Defending Christine O’ Donnell
September 21, 2010
Elizabeth Scalia
A week after her stunning upset in the Delaware primaries, I find myself in the odd position of defending Tea-Party-endorsed Christine O’Donnell, about whom I am mostly agnostic.
O’Donnell is like Palin-Lite; half the experience, less bitter. In her favor, though, is that she appears to be utterly without guile. She projects the sort of wide-eyed-innocent openness that personifies American naiveté to our cousins in Europe and often embarrasses (and trips up) the dismissive post-American sophisticates on the Upper West Side.
I rise to defend O’Donnell on two points tender to the Christian conscience, those of lying for the greater good, and masturbation.
A decade ago, O’Donnell asserted that she would not lie to a Nazi about hiding Anne Frank in her attic. These rhetorical scenarios are amusing “gotchas” in casual discussion-panel debates, but O’Donnell’s soundbite has been found objectionable by some, precisely because it is a soundbite; as such, it encourages reactions rather than reasoned musings. First Things’ own Joe Carter writes: “As a virtue ethicist I believe it would be immoral to not lie in that situation . . . If your hiding some of the Chosen People from enemies who want to kill them, it’s your duty to lie to protect them.”
No less then the Jew-hiding heroine Corrie ten Boom might disagree. In her book The Hiding Place, ten Boom recounts an episode where Nazis sought her nephew, Peter, who had been hidden in a root cellar, a rug and table hastily placed over the trapdoor. When soldiers demanded to know Peter’s whereabouts, his young cousin Cocky replied, “Why, he is under the table.”
The soldiers peered under the table while the family suppressed nervous chuckles. Humiliated, the Nazis threatened the family, then left. As others chastised Cocky for putting Peter—and the whole family—at such risk, her mother defended her, saying, “God honors truth-telling with perfect protection!”
Simplistic, right? Some might say “fundamentalist” and “anti-intellectual” to boot. But the story bolsters O’Donnell’s position; it suggests that power resides in a complete abandonment and surrender to the will of God and his laws, a faithful reliance that says, “If God is truth, he will be found only within truth, and not in a lie.”
This is the sort of heart-over-head theology that invites mockery, even as it zeroes in on Christ’s urging toward “childlike faith.” Jesus enjoyed the sophisticated reasoning of Nicodemus, but he rewarded the Centurion whose servant was sick, and who approached him wholly on faith. Intellectual debate did not lessen his appreciation of simple trust.
Catholics should appreciate O’Donnell’s Anne Frank answer; it is of a piece with a theology that recommends natural family planning over artificial contraception, adoption over abortion; it leaves room for God to enter into any given situation, rather than closing off access, and God—being all Good and without negatives—travels more naturally upon the truth than upon the lie.
And how refreshing might it be to have a Congress in place full of people dedicated to serving the truth, over truthiness.
Another long-ago-and-youthful remark by O’ Donnell, “The Bible says that lust in your heart is committing adultery, so you can't masturbate without lust" has also become fodder for the hyena set. Huffpo—in an impressive display of intellectualism—predictably called her youthful admonitions “crazy.”
Perpetual adolescents will demand that the masturbation quotes dog her campaign (and O’Donnell should prepare to hear boisterous strains of “Every Sperm is Sacred” from the Monty Python crowd), but here again, a Catholic (and for that matter a Buddhist or a Taoist) should appreciate the point O’ Donnell was clumsily trying to make: that human sexuality is deeply powerful in co-creative and energetic ways, and that it has meaning beyond its pleasures, which are great, but never meant to be solitary.
O’Donnell recently worked to reassure voters that sexual matters are ultimately private and that her “faith has matured” since her early pronouncements; she has had a masturbation maturation. But a “matured” faith could mean anything from Puritanism to Relativism; doubtless, someone will eventually ask her to be more explicit.
At that point, O’Donnell might wish to borrow some of the sane and helpful language of the Catechism of the Catholic Church, which has already wrung the matter through the processes of faith and reason:
“The deliberate use of the sexual faculty, for whatever reason, outside of marriage is essentially contrary to its purpose.” For here sexual pleasure is sought outside of “the sexual relationship which is demanded by the moral order and in which the total meaning of mutual self-giving and human procreation in the context of true love is achieved.”
To form an equitable judgment about the subjects’ moral responsibility and to guide pastoral action, one must take into account the affective immaturity, force of acquired habit, conditions of anxiety or other psychological or social factors that lessen, if not even reduce to a minimum, moral culpability (CCC 2352).
It is impossible, and probably impolite, to attempt to pinpoint where another person is on the “journey of faith,” but since O’ Donnell’s religious beliefs have become a prominent part of her political persona, we may safely assume she has signed on for the sojourn. As the saints can attest, the way of faith is curiously circuitous; one begins with a passionate move toward surrender, and urges others toward it.
Then one is challenged and must find a way to reason-out and articulate the faith. If one can do that soundly, without dropping articles of faith or dangling dogmatic participles, one is inevitably led once again toward surrender, but with a fuller—a matured—understanding of its meaning.
If one cannot, relativism becomes one’s campaign manager.
The chasm between religion and politics is wide and voracious; politicians more sublimely gifted than Christine O’Donnell have disappeared into its abyss while attempting to navigate between the two. Those who manage it end up compromised or despised, or both. O’Donnell’s Frank Capraesque turn at these precarious edges will make her the irresistible story of the 2010 elections.
Elizabeth Scalia is a contributing writer for First Things. She blogs at The Anchoress.
Comments:
9.21.2010 | 5:39am
Michael says:
To lie is one thing and to deceive, or, rather, to permit another to deceive himself, is another. That is why so many moral theologians have allowed evasion and equivocation, of which Corky's reply was an excellent example.
Saint Athanasius sailed his boat back past his pursuers and told them that Athanasius had passed that way, going upstream, a little while ago, which was literally true, but misleading.
Saint Athanasius sailed his boat back past his pursuers and told them that Athanasius had passed that way, going upstream, a little while ago, which was literally true, but misleading.
9.21.2010 | 7:49am
Jacob Lentz says:
Mr. Carter,
Hebrews 11:31 commends Rahab for her faith because she "received the spies in peace" (NRSV). It did not commend her dishonest misleading of the spies.
You ask "Should Rahab have turned them in and waited for God to find another way to save them?" The answer is "Yes!" Although God providentially used Rahab's deception for his purpose, he didn't implicitly condone it.
There will always be a tension between God's purpose and our participation in fulfilling that purpose. Another popular example of this tension is found in the story of Jacob and Esau. God intended for Jacob to be the father of the twelve tribes of Israel. In order for this to happen, Jacob needed to receive the birthright and blessing that Esau possessed. Was Jacob's deception of Isaac morally right?
Hebrews 11:31 commends Rahab for her faith because she "received the spies in peace" (NRSV). It did not commend her dishonest misleading of the spies.
You ask "Should Rahab have turned them in and waited for God to find another way to save them?" The answer is "Yes!" Although God providentially used Rahab's deception for his purpose, he didn't implicitly condone it.
There will always be a tension between God's purpose and our participation in fulfilling that purpose. Another popular example of this tension is found in the story of Jacob and Esau. God intended for Jacob to be the father of the twelve tribes of Israel. In order for this to happen, Jacob needed to receive the birthright and blessing that Esau possessed. Was Jacob's deception of Isaac morally right?
9.21.2010 | 7:59am
Jerry L. L. says:
Joe Carter writes: "The purpose of lying in such a situation is to mislead the Nazis about the whereabouts of the hidden Jews. Any act that misleads them is therefore akin to lying. How does that make it acceptable?"
What about mental reservation? I'm afraid I couldn't explain what it is, exactly; but from what I do know, it's about mentally reserving the truth for those who don't deserve to know it. I wonder if anyone around here could elaborate on it further for me.
I do know, however, that the Catholic Church teaches that lying is an intrinsic evil, as is shown in the Catechism, 2482-2485. And the paragraphs relevant to mental reservation are found in 2488 and 2489:
"The right to the communication of the truth is not unconditional. Everyone must conform his life to the Gospel precept of fraternal love. This requires us in concrete situations to judge whether or not it is appropriate to reveal the truth to someone who asks for it.
"Charity and respect for the truth should dictate the response to every request for information or communication. The good and safety of others, respect for privacy, and the common good are sufficient reasons for being silent about what ought not be known or for making use of a discreet LANGUAGE. The duty to avoid scandal often commands strict discretion. No one is bound to reveal the truth to someone who does not have the right to know it."
For a full context of what is stated in the Catechism on the eighth commandment, you can find it at this link:
http://www.usccb.org/catechism/text/pt3sect2chpt2art8.shtml
What about mental reservation? I'm afraid I couldn't explain what it is, exactly; but from what I do know, it's about mentally reserving the truth for those who don't deserve to know it. I wonder if anyone around here could elaborate on it further for me.
I do know, however, that the Catholic Church teaches that lying is an intrinsic evil, as is shown in the Catechism, 2482-2485. And the paragraphs relevant to mental reservation are found in 2488 and 2489:
"The right to the communication of the truth is not unconditional. Everyone must conform his life to the Gospel precept of fraternal love. This requires us in concrete situations to judge whether or not it is appropriate to reveal the truth to someone who asks for it.
"Charity and respect for the truth should dictate the response to every request for information or communication. The good and safety of others, respect for privacy, and the common good are sufficient reasons for being silent about what ought not be known or for making use of a discreet LANGUAGE. The duty to avoid scandal often commands strict discretion. No one is bound to reveal the truth to someone who does not have the right to know it."
For a full context of what is stated in the Catechism on the eighth commandment, you can find it at this link:
http://www.usccb.org/catechism/text/pt3sect2chpt2art8.shtml
9.21.2010 | 8:58am
BE says:
There is no admiring Catholic politicians who can't express their views in an articulate and clear fashion. They may be virtuous, they may have charisma, they may be winners, but in the end they make the faith seem indefensible. What Catholicism nee today is public figures who know why they believe and can explain their conviction.
9.21.2010 | 9:29am
Tricia says:
Not to belabor the point, but there is something else to take into consideration when discussing "lying to Nazis," even hypothetically. It is morally valid to ask if the person ask you a question is entitled to the truth. Your parents asking who you were out with last night, your boss inquiring if you followed up as he had asked, or an immoral brute wanting to know where people are hiding so that he might kill them. The first two, of course, have a valid and moral claim to your honesty, the last does not. So you can make the argument that you are not committing a moral evil (lying) when you you deceive someone who has no claim on truth.
9.21.2010 | 9:36am
Paul says:
I'm with Joe Carter here. Though I would introduce a distinction (one not my own, to be sure). I think the relevant philosophical/theological thinker is Bonhoeffer rather than Kant. Bonhoeffer notes that deception is the genus of which lying is the species (though his terminology is a bit different). Thus, while all lies are acts of deception, not all acts of deception are lies (in the moral sense). To lie is to withhold the truth from someone to whom the truth belongs. Put in terms Nick Wolterstorff might appreciate, to lie is deprive someone of a truth to which they have a right--where the truth in question constitutes a good for them in their life. But, of course, the Nazis, given their actions and intentions, had no right to the truth that Jews were being hidden by Corrie Ten Boom and their family in their home. If one uses the term lying for all acts of deception, however, then I do think we must distinguish between moral and immoral acts of deception. And perhaps it is worth noting that the decalogue doesn't, strictly speaking forbid lying. It forbids something rather more precise--bearing false witness. And while bearing false witness is an instance of lying. Not all instances of lying amount to bearing false witness . . . At least, I would offer these as points for reflection and comment.
9.21.2010 | 9:41am
Jules Aime says:
Actually, you have the sides here exactly wrong. Neither Corrie ten Boom nor O'Donnell are being simplistic or anti-intellectual. Both are conforming, and conforming rather rigidly (as intellectuals often do), to the highest principles of the Enlightenment. Both advocate doing exactly what Kant would have them do (and not Jesus who cheerfully uses and advocates clever subterfuge in such situations).
And it is that which is wrong with it. The true simple person would never embrace the sort of rigid deontology suggested by these two women. The truly simple person would consider character, history, circumstance in making their decision. Only someone burdened by an excessive regard for their own intelligence would embrace the rigid and harsh morality of these two. Thank God that he intervened to prevent Corrie ten Boom from bring disaster on her nephew.
And it is that which is wrong with it. The true simple person would never embrace the sort of rigid deontology suggested by these two women. The truly simple person would consider character, history, circumstance in making their decision. Only someone burdened by an excessive regard for their own intelligence would embrace the rigid and harsh morality of these two. Thank God that he intervened to prevent Corrie ten Boom from bring disaster on her nephew.
9.21.2010 | 10:00am
Joe Carter says:
@Michael ***To lie is one thing and to deceive***
The definition of a lie is “a false statement made with deliberate intent to deceive.”
@Jacob ***You ask "Should Rahab have turned them in and waited for God to find another way to save them?" The answer is "Yes!"***
The Bible gives no hint that this is the case. In fact, the categorical imperative not to lie under any circumstances is not found in the Bible, it was something Augustine picked up from Aristotle.
Those men were geniuses but even they could be wrong sometimes. If Rahab had turned in the spies (as strict honesty would have required her to do) she would not have, as the ESV says, “given a friendly welcome” to them.
***Was Jacob's deception of Isaac morally right?***
No, because he had the wrong motives for his deception.
@Jerry L. L. ***What about mental reservation? ***
I could be wrong, but I don’t think that is position accepted by Catholic moral theologians.
@Tricia ***It is morally valid to ask if the person ask you a question is entitled to the truth.***
While I agree with you, I think that is the position that Elizabeth is disagreeing with. According the Catholic Encyclopedia on lying:
“A recent writer in Paris series, Science et Religion, wishes to add to the common definition some such words as "made to one who has the right to truth." So that a false statement knowingly made to one who has not a right to the truth will not be a lie. This, however, seems to ignore the malice which a lie has in itself, like hypocrisy, and to derive it solely from the social consequence of lying. Most of these writers who attack the common opinion show that they have very imperfectly grasped its true meaning. At any rate they have made little or no impression on the common teaching of the Catholic schools.”
The definition of a lie is “a false statement made with deliberate intent to deceive.”
@Jacob ***You ask "Should Rahab have turned them in and waited for God to find another way to save them?" The answer is "Yes!"***
The Bible gives no hint that this is the case. In fact, the categorical imperative not to lie under any circumstances is not found in the Bible, it was something Augustine picked up from Aristotle.
Those men were geniuses but even they could be wrong sometimes. If Rahab had turned in the spies (as strict honesty would have required her to do) she would not have, as the ESV says, “given a friendly welcome” to them.
***Was Jacob's deception of Isaac morally right?***
No, because he had the wrong motives for his deception.
@Jerry L. L. ***What about mental reservation? ***
I could be wrong, but I don’t think that is position accepted by Catholic moral theologians.
@Tricia ***It is morally valid to ask if the person ask you a question is entitled to the truth.***
While I agree with you, I think that is the position that Elizabeth is disagreeing with. According the Catholic Encyclopedia on lying:
“A recent writer in Paris series, Science et Religion, wishes to add to the common definition some such words as "made to one who has the right to truth." So that a false statement knowingly made to one who has not a right to the truth will not be a lie. This, however, seems to ignore the malice which a lie has in itself, like hypocrisy, and to derive it solely from the social consequence of lying. Most of these writers who attack the common opinion show that they have very imperfectly grasped its true meaning. At any rate they have made little or no impression on the common teaching of the Catholic schools.”
