Prepositions, Prejudice, and Religiously Based Explanations
Nov 17, 2010
Joe Carter
After an overzealous editor attempted to rearrange one of Winston Churchill’s sentences to avoid ending it in a preposition, the Prime Minister is said to have scribbled in reply: “This is the sort of nonsense up with which I will not put.”
Churchill was confident about his writing style and knowledgeable enough to recognize that the "rule" against preposition-stranding was a convention of usage and not an inviolable grammatical standard. The silly rule, according to the Cambridge Grammar of the English Language, had been “created ex nihilo in 1672 by the essayist John Dryden.” Churchill understood the difference between conventional wisdom and established fact and his witty rebuke ensured that that chastened proofreader learned the lesson too.
I was reminded of this (possibly apocryphal) anecdote while re-reading a review in First Things by Justice Antonin Scalia of Steven Smith’s Law’s Quandary. In presenting his analysis, Smith claims that there are three “ontological inventories” describing what we in twenty-first-century America “believe to be real”: everyday experience, science, and religion.
Scalia notes that Smith excludes the last from consideration because of the “norm prescribing that religious beliefs are inadmissible in academic explanations.” The view he describes has become the conventional wisdom despite being utter nonsense. The sort of nonsense up with which I will not put. And up with which you should not put either.
All too often Christians—and theists in general—allow such silly remarks to pass unchallenged. We shrug and sigh, assuming those are the rules of the game. Instead we should giggle and snort and point out that no one is without religious beliefs. A belief is a religious belief, as philosopher Roy Clouser usefully defines the term, provided that:
(1) It is a belief in something(s) or other as divine, or (2) It is a belief concerning how humans come to stand in relation to the divine.
Even those who might quibble with the novel definition cannot deny that this is a universal set of beliefs. Whether the subject is Yahweh, Zeus, the Great Pumpkin, or the physical cosmos, everyone has a belief about the “divine” and man’s relation to such an entity. It may be the devil or it may be the Lord, as Bob Dylan said, but you're gonna have to serve somebody.
Like Dryden and prepositional-endings, those who create this “norm” create, ex nihilo, the silly rule that the only legitimate relation to the divine is a functional atheism. “You can believe your fairy stores about Jehovah and Jesus,” they smirk, “but they are inadmissible in academic explanations.”
The only proper response to such foolishness is to deride their palpable and wholly self-imposed vincible ignorance. Would they attempt to apply this ridiculous standard in dismissing the explanations of Augustine, Aquinas, Sir William Blackstone, T.S. Eliot, Isaac Newton, Johann Kepler, or Alvin Plantinga? If so, then they are unserious and can be rightfully dismissed as poseurs.
Instead of doing that, though, we Christians react defensively. We tend to act as if we are the ones who are required by default to defend our position because . . . well, because those are the rules of the game.
We evangelicals in particular, having squandered our intellectual heritage, are especially prone to being cowed into submission. Our scholars leave their publicly unpalatable beliefs at the gates of the Ivory Tower, promising to return for them when they join the hallowed ranks of the tenured and are free to speak without fear of reproach. But having learned to serve a false god—the divinity of functional atheism—they find their minds are too flabby and unfit to “think Christianly” about their research programs.
Academics are not the only ones at fault. Many of us fool ourselves into believing that we can approach our vocations from the position of religious neutrality. What we fail to understand is that we either bring the Logos to bear on our areas of expertise and fields of study or we reject him as irrelevant, a useless appendage that can be shaved off with Occam’s razor. We would do well to remember Christ’s warning that if we deny him before men that he will also deny us before his Father in heaven—and that we can deny Christ without ever moving our lips.
In refusing to acknowledge how our religious beliefs affect our work, we do more than merely shame our Creator. Common grace can only carry us so far, and without bringing the Logos to bear on our work, we will sink further into cognitive dissonance, as, for example, in being unable to resolve the tension between a purely material, deterministic universe and human free will.
When corrected by archaic grammarians who insist—even though we don’t speak Latin—that it’s improper to split infinitives, we must have the courage and good sense to call them on their nonsense. The same is true for those who attempt to hinder rational inquiry by excluding explanations rooted in theism. It is our duty to boldly challenge such illogical prejudice; nonsense up with which we should not put.
Joe Carter is web editor of First Things. His previous articles for “On the Square” can be found here.
