A radical shift in the Zeitgeist was occurring: authority began to be questioned; a skeptical relativism spread among the intelligentsia; claims about God and moral absolutes were rejected; human belief was perceived to be nothing more than a social-construction; the Christian worldview continued to crumble, its primacy supplanted by secularism.
The postmodern age may have started late in the second millennium, but it isn’t so different from the post-Renaissance era, circa 1630.
Into that age of skepticism came the French Catholic mathematician and philosopher René Descartes. Attempting to reestablish a firm footing for knowledge, he decided to make a clean sweep of presuppositions by clearing away all that could be doubted. He applied the method with the precision of a mathematical proof. Cutting away anything that could be doubted, Descartes was left with only one piece of data that was clearly indubitable: the fact of his doubting.
Doubting is a form of thinking, and thinking requires a thinker. The existence of the I that was doing the doubting, therefore, could not itself be doubted. Descartes discovered the apparent foundation for all knowledge: Cogito ergo sum—I think, therefore I am.
To modern ears the phrase is a cliché, and Descartes’ choice of ground for thinking seems obvious. But in the mid-seventeenth century it marked a revolutionary philosophical shift away from the classical and Christian mind that had relied on authority and revelation for centuries. As Richard Tarnas explains in The Passion of the Western Mind, “Descartes unintentionally began a theological Copernican revolution, for his mode of reasoning suggested that God’s existence was established by human reason and not vice versa.”
While starting with the best of intentions, the Jesuit-trained Descartes undermined the Christian worldview for centuries because he made the mistake of starting with epistemology rather than ontology, with knowing rather than being. Necessarily, what is is prior to what can be known, for knowing itself implies both the existence of a knower and something to be known. Descartes reversed the order and in doing so helped create what we call modernity.
Over the past few decades, many Christians—particularly those intrigued by postmodernism—have rightly questioned Descartes’ reversal. They have attempted to dethrone the idol of reason by pointing out the limits of rationality and questioning the human ability to achieve epistemic certainty, particularly about matters of theology. Unfortunately, in trimming away the underbrush they have failed to cut away the root of Descartes error: the faith in doubt.
Among these Christians, as well as among secular intellectuals, doubt about metaphysical truths—such as the existence and creative actions of God—has become viewed as a form of intellectual humility. Once considered evidence of a poor intellect, agnosticism and atheism are now treated as evidence of intellectual virtue.
Nothing could be further from the truth. This reliance on doubt requires that the doubter be the supreme judge of what can or cannot be known. Rejecting a dogmatic certitude about what is known in favor of a questioning attitude of whether something can be known with certainty merely shifts the idol of reason to a new location and gives it a more palatable, humble-sounding name. The doubters accept the limits of the human mind, embrace pluralism, and do not impose any one idea of truth upon others.
However when we put our trust solely in our own reason we either become dogmatic or skeptical, and even dogmatic in our skepticism. But when we set aside our self-idolatry and seek true epistemic humility we can discover that the only reliable foundation for reason is found in special revelation.
The only solid basis for our knowledge was revealed more than a thousand years before Descartes began to doubt. As the first chapter of John assures us, the Truth created all that exists:
In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. He was in the beginning with God. All things came into being through Him, and apart from Him nothing came into being that has come into being. In Him was life, and the life was the Light of men. The Light shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it. (John 1:1-5)
Commenting on this passage, James Sire notes that this means “God in Christ is the Meaning of everything. He is the ultimate Reason of all Being—his own being and the being of the universe.”
Because Christ created all things, everything—all existence—is imbued with meaning. We only know any truths because he exists. Christians can doubt many things, but to question the existence of God—or even to consider it an intellectually respectable proposition—is to doubt the source of all meaning in the universe. Are we able to take the place of the Creator, constructing reality and meaning ex nihilo?
We can deny God and retain an illusion of certainty. But there is only one indubitable foundation for knowledge—our reason and our ability to know is rooted in the person of Jesus Christ. We are not merely making claims about him; we are simply recognizing what cannot but be acknowledged when we truly humble our reason: that Christ is the Logos, the creator of all meaning and the fountainhead of all truth.