9.21.2010 | 10:13am
Elizabeth Scalia says:
Being Catholic, I cannot help but bring into the argument the notion of "intention." Corky was a very young girl and her intention was not to deceive; she simply, in her nervousness, blurted out the truth, her very innocence may have contributed to the stumping of the nazis, but her intention appeared to simply be her authentic self. Oddly enough, I believe O' Donnell's intentions have been the same. And God loves us when we are willing to be our authentic (thus vulnerable) selves. Recall how Jesus appreciated the Canaanite (?) woman who challenged him about the dogs feasting on the tablescraps. She was not hiding or groveling; she used her with a fully authentic intention. Jesus loved it.
9.21.2010 | 10:30am
Paul says:
@Jules Aime
I think only someone who has never read The Hiding Place or never heard her speak could so (mis)characterize and so impugn Corrie Ten Boom. It seems your entire argument against her is based on a thorough misunderstanding of both what she wrote and who she was. I suggest picking up a copy of the book immediately--a book which is preeminently about forgiveness, even of those who persecute us to the point of disgracing us or worse. Miss Ten Boom was placed in a Nazi interment camp. She was humiliated. Members of her family died in those camps. And yet she believed she was called to call those who suffered the worst the Nazi regime had to offer to forgive, genuinely and sincerely, those who persecuted them. Moreover, she found herself confronted with one of her oppressors and I think, in the ensuing passage in The Hiding Place, writes one of the profoundest twentieth century reflections on forgiveness. Furthermore, only someone who had never heard her speak would so characterize her personality. I'm really astonished someone would say such things.
I think only someone who has never read The Hiding Place or never heard her speak could so (mis)characterize and so impugn Corrie Ten Boom. It seems your entire argument against her is based on a thorough misunderstanding of both what she wrote and who she was. I suggest picking up a copy of the book immediately--a book which is preeminently about forgiveness, even of those who persecute us to the point of disgracing us or worse. Miss Ten Boom was placed in a Nazi interment camp. She was humiliated. Members of her family died in those camps. And yet she believed she was called to call those who suffered the worst the Nazi regime had to offer to forgive, genuinely and sincerely, those who persecuted them. Moreover, she found herself confronted with one of her oppressors and I think, in the ensuing passage in The Hiding Place, writes one of the profoundest twentieth century reflections on forgiveness. Furthermore, only someone who had never heard her speak would so characterize her personality. I'm really astonished someone would say such things.
9.21.2010 | 10:37am
Gabriel says:
A discussion from the Bablylonian Talmud seems relevant here, from Tractate Yevamot, 65b (Soncino edition). Note particularly the saying of the school of R Ishmael, that in the Bible even God lied for the sake of peace:
“R. Ile'a further stated in the name of R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon: One may modify a statement in the interests of peace; for it is said in Scripture, ‘Thy father did command etc. so shall ye say unto Joseph: Forgive, I pray thee now, etc’. [[1]]
R. Nathan said: It [[2]] is a commandment; for it is stated in Scripture, ‘And Samuel said: 'How can I go? If Saul hear it, he will kill me', etc’. [[3]]
At the School of R. Ishmael it was taught: Great is the cause of peace. Seeing that for its sake even the Holy One, blessed be He, modified a statement; for at first it is written, ‘My lord being old’, [[4]] while afterwards it is written, ‘And I am old’. [[5]]”
NOTES:
[[1]] Gen. L, 16f. It is nowhere found that Jacob commanded it; but the brothers attributed the request to him for the sake of preserving the peace between themselves and Joseph.
[[2]] Modification of a statement in the interests of peace.
[[3]] I Sam. XVI, 2. In response to this, Samuel was advised by God to say that he came to sacrifice to the Lord (ibid.) though his mission, in fact, was the anointing of David (v. ibid. 1 and 13).
[[4]] Gen. XVIII, 12, a slight on Abraham,
[[5]] Ibid. 13. Thus God, when speaking to Abraham, modified Sarah's expression concerning him, which he might have resented, to one in which the slight of 'crabbed old age' was directed towards Sarah herself.
“R. Ile'a further stated in the name of R. Eleazar son of R. Simeon: One may modify a statement in the interests of peace; for it is said in Scripture, ‘Thy father did command etc. so shall ye say unto Joseph: Forgive, I pray thee now, etc’. [[1]]
R. Nathan said: It [[2]] is a commandment; for it is stated in Scripture, ‘And Samuel said: 'How can I go? If Saul hear it, he will kill me', etc’. [[3]]
At the School of R. Ishmael it was taught: Great is the cause of peace. Seeing that for its sake even the Holy One, blessed be He, modified a statement; for at first it is written, ‘My lord being old’, [[4]] while afterwards it is written, ‘And I am old’. [[5]]”
NOTES:
[[1]] Gen. L, 16f. It is nowhere found that Jacob commanded it; but the brothers attributed the request to him for the sake of preserving the peace between themselves and Joseph.
[[2]] Modification of a statement in the interests of peace.
[[3]] I Sam. XVI, 2. In response to this, Samuel was advised by God to say that he came to sacrifice to the Lord (ibid.) though his mission, in fact, was the anointing of David (v. ibid. 1 and 13).
[[4]] Gen. XVIII, 12, a slight on Abraham,
[[5]] Ibid. 13. Thus God, when speaking to Abraham, modified Sarah's expression concerning him, which he might have resented, to one in which the slight of 'crabbed old age' was directed towards Sarah herself.
9.21.2010 | 10:53am
Stephen M. Barr says:
To Joe Carter,
The great majority of Catholic theologians through the centuries have taught that it is wrong to tell a lie under any circumstances whatever. (This position has difficulties. And other positions are allowable for Catholics to hold.) St. Augustine held the absolute view. You say that he "picked that up from Aristotle". That is rather a blithe assertion. Neither St. Augustine nor the other Church fathers uncritically accepted ideas from pagan thinkers. They took what they saw as consonant with the gospel and Catholic tradition and rejected what they saw as inconsistent. It is fashionable among some non-Catholic Christians --- but too facile --- to say that anything in theological tradition that cannot be found explicitly in Scripture is simply borrowed from pagan sources. For example, it nowhere says unambiguously in Scripture that God is immutable and impassible, and so some theologians who want to say that God changes, does not know the future, etc. claim that these ideas were imported from Greek metaphysics.
Anyway, I would be interested to see it demonstrated that Augustine was merely parroting Aristotle on the question of lying. Augustine was a powerful thinker, and his views on lying are of a piece with his views on other moral questions, and with his theology in general.
To Elizabeth Scalia: As someone who lives in Delaware and has some familiarity with the situation, I find all of this discussion strangely irrelevant to the actual human being Christine O'Donnell. I don't know whether she'd lie to a Nazi, but she has lied in very recent times about all SORTS of things. She lied when she said that she was demoted and then fired by ISI because they were discriminating against her for reasons of gender. (She was demoted and fired, I believe, for doing a lousy job.) She lied (in the context of her lawsuit against ISI) when she said that working for ISI cost her the opportunity to study in a masters degree program at Princeton. She had not been accepted to that program, and did not have a bachelor's degree at that time, and so it is doubtful she would have been accepted by it. She lied in saying at a fund raiser that she won two of the three counties of Delaware in her race against Biden, when in fact she lost two by wide margins and the third by a thin margin. There are many things one can criticize her for, but being an absolutist on the subject of lying is EMPHATICALLY not one of them.
I will hold my nose and vote for O'Donnell. Coons is extremely liberal. O'Donnell is right on most issues.
The great majority of Catholic theologians through the centuries have taught that it is wrong to tell a lie under any circumstances whatever. (This position has difficulties. And other positions are allowable for Catholics to hold.) St. Augustine held the absolute view. You say that he "picked that up from Aristotle". That is rather a blithe assertion. Neither St. Augustine nor the other Church fathers uncritically accepted ideas from pagan thinkers. They took what they saw as consonant with the gospel and Catholic tradition and rejected what they saw as inconsistent. It is fashionable among some non-Catholic Christians --- but too facile --- to say that anything in theological tradition that cannot be found explicitly in Scripture is simply borrowed from pagan sources. For example, it nowhere says unambiguously in Scripture that God is immutable and impassible, and so some theologians who want to say that God changes, does not know the future, etc. claim that these ideas were imported from Greek metaphysics.
Anyway, I would be interested to see it demonstrated that Augustine was merely parroting Aristotle on the question of lying. Augustine was a powerful thinker, and his views on lying are of a piece with his views on other moral questions, and with his theology in general.
To Elizabeth Scalia: As someone who lives in Delaware and has some familiarity with the situation, I find all of this discussion strangely irrelevant to the actual human being Christine O'Donnell. I don't know whether she'd lie to a Nazi, but she has lied in very recent times about all SORTS of things. She lied when she said that she was demoted and then fired by ISI because they were discriminating against her for reasons of gender. (She was demoted and fired, I believe, for doing a lousy job.) She lied (in the context of her lawsuit against ISI) when she said that working for ISI cost her the opportunity to study in a masters degree program at Princeton. She had not been accepted to that program, and did not have a bachelor's degree at that time, and so it is doubtful she would have been accepted by it. She lied in saying at a fund raiser that she won two of the three counties of Delaware in her race against Biden, when in fact she lost two by wide margins and the third by a thin margin. There are many things one can criticize her for, but being an absolutist on the subject of lying is EMPHATICALLY not one of them.
I will hold my nose and vote for O'Donnell. Coons is extremely liberal. O'Donnell is right on most issues.
9.21.2010 | 10:55am
Paul says:
@ Joe,
I think I might disagree with your reply to Michael. But that's only because I would suggest that truth is not just a property of propositions. But it is also a substantive good. And one is only lied to when one is deprived that good in just those cases in which one has a right to or claim upon that good. And the Nazis had no such claim and so they were not lied to, though they were deceived. Still, nothing that was owed them was denied them.
I quite agree with what I take to be an implication of your position and mine. That it would be strange--very strange--to say that folks like Corrie Ten Boom owed to God treating the Nazis so as to tell them the truth about the Jews she was hiding. That seems a moral absurdity of tremendous proportions. Wouldn't God be less than wholly good if he constituted us so that by virtue of nature we owed to him that sort of action? Ockham would answer in the negative. But shouldn't a realist answer in the affirmative, contra Ockham on this count? And how could a positive divine law imposing such an obligation not be at variance with divine moral goodness?
(Ockham might demur, but shouldn't a realist concur)
I think I might disagree with your reply to Michael. But that's only because I would suggest that truth is not just a property of propositions. But it is also a substantive good. And one is only lied to when one is deprived that good in just those cases in which one has a right to or claim upon that good. And the Nazis had no such claim and so they were not lied to, though they were deceived. Still, nothing that was owed them was denied them.
I quite agree with what I take to be an implication of your position and mine. That it would be strange--very strange--to say that folks like Corrie Ten Boom owed to God treating the Nazis so as to tell them the truth about the Jews she was hiding. That seems a moral absurdity of tremendous proportions. Wouldn't God be less than wholly good if he constituted us so that by virtue of nature we owed to him that sort of action? Ockham would answer in the negative. But shouldn't a realist answer in the affirmative, contra Ockham on this count? And how could a positive divine law imposing such an obligation not be at variance with divine moral goodness?
(Ockham might demur, but shouldn't a realist concur)
9.21.2010 | 11:07am
Jim Gordon says:
Agonizing whether it would be right to deceive a Storm Trooper seeking a Jew? Really?
If lying to a Nazi to save Anne Frank is an affront to God, then D-Day certainly was an abomination.
We're enjoined to look into our souls daily and see how closely we've walked with God. But some things can be over-thought. This is one of them.
If lying to a Nazi to save Anne Frank is an affront to God, then D-Day certainly was an abomination.
We're enjoined to look into our souls daily and see how closely we've walked with God. But some things can be over-thought. This is one of them.
9.21.2010 | 11:10am
Donovan77 says:
It is just amazing how the press just pulls quotes from Christine O'Donnell's past and doesn't even both to really examine what she said from both sides. It's also appalling that the left completely ignores what their candidate, Chris Coons, has said about Marxism. Delaware Republican's chose the right and true conservative in the race. I urge everyone to read http://americasculturalstudies.com/280/about-not-having-cap-trade/ for a great take on the importance of the Cap and Trade issue in this argument of why Delaware voters picked the right candidate to face Coons in November.
9.21.2010 | 11:28am
Paul says:
@ Stephen Barr,
It's good to return to Christine O'Donnell herself. And here I think it bears mentioning that conservatives are definitely in the wilderness when we are saddled with a candidate like O'Donnell (or when O'Donnell is the sort of person that someone like Palin successfully advances). Now more than ever, conservatives need smart, prudential, philosophical statesman--the sort of folks that don't leave us holding our noses when we vote.
It's good to return to Christine O'Donnell herself. And here I think it bears mentioning that conservatives are definitely in the wilderness when we are saddled with a candidate like O'Donnell (or when O'Donnell is the sort of person that someone like Palin successfully advances). Now more than ever, conservatives need smart, prudential, philosophical statesman--the sort of folks that don't leave us holding our noses when we vote.
9.21.2010 | 11:30am
jason taylor says:
Jane Jacobs in Systems of Survival claims that there are two systems of ethical emphasis, one for protecting and one for providing. According to that deception is permitted as long as it is appropriate to the mission and is compatible with loyalty to those one works with. On that reasoning, in other words, the President of the United States is supposed to deceive the Russians and not the American people.
That is not a Christian idea but it is an insightful one, and it is one we know by intuition which is one reason why we delight in reading of trickster heroes.
The point about right to the truth expresses it better and says something I thought of earlier but couldn't phrase as well. I remember two incidents from history that express differing ways to deceive. One was during the Napoleonic wars. A French column was held up by some Austrians on the other side of the river. He sent a flag of truce telling the Austrian commander,"rejoice, it's peace", or something like that. When the Austrians were off their guard the French then galloped down to seize a bridge allowing them to cross the river. That was a lie as the Austrians certainly did have a right to the knowledge that hostilities continued.
Another story was the famous Man Who Never Was, a delightful blend of cunning and macabre that has always enchanted spy enthusiasts. In World War II, a corpse was deposited for the Germans to find, with the totally imagined life of it's owner, and a suitcase full of plans of which he was the alleged courier. This was a just ruse of war not lying. The Germans in this case did not have a right to Britain's state secrets. In a sense they had a right to try to find them out. That is, they were a rival state and indeed a belligerent. And while they were at war with Britain unjustly, granted the unjust war, probing Britain's secrets was perfectly fair play. However Germany certainly did not have a right to have Britain abstain from trying to conceal her secrets.
That is not a Christian idea but it is an insightful one, and it is one we know by intuition which is one reason why we delight in reading of trickster heroes.
The point about right to the truth expresses it better and says something I thought of earlier but couldn't phrase as well. I remember two incidents from history that express differing ways to deceive. One was during the Napoleonic wars. A French column was held up by some Austrians on the other side of the river. He sent a flag of truce telling the Austrian commander,"rejoice, it's peace", or something like that. When the Austrians were off their guard the French then galloped down to seize a bridge allowing them to cross the river. That was a lie as the Austrians certainly did have a right to the knowledge that hostilities continued.