RESOURCES
Antonin Scalia’s Law & Language
R.R. Reno’s Metaphysics and the Common Good, a review of Steven D. Smith's The Disenchantment of Secular Discourse
David Mills’ Secularist Cheating
Joe Carter’s Cogito and Christ
Joe Carter’s Should You Trust the Monkey Mind?.
Comments:
11.17.2010 | 5:34am
Steve Jones says:
Right on, bro! (I grew up in the 60s.) For a similar evangelical perspective, an excerpt from Charles Malik's speech at the dedication of the Billy Graham Center at Wheaton College can be found here: http://www.youthnow.org/site/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=207&Itemid=53
11.17.2010 | 6:08am
Ray Ingles says:
"A belief is a religious belief, as philosopher Roy Clouser usefully defines the term, provided that: (1) It is a belief in something(s) or other as divine, or (2) It is a belief concerning how humans come to stand in relation to the divine."
As I said the last time you proposed this definition of 'religion':
Me, I have a different classification scheme. Everyone has a ‘worldview’, true… but only some worldviews are religious. And what makes a worldview religious? Whether or not it contains a supernatural element.
And what does ‘supernatural’ mean? In practice, so far as I can see, it means something ‘unknowable’, something forever removed from human ken.
Note that there’s already controversy about worldviews like Confucianism and many forms of Buddhism. They are very likely to be called ‘philosophies’ instead of ‘religions’, precisely because of their lack of a supernatural element.
As I said the last time you proposed this definition of 'religion':
Me, I have a different classification scheme. Everyone has a ‘worldview’, true… but only some worldviews are religious. And what makes a worldview religious? Whether or not it contains a supernatural element.
And what does ‘supernatural’ mean? In practice, so far as I can see, it means something ‘unknowable’, something forever removed from human ken.
Note that there’s already controversy about worldviews like Confucianism and many forms of Buddhism. They are very likely to be called ‘philosophies’ instead of ‘religions’, precisely because of their lack of a supernatural element.
11.17.2010 | 6:22am
Roger Dubin says:
Excellent post, Joe. As to the first point, certainly not the main one, regarding dangling prepositions: I revere Mr. Churchill for many reasons, not least of which is his writing, and I imagine you do as well. So I can't be 100% sure if your headline doesn't, within itself, contain a sly, subtle dig at grammatical sticklers. Personally, I like to push the envelope when I write fiction, but in a piece such as this? So, at the risk of becoming positively Dryden-like, and on the outside chance you aren't aware of the rule (in this case a good one), one should never use a hyphen after an adverb ending in "ly," such as "badly damaged," "fully formed," or, as in your headline, "religiously based explanations," even when creating a compound word as a modifier of a noun. Just sayin'.
11.17.2010 | 6:35am
Joe Carter says:
@Roger Dubin You're absolutely right. I shouldn't put a a hyphen in an adverb-adjective compound. I've fixed that. Whether Churchill would agree or not, I think that is a rule that should be followed.
11.17.2010 | 6:46am
MacGabhann says:
** A belief is a religious belief, as philosopher Roy Clouser usefully defines the term, provided that:
(1) It is a belief in something(s) or other as divine, or (2) It is a belief concerning how humans come to stand in relation to the divine.
Even those who might quibble with the novel definition cannot deny that this is a universal set of beliefs. **
Of course my dog and my teenage son have no belief regarding the existence of the divine. The question of the divine simply doesn’t arise for them. They are neither “deists,” atheists nor agnostics. The meaning of this word belief needs to be clarified.
Regarding the norm that prescribes religious beliefs to be inadmissible in academic explanations, Voegelin on Weber’s value free science is apposite:
The whole complex of ideas—of "values," "reference to values," "value-judgments," and "value-free science"—seemed on the point of disintegration. An "objectivity" of science had been regained that plainly did not fit into the pattern of the methodological debate. And, yet, even the studies on sociology of religion could not induce Weber to take the decisive step toward a science of order. The ultimate reason for his hesitation, if not fear, is perhaps impenetrable; but the technical point at which he stopped can be clearly discerned.
His studies on sociology of religion have always aroused admiration as a tour de force, if not for other reasons. The amount of materials he mastered in these voluminous studies on Protestantism, Confucianism, Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Israel, and Judaism, to be completed by a study on Islam, is indeed awe-inspiring. In the face of such impressive performance it has perhaps not been sufficiently observed that the series of these studies receives its general tone through a significant omission, that is, of pre-Reformation Christianity.