Joe Carter is web editor of First Things.
Comments:
I just think it is dangerous to begin with a dogmatic truth that is "revealed" without question to us. We are rational creatures for a purpose, and it's important that we use this reason. When we do so, we are able to discover so much more than we ever thought possible about the God we know and love. God could have very well made us incapable of reason, but that would take away from the richness of knowing Him. I absolutely embrace the atheists and the agnostics (although the atheists have more to say) because it gives me the chance as a believer to question my own beliefs, and come back ten times stronger in them.
You probably agree with what I've said, and perhaps your article is even suggesting the same thing. I just want to be clear that we don't necessarily have to humble our reason in order to come to know Christ and who He is. I do acknowledge that certain things cannot be attained through reason and that's where Faith transcends it, but we never forget that reason got us there to begin with..and I don't see anything wrong with that.
I loved reading this one!
"For we are, and we know that we are, and we love to be and to know that we are. Moreover, in the three things I have [just] said there is no falsity resembling truth to trouble us. For we do not take hold of these things with any bodily sense, as we do what is outside us. Thus we perceive colors by seeing, sounds by hearing, odors by smelling, flavors by tasting, hard and soft things by touching; and in thought we turn over incorporeal images that resemble these sensible things and we hold them in the memory and by their means we are aroused to desire the sensible things themselves. But without any teasing imagination of appearances or illusions, it is most certain to me that I am, that I know it, and that I love it.
"Concerning these truths I fear no arguments of the Academicians in which they say, "What if you should be mistaken?" For if I am mistaken, I am [si fallor, sum]. For one who does not exist cannot be mistaken either. And so I am, if I am mistaken. Because therefore I am, if I am mistaken, how am I mistaken about my existence when it is certain that I am if I am mistaken? Because therefore I, who would be the one mistaken, would have to exist to be mistaken, there is no doubt I am not mistaken in knowing that I am.
"Moreover, it follows that I should not be mistaken even in knowing that I know. For just as I know that I am, so also I know that I know it. And when I love these two things, I also add to the things I know a third and no less valuable something, this very love."
Moreover, in De trinitate, he writes,
"On the other hand who would doubt that he lives, remembers, understands, wills, thinks, knows, and judges? For even if he doubts, he lives; if he doubts, he remembers why he doubts; if he doubts, he understands that he doubts; if he doubts, he wishes to be certain; if he doubts, he thinks; if he doubts, he knows that he does not know; if he doubts, he judges that he ought not to consent rashly. Whoever then doubts about anything else ought never to doubt about all of these; for if they were not , he would be unable to doubt anything at all."
Now the question. Why doesn't rejecting Descartes in matters epistemic also entail tossing Augustine as well? For the basic inference in Augustine comes from doubt as well--he too is certain of doubt and certain of what doubt entails--If I doubt, there must be an "I" to do the doubting. To be sure, I maintain, following Plantinga and Wolterstorff, that I don't need any argument to know that I exist. But that doesn't negate the certainty of the inference to which Descartes and Augustine both subscribe.
Ironically, in Proper Confidence, Leslie Newbigin leverages Augustine against Descartes, all the why ignoring (or remaining blissfully unaware) of significant similarities in their epistemic procedure.
As Joe is well aware, I'm a huge fan of Reformed Epistemology and neither a Lockean nor a Cartesian. So I pose this as a question--what are we to do with these passages in Augustine (and with Gareth Matthews compelling arguments both in his essay in The Augustinian Tradition and in his book)? Is this a point at which a sound Christian epistemology must not only break with Descartes but with Augustine as well? Is there a way to criticize Descartes without glossing over the obvious logical validity of the inference and, what seems equally obvious, the analytic truth of the major premise?