Another story was the famous Man Who Never Was, a delightful blend of cunning and macabre that has always enchanted spy enthusiasts. In World War II, a corpse was deposited for the Germans to find, with the totally imagined life of it's owner, and a suitcase full of plans of which he was the alleged courier. This was a just ruse of war not lying. The Germans in this case did not have a right to Britain's state secrets. In a sense they had a right to try to find them out. That is, they were a rival state and indeed a belligerent. And while they were at war with Britain unjustly, granted the unjust war, probing Britain's secrets was perfectly fair play. However Germany certainly did not have a right to have Britain abstain from trying to conceal her secrets.
9.21.2010 | 11:35am
Bender says:
“As a virtue ethicist I believe . . ."
To begin with, we do better to listen to the Church in properly forming our conscience, rather than relying up self-puffery to vainly build up our bona fides.
Secondly, we need to see these moral "what-ifs" for what they are. None of us -- NONE -- will ever have Nazis coming to our doors asking for Jews. It will never happen.
But when someone promotes this idea that it is not only morally acceptable, but morally obligatory, to do some wrong in service of the greater good, to do a little evil to avoid a greater evil, given that we will NEVER face the situation posed in the question, we have to ask ourselves, now that we have stated that it is OK in some circumstances to do evil, where do we draw the line?
In what other circumstances is it, not merely OK, but obligatory, to do what we think is a little evil (or not wrong at all, even though centuries of moral theology says it is an objective evil) to advance what we believe to be the greater good?
When else is it OK to lie for the greater good? True, politicians do it EVERY DAY. Even a thief will justify his stealing, saying that it is permissible to steal from this person of means in order to feed himself or his family.
Indeed, one lesson of eating the Fruit in the Garden is that we all justify our sins in this way -- oh, what we are doing is only a small wrong, if a wrong at all, and it is done for the greater good in any event.
Very few people do evil knowing it to be evil and purposely intending to do evil. Instead, they justify it. They say that it isn't evil at all, but good to do. Even Adolf Hitler himself justified killing Jews, who he deemed to be social vermin, for the greater good of protecting the German people.
So, where does this idea that it is morally acceptable to do a little wrong for the greater good get us? Where does this idea that a moral wrong is a actually a moral good if we have a good enough intention get us?
To begin with, we do better to listen to the Church in properly forming our conscience, rather than relying up self-puffery to vainly build up our bona fides.
Secondly, we need to see these moral "what-ifs" for what they are. None of us -- NONE -- will ever have Nazis coming to our doors asking for Jews. It will never happen.
But when someone promotes this idea that it is not only morally acceptable, but morally obligatory, to do some wrong in service of the greater good, to do a little evil to avoid a greater evil, given that we will NEVER face the situation posed in the question, we have to ask ourselves, now that we have stated that it is OK in some circumstances to do evil, where do we draw the line?
In what other circumstances is it, not merely OK, but obligatory, to do what we think is a little evil (or not wrong at all, even though centuries of moral theology says it is an objective evil) to advance what we believe to be the greater good?
When else is it OK to lie for the greater good? True, politicians do it EVERY DAY. Even a thief will justify his stealing, saying that it is permissible to steal from this person of means in order to feed himself or his family.
Indeed, one lesson of eating the Fruit in the Garden is that we all justify our sins in this way -- oh, what we are doing is only a small wrong, if a wrong at all, and it is done for the greater good in any event.
Very few people do evil knowing it to be evil and purposely intending to do evil. Instead, they justify it. They say that it isn't evil at all, but good to do. Even Adolf Hitler himself justified killing Jews, who he deemed to be social vermin, for the greater good of protecting the German people.
So, where does this idea that it is morally acceptable to do a little wrong for the greater good get us? Where does this idea that a moral wrong is a actually a moral good if we have a good enough intention get us?
9.21.2010 | 11:41am
Michael says:
SSt Augustine is very explicit in his view
You hate all who do iniquity: You destroy those who speak falsehood (Ps 5:6)
Now He hates all who work iniquity: but all who speak falsehood He also destroys. Which thing being fixed, who of them which assert this will be moved by those examples, when it is said, suppose a man should seek shelter with you who by your lie may be saved from death? For that death which men are foolishly afraid of, who are not afraid to sin, kills not the soul but the body, as the Lord teaches in the Gospel; whence He charges us not to fear that death: but the mouth which lies kills not the body but the soul. For in these words it is most plainly written, “The mouth that lies slays the soul. “ (Wisdom 1:11) How then can it be said without the greatest perverseness, that to the end one man may have life of the body, it is another man's duty to incur death of the soul?
However, as other theologians have pointed out, it is not every deception that involves falsehood - Equivocation being the obvious example
You hate all who do iniquity: You destroy those who speak falsehood (Ps 5:6)
Now He hates all who work iniquity: but all who speak falsehood He also destroys. Which thing being fixed, who of them which assert this will be moved by those examples, when it is said, suppose a man should seek shelter with you who by your lie may be saved from death? For that death which men are foolishly afraid of, who are not afraid to sin, kills not the soul but the body, as the Lord teaches in the Gospel; whence He charges us not to fear that death: but the mouth which lies kills not the body but the soul. For in these words it is most plainly written, “The mouth that lies slays the soul. “ (Wisdom 1:11) How then can it be said without the greatest perverseness, that to the end one man may have life of the body, it is another man's duty to incur death of the soul?
However, as other theologians have pointed out, it is not every deception that involves falsehood - Equivocation being the obvious example
9.21.2010 | 11:45am
Dan Deeny says:
On the question of lying:
Lying to Jesus, St. Francis, an ordinary person, or oneself is not a good idea. But lying to a Nazi? Isn't a Nazi working for Lucifer? So, the question is whether we can lie to Satan or to someone working for him. I would say we could. We must use the weapons at hand.
I am interested in your comments.
Thank you.
Lying to Jesus, St. Francis, an ordinary person, or oneself is not a good idea. But lying to a Nazi? Isn't a Nazi working for Lucifer? So, the question is whether we can lie to Satan or to someone working for him. I would say we could. We must use the weapons at hand.
I am interested in your comments.
Thank you.
9.21.2010 | 11:51am
harry says:
BE wrote:
“There is no admiring Catholic politicians who can't express their views in an articulate and clear fashion. They may be virtuous, they may have charisma, they may be winners, but in the end they make the faith seem indefensible. What Catholicism needs today is public figures who know why they believe and can explain their conviction.”
I agree in general, but I am not sure it is possible for politicians who are genuinely Catholic to articulate the traditional view of sexual morality in a way that will not be mocked and ridiculed by those who have already decided traditional sexual morality is indefensible. I think politicians who take their Catholic faith seriously would do well, when asked about their views on sexual matters like masturbation, if they simply responded that they are Catholic and that the Church's teachings on such matters can be found in the Catechism of the Catholic Church.
As for her statements about lying, O'Donnell strikes me as being innocent. This indicates to me she has the truths of the faith in her heart – where it counts – even if she doesn't have a theologian's understanding of them. In one sense it is better that way. After all, the devil is a better theologian than any of us. That does neither him nor anyone else any good.
“There is no admiring Catholic politicians who can't express their views in an articulate and clear fashion. They may be virtuous, they may have charisma, they may be winners, but in the end they make the faith seem indefensible. What Catholicism needs today is public figures who know why they believe and can explain their conviction.”
I agree in general, but I am not sure it is possible for politicians who are genuinely Catholic to articulate the traditional view of sexual morality in a way that will not be mocked and ridiculed by those who have already decided traditional sexual morality is indefensible. I think politicians who take their Catholic faith seriously would do well, when asked about their views on sexual matters like masturbation, if they simply responded that they are Catholic and that the Church's teachings on such matters can be found in the Catechism of the Catholic Church.
As for her statements about lying, O'Donnell strikes me as being innocent. This indicates to me she has the truths of the faith in her heart – where it counts – even if she doesn't have a theologian's understanding of them. In one sense it is better that way. After all, the devil is a better theologian than any of us. That does neither him nor anyone else any good.
9.21.2010 | 12:00pm
Charlie Collier says:
Augustine's position on lying cannot, contra Joe Carter, be reduced to influence from Aristotle. For those interested in a book-length treatment of the issues at stake in this debate, I highly recommend Paul J. Griffiths' book "Lying: An Augustinian Theology of Duplicity" (Brazos Press, 2004).
Stephen Barr makes excellent points—the absence of a proof-text from Scripture hardly settles the matter, and Augustine had one huge theological brain and should never be so easily dismissed.
So consider the matter theologically. If a good reason could be given for lying, how about this reason—the redemption of the world? Now, if God has the best reason of all to lie, an affirmation of lying does nothing less than undercut the doctrine of the incarnation—perhaps Jesus is not the manifestation of God in the flesh after all. Perhaps God was just lying to save us. Thus, affirm lying, and you undercut Christian doctrine, for no one is in a more serious position to justify lying to defeat evil than God. And so perhaps the Word did not become flesh, but instead dissembled and took on some deceitful guise for us and for our salvation. And thus maybe God's not like Jesus at all.
I don't believe any of that has anything to do with Aristotle.
Stephen Barr makes excellent points—the absence of a proof-text from Scripture hardly settles the matter, and Augustine had one huge theological brain and should never be so easily dismissed.
So consider the matter theologically. If a good reason could be given for lying, how about this reason—the redemption of the world? Now, if God has the best reason of all to lie, an affirmation of lying does nothing less than undercut the doctrine of the incarnation—perhaps Jesus is not the manifestation of God in the flesh after all. Perhaps God was just lying to save us. Thus, affirm lying, and you undercut Christian doctrine, for no one is in a more serious position to justify lying to defeat evil than God. And so perhaps the Word did not become flesh, but instead dissembled and took on some deceitful guise for us and for our salvation. And thus maybe God's not like Jesus at all.
I don't believe any of that has anything to do with Aristotle.
9.21.2010 | 12:02pm
Jules Aime says:
@ Paul
There is nothing about someone having an exemplary character, bearing suffering with faith or forgiving their enemies that precludes the possibility of their being simply wrong about a moral question.
There is nothing about someone having an exemplary character, bearing suffering with faith or forgiving their enemies that precludes the possibility of their being simply wrong about a moral question.
9.21.2010 | 12:02pm
Sophia Mason says:
I am reminded of the story of a Jesuit priest on trial under one of the Tudors. Since it was understood by the Tudors that these fiendishly crafty men used equivocation and other means to deceive their captors, the questioners put it to the Jesuit, who was under oath, whether he had ever used equivocation. The Jesuit replied that he had not. He wasn’t lying, but he was equivocating on the meaning of the word “equivocation.” They understood equivocation as a sin, and he did not.
As SDG notes above, I suspect St. Thomas Aquinas would approve of the Jesuit’s position, and those of Corrie Ten Boom and Christine O’Donnell. Aquinas makes a clear distinction in the Summa between lying and deceiving. (II:II, Question 110.) While insisting that lying, which is opposed to truth, is always a sin (Article 4), he also says (Article 1, Objection 3 and Reply) that the desire to deceive, which is “the perfection of lying”, is not opposed to truth but rather to “benevolence or justice”. He says, furthermore, that a “perfect lie” includes (1) an actual falsehood uttered (material cause), (2) the intent to utter a falsehood (formal cause), and (3) intent to deceive. Of these three, he seems to consider only the intent to utter a falsehood always sinful, and it is the intent to utter a falsehood that he calls the “essential notion of a lie.”
Hence, to deceive someone without lying (“The Jews are under the table”), even if the intention is deceive, is not a lie; it might be a sin opposed to “benevolence and justice.” However, in a case where the interrogators (be they Tudors or Nazis) do not deserve to know the truth, then neither justice nor benevolence would seem to demand that they be made to understand it. A lie to such persons would still be a sin—not against them, but against God. (Similarly, non-abortifacient contraception differs from abortion: the latter is a sin against another person and against God; the former is a sin against God directly.) In such cases an equivocation, a half truth, etc., would seem to be no sin at all.
In Aquinas own words: “A lie is sinful not only because it injures one’s neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this Article [4]. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms [sic], except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x).”
I suspect most of us were fast enough on our feet to figure out ways to deceive our parents without actually lying to them. (Those deceptions were of course still sins, since benevolence and justice demanded that our parents know THE WHOLE truth.) But if we are able to deceive those around us without actually lying, why assume that “hid[ing] the truth prudently” would suddenly become difficult in cases like that of the Nazis at the door? Then, if ever, we’d have with the Holy Spirit on our side—especially if we’d resolved, by His grace, not to lie.
Of course, if you feel that ANY form of deception is a lie (rather than taking Aquinas’ definition where a lie=a verbal falsehood), then you won’t think that all lies are sins. It does seem like a lot of the disagreement on this page centers around what “lie” is understood to mean.
As SDG notes above, I suspect St. Thomas Aquinas would approve of the Jesuit’s position, and those of Corrie Ten Boom and Christine O’Donnell. Aquinas makes a clear distinction in the Summa between lying and deceiving. (II:II, Question 110.) While insisting that lying, which is opposed to truth, is always a sin (Article 4), he also says (Article 1, Objection 3 and Reply) that the desire to deceive, which is “the perfection of lying”, is not opposed to truth but rather to “benevolence or justice”. He says, furthermore, that a “perfect lie” includes (1) an actual falsehood uttered (material cause), (2) the intent to utter a falsehood (formal cause), and (3) intent to deceive. Of these three, he seems to consider only the intent to utter a falsehood always sinful, and it is the intent to utter a falsehood that he calls the “essential notion of a lie.”
Hence, to deceive someone without lying (“The Jews are under the table”), even if the intention is deceive, is not a lie; it might be a sin opposed to “benevolence and justice.” However, in a case where the interrogators (be they Tudors or Nazis) do not deserve to know the truth, then neither justice nor benevolence would seem to demand that they be made to understand it. A lie to such persons would still be a sin—not against them, but against God. (Similarly, non-abortifacient contraception differs from abortion: the latter is a sin against another person and against God; the former is a sin against God directly.) In such cases an equivocation, a half truth, etc., would seem to be no sin at all.
In Aquinas own words: “A lie is sinful not only because it injures one’s neighbor, but also on account of its inordinateness, as stated above in this Article [4]. Now it is not allowed to make use of anything inordinate in order to ward off injury or defects from another: as neither is it lawful to steal in order to give an alms [sic], except perhaps in a case of necessity when all things are common. Therefore it is not lawful to tell a lie in order to deliver another from any danger whatever. Nevertheless it is lawful to hide the truth prudently, by keeping it back, as Augustine says (Contra Mend. x).”
I suspect most of us were fast enough on our feet to figure out ways to deceive our parents without actually lying to them. (Those deceptions were of course still sins, since benevolence and justice demanded that our parents know THE WHOLE truth.) But if we are able to deceive those around us without actually lying, why assume that “hid[ing] the truth prudently” would suddenly become difficult in cases like that of the Nazis at the door? Then, if ever, we’d have with the Holy Spirit on our side—especially if we’d resolved, by His grace, not to lie.
Of course, if you feel that ANY form of deception is a lie (rather than taking Aquinas’ definition where a lie=a verbal falsehood), then you won’t think that all lies are sins. It does seem like a lot of the disagreement on this page centers around what “lie” is understood to mean.
9.21.2010 | 12:12pm
King says:
The Gospel proclaimed at mass this week is relevant to the discussion.
