindered. Our particular love and loyalties are absorbed inward and pushed outward, leaving us with neither selfhood nor solidarity, but rather consumptive desire and a political landscape dominated by pollsters, attack ads, and manipulative media.
Without church, family, neighborhood, Boy Scouts, local traditions—without the enduring, compelling, life-conscripting social institutions that defy the sovereignty of individual desire and stubbornly refuse to be reduced to a universal process or principle, we lack the ballast we need for both individuality and loyalty to others. Particular loves and loyalties—mediating institutions as sociologists like to say—are necessary for a healthy democratic culture.
Recognizing this, however, requires a sober attentiveness to the complexities of the human condition rather than metaphysical reveries of the sort that make Whitman’s poetry so alluring.
R.R. Reno is Senior Editor at First Things and Professor of Theology at Creighton University. He is the general editor of the Brazos Theological Commentary on the Bible.
Comments:
Anyway, the fact that Whitman inspired Allen Ginsberg to write his drivel makes Whitman a permanently closed book for me.
But if that is the author's point? Then first, what are the best examples of each? Regarding the need for at least some of the Universal: did for example, the Greeks and Romans really have that fully or purely? Did they really ALWAYS see particular humans as that insignificant: aren't there Greek, individually human heros? Oedipus is not the only Greek story after all; there were far more successful heros, even individuals.
But especially: ARE specifically "Democracy" or "Nature," really just empty abstractions, of almost no value in themselves?
Possibly just in themselves, they might seem to be rather flat to some. But in Whitman's time, in the first century after the first democratic revolution, Democracy was for example, first of all 1) the proper metaphysical counterbalance, to the excessive individualism or class exceptionalism, of royal, then frontier, America.
Indeed, furthermore, 2) the word "democracy" in the time of Whitman especially referred, in part, to a rather specific narrative: to the Revolutionary War. If today the word "Democracy" seems too general, and needs to be located within more particular institutions, those institutions were clearly in mind, in Whitman's time.
While in fact 3) "democracy" can be seen as a useful, median (not over-abstract) guideline still, in evaluating foreign governments; in evaluating talk radio "debates"; as well as a guideline in the Boy Scouts.
Likewise, "Nature."
For that matter by the way, 4) the "Self" and "Nature" are not just two over-general abstractions, adding up to an even larger, giant abstraction; the (by the way, individual, particular) "Self," is to some extent BALANCED BY "Nature." In that we, as selves, as individuals, seek to realize our individual desires ... but only insofar as they are allowed by Nature, after all.
5) While science is constantly furthermore, specifying the content of "Nature." So that it does not remain an empty abstraction.
So 6) in conclusion, there is no need to reject democracy, nature, and science, for the Boy Scouts. They are not hopelessly general abstractions; but can themselves be located within any number of concrete examples; and median institutions.
Or, if we insist on defending the Boy Scouts? Then even here, for that matter, defending "democracy," being a good citizen, is one of the principles of even that institution; of the Boy Scouts.
"Democracy" and "Nature" therefore, are anything but dead, or empty, abstractions.
Or parenthetically, 7) if Whitman seems to have over-abstracted them at times, that was just in proper counterbalance, for example, not only of the life of the American frontier (even in Boston); but also of the wild life, of a homosexual male nurse, and poet.
So that in the end, a balance IS struck, between the individual and the general, even within the rubrics of "Democracy" and "Nature." Even in Whitman. And even more, in "Science."
While personally, as a balanced, median institution, with a grasp of both the particular and the general, I prefer the institutional world of Science in fact, over say, the Boy Scouts.
"Hush'd be the camps today, /And soldiers let us drape our war-worn weapons, /And each with musing soul retire to celebrate, /Our dear commander's death. /No more for him life's stormy conflicts, /Nor victory, nor defeat--no more time's dark events, /Charging like ceaseless clouds across the sky. But sing poet in our name, /Sing of the love we bore him--because you, dweller in camps, know it truly. /As they invault the coffin there, /Sing--as they close the doors of earth upon him--one verse, /For the heavy hearts of soldiers."
No sense of tragic, that Whitman. And perhaps the most moving now, when our flags are half-mast for an local soldier (and father and son) is "When Lilacs Last in the Dooryard Bloomed":
"Over the breast of the spring, the land, amid cities, /Amid lanes and through old woods, where lately the violets peep'd from the ground, spotting the gray debris, /Amid the grass in the fields each side of the lanes, passing the endless grass, /Passing the yellow-spear'd wheat, every grain from its shroud in the dark-brown fields uprisen, /Passing the apple-tree blows of white and pink in the orchards, /Carrying a corpse to where it shall rest in the grave, /Night and day journeys a coffin."
There is a difference between recognizing that tragic things happen (and after the Civil War it was impossible not to recognize that) and recognizing that the tragic is an inextricable part of the human condition, an aspect of what the Christians call "original sin," that the tragic inheres in the inescapable limitations of being human and not just in the fact that people sometimes choose to do evil things (under the influence of a society corrupt because of its separation from "nature") or because accidents happen. That is the difference between Whitman and the Transcendentalists one the one hand and Hawthorne, Melville, and Dickinson on the other.