The reason of the omission seems to be obvious. One can hardly engage in a serious study of medieval Christianity without discovering among its "values" the belief in a rational science of human and social order and especially of natural law. Moreover, this science was not simply a belief, but it was actually elaborated as a work of reason. Here Weber would have run into the fact of a science of order, just as he would if he had seriously occupied himself with Greek philosophy. Weber's readiness to introduce verities about order as historical facts stopped short of Greek and medieval metaphysics.
In order to degrade the politics of Plato, Aristotle, or Saint Thomas to the rank of "values" among others, a conscientious scholar would first have to show that their claim to be science was unfounded. And that attempt is self-defeating. By the time the would-be critic has penetrated the meaning of metaphysics with sufficient thoroughness to make his criticism weighty, he will have become a metaphysician himself. The attack on metaphysics can be undertaken with a good conscience only from the safe distance of imperfect knowledge. The horizon of Weber's social science was immense; all the more does his caution in coming too close to its decisive center reveal his positivistic limitations.
Hence, the result of Weber's work was ambiguous. He had reduced the principle of a value-free science ad absurdum. The idea of a value-free science whose object would be constituted by "reference to a value" could be realized only under the condition that a scientist was willing to decide on a "value" for reference. If the scientist refused to decide on a "value," if he treated all "values" as equal (as Max Weber did), if, moreover, he treated them as social facts among others—then there were no "values" left that could constitute the object of science, because they had become part of the object itself.
This abolition of the "values" as the constituents of science led to a theoretically impossible situation because the object of science has a "constitution" after all, that is, the essence toward which we are moving in our search for truth. Since the positivistic hangover, however, did not permit the admission of a science of essence, of a true episteme, the principles of order had to be introduced as historical facts.
When Weber built the great edifice of his "sociology" (i.e., the positivistic escape from the science of order), he did not seriously consider "all values" as equal. He did not indulge in a worthless trash collection but displayed quite sensible preferences for phenomena that were "important" in the history of mankind; he could distinguish quite well between major civilizations and less important side developments and equally well between "world religions" and unimportant religious phenomena. In the absence of a reasoned principle of theoretization he let himself be guided not by "values" but by the auctoritas majorum and his own sensitiveness for excellence.
(1) It is a belief in something(s) or other as divine, or (2) It is a belief concerning how humans come to stand in relation to the divine.
Even those who might quibble with the novel definition cannot deny that this is a universal set of beliefs. **
Of course my dog and my teenage son have no belief regarding the existence of the divine. The question of the divine simply doesn’t arise for them. They are neither “deists,” atheists nor agnostics. The meaning of this word belief needs to be clarified.
Regarding the norm that prescribes religious beliefs to be inadmissible in academic explanations, Voegelin on Weber’s value free science is apposite:
The whole complex of ideas—of "values," "reference to values," "value-judgments," and "value-free science"—seemed on the point of disintegration. An "objectivity" of science had been regained that plainly did not fit into the pattern of the methodological debate. And, yet, even the studies on sociology of religion could not induce Weber to take the decisive step toward a science of order. The ultimate reason for his hesitation, if not fear, is perhaps impenetrable; but the technical point at which he stopped can be clearly discerned.
His studies on sociology of religion have always aroused admiration as a tour de force, if not for other reasons. The amount of materials he mastered in these voluminous studies on Protestantism, Confucianism, Taoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism, Israel, and Judaism, to be completed by a study on Islam, is indeed awe-inspiring. In the face of such impressive performance it has perhaps not been sufficiently observed that the series of these studies receives its general tone through a significant omission, that is, of pre-Reformation Christianity.
The reason of the omission seems to be obvious. One can hardly engage in a serious study of medieval Christianity without discovering among its "values" the belief in a rational science of human and social order and especially of natural law. Moreover, this science was not simply a belief, but it was actually elaborated as a work of reason. Here Weber would have run into the fact of a science of order, just as he would if he had seriously occupied himself with Greek philosophy. Weber's readiness to introduce verities about order as historical facts stopped short of Greek and medieval metaphysics.
In order to degrade the politics of Plato, Aristotle, or Saint Thomas to the rank of "values" among others, a conscientious scholar would first have to show that their claim to be science was unfounded. And that attempt is self-defeating. By the time the would-be critic has penetrated the meaning of metaphysics with sufficient thoroughness to make his criticism weighty, he will have become a metaphysician himself. The attack on metaphysics can be undertaken with a good conscience only from the safe distance of imperfect knowledge. The horizon of Weber's social science was immense; all the more does his caution in coming too close to its decisive center reveal his positivistic limitations.