"And I tell you, make friends for yourselves by means of unrighteous mammon, so that when it fails they may receive you into the eternal habitations. He who is faithful in a very little is faithful also in much; and he who is dishonest in a very little is dishonest also in much." -- Luke 16:9-10
These hypothetical discussions about Nazis and pure truth telling are deliberately argued at the margins. We use them not for practical advice but for clarity of principle. We know the correct thing to do in 999 out of a 1000 situations. For the other one-in-a-thousand, consult a Solomon.
Where we (and, I dunno, say, Kant) get into trouble is attempting to devise a systematic process whereby we can reliably discern the good through formula. And, like Tycho's circles vs. Kepler's ellipses of planetary motion, we devise intricate and clever explanations for the exceptions to our rule simply to keep the integrity of the system in which we had invested so much of our confidence.
In the parable above, the steward is commended for his cleverness, his cheating, his lying. Is that a straightforward approval of cheating and lying or an acknowledgment that a little cleverness will help the "sons of light" in their unrelenting struggle against the evils of the "sons of this world"? Could any catechistic doctrine communicate the wisdom of Christ's parable? Metaphor defeats prose again, narrative communicates where polemic cannot.
"It is a great thing, indeed, to make a proper use of ... poetical forms, as also of compounds and strange words. But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learned from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars." -- Aristotle, Poetics 22
Lie to the Nazis, fool! Don't be proud of your foolishness if that foolishness prevents the coming of the kingdom. Priorities, Sons of Light! God gave you a brain and a will to cleverness. Bend your shrewdness towards righteous causes, and always be conscious of the temptation to employ such subtle powers toward unrighteous ends. Be wise as serpents, harmless as doves. But never forget the power of the childlike, the naive courage that coincides with truth, the power that ultimately will conquer all cleverness -- just not yet.
Thank you, Ms. Scalia, for defending O'Donnell. She appears to be an oddball -- she is an oddball -- because the culture is so skewed, and it requires the naive courage Ms. O'Donnell has in spades to puncture prevailing pretensions.
"And I tell you, make friends for yourselves by means of unrighteous mammon, so that when it fails they may receive you into the eternal habitations. He who is faithful in a very little is faithful also in much; and he who is dishonest in a very little is dishonest also in much." -- Luke 16:9-10
These hypothetical discussions about Nazis and pure truth telling are deliberately argued at the margins. We use them not for practical advice but for clarity of principle. We know the correct thing to do in 999 out of a 1000 situations. For the other one-in-a-thousand, consult a Solomon.
Where we (and, I dunno, say, Kant) get into trouble is attempting to devise a systematic process whereby we can reliably discern the good through formula. And, like Tycho's circles vs. Kepler's ellipses of planetary motion, we devise intricate and clever explanations for the exceptions to our rule simply to keep the integrity of the system in which we had invested so much of our confidence.
In the parable above, the steward is commended for his cleverness, his cheating, his lying. Is that a straightforward approval of cheating and lying or an acknowledgment that a little cleverness will help the "sons of light" in their unrelenting struggle against the evils of the "sons of this world"? Could any catechistic doctrine communicate the wisdom of Christ's parable? Metaphor defeats prose again, narrative communicates where polemic cannot.
"It is a great thing, indeed, to make a proper use of ... poetical forms, as also of compounds and strange words. But the greatest thing by far is to be a master of metaphor. It is the one thing that cannot be learned from others; and it is also a sign of genius, since a good metaphor implies an intuitive perception of the similarity in dissimilars." -- Aristotle, Poetics 22
Lie to the Nazis, fool! Don't be proud of your foolishness if that foolishness prevents the coming of the kingdom. Priorities, Sons of Light! God gave you a brain and a will to cleverness. Bend your shrewdness towards righteous causes, and always be conscious of the temptation to employ such subtle powers toward unrighteous ends. Be wise as serpents, harmless as doves. But never forget the power of the childlike, the naive courage that coincides with truth, the power that ultimately will conquer all cleverness -- just not yet.
Thank you, Ms. Scalia, for defending O'Donnell. She appears to be an oddball -- she is an oddball -- because the culture is so skewed, and it requires the naive courage Ms. O'Donnell has in spades to puncture prevailing pretensions.
9.21.2010 | 12:26pm
John says:
I'm kind of surprised by Joe Carter's first comment here. Does he really think that anything that has the effect of deceiving is lying? It doesn't matter if it is "akin to lying" - as he says, a lie requires a false statement made with intent to deceive. From what I've read, Corky didn't make a false statement. Thus, not a lie.
And I just don't see how it follows that full disclosure is required under this example. How can he say that requiring people not to lie automatically requires them to fully disclose everything? That doesn't make any sense.
Joe, I'm fairly certain mental reservation is recognized by moral theologians. You are right, it cannot be a false statement. But it can be an intentionally misleading statement, hiding the truth, if the person is someone who has no right to know.
I don't see how you can disagree with O'Donnell and maintain the principle that the ends don't justify the means. The position of Joe Carter is that you can lie, an objectively wrong act, because it is worth it to save a life. That is the definition of the ends justifying the means.
And I just don't see how it follows that full disclosure is required under this example. How can he say that requiring people not to lie automatically requires them to fully disclose everything? That doesn't make any sense.
Joe, I'm fairly certain mental reservation is recognized by moral theologians. You are right, it cannot be a false statement. But it can be an intentionally misleading statement, hiding the truth, if the person is someone who has no right to know.
I don't see how you can disagree with O'Donnell and maintain the principle that the ends don't justify the means. The position of Joe Carter is that you can lie, an objectively wrong act, because it is worth it to save a life. That is the definition of the ends justifying the means.
9.21.2010 | 12:32pm
Paul says:
@Jules Aime,
I didn't say that having those character traits precluded doing something wrong. I was responding to your characterization of Corrie Ten Boom as rigid and harsh. Well, you said her morals were rigid and harsh (which I think follows only from a thoroughly misapprehension of those morals). But you seem to think she instantiated those morals in her character. So it seemed, as a matter of simple logic, that your characterization of her morals was, in your eyes, a depiction of her character. And it was your depiction of her character with which I was taking issue. You implied that she had all the humanness of Immanuel Kant. And I can't see how anyone who knows anything about her could arrive at so bizarre a conclusion.
To Jules and others--I haven't heard anyone say that it is acceptable to do evil to bring about good. I certainly didn't say Ms. Ten Boom did something wrong, which was nevertheless morally justifiable. Those of us defending Ms. Ten Boom believe that her actions were not wrong. In my case, I believe she deceived but did not lie (where lying is deceiving someone so as to prevent them from having possession of a truth to which they have a right).
Again, isn't it relevant that the Decalogue forbids bearing false witness which itself is neither the same as deception or simply identical to lying?
I didn't say that having those character traits precluded doing something wrong. I was responding to your characterization of Corrie Ten Boom as rigid and harsh. Well, you said her morals were rigid and harsh (which I think follows only from a thoroughly misapprehension of those morals). But you seem to think she instantiated those morals in her character. So it seemed, as a matter of simple logic, that your characterization of her morals was, in your eyes, a depiction of her character. And it was your depiction of her character with which I was taking issue. You implied that she had all the humanness of Immanuel Kant. And I can't see how anyone who knows anything about her could arrive at so bizarre a conclusion.
To Jules and others--I haven't heard anyone say that it is acceptable to do evil to bring about good. I certainly didn't say Ms. Ten Boom did something wrong, which was nevertheless morally justifiable. Those of us defending Ms. Ten Boom believe that her actions were not wrong. In my case, I believe she deceived but did not lie (where lying is deceiving someone so as to prevent them from having possession of a truth to which they have a right).
Again, isn't it relevant that the Decalogue forbids bearing false witness which itself is neither the same as deception or simply identical to lying?
9.21.2010 | 12:54pm
Jules Aime says:
@Paul
I didn't say that ten Boom did anything wrong. What I said was that it is wrong to refuse to lie even to Nazis.
The other point I made, and I'm intrigued that no one has picked up on this, is that the position taken by the youthful O'Donnell and imputed to the youthful ten Boom is not the simple childlike position that it is presented as. It is, rather, pure Kant. O'Donnell got herself in trouble by being too clever not by being childlike. As to ten Boom, I don't know enough to say, BUT if as Elizabeth Scalia suggests in her defense above, she just blurted out her answer in childlike confusion then her story has no place at all in this discussion.
OTOH, I suspect the majority of any kindergarten class in the country would have no trouble figuring out that if big scary men want to do mean things to someone you shouldn't tell them where that someone is even if asked a direct question.
I didn't say that ten Boom did anything wrong. What I said was that it is wrong to refuse to lie even to Nazis.
The other point I made, and I'm intrigued that no one has picked up on this, is that the position taken by the youthful O'Donnell and imputed to the youthful ten Boom is not the simple childlike position that it is presented as. It is, rather, pure Kant. O'Donnell got herself in trouble by being too clever not by being childlike. As to ten Boom, I don't know enough to say, BUT if as Elizabeth Scalia suggests in her defense above, she just blurted out her answer in childlike confusion then her story has no place at all in this discussion.
OTOH, I suspect the majority of any kindergarten class in the country would have no trouble figuring out that if big scary men want to do mean things to someone you shouldn't tell them where that someone is even if asked a direct question.
9.21.2010 | 12:57pm
James Kabala says:
"[S]he appears to be utterly without guile."
Based on Mr. Barr's comments, which match what I had already heard, this is not the case.
Based on Mr. Barr's comments, which match what I had already heard, this is not the case.
9.21.2010 | 12:58pm
Paul says:
Consider this passage in Chapter 22 of I Kings (alluded to by others):
19And he said, Hear thou therefore the word of the LORD: I saw the LORD sitting on his throne, and all the host of heaven standing by him on his right hand and on his left.
20And the LORD said, Who shall persuade Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramothgilead? And one said on this manner, and another said on that manner.
21And there came forth a spirit, and stood before the LORD, and said, I will persuade him.
22And the LORD said unto him, Wherewith? And he said, I will go forth, and I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And he said, Thou shalt persuade him, and prevail also: go forth, and do so.
23Now therefore, behold, the LORD hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy prophets, and the LORD hath spoken evil concerning thee.
According to sacred revelation, the LORD placed a lying spirit in the mouth of Ahab's prophets. From the context, "lying" here clearly means deceiving through utterance and with intent. Now is the position of those who claim that such action is always wrong that such action is always wrong for human persons or not the divine person? Or will they say that God did not lie but that He only caused others to lie and whereas lying is wrong, causing to lie is not? Answering the first question in the affirmative undermines any meaningful human affirmation of the goodness of God and therefore eviscerates worship of its very essence. But answering the second in the affirmative entails affirming what looks to many of us like a distinction without difference. Causing to lie and lying would be the same type of action. Denying it would be like saying--"Well, look, I only pulled the trigger and fired the gun. But I didn't kill him. The bullet did that."
19And he said, Hear thou therefore the word of the LORD: I saw the LORD sitting on his throne, and all the host of heaven standing by him on his right hand and on his left.
20And the LORD said, Who shall persuade Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramothgilead? And one said on this manner, and another said on that manner.
21And there came forth a spirit, and stood before the LORD, and said, I will persuade him.
22And the LORD said unto him, Wherewith? And he said, I will go forth, and I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And he said, Thou shalt persuade him, and prevail also: go forth, and do so.
23Now therefore, behold, the LORD hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy prophets, and the LORD hath spoken evil concerning thee.
According to sacred revelation, the LORD placed a lying spirit in the mouth of Ahab's prophets. From the context, "lying" here clearly means deceiving through utterance and with intent. Now is the position of those who claim that such action is always wrong that such action is always wrong for human persons or not the divine person? Or will they say that God did not lie but that He only caused others to lie and whereas lying is wrong, causing to lie is not? Answering the first question in the affirmative undermines any meaningful human affirmation of the goodness of God and therefore eviscerates worship of its very essence. But answering the second in the affirmative entails affirming what looks to many of us like a distinction without difference. Causing to lie and lying would be the same type of action. Denying it would be like saying--"Well, look, I only pulled the trigger and fired the gun. But I didn't kill him. The bullet did that."
9.21.2010 | 1:04pm
Paul says:
@Jules Aime,
Did you mean to say "it is wrong to refuse to lie even to Nazis" or that "it is wrong to lie even to Nazis"? I confess you've left me a bit confused here.
And perhaps I'm misreading your analysis--for you seem to have gotten Corrie Ten Boom and Peter's young cousin turned around. For it wasn't Ten Boom who just blurted this out about Peter being under the table--it was Peter's young cousin.
Did you mean to say "it is wrong to refuse to lie even to Nazis" or that "it is wrong to lie even to Nazis"? I confess you've left me a bit confused here.
And perhaps I'm misreading your analysis--for you seem to have gotten Corrie Ten Boom and Peter's young cousin turned around. For it wasn't Ten Boom who just blurted this out about Peter being under the table--it was Peter's young cousin.
9.21.2010 | 1:09pm
Dwiss says:
To All:
If you are ever in a position to shield my family or me from those who want to kill us, please do me a favor: Lie to the bastards!
Separately, and I know that we're not talking about the witchcraft kerfuffle, but O'Donnell's defense of that was genuine and priceless. She laughed incredulously and said, "Who didn't have interesting friends in high school?". She got my vote right there (but I don't live in Delaware).
If you are ever in a position to shield my family or me from those who want to kill us, please do me a favor: Lie to the bastards!
Separately, and I know that we're not talking about the witchcraft kerfuffle, but O'Donnell's defense of that was genuine and priceless. She laughed incredulously and said, "Who didn't have interesting friends in high school?". She got my vote right there (but I don't live in Delaware).
9.21.2010 | 1:10pm
Kari S says:
Corrie ten Boom actually told numerous lies in her protection of the Jews, and she had the faith to believe that God would forgive her lying because of the greater importance of saving lives. In her book, however, she also affirms the person who had the faith to tell the truth and believe that God would save the lives without a lie being told. So Corrie herself was acknowledging the complexity of the question and affirming that faith in God could lead to either decision.
9.21.2010 | 1:14pm
Diane says:
What Christine said she would do is very different then what she has done.
She has told several lies in order to better herself.
She told a lie about graduating form college about being accepted into a grad program, about why she lost her job. I can't believe that she did not know why the IRS was upset because she did not pay her taxes or why her house was in foreclosure.
These amount to big lies. And I wonder what else she is lying about.
Why would you vote for somebody that says she would not lie in a hypothetical situation, yet lies convincingly to the public and repeatedly?
There are also question of how she spent campaign funds, using donations for her personal use.
Is this really a moral, good person?
If she were a Democrat you would use these reason to vote against her.
Why do you support her, just because she is a conservative?
Are you sure?
She has told several lies in order to better herself.
She told a lie about graduating form college about being accepted into a grad program, about why she lost her job. I can't believe that she did not know why the IRS was upset because she did not pay her taxes or why her house was in foreclosure.
These amount to big lies. And I wonder what else she is lying about.
Why would you vote for somebody that says she would not lie in a hypothetical situation, yet lies convincingly to the public and repeatedly?
There are also question of how she spent campaign funds, using donations for her personal use.
Is this really a moral, good person?
If she were a Democrat you would use these reason to vote against her.
Why do you support her, just because she is a conservative?
Are you sure?