My concern is this--while I think Descartes wrongheaded (and while I am certain that strong foundationalism is self-referentially incoherent), many Christian critiques of Descartes seem careless and likewise wrongheaded (bordering on denying the obvious--here, again, Newbigin comes to mind). The one who subscribes to Reformed Epistemology need only say that I don't need Cartesian certainty to know that I exist and so don't need Descartes (or Augustine's) argument. But that doesn't entail rejecting the validity of the Augustinian/Cartesian inference.
Best,
Richard
Nonsense: they impose the idea that there is no objective truth, an idea that is at odds with not only Christianity, but with our day-to-day reality. If you have an egg in your hand, you have an egg in your hand. Stating that you don't know how you know that there is an egg in your hand, if it is, in fact, an egg, is an intellectual party game.
Descarte's position is that truth can never be known. If truth can never be known, the only thing left is madness--which is what he have today
"Descartes position is that truth can never be known."
To agree or disagree with his epistemology is one thing. But this characterization of his method is simply wrong. He does in fact think that truth can be known--and certainly known. This alone makes sense of his particular doctrine of innate ideas and of his cogito ergo sum. You may think that Descartes radical doubt should lead to the rejection of truth. But, rightly or wrongly, that is not the conclusion Descartes himself reached.
This seems to work for the quantum mechanics crowd and maybe the string theory and M-theory folks.
But then, if I know I am conscious, then maybe "I know therefore I am." is a better argument still.
"While starting with the best of intentions, the Jesuit-trained Descartes undermined the Christian worldview for centuries because he made the mistake of starting with epistemology rather than ontology, with knowing rather than being. Necessarily, what _is_ is prior to what can be known, for knowing itself implies both the existence of a knower and something to be known. Descartes reversed the order and in doing so helped create what we call modernity."
I am a student of the law of evidence and of evidential inference. It may interest some people to know that after many years of study I have reached roughly the same conclusion: ontology must precede epistemology. It may also interest people to know that super-modern research in AI and cognitive science effectively (if unwittingly) suggests that only a neo-Aristotelian ontology will do. Cf. P. Tillers, " Are There Universal Principles or Forms of Evidential Inference? Of Inference Networks and Onto-Epistemology," http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1079235 In roughly two weeks I am giving a talk in Sydney in which I will again advance this thesis (among others). See http://tillerstillers.blogspot.com/search?q=Sydney
Absolutely fascinating. Nominalism vs. universalism has been a hot topic for centuries, and I am particularly interested in your finding great use in a neo-Aristotelian ontology (both Aristotle and ontology being naughty words in many intellectual circles). I know very bright people who think we have absolutely nothing to learn from moldy oldies like Aristotle. And how I would love to be able to taunt Sartre's ghost with the chant "Essence precedes existence." Keep us posted.
Best+
Richard
And yet . . . Isn't the real problem with Descartes less epistemic and more ontological. Isn't the real problem his universal possibilism in matters metaphysical? Isn't the real problem his contention that we can make sense of conditional necessity without any recourse to absolute necessity? It is precisely in his radicalization of Ockham's nominalism (which entails, of course, his commitment to Ockham's nominalism) where the problem lies.
But again, though I reject modernist epistemologies in favor of Reformed Epistemology (or, in favor of the common ground between Aquinas, Calvin, and Reid), I must nevertheless pose a question. Where is the failure in validity or soundness with respect to the cogito ergo sum argument? And I must reiterate the need to think through the apparent affinity between Augustine of Hippo and Rene Descartes with respect to this argument. Are Descartes's detractors here interested in tossing the arguments of Augustine and De civitate dei and De trinitate that would seem to be much the same?
Again, no defense of Descartes intended. But I think the way in which and the reasons for which he is repudiated matter a great deal. We need more precision here. Where is the inferential failure? What premise is to dubious or false? What then of Augustine's similar arguments?