Hence, the result of Weber's work was ambiguous. He had reduced the principle of a value-free science ad absurdum. The idea of a value-free science whose object would be constituted by "reference to a value" could be realized only under the condition that a scientist was willing to decide on a "value" for reference. If the scientist refused to decide on a "value," if he treated all "values" as equal (as Max Weber did), if, moreover, he treated them as social facts among others—then there were no "values" left that could constitute the object of science, because they had become part of the object itself.
This abolition of the "values" as the constituents of science led to a theoretically impossible situation because the object of science has a "constitution" after all, that is, the essence toward which we are moving in our search for truth. Since the positivistic hangover, however, did not permit the admission of a science of essence, of a true episteme, the principles of order had to be introduced as historical facts.
When Weber built the great edifice of his "sociology" (i.e., the positivistic escape from the science of order), he did not seriously consider "all values" as equal. He did not indulge in a worthless trash collection but displayed quite sensible preferences for phenomena that were "important" in the history of mankind; he could distinguish quite well between major civilizations and less important side developments and equally well between "world religions" and unimportant religious phenomena. In the absence of a reasoned principle of theoretization he let himself be guided not by "values" but by the auctoritas majorum and his own sensitiveness for excellence.
11.17.2010 | 7:09am
Carson says:
It's more "almost certainly" apocryphal than "possibly." See Benjamin Zimmer's post from the fine linguistics folks at Language Log.
11.17.2010 | 7:16am
J de la Cruz says:
Joe Carter said: "Common grace can only carry us so far, and without bringing the Logos to bear on our work, we will sink further into cognitive dissonance, as, for example, in being unable to resolve the tension between a purely material, deterministic universe and human free will."
Yes, yes, and YES! Thank you Joe Carter.
I am embarrassed to say I am not familiar with Sir William Blackstone and Alvin Plantinga. Would you please recommend their writings so I may get acquainted?
Yes, yes, and YES! Thank you Joe Carter.
I am embarrassed to say I am not familiar with Sir William Blackstone and Alvin Plantinga. Would you please recommend their writings so I may get acquainted?
11.17.2010 | 7:31am
Paul says:
Ray Ingles like to define "religion" in rather idiosyncratic terms. He certainly does NOT define religion in the way in which religious believers characterize their own belief. But I'm sure he'd object if we characterized his way of thinking in terms he does not accept. Which leads to this question: Why the double standard Ray?
11.17.2010 | 7:37am
Joe Carter says:
@J de la Cruz
Here is a page with links to many of Plantinga's main papers: http://philofreligion.homestead.com/Papersbyplantinga.html
Although he's a professional philosopher, his work is fairly accessible.
For a dumbed-down version of his evolutionary argument against naturalism, see my article "Should You Trust the Monkey Mind?": http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2010/09/should-you-trust-the-monkey-mind/joe-carter
Blackstone was one of the most brilliant legal minds of the 18th century. He believed that most human laws were creations of God waiting to be discovered by reason. His thinking on common law had a profound influence on the American Constitution.
Here's a good brief article on him: http://www.earlyamerica.com/review/spring97/blackstone.html
Here is a page with links to many of Plantinga's main papers: http://philofreligion.homestead.com/Papersbyplantinga.html
Although he's a professional philosopher, his work is fairly accessible.
For a dumbed-down version of his evolutionary argument against naturalism, see my article "Should You Trust the Monkey Mind?": http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2010/09/should-you-trust-the-monkey-mind/joe-carter
Blackstone was one of the most brilliant legal minds of the 18th century. He believed that most human laws were creations of God waiting to be discovered by reason. His thinking on common law had a profound influence on the American Constitution.
Here's a good brief article on him: http://www.earlyamerica.com/review/spring97/blackstone.html
11.17.2010 | 8:12am
Andrew Lyttle says:
@ Ray Ingles,
Gosh, that does seem to be your definition of the supernatural, and you're sticking with it. It's completely nonsensical, of course, because if there is a supernatural realm--and indeed there is, however minimal it might be, since nature cannot explain the reality of its own existence, as Dr Hart pointed out (and you failed to grasp) a while ago--then there are any number of possible ways of knowing something about it: inductive reasoning, deductive logic, mystical experience, historical revelation, etc. Unless you're one of those poor confused positivists who think that we don't know anything that can't be tested in a laboratory (in which case, we don't know anything at all, because the proposition that knowledge comes through laboratory experiment is not susceptible to proof in a laboratory), then you