9.21.2010 | 1:23pm
Paul says:
What follows is an emendation of my prior post by two, all important words:
Consider this passage in Chapter 22 of I Kings (alluded to by others):
19And he said, Hear thou therefore the word of the LORD: I saw the LORD sitting on his throne, and all the host of heaven standing by him on his right hand and on his left.
20And the LORD said, Who shall persuade Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramothgilead? And one said on this manner, and another said on that manner.
21And there came forth a spirit, and stood before the LORD, and said, I will persuade him.
22And the LORD said unto him, Wherewith? And he said, I will go forth, and I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And he said, Thou shalt persuade him, and prevail also: go forth, and do so.
23Now therefore, behold, the LORD hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy prophets, and the LORD hath spoken evil concerning thee.
According to sacred revelation, the LORD placed a lying spirit in the mouth of Ahab's prophets. From the context, "lying" here clearly means deceiving through utterance and with intent. Now is the position of those who claim that such action is always wrong that such action is always wrong for human persons but not for the divine person? Or will they say that God did not lie but that He only caused others to lie and whereas lying is wrong, causing to lie is not? Answering the first question in the affirmative undermines any meaningful human affirmation of the goodness of God and therefore eviscerates worship of its very essence. But answering the second in the affirmative entails affirming what looks to many of us like a distinction without difference. Causing to lie and lying would be the same type of action. Denying it would be like saying--"Well, look, I only pulled the trigger and fired the gun. But I didn't kill him. The bullet did that."
Consider this passage in Chapter 22 of I Kings (alluded to by others):
19And he said, Hear thou therefore the word of the LORD: I saw the LORD sitting on his throne, and all the host of heaven standing by him on his right hand and on his left.
20And the LORD said, Who shall persuade Ahab, that he may go up and fall at Ramothgilead? And one said on this manner, and another said on that manner.
21And there came forth a spirit, and stood before the LORD, and said, I will persuade him.
22And the LORD said unto him, Wherewith? And he said, I will go forth, and I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of all his prophets. And he said, Thou shalt persuade him, and prevail also: go forth, and do so.
23Now therefore, behold, the LORD hath put a lying spirit in the mouth of all these thy prophets, and the LORD hath spoken evil concerning thee.
According to sacred revelation, the LORD placed a lying spirit in the mouth of Ahab's prophets. From the context, "lying" here clearly means deceiving through utterance and with intent. Now is the position of those who claim that such action is always wrong that such action is always wrong for human persons but not for the divine person? Or will they say that God did not lie but that He only caused others to lie and whereas lying is wrong, causing to lie is not? Answering the first question in the affirmative undermines any meaningful human affirmation of the goodness of God and therefore eviscerates worship of its very essence. But answering the second in the affirmative entails affirming what looks to many of us like a distinction without difference. Causing to lie and lying would be the same type of action. Denying it would be like saying--"Well, look, I only pulled the trigger and fired the gun. But I didn't kill him. The bullet did that."
9.21.2010 | 1:26pm
Jules Aime says:
@Paul
Let me try to clarify the first point by stating it positively. My position is the same as Joe Carter's: it is not only okay to lie to Nazis it would be a moral obligation to lie to them about the location of Anne Frank.
As to the second point, you are right, I confused the people in the story.
Is Corie ten Boom the mother? If so the case is even clearer, she was just wrong when she said, “God honors truth-telling with perfect protection!” And no matter how exemplary her character and behaviour were otherwise it is simply mistaken to cite her case as support for the view that one should always tell the truth. For starters, are we supposed to assume that the 6 million who died somehow failed to measure up to the standards of truth telling of young Cocky?
Bearing false witness is not, as you point out, the same thing as lying. Bearing false witness implies the persons seeking information from us have a legitimate reason or purpose for acquiring that information. It is not always easy figuring this out, which is why we are advised to be both as wise as serpents and as innocent as doves.
Let me try to clarify the first point by stating it positively. My position is the same as Joe Carter's: it is not only okay to lie to Nazis it would be a moral obligation to lie to them about the location of Anne Frank.
As to the second point, you are right, I confused the people in the story.
Is Corie ten Boom the mother? If so the case is even clearer, she was just wrong when she said, “God honors truth-telling with perfect protection!” And no matter how exemplary her character and behaviour were otherwise it is simply mistaken to cite her case as support for the view that one should always tell the truth. For starters, are we supposed to assume that the 6 million who died somehow failed to measure up to the standards of truth telling of young Cocky?
Bearing false witness is not, as you point out, the same thing as lying. Bearing false witness implies the persons seeking information from us have a legitimate reason or purpose for acquiring that information. It is not always easy figuring this out, which is why we are advised to be both as wise as serpents and as innocent as doves.
9.21.2010 | 1:30pm
Elizabeth Scalia says:
Msgr. Charles Pope weighs in, here:
http://blog.adw.org/2010/09/the-politician-and-the-private-sin-christine-odonnell-runs-afoul-of-the-new-morality/
http://blog.adw.org/2010/09/the-politician-and-the-private-sin-christine-odonnell-runs-afoul-of-the-new-morality/
9.21.2010 | 1:31pm
AML says:
I am not sure that Thomas Aquinas would back up O'Donnell here. He explicitly states that deception is permissible in warfare. Furthermore, Thomas would not approve the use of his name as an argument from authority. Let us allow the Angelic Doctor to speak for himself:
Article 3. Whether it is lawful to lay ambushes in war?
Objection 1. It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in war. For it is written (Deuteronomy 16:20): "Thou shalt follow justly after that which is just." But ambushes, since they are a kind of deception, seem to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to lay ambushes even in a just war.
Objection 2. Further, ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states (Contra Mend. xv). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith with one's enemy, as Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems that it is unlawful to lay ambushes for one's enemies.
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Matthew 7:12): "Whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them": and we ought to observe this in all our dealings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is our neighbor. Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions to be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on war by laying ambushes.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. qu. x super Jos): "Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be carried on openly or by ambushes": and he proves this by the authority of the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the city of Hai (Joshua 8:2).
I answer that, The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive the enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another's word or deed in two ways. First, through being told something false, or through the breaking of a promise, and this is always unlawful. No one ought to deceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain "rights of war and covenants, which ought to be observed even among enemies," as Ambrose states (De Officiis i).
Secondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do not declare our purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always bound to do this, since even in theSacred Doctrine many things have to be concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it, according to Matthew 7:6: "Give not that which is holy, to dogs." Wherefore much more ought the plan of campaign to be hidden from the enemy. For this reason among other things that a soldier has to learn is the art of concealing his purpose lest it come to the enemy's knowledge, as stated in the Book on Strategy [Stratagematum i, 1 by Frontinus. Such like concealment is what is meant by an ambush which may be lawfully employed in a just war.
Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor are they contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have an inordinate will if he were unwilling that others should hide anything from him
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
Article 3. Whether it is lawful to lay ambushes in war?
Objection 1. It would seem that it is unlawful to lay ambushes in war. For it is written (Deuteronomy 16:20): "Thou shalt follow justly after that which is just." But ambushes, since they are a kind of deception, seem to pertain to injustice. Therefore it is unlawful to lay ambushes even in a just war.
Objection 2. Further, ambushes and deception seem to be opposed to faithfulness even as lies are. But since we are bound to keep faith with all men, it is wrong to lie to anyone, as Augustine states (Contra Mend. xv). Therefore, as one is bound to keep faith with one's enemy, as Augustine states (Ep. ad Bonif. clxxxix), it seems that it is unlawful to lay ambushes for one's enemies.
Objection 3. Further, it is written (Matthew 7:12): "Whatsoever you would that men should do to you, do you also to them": and we ought to observe this in all our dealings with our neighbor. Now our enemy is our neighbor. Therefore, since no man wishes ambushes or deceptions to be prepared for himself, it seems that no one ought to carry on war by laying ambushes.
On the contrary, Augustine says (QQ. in Hept. qu. x super Jos): "Provided the war be just, it is no concern of justice whether it be carried on openly or by ambushes": and he proves this by the authority of the Lord, Who commanded Joshua to lay ambushes for the city of Hai (Joshua 8:2).
I answer that, The object of laying ambushes is in order to deceive the enemy. Now a man may be deceived by another's word or deed in two ways. First, through being told something false, or through the breaking of a promise, and this is always unlawful. No one ought to deceive the enemy in this way, for there are certain "rights of war and covenants, which ought to be observed even among enemies," as Ambrose states (De Officiis i).
Secondly, a man may be deceived by what we say or do, because we do not declare our purpose or meaning to him. Now we are not always bound to do this, since even in theSacred Doctrine many things have to be concealed, especially from unbelievers, lest they deride it, according to Matthew 7:6: "Give not that which is holy, to dogs." Wherefore much more ought the plan of campaign to be hidden from the enemy. For this reason among other things that a soldier has to learn is the art of concealing his purpose lest it come to the enemy's knowledge, as stated in the Book on Strategy [Stratagematum i, 1 by Frontinus. Such like concealment is what is meant by an ambush which may be lawfully employed in a just war.
Nor can these ambushes be properly called deceptions, nor are they contrary to justice or to a well-ordered will. For a man would have an inordinate will if he were unwilling that others should hide anything from him
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
9.21.2010 | 1:39pm
Joe Carter says:
@Stephen M. Barr. ***You say that he "picked that up from Aristotle". That is rather a blithe assertion. ***
You're right. I tend to be a bit careless in the comments. What I should have said was "following in the line of." I meant it more as tracing the intellectual history of the idea. Artistole and Augustine took that path, while Plato and Origen too the other.
***Neither St. Augustine nor the other Church fathers uncritically accepted ideas from pagan thinkers.***
True, and I should have made that point more clear.
***to say that anything in theological tradition that cannot be found explicitly in Scripture is simply borrowed from pagan sources.***
I don't think there is anything wrong with "plundering the Egyptians" for philosophical gold. As an advocate of the strong view of general revelation, I think it is a licit practice to see where God has illuminated the thinking of pagans.
*** I find all of this discussion strangely irrelevant to the actual human being Christine O'Donnell. I***
I was going to say that same thing. It's an interesting and worthwhile discussion, though O'Donnell herself a good example of what she defends.
@Paul *** And one is only lied to when one is deprived that good in just those cases in which one has a right to or claim upon that good.***
On this point we agree. But since I come to this conclusion as an evangelical virtue ethicists, so I don't think I'll change the minds of the Catholic deontological advocates. ; )
@Bender ***To begin with, we do better to listen to the Church in properly forming our conscience, rather than relying up self-puffery to vainly build up our bona fides.***
Being an evangelical Calvinist, my conscience is obviously formed from a different tradition than the Catholic Church.
Also, I wans't trying to build up my bona fides—it's not like I'm saying that I'm either virtous or an ethicist!
All I mean is that I subscribe to virtue ethic, an approach to ethics that emphasizes the character of the moral agent, rather than rules or consequences, as the key element of ethical thinking. (To be more precise, I subscribe to pneumatalogical virtue ethics—morality that is based on Scripture and church Tradition and guided and illuminated by the Holy Spirit. I hope to write a column on that soon.) This is simply to differentiate my position from utilitarianism, consequentalism, or purely deontological systems.
*** In what other circumstances is it, not merely OK, but obligatory, to do what we think is a little evil (or not wrong at all, even though centuries of moral theology says it is an objective evil) to advance what we believe to be the greater good?***
I don't think it is doing a "little evil." I don't think it is evil at all. There are many factors that determine whether an action is good or evil. You can slice someone's stomach open to take out his gall bladder or to cause them to bleed to death. The actions could be the same but the morality of each is quite different.
And while there are centuries of moral theology that say that is an objective evil, there is as long a history that says it is not.
@John *** Does he really think that anything that has the effect of deceiving is lying?***
Yes, that is what makes lying immoral.
*** Joe, I'm fairly certain mental reservation is recognized by moral theologians.***
Some, yes, just not Catholic ones. Most follow Aquinas in claiming that a lie is " a statement at variance with the mind."
*** The position of Joe Carter is that you can lie, an objectively wrong act, because it is worth it to save a life.***
I disagree that lying is always an objectively wrong act.
You're right. I tend to be a bit careless in the comments. What I should have said was "following in the line of." I meant it more as tracing the intellectual history of the idea. Artistole and Augustine took that path, while Plato and Origen too the other.
***Neither St. Augustine nor the other Church fathers uncritically accepted ideas from pagan thinkers.***
True, and I should have made that point more clear.
***to say that anything in theological tradition that cannot be found explicitly in Scripture is simply borrowed from pagan sources.***
I don't think there is anything wrong with "plundering the Egyptians" for philosophical gold. As an advocate of the strong view of general revelation, I think it is a licit practice to see where God has illuminated the thinking of pagans.
*** I find all of this discussion strangely irrelevant to the actual human being Christine O'Donnell. I***
I was going to say that same thing. It's an interesting and worthwhile discussion, though O'Donnell herself a good example of what she defends.
@Paul *** And one is only lied to when one is deprived that good in just those cases in which one has a right to or claim upon that good.***
On this point we agree. But since I come to this conclusion as an evangelical virtue ethicists, so I don't think I'll change the minds of the Catholic deontological advocates. ; )
@Bender ***To begin with, we do better to listen to the Church in properly forming our conscience, rather than relying up self-puffery to vainly build up our bona fides.***
Being an evangelical Calvinist, my conscience is obviously formed from a different tradition than the Catholic Church.
Also, I wans't trying to build up my bona fides—it's not like I'm saying that I'm either virtous or an ethicist!
All I mean is that I subscribe to virtue ethic, an approach to ethics that emphasizes the character of the moral agent, rather than rules or consequences, as the key element of ethical thinking. (To be more precise, I subscribe to pneumatalogical virtue ethics—morality that is based on Scripture and church Tradition and guided and illuminated by the Holy Spirit. I hope to write a column on that soon.) This is simply to differentiate my position from utilitarianism, consequentalism, or purely deontological systems.
*** In what other circumstances is it, not merely OK, but obligatory, to do what we think is a little evil (or not wrong at all, even though centuries of moral theology says it is an objective evil) to advance what we believe to be the greater good?***
I don't think it is doing a "little evil." I don't think it is evil at all. There are many factors that determine whether an action is good or evil. You can slice someone's stomach open to take out his gall bladder or to cause them to bleed to death. The actions could be the same but the morality of each is quite different.
And while there are centuries of moral theology that say that is an objective evil, there is as long a history that says it is not.
@John *** Does he really think that anything that has the effect of deceiving is lying?***
Yes, that is what makes lying immoral.
*** Joe, I'm fairly certain mental reservation is recognized by moral theologians.***
Some, yes, just not Catholic ones. Most follow Aquinas in claiming that a lie is " a statement at variance with the mind."
*** The position of Joe Carter is that you can lie, an objectively wrong act, because it is worth it to save a life.***
I disagree that lying is always an objectively wrong act.
9.21.2010 | 1:43pm
shana says:
I want to elaborate a bit more on Bender's point of the hypothetial being that - hypthetical and not a reality.
In the comfort of our home, or in the discomfort of close scrutiny, we say we would do what is moral or just or merciful. But what we actually do in the given situation is another story entirely.