I'm no defender of Descartes (save apparently for today). However, just where is the supra-rational leap? Descartes reintroduces such things as God and an external world by way of rational argumentation--that is, in a syllogistic format. And though I'm no Cartesian, I haven't seen anyone here yet point out where his ARGUMENT for the existence of God (which is a kind of ontological argument) or his argument for the veracity of an external world (and of other minds) fails in terms of validity or soundness. What premise in the ARGUMENT for these is dubious or false? Where, in the course of these arguments, does the conclusion not follow from the premises? I ask these as genuine questions. As I've noted, I'm convinced wholly by Plantinga and Wolterstorff and therefore don't subscribe to Cartesian (or Lockean) epistemology. But one who so subscribes, might nevertheless ask why Descartes argument fails if one eliminates his contention that one can only know by application of such a methodology. Perhaps one can know without application of such a method and also as a result of arguments deriving from it.
As well, the argument Descartes makes has to do with the order of epistemology and not the order of ontology. But why think that the order of knowing is just the same as the order of being? Maybe things known first in the order of epistemology are not first in the order of ontology. If so, what's the problem? Again, I reject Descartes ontology and his epistemology. For though I reject Descartes, I've often thought Christian thinkers--Catholic and Protestant--tend to reject caricatures and summaries rather than what Descartes actually said.
What is the difference in the places at which they arrived (save that Augustine is a metaphysical realist and Descartes a universal possibilist)? Both believe (and with certainty) in God (whom both describe as good), an external world, other minds, and in their own existence. Both agree not only that knowledge is possible, but even certainty. And we might go on. If they arrive at different places, then it's not the case on the surface. The difference must be rather below the surface. And what is this below the surface difference? Since both have certainty about the existence of things just mentioned, are you suggesting that the difference is just in the degree of certainty?
Perhaps Descartes felt the need to try to make a rational argument for his faith---meeting the prevailing protest and the skepticism on its own terrain---as he encountered the powerful turning-away from Catholicism occurring around him.
Descartes' failed effort may be a fitting point of departure as we now experience a scientistic intellectual climate dismissive of most teaching that affirms the Almighty's existence.
Without the spirit exemplified by Mr. Carter's conclusion we will be helpless in identifying correctly the errors of this age and in saving people from them.
If you take Descartes’ cogito ergo sum as an absolute truth, then it reveals that you simply absorbed a junk heap of philosophical drivels without having been able to consistently and coherently integrate them. Rene Descartes’ “the prior certainty of consciousness” is the idea that existence is not plain and obvious to man—that it can only be validated by the process of deduction from the innate, intrinsic contents of his consciousness.[2] This means that man’s consciousness consists of some faculty other than the faculty of perception. Thus Descartes considered the contents of a man’s consciousness as the irreducible primary and absolute, to which existence or reality has to adhere to. Is this what you call an absolute truth?
CONTINUE READING... http://fvdb.wordpress.com/2010/04/16/in-defense-of-truth-part-ii/
As an analogy, Aquinas (who, ironically, did not believe in the legitimacy of epistimological skepticism) argued that one could not know God existed, as a self evident truth. Therefore, he disagreed with Anslem, who argued that God's existence is self evident. Aquinas agreed with Anslem that God's existence is self evident, ontologically, but not epistimologically. We humans, with our finite minds, cannot know that God's existence is self evident, even though it is, and an angel would know this.
So, although, ontologically Mr,. Carter may be right, epistimologically, I think he's wrong.
Epistimologically, Aquinas's assertion, that all knowledge begins with sensations is correct. We then, can argue for God's existence, and the specifics of Christianity, but the latter two, rely on revelation, and therefore cannot be apart of out knowledge scheme, as true as they are.



“Descartes unintentionally began a theological Copernican revolution, for his mode of reasoning suggested that God’s existence was established by human reason and not vice versa.”
The conflation can be traced in this passage to a single word, "established," that is used as if it expresses a single meaning. To make sense of the passage, however, it has to take on two distinct meanings. In the sense in which God's existence is established by human reason, "established" means "proved" (the epistemic notion); in the sense in which human reason is established by God's existence (or, rather, God), "established" means "created" (the metaphysical notion). The two claims are not inconsistent with one another, so there's no reason to think that they can't both be true. Indeed, Descartes argued that they both are true. The fact that later thinkers failed to see that possibility can hardly be blamed on him.