We do not, in fact, know how we would deal with any given situation once it is upon us. In a crisis, or some other 'on the spot' situation, even trained people can begin to panic and forget what training has taught them. One of my daughters had such a panic attack at university at having to stand and give a talk on Charlemagne that she was unable to read - her typed notes looked like Chinese characters and she could not decipher them. She had spoken in front of others in groups before and did not expect that happening in the formal classroom setting among peers who were more strangers than friends. The Professor thought she was going to faint, because she literally turned grey. This unexpected thing could have gone three ways. She could have forgotten her subject entirely, she could have fainted or she could have gone on 'automatic' and let what she knew of her subject from years of study give her the words she needed. Fortunately, the latter won out in this case because Charlemagne is one of her favorite historical characters. But the former scenarios just as easily could have happened. Her years of reading about one historical figure so carefully served her well. It probably would not have happened this way if her subject was, say, Mary Queen of Scots, about whom she has studied little. And this is part of what I'm rather badly driving at.
We who are Christians are taught by Jesus that in a time of persecution, we WILL be inspired by the Holy Spirit as to what to say. We do, however, have to keep our own souls in a state of grace in order to be free-flowing conduits of that grace - if we are already in a state of mortal sin and unrepentant on one hand, would we, even with good intentions, do what is right in another? Well, certainly some do. However, if we have let our moral bearings slide in one area it is anyone's guess in the moment as to whether we would know the voice of the Holy Spirit deep within - that small, still voice - and respond.
If we spend time, not in pondering unlikely 'what if's' but in actually reading, studying, and more importanly LIVING the fullness of our Christian faith, and doing all we can daily to be as closely united to Christ as our state in life allows, we are more likely to do what is right. But even then - we cannot be 100% sure. There were Christians who offered their pinch of incense to save their lives or ratted out other Christians under threat of torture and violent death, too.
There is always a hope we would do the right thing. Only when we have to face real serious moral situations do we, and likely everyone else, actually 'know'. It will be more interesting to see in reality what O'Donnell does when she is presented with the dilemma of being told by, say, her party to lie about a bill, or if she decides to accept bribes, or lies about the real intention of a tax. If, as another post says, she is already been caught lying and excusing herself, that is a much worse sign than if she believes she should be honest about hiding Jew in her garage. Yet - it is as common as breathing for people to excuse themselves when caught in a situation that makes them look bad. Very few people are moral 100% of the time, or we wouldn't need the Sacraments.
We can only keep our eyes open, look at her honestly and not hold her to standards no one outside an enclosed monastery can keep, but also not let her get away with bad behavior because we are apathetic, and watch and pray that we also do well what is commanded of us.
In the comfort of our home, or in the discomfort of close scrutiny, we say we would do what is moral or just or merciful. But what we actually do in the given situation is another story entirely.
We do not, in fact, know how we would deal with any given situation once it is upon us. In a crisis, or some other 'on the spot' situation, even trained people can begin to panic and forget what training has taught them. One of my daughters had such a panic attack at university at having to stand and give a talk on Charlemagne that she was unable to read - her typed notes looked like Chinese characters and she could not decipher them. She had spoken in front of others in groups before and did not expect that happening in the formal classroom setting among peers who were more strangers than friends. The Professor thought she was going to faint, because she literally turned grey. This unexpected thing could have gone three ways. She could have forgotten her subject entirely, she could have fainted or she could have gone on 'automatic' and let what she knew of her subject from years of study give her the words she needed. Fortunately, the latter won out in this case because Charlemagne is one of her favorite historical characters. But the former scenarios just as easily could have happened. Her years of reading about one historical figure so carefully served her well. It probably would not have happened this way if her subject was, say, Mary Queen of Scots, about whom she has studied little. And this is part of what I'm rather badly driving at.
We who are Christians are taught by Jesus that in a time of persecution, we WILL be inspired by the Holy Spirit as to what to say. We do, however, have to keep our own souls in a state of grace in order to be free-flowing conduits of that grace - if we are already in a state of mortal sin and unrepentant on one hand, would we, even with good intentions, do what is right in another? Well, certainly some do. However, if we have let our moral bearings slide in one area it is anyone's guess in the moment as to whether we would know the voice of the Holy Spirit deep within - that small, still voice - and respond.
If we spend time, not in pondering unlikely 'what if's' but in actually reading, studying, and more importanly LIVING the fullness of our Christian faith, and doing all we can daily to be as closely united to Christ as our state in life allows, we are more likely to do what is right. But even then - we cannot be 100% sure. There were Christians who offered their pinch of incense to save their lives or ratted out other Christians under threat of torture and violent death, too.
There is always a hope we would do the right thing. Only when we have to face real serious moral situations do we, and likely everyone else, actually 'know'. It will be more interesting to see in reality what O'Donnell does when she is presented with the dilemma of being told by, say, her party to lie about a bill, or if she decides to accept bribes, or lies about the real intention of a tax. If, as another post says, she is already been caught lying and excusing herself, that is a much worse sign than if she believes she should be honest about hiding Jew in her garage. Yet - it is as common as breathing for people to excuse themselves when caught in a situation that makes them look bad. Very few people are moral 100% of the time, or we wouldn't need the Sacraments.
We can only keep our eyes open, look at her honestly and not hold her to standards no one outside an enclosed monastery can keep, but also not let her get away with bad behavior because we are apathetic, and watch and pray that we also do well what is commanded of us.
9.21.2010 | 1:45pm
Glenn B says:
In the Nazi situation, I find 2 moral obligations in conflict: the duty to preserve life and the duty to tell the truth. A choice has to be made: tell the truth and forfeit a life, or tell a lie and preserve a life. Let's not be Clintonesque about deception and the like with "it depends on what the definition of "is" is." Clinton lied and hurt someone in the process. People lied (deceived) and saved Jews. We know the difference even though we can't define it. Context and intent do matter. My duty to pay taxes does not mean that I support everything those tax dollars go to support. Otherwise, I sin in my duty in paying taxes. Rendering to Caesar does not necessarily implicate me in Caesar's sins.
Even Jesus seemed to recognize on occasions that the truth is withheld from those who intend to use it for harmful purposes. That he was subtle in his deceptions rather than flagrant merely reflects his wisdom. The normal operation of truth which Jesus elsewhere stresses (let your yes be yes) is suspended in an evil context. Let your yes be yes was suspended by Jesus himself.
As with Rahab, one might, in facing an evil situation, be "constrained to tell a lie (deceive, mislead etc.) in order to preserve a life. Or the Hebrew midwives with Pharoah. Or even a guard on duty at a bank might find his duty to protect the bank's assets in conflict with the duty to tell the truth. These kind of situations still preserve the duty to tell the truth. Our trouble is not the exceptions, but the normal situations in which we tell a lie because we're deceived about what matters most. We'll lie for more money rather than tell the truth and trust God's provision in the truth. Or to protect our reputation. Rather than admit a sin and seek reconciliation, we'll lie. We deceive ourselves about the exceptions (which few of us ever face) in order to justify the normal situations in which we lie. But we do know the difference. We just pretend that we don't.
God commends Rahab for her faith, not her lying. The story of Rahab is not an ethics lesson about lying. Jesus was always interested in the "intentions of the heart." A man could still be considered an adulterer, even if never actually physically involved. And a person, in certain deceptive situations, can be involved in a lie even if not literally using false words. Intent and context matters.
Telling a lie to a Nazi does not mean that the person telling the lie thinks it is okay to lie. That person merely recognizes that in this situation, to honor God and preserve a life, in order to constrain evil, my obligation to tell the truth is suspended in this context. But tomorrow, I must be honest with my boss about the mistake I made, even though it might cost me a promotion.
Even Jesus seemed to recognize on occasions that the truth is withheld from those who intend to use it for harmful purposes. That he was subtle in his deceptions rather than flagrant merely reflects his wisdom. The normal operation of truth which Jesus elsewhere stresses (let your yes be yes) is suspended in an evil context. Let your yes be yes was suspended by Jesus himself.
As with Rahab, one might, in facing an evil situation, be "constrained to tell a lie (deceive, mislead etc.) in order to preserve a life. Or the Hebrew midwives with Pharoah. Or even a guard on duty at a bank might find his duty to protect the bank's assets in conflict with the duty to tell the truth. These kind of situations still preserve the duty to tell the truth. Our trouble is not the exceptions, but the normal situations in which we tell a lie because we're deceived about what matters most. We'll lie for more money rather than tell the truth and trust God's provision in the truth. Or to protect our reputation. Rather than admit a sin and seek reconciliation, we'll lie. We deceive ourselves about the exceptions (which few of us ever face) in order to justify the normal situations in which we lie. But we do know the difference. We just pretend that we don't.
God commends Rahab for her faith, not her lying. The story of Rahab is not an ethics lesson about lying. Jesus was always interested in the "intentions of the heart." A man could still be considered an adulterer, even if never actually physically involved. And a person, in certain deceptive situations, can be involved in a lie even if not literally using false words. Intent and context matters.
Telling a lie to a Nazi does not mean that the person telling the lie thinks it is okay to lie. That person merely recognizes that in this situation, to honor God and preserve a life, in order to constrain evil, my obligation to tell the truth is suspended in this context. But tomorrow, I must be honest with my boss about the mistake I made, even though it might cost me a promotion.
9.21.2010 | 1:53pm
Paul says:
@Jules Aime,
Corrie Ten Boom is neither the Mother nor the younger cousin. She is yet a third person.
On bearing false witness . . . The distinction I had in mind with this--bearing false witness, in the Decalogue, is a juridical notion that carries the connotation of lying to duly constituted authority in a legal proceeding (to be sure, not one quite so elaborate as the modern American court system). So all instances of bearing false witness are instances of deception of lying. But the converse is not the case. The question then becomes one about the implications of the Decalogues ban on bearing false witness for lying and deception more generally.
Corrie Ten Boom is neither the Mother nor the younger cousin. She is yet a third person.
On bearing false witness . . . The distinction I had in mind with this--bearing false witness, in the Decalogue, is a juridical notion that carries the connotation of lying to duly constituted authority in a legal proceeding (to be sure, not one quite so elaborate as the modern American court system). So all instances of bearing false witness are instances of deception of lying. But the converse is not the case. The question then becomes one about the implications of the Decalogues ban on bearing false witness for lying and deception more generally.
9.21.2010 | 2:13pm
Ryan Haber says:
There's a whole lot of swirling going on here, huh? Let's get some clarity. Happly, the Catechism provides tons.
But what exactly is a lie? Happily, the CCC provides a great deal. CCC #2484 states, "To lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead someone into error." We find a very slightly different definition at CCC #2482, "A lie consists in speaking a falsehood with the intention of deceiving."
Every lie is a sin. At CCC #2483 we read, "Lying is the most direct offense against the truth." And at #2485 we read, "By its very nature, lying is to be condemned. It is a profanation of speech, whereas the purpose of speech is to communicate known truth to others." "By its very nature" indicates that the sinful nature of a lie is intrinsic to the act itself. Lying, like contracepting, or murdering, is never morally justifiable.
Not every lie is a mortal sin. At CCC #2484 we read, "The gravity of a lie is measured against the nature of the truth it deforms, the circumstances, the intentions of the one who lies, and the harm suffered by its victims." Not every lie is a mortal sin, because lying (like theft but unlike murder) admits of parvity, or smallness, of matter. That is, there are very serious lies (CCC #2485 states, "The culpability is greater when the intention of deceiving entails the risk of deadly consequences for those who are led astray,") and there are lies that are very trivial, whose consequence and harm is negligible even in a short view. Telling someone that you were watching one morally unoffensive TV show instead of the actual, inoffensive one, is a perfect example. Moreover, because of consequences involved, some lies - like the Hidden Jew lie - are very, very understandable. Something in the midst of these two extreme lies - one extremely inconsequential and the other extremely understandable - is the famous, "Honey, how does this dress look?" lie. Somewhat inconsequential, yet also somewhat understandable. In this category, also, are lies that prevent from knowing the truth someone who will likely misuse it if informed - like the Nazi hunting the Hidden Jew. Better not to lie, certainly, but coming up with a clever truth might be much harder on one's feet - here, a lie is certainly very understandable.
Yet the Dress lie is a good example of where truth might be best in the long run. Perhaps the lady needs to hear the truth, or perhaps she needs to learn to find her affirmation in a better source. A lie handicaps those two better outcomes in return for a bit of quiet.
If somebody already believes a falsehood, or something true that we state allows them to believe a falsehood (as everything true we could say might very well so allow) and we haven't an obligation to provide them with truth (2488, as mentioned in an earlier post), we are not guilty of lying if we fail to dispel their mistaken belief. Mental reservations are fine in the case where the person incompletely informed is not entitled to the truth. Mental reservations are not lies. They are presentations of parts of the truth, without presenting the whole truth, while permitting the person so informed to maintain the mistaken belief that what they have been told is the whole truth. Now, let it be noted that simply not stating a truth - even if it leads others into a false conception - isn't a lie, or else we'd be doing it almost all the time, literally. The definition at #2482 strengthens the intuition that not communicating cannot be a lie. Refraining from saying a true thing and speaking a thing one knows to be false are not morally equivalent. If they were morally equivalent, then we would be lying at every moment in which a person in our vicinity or influence were deceived by something upon which we failed to enlighten them to the best of our ability. That's obvious nonsense.
Corky, in the story of the Hiding Jew and the Kitchen Table, was not lying. The words she spoke were true. The Nazis did not see how they could be, and she had no obligation to inform them.
Jules Aime, your comment strikes me as a bit odd. I do not think either O'Donnell nor Corrie ten Boom were either lying or conforming to Kantian principles. It is not a Kantian principle that one must always tell the truth; Kant, in rejecting the supposed justifiability of a lie was doing so upon a kinda goofy philosophical basis - but his conclusion, that lying is never morally justifiable, matches precisely that of the Catholic Church. Lastly, your comment that Jesus cheerfully used subterfuge is odd. What do you mean? I don't know what you could be refering to, though I admit I am missing something.
But what exactly is a lie? Happily, the CCC provides a great deal. CCC #2484 states, "To lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead someone into error." We find a very slightly different definition at CCC #2482, "A lie consists in speaking a falsehood with the intention of deceiving."
Every lie is a sin. At CCC #2483 we read, "Lying is the most direct offense against the truth." And at #2485 we read, "By its very nature, lying is to be condemned. It is a profanation of speech, whereas the purpose of speech is to communicate known truth to others." "By its very nature" indicates that the sinful nature of a lie is intrinsic to the act itself. Lying, like contracepting, or murdering, is never morally justifiable.
Not every lie is a mortal sin. At CCC #2484 we read, "The gravity of a lie is measured against the nature of the truth it deforms, the circumstances, the intentions of the one who lies, and the harm suffered by its victims." Not every lie is a mortal sin, because lying (like theft but unlike murder) admits of parvity, or smallness, of matter. That is, there are very serious lies (CCC #2485 states, "The culpability is greater when the intention of deceiving entails the risk of deadly consequences for those who are led astray,") and there are lies that are very trivial, whose consequence and harm is negligible even in a short view. Telling someone that you were watching one morally unoffensive TV show instead of the actual, inoffensive one, is a perfect example. Moreover, because of consequences involved, some lies - like the Hidden Jew lie - are very, very understandable. Something in the midst of these two extreme lies - one extremely inconsequential and the other extremely understandable - is the famous, "Honey, how does this dress look?" lie. Somewhat inconsequential, yet also somewhat understandable. In this category, also, are lies that prevent from knowing the truth someone who will likely misuse it if informed - like the Nazi hunting the Hidden Jew. Better not to lie, certainly, but coming up with a clever truth might be much harder on one's feet - here, a lie is certainly very understandable.
Yet the Dress lie is a good example of where truth might be best in the long run. Perhaps the lady needs to hear the truth, or perhaps she needs to learn to find her affirmation in a better source. A lie handicaps those two better outcomes in return for a bit of quiet.
If somebody already believes a falsehood, or something true that we state allows them to believe a falsehood (as everything true we could say might very well so allow) and we haven't an obligation to provide them with truth (2488, as mentioned in an earlier post), we are not guilty of lying if we fail to dispel their mistaken belief. Mental reservations are fine in the case where the person incompletely informed is not entitled to the truth. Mental reservations are not lies. They are presentations of parts of the truth, without presenting the whole truth, while permitting the person so informed to maintain the mistaken belief that what they have been told is the whole truth. Now, let it be noted that simply not stating a truth - even if it leads others into a false conception - isn't a lie, or else we'd be doing it almost all the time, literally. The definition at #2482 strengthens the intuition that not communicating cannot be a lie. Refraining from saying a true thing and speaking a thing one knows to be false are not morally equivalent. If they were morally equivalent, then we would be lying at every moment in which a person in our vicinity or influence were deceived by something upon which we failed to enlighten them to the best of our ability. That's obvious nonsense.
Corky, in the story of the Hiding Jew and the Kitchen Table, was not lying. The words she spoke were true. The Nazis did not see how they could be, and she had no obligation to inform them.
Jules Aime, your comment strikes me as a bit odd. I do not think either O'Donnell nor Corrie ten Boom were either lying or conforming to Kantian principles. It is not a Kantian principle that one must always tell the truth; Kant, in rejecting the supposed justifiability of a lie was doing so upon a kinda goofy philosophical basis - but his conclusion, that lying is never morally justifiable, matches precisely that of the Catholic Church. Lastly, your comment that Jesus cheerfully used subterfuge is odd. What do you mean? I don't know what you could be refering to, though I admit I am missing something.
9.21.2010 | 2:32pm
Bender says:
***Corrie ten Boom actually told numerous lies in her protection of the Jews, and she had the faith to believe that God would forgive her lying***
This is key.
Part of the moral difficulty here is the tendency to conflate the matter of the morality of a given act with God's response to that act, that is, conflating a sin with the punishment for that sin (or the forgiveness for it).
It cannot be disputed that an intentional lie is intrinsically and objectively a moral wrong. It is by its very nature contrary to truth, and sin is, by its very nature, a distortion and privation of truth. The Tree of Knowledge is, in actuality, a Tree of Lies.
All lying is morally wrong, even if done for a "greater good," even if done to save Jews or priests or gypsies or the disabled from the Nazis.
HOWEVER, God is ever merciful, and He is fully capable of taking the entire situation into consideration and mitigation. The lie is a wrong -- but it is an entirely forgiveable wrong.
True, we should not presume upon God's mercies, even in this context, so it would be better to find some skillful way to accomplish the good without the lie, but the God of love and divine mercy knows how to forgive in such cases.
But even though God might "cut us some slack" and forgive in certain situations does NOT mean that the action itself is not still wrongful.
This is key.
Part of the moral difficulty here is the tendency to conflate the matter of the morality of a given act with God's response to that act, that is, conflating a sin with the punishment for that sin (or the forgiveness for it).
It cannot be disputed that an intentional lie is intrinsically and objectively a moral wrong. It is by its very nature contrary to truth, and sin is, by its very nature, a distortion and privation of truth. The Tree of Knowledge is, in actuality, a Tree of Lies.
All lying is morally wrong, even if done for a "greater good," even if done to save Jews or priests or gypsies or the disabled from the Nazis.
HOWEVER, God is ever merciful, and He is fully capable of taking the entire situation into consideration and mitigation. The lie is a wrong -- but it is an entirely forgiveable wrong.
True, we should not presume upon God's mercies, even in this context, so it would be better to find some skillful way to accomplish the good without the lie, but the God of love and divine mercy knows how to forgive in such cases.
But even though God might "cut us some slack" and forgive in certain situations does NOT mean that the action itself is not still wrongful.
9.21.2010 | 2:45pm
Ryan Haber says:
What Paul wrote about bearing false witness is correct. The seventh commandment is an injunction against lying under oath. That said, the Church teaching unequivocally that to speak (or write) that which one knows to be false for the purpose of deception is to lie, and is always morally unjustifiable - under the same principle that makes perjury unjustifiable.
9.21.2010 | 2:48pm
Jules Aime says:
@Ryan Harber
I wish I could second your view that the Catechism brings clarity to the situation here but I cannot say it does. Certainly, the definitions seem clear enough by themselves but the clarity disappears when we apply them to our lives.
Bearing false witness clearly does have implications beyond the juridical. But to assert that it implies that all lying is morally wrong is not so much incorrect as nonsensical; it is one of those positions that can't even be wrong.
As to the use of subterfuge by Jesus the first example I think of is Luke 20 wherein Jesus uses a clever trick to avoid answering the chief priests' question about where he gets his authority. And, while I will grant that Sunday's Gospel reading is a difficult reading, I don't know of any reading that can make it look even vaguely like Jesus condemns the steward's deliberate falsification of the promissory notes.
Arguments have to stop somewhere and I think that this thread has reached the point where no one is going to convince anyone else by stating their view with greater clarity or precision. The thought I bow out on this: If I were ever to find myself in the position of hiding someone in the attic from murderers I would quietly pray, "Please Lord, give me the strength to lie convincingly."
I wish I could second your view that the Catechism brings clarity to the situation here but I cannot say it does. Certainly, the definitions seem clear enough by themselves but the clarity disappears when we apply them to our lives.
Bearing false witness clearly does have implications beyond the juridical. But to assert that it implies that all lying is morally wrong is not so much incorrect as nonsensical; it is one of those positions that can't even be wrong.
As to the use of subterfuge by Jesus the first example I think of is Luke 20 wherein Jesus uses a clever trick to avoid answering the chief priests' question about where he gets his authority. And, while I will grant that Sunday's Gospel reading is a difficult reading, I don't know of any reading that can make it look even vaguely like Jesus condemns the steward's deliberate falsification of the promissory notes.
Arguments have to stop somewhere and I think that this thread has reached the point where no one is going to convince anyone else by stating their view with greater clarity or precision. The thought I bow out on this: If I were ever to find myself in the position of hiding someone in the attic from murderers I would quietly pray, "Please Lord, give me the strength to lie convincingly."
9.21.2010 | 2:48pm
Dick Poodle says:
Neighbor says she has proof: Christine O'Donnell is a witch - SHOCKING story at:
http://spnheadlines.blogspot.com/2010/09/gladys-kravitz-odonnell-is-witch.html
Peace! :-)
http://spnheadlines.blogspot.com/2010/09/gladys-kravitz-odonnell-is-witch.html
Peace! :-)
9.21.2010 | 3:24pm
Patrick says:
Hey, I have a B.A. too. And unlike O'Donnell it only took me five years to get it. Maybe I should quit my $13/hr clerk job and run for United States Senator... I hear they get like totally sweet Secret Services escorts and stuff, sounds pretty awesome.
9.21.2010 | 4:02pm
Donald Todd says:
I don't live in Delaware but would vote for O'Donnell against the Democrat if I lived there. Could I have voted for the Republican O'Donnell bested in the primary? Nope. I am a moral / fiscal / small government / defend the country conservative, and a convert to the Catholic Church. Those are not synonymous but there are points where they converge.
I was rather amazed at how far afield the discussion has become about whether O'Donnell is worthy of a defense. For the Catholics and conservatives who want a pro-life (or anti-abortion), fiscal conservative, O'Donnell was the only choice. If someone in the above letters from Delaware wanted to run against her, it is too late.
Before finding the Catholic Church (or being found since I am not sure Who found whom), I did a great many things, not all of them good. As a regular user of the confessional, I tend (like many conservatives and many good Catholics) to take a broad view of humankind's predilections and pray for God's attendance and mercy on my fellow human beings. It is after all something I want for myself as well.
Will O'Donnell be better or worse than the Republican she bested in the primaries? I do not know but I do know what he stood for. Will O'Donnell be better than the Democrat she is competing with for the general election? I do not know but I do know what he has done as a county commissioner and I certainly don't want him doing that for the rest of the country. O'Donnell appears to be the best choice available to the people of Delaware.
Go Christine go.
I was rather amazed at how far afield the discussion has become about whether O'Donnell is worthy of a defense. For the Catholics and conservatives who want a pro-life (or anti-abortion), fiscal conservative, O'Donnell was the only choice. If someone in the above letters from Delaware wanted to run against her, it is too late.
Before finding the Catholic Church (or being found since I am not sure Who found whom), I did a great many things, not all of them good. As a regular user of the confessional, I tend (like many conservatives and many good Catholics) to take a broad view of humankind's predilections and pray for God's attendance and mercy on my fellow human beings. It is after all something I want for myself as well.
Will O'Donnell be better or worse than the Republican she bested in the primaries? I do not know but I do know what he stood for. Will O'Donnell be better than the Democrat she is competing with for the general election? I do not know but I do know what he has done as a county commissioner and I certainly don't want him doing that for the rest of the country. O'Donnell appears to be the best choice available to the people of Delaware.
Go Christine go.
9.21.2010 | 4:38pm
James Murphy says:
Ms. Scalia - You've convinced me that Christine O'Donnell is without guile and possesses the wide eyed innocence of a child. So does my ten year old niece, who is also not qualified to be a US Senator. She's "Palin Lite"?? Give me a break. Allow us to be frustrated when our political leadership choices are limited to morally bankrupt Progressives on the one hand and the Palin Lite candidate who took fifteen years to get her BA from Fairleigh Ridiculous and who would have told the Nazi's that Anne Frank was hiding in her attic.
9.21.2010 | 5:21pm
gb says:
Oh for heaven's sake, what sense does it make to go on & on re: O'Donnell's views when we take look at the havoc that Catholics in Congress have caused during the last forty years? Throw in Sebelius etc & its hard to imagine how in the world ANYONE could muck it up anymore than it already is.
Do I care at all whether ODonnell is a polished & sophisticated liar, like the Catholics who are ruling this country now? No. Like it or not, James Murphy, that appears to be our choice. If Catholics had just voted according to Church teaching two years ago, we wouldn't be in this mess so we have no one to blame but ourselves.
And let me throw in a prayer of Corrie TenBoom's in the years before she died (1983): She used to ask God to help her "See great things great & small things small." THAT would be an excellent prayer for every USA Catholic to say before voting.
Do I care at all whether ODonnell is a polished & sophisticated liar, like the Catholics who are ruling this country now? No. Like it or not, James Murphy, that appears to be our choice. If Catholics had just voted according to Church teaching two years ago, we wouldn't be in this mess so we have no one to blame but ourselves.
And let me throw in a prayer of Corrie TenBoom's in the years before she died (1983): She used to ask God to help her "See great things great & small things small." THAT would be an excellent prayer for every USA Catholic to say before voting.
9.21.2010 | 5:28pm
Maria V. says:
Hoping that Ms. O' Donnell might be used one way or other by a merciful God , to make the public aware of what dabbling in occult can do .....confusion and its attendant effects in many areas ...
and that she would use the forthrightness , if that is what it is , to see needs and ways to deal with same , thus may be of help to many others - may be even becoming a good spiritual warrior, right there where she intends to be !
and that she would use the forthrightness , if that is what it is , to see needs and ways to deal with same , thus may be of help to many others - may be even becoming a good spiritual warrior, right there where she intends to be !
9.21.2010 | 6:00pm
Peter H says:
The issue of lying is rather tricky, and many philosophers and ethicists struggle with it, but there is an excellent Scriptural reference which puts the whole thing into its proper perspective — I mean when Jesus proclaimed that He is the way and the truth and the life...
If it is only Jesus that is the whole and perfect truth, everything else, including our imperfect human nature, as well as our imperfect human language, (which has been proven to be imperfect and incomplete even scientifically and philosophically), is made relative by this statement of Jesus.
There are shades of truth and lies across the whole spectrum, white lie being actually defined as praiseworthy. So would presumably be a lie told to a cruel tyrant when accomplishing a greater good. Here, however, one must consider the safety and well-being of others, so one is not free to be perfectly honest when others' lives are in danger by one's statements. Regulus, the legendary martyr of Rome captured by Carthagians, was considered an epitome of Roman honesty, but he was free to choose his own torture and death for the sake of truth and honesty.
The word lie itself meant different things in different times, for example in times of Samuel Johnson it wasn't the same thing Mr. Joe Carter says it means today. Consider Boswell's clarification that Johnson used the word lie even in cases when someone made a logical or language error or an honest mistake without the intent to deceive.
The whole problem of truth and lying in the context of human expression was rather cynically summarized by Cardinal Richelieu : "Give me six lines written by the most honorable of men, and I will find an excuse in them to hang him."
We are all sinners and quite often liars, whether we mean it or not. Indeed as father Corapi used to say in his homilies where he reflected on the truth that only Jesus Himself is Truth, humility is the only proper acknowledgment of such truth.
If it is only Jesus that is the whole and perfect truth, everything else, including our imperfect human nature, as well as our imperfect human language, (which has been proven to be imperfect and incomplete even scientifically and philosophically), is made relative by this statement of Jesus.
There are shades of truth and lies across the whole spectrum, white lie being actually defined as praiseworthy. So would presumably be a lie told to a cruel tyrant when accomplishing a greater good. Here, however, one must consider the safety and well-being of others, so one is not free to be perfectly honest when others' lives are in danger by one's statements. Regulus, the legendary martyr of Rome captured by Carthagians, was considered an epitome of Roman honesty, but he was free to choose his own torture and death for the sake of truth and honesty.
The word lie itself meant different things in different times, for example in times of Samuel Johnson it wasn't the same thing Mr. Joe Carter says it means today. Consider Boswell's clarification that Johnson used the word lie even in cases when someone made a logical or language error or an honest mistake without the intent to deceive.
The whole problem of truth and lying in the context of human expression was rather cynically summarized by Cardinal Richelieu : "Give me six lines written by the most honorable of men, and I will find an excuse in them to hang him."
We are all sinners and quite often liars, whether we mean it or not. Indeed as father Corapi used to say in his homilies where he reflected on the truth that only Jesus Himself is Truth, humility is the only proper acknowledgment of such truth.
9.21.2010 | 7:04pm
Joe McFaul says:
"There's a whole lot of swirling going on here, huh? Let's get some clarity. Happly, the Catechism provides tons."
No it doesn't. It is not widely known but the Catechism was revised excatly on this point---and it switched positions!
The Catechism cannot be relied upon as authoritative Catholic teaching on this particular point.
http://www.catholicculture.org/commentary/articles.cfm?id=242
No it doesn't. It is not widely known but the Catechism was revised excatly on this point---and it switched positions!
The Catechism cannot be relied upon as authoritative Catholic teaching on this particular point.
http://www.catholicculture.org/commentary/articles.cfm?id=242
9.21.2010 | 9:52pm
J.C. says:
@ Mr. Carter,
I remember Alexander Pruss, whom is a philosopher and teaches at Baylor University, mentioned the difference between deceiving and lying.
Here is his [Alexander Pruss] words verbatim, "For instance, if I am escaping from an enemy, come to a cross-roads, and make a false track in one direction while going in the other, I am not lying. The reason for that is lying essentially involves assertion (by speech or perhaps gesture), and--more speculatively (here I am following Jorge Garcia, as well as a lot of conversations with Mark Murphy)--a connection to interpersonal trust. Lying and causing a false belief by non-assertoric speech are also different."
I'm persuaded into thinking that lying and deceiving are not the same, at least not all the time.
I remember Alexander Pruss, whom is a philosopher and teaches at Baylor University, mentioned the difference between deceiving and lying.
Here is his [Alexander Pruss] words verbatim, "For instance, if I am escaping from an enemy, come to a cross-roads, and make a false track in one direction while going in the other, I am not lying. The reason for that is lying essentially involves assertion (by speech or perhaps gesture), and--more speculatively (here I am following Jorge Garcia, as well as a lot of conversations with Mark Murphy)--a connection to interpersonal trust. Lying and causing a false belief by non-assertoric speech are also different."
I'm persuaded into thinking that lying and deceiving are not the same, at least not all the time.
9.21.2010 | 10:32pm
Ken says:
For O'Donnell to be utterly without guile, she would have to inhuman. And wide-eyed-innocent openness is a lovely quality in a young person, not in a national leader. Ms. Scalia chooses to defend O'Donnell on the easy stuff, and I'm with her there. But she also chooses to ignore the stoopid things the candidate has said, her decision to duck the Sunday shows but appear with Hannity, and the allegations that she has billed her campaigns for living expenses. Let's see Scalia address the real issues and not the trumped up ones.
9.21.2010 | 11:59pm
Greg Buls says:
Religious and philosophical injunctions against lying are not about absolutes, they are almost always assumed to be tempered by common sense and weighed against other principles. If the ancients didn't write in these terms, it was likely because they did not share our legalistic, western outlook. It was probably not considered necessary to remind people to use their common sense. The ancients were generally referring to lying in its generally understood, selfish terms.
For instance - would a person concede to a belligerent drunk that he might well be able to stagger safely across a busy interstate, if he is careful? If caught outside the walls by barbarians besieging a city, intend on raping and murdering every living thing inside the walls, do you tell them, 'Yes", that there is indeed a simple way over or under the walls? Would a person sit with their child and describe the effects of all the household products they might be inclined to swallow, or just wave a hand and say "If you swallow any of this stuff it can kill you"? Would they concede to a suicidal friend that their position does seem utterly and irretrievably hopeless, that they might well be better off dead, and that yes, there are a number of relatively painless ways to die that can be accomplished in every house?
There's also the issue of duress. If you know someone will kill others if you tell the truth, by what moral principle does one justify telling the truth? Is the world improved by their perhaps unknown act of absolutist virtue? Are they likely to be more or less committed to their life of obedience while carrying the deaths of others on their conscience? Lying in this case is the unselfish thing to do. The essence of religion (aside from a few) is subordination and denial of the self, in favor of others, and in favor of love for and obedience to The Creator. It can be argued that being truthful is exalting the self, in this situation. Lying to save the innocent isn't a sin by any objective or reasonable philosophical or religious measure.
Duress is the extreme. The ideal life probably involves being honest with those around you, while making your love for them clear as you dispense your often brutal honesty. Ideally your wife would be confident enough of God's love to not care if she looks fat in a given garment, and humble enough to know when she does look fat, and not let it ruin her day. But that's a level of philosophical perfection few people ever achieve. As we grow in our love for God, we see with greater clarity how far we truly are from the mark. Thus the frequent, heartfelt salutation found at the ends of many letters written by the saints, "First among sinners".
Many of us are more honest with others than we are with ourselves. Some of the most fruitful attempts to be honest are those that take place completely in one's own head. Honesty starts there and spreads outward.
Better to save the absolutism for its proper role: a concrete injunction against lying for selfish reasons. Those are the lies that poison trust and relations, and the ones that concerned the ancients.
For instance - would a person concede to a belligerent drunk that he might well be able to stagger safely across a busy interstate, if he is careful? If caught outside the walls by barbarians besieging a city, intend on raping and murdering every living thing inside the walls, do you tell them, 'Yes", that there is indeed a simple way over or under the walls? Would a person sit with their child and describe the effects of all the household products they might be inclined to swallow, or just wave a hand and say "If you swallow any of this stuff it can kill you"? Would they concede to a suicidal friend that their position does seem utterly and irretrievably hopeless, that they might well be better off dead, and that yes, there are a number of relatively painless ways to die that can be accomplished in every house?
There's also the issue of duress. If you know someone will kill others if you tell the truth, by what moral principle does one justify telling the truth? Is the world improved by their perhaps unknown act of absolutist virtue? Are they likely to be more or less committed to their life of obedience while carrying the deaths of others on their conscience? Lying in this case is the unselfish thing to do. The essence of religion (aside from a few) is subordination and denial of the self, in favor of others, and in favor of love for and obedience to The Creator. It can be argued that being truthful is exalting the self, in this situation. Lying to save the innocent isn't a sin by any objective or reasonable philosophical or religious measure.
Duress is the extreme. The ideal life probably involves being honest with those around you, while making your love for them clear as you dispense your often brutal honesty. Ideally your wife would be confident enough of God's love to not care if she looks fat in a given garment, and humble enough to know when she does look fat, and not let it ruin her day. But that's a level of philosophical perfection few people ever achieve. As we grow in our love for God, we see with greater clarity how far we truly are from the mark. Thus the frequent, heartfelt salutation found at the ends of many letters written by the saints, "First among sinners".
Many of us are more honest with others than we are with ourselves. Some of the most fruitful attempts to be honest are those that take place completely in one's own head. Honesty starts there and spreads outward.
Better to save the absolutism for its proper role: a concrete injunction against lying for selfish reasons. Those are the lies that poison trust and relations, and the ones that concerned the ancients.
9.21.2010 | 11:59pm
Jen says:
It seems to me that much (if not all) of the debate over lying would go away if we had a linguistic distinction akin to that between killing (physical act of taking of a human life) and murder (sinful taking of a human life). All murder is killing, and all murder is a sin, but not all killing (e.g. defense, combat) is murder.
I believe there is a relevant distinction between lie/act-of-uttering-a-falsehood and lie/immorally-uttering-a-falsehood
Speaking of killing, do we really want to say that to defend innocents it's okay to use deadly force against a Nazi but not okay to lie to him?
I believe there is a relevant distinction between lie/act-of-uttering-a-falsehood and lie/immorally-uttering-a-falsehood
Speaking of killing, do we really want to say that to defend innocents it's okay to use deadly force against a Nazi but not okay to lie to him?
9.22.2010 | 12:05am
James Murphy says:
This just in. O'Donnell just said she can see Iran from Deleware!
Seriously now, GB, there is truth in what you've written. I want candidates who are electable, though. Is she?
J
Seriously now, GB, there is truth in what you've written. I want candidates who are electable, though. Is she?
J
9.22.2010 | 1:09am
John D. Hartigan says:
Dear Ms. Scalia,
Why waste your breath parsing what Christine O'Donnell once said about masturbation and telling the truth to Nazis? The real issue is what her past actions tell us about whether she's fit to be a United States Senator.
One thing that troubles me is that, during her thirties, O'Donnell made a number of appearances on Bill Maher's dismal late night TV show. Whether she did it for money or for kicks, it doesn't exactly add luster to her resume.
Neither does her 2008 decision to abandon a $6,952,477 million gender discrimination lawsuit she brought against a former employer. She claims she had to drop the case because she couldn't afford the legal fees, but it seems much more likely that she didn't have a leg to stand on. If her case had any real merit, she wouldn't have had to pay her attorneys anything out of her own pocket. They would have agreed to represent her for a percentage of whatever she was eventually awarded (meaning zero if the case was decided against her).
So, while you may be right that O'Donnell's photos project a "sort of wide-eyed-innocent openness", that doesn't persuade me that she's dependable enough to deserve election.
John D. Hartigan
Why waste your breath parsing what Christine O'Donnell once said about masturbation and telling the truth to Nazis? The real issue is what her past actions tell us about whether she's fit to be a United States Senator.
One thing that troubles me is that, during her thirties, O'Donnell made a number of appearances on Bill Maher's dismal late night TV show. Whether she did it for money or for kicks, it doesn't exactly add luster to her resume.
Neither does her 2008 decision to abandon a $6,952,477 million gender discrimination lawsuit she brought against a former employer. She claims she had to drop the case because she couldn't afford the legal fees, but it seems much more likely that she didn't have a leg to stand on. If her case had any real merit, she wouldn't have had to pay her attorneys anything out of her own pocket. They would have agreed to represent her for a percentage of whatever she was eventually awarded (meaning zero if the case was decided against her).
So, while you may be right that O'Donnell's photos project a "sort of wide-eyed-innocent openness", that doesn't persuade me that she's dependable enough to deserve election.
John D. Hartigan
9.22.2010 | 1:43am
Frank M. Niemiec says:
The discussion has been very interesting. What will be even more interesting is what the Delaware voters will do when they are faced with their decision in the voting booths.
9.22.2010 | 10:12am
John says:
Joe Carter: By your definition, lying requires a false statement. It requires more than merely something that has the effect of deceiving. I'm not an expert on mental reservation, but am Catholic and was educated at Catholic schools my whole life. We learned the principle of mental reservation.
Your position seems to be that lying is not objectively wrong when it is done for the right reasons. How does this line up with objective truth? How can the very same act - saying something false with intent to deceive - be wrong in many (most?) instances, but not wrong depending on what its purpose is? This flies in the face of objective truth and is a consequentialist position.
This is a great debate, though somewhat more weighty than Christine O'Donnell. How about an article in First Things?
Your position seems to be that lying is not objectively wrong when it is done for the right reasons. How does this line up with objective truth? How can the very same act - saying something false with intent to deceive - be wrong in many (most?) instances, but not wrong depending on what its purpose is? This flies in the face of objective truth and is a consequentialist position.
This is a great debate, though somewhat more weighty than Christine O'Donnell. How about an article in First Things?
9.22.2010 | 12:01pm
Galina Krasskova says:
"And how refreshing might it be to have a Congress in place full of people dedicated to serving the truth, over truthiness."
I would not find it refreshing to have a Congress full of any more people who feel it is ok to dismiss and misrespresent a minority religion (Wicca) for their own ends.
Her intellectual capacities aside, I smell fundamentalism there, the type of fundamentalism that says 'worship the way I do, or it's not worship" and the type that could easily spur a witchhunt in order to raise her own status. That offends me, and what offends me more is that the media jumps on the fact that she "dabbles in witchcraft" and not on the fact that she's egregiously misrepresenting a growing religion.
As to her comment that she would not lie to save someone from the Nazis...i too feel that it would be her moral imperative TOO lie. I've always been of the opinion that if we do what we must to protect and honor our fellow men, God might not have to jump in quite so often.
I would not find it refreshing to have a Congress full of any more people who feel it is ok to dismiss and misrespresent a minority religion (Wicca) for their own ends.
Her intellectual capacities aside, I smell fundamentalism there, the type of fundamentalism that says 'worship the way I do, or it's not worship" and the type that could easily spur a witchhunt in order to raise her own status. That offends me, and what offends me more is that the media jumps on the fact that she "dabbles in witchcraft" and not on the fact that she's egregiously misrepresenting a growing religion.
As to her comment that she would not lie to save someone from the Nazis...i too feel that it would be her moral imperative TOO lie. I've always been of the opinion that if we do what we must to protect and honor our fellow men, God might not have to jump in quite so often.
9.22.2010 | 10:38pm
pentamom says:
"How can the very same act - saying something false with intent to deceive - be wrong in many (most?) instances, but not wrong depending on what its purpose is? This flies in the face of objective truth and is a consequentialist position."
Only in the sense that a tracheotomy is equivalent to murderously slitting someone's throat, which is an untenable position.
But of course, it's not "the very same act." A tracheotomy is done in a very different way from a throat-slitting. Lying to a Nazi about the location of one of his intended victims is not the "very same act" as lying to your spouse about where you were last night. The words are different, the subject of which you're speaking is different, the purpose for which you are choosing to mislead is different, and the person to whom you're speaking is different. Only by factoring out everything that makes it different can you call it "the very same," and the argument is that those differing factors are a part of what determines the nature of the act, not merely the similarity of intent to mislead.
Only in the sense that a tracheotomy is equivalent to murderously slitting someone's throat, which is an untenable position.
But of course, it's not "the very same act." A tracheotomy is done in a very different way from a throat-slitting. Lying to a Nazi about the location of one of his intended victims is not the "very same act" as lying to your spouse about where you were last night. The words are different, the subject of which you're speaking is different, the purpose for which you are choosing to mislead is different, and the person to whom you're speaking is different. Only by factoring out everything that makes it different can you call it "the very same," and the argument is that those differing factors are a part of what determines the nature of the act, not merely the similarity of intent to mislead.
9.27.2010 | 1:21pm
KDZ says:
Stephen Barr's account of O'Donnell seems to carry the day. But is it possible that O'Donnell is not a liar as such but is simply self-deceived and unreflective?
9.28.2010 | 10:37pm
Lynn says:
Nope, Sorry Mr. Carter, Cocky's mother, was indeed faced with the Nazis, and she did indeed tell the truth about her own hidden Jews. The Jews got away safely; and Nollie was the only family member to spend a short amount of time in prison.
To lie, is to doubt God's ability. We act on what the Lord has told us, not on the experience of others.
To lie, is to doubt God's ability. We act on what the Lord has told us, not on the experience of others.
9.28.2010 | 10:43pm
Lynn says:
As for O'Donnell's speech and if she is articulate enough for office. Well, we voted in a supposedly articulate man, who is a lousy leader! And hey, look at who O'Donnell would replace! The Gaff machine himself: Joe Biden! PLEASE! She is the perfect replacement for the guy who always billed himself as the "ordinary Joe"...."O'Donnell's opponent billed himself as the "Bearded Marxist"....we have to get the Marxists OUT of our government..not put more in!
11.14.2010 | 3:23am
Manteca Selene says:
Jane Jacobs in Systems of Survival claims that there are two systems of ethical emphasis, one for protecting and one for providing. According to that deception is permitted as long as it is appropriate to the mission and is compatible with loyalty to those one works with. On that reasoning, in other words, the President of the United States is supposed to deceive the Russians and not the American people. I don't think it is doing a "little evil." I don't think it is evil at all. There are many factors that determine whether an action is good or evil. You can slice someone's stomach open to take out his gall bladder or to cause them to bleed to death. The actions could be the same but the morality of each is quite different.
4.1.2011 | 3:04am
Jana Cancer says:
What about mental reservation? I'm afraid I couldn't explain what it is, exactly; but from what I do know, it's about mentally reserving the truth for those who don't deserve to know it. I wonder if anyone around here could elaborate on it further for me. And let me throw in a prayer of Corrie TenBoom's in the years before she died (1983): She used to ask God to help her "See great things great & small things small." THAT would be an excellent prayer for every USA Catholic to say before voting.
The purpose of lying in such a situation is to mislead the Nazis about the whereabouts of the hidden Jews. Any act that misleads them is therefore akin to lying. How does that make it acceptable?
Also, taking this position means that everyone who hid Jews from the Nazis was committing a sin by not being honest with the government officials. Would turning them in really have been the moral thing to do?
This also raises the question of Rahab hiding the Hebrew spies (Joshua 2, 6). According to O'Donnell, she was committing a sin by lying about hiding them. Should Rahab have turned them in and waited for God to find another way to save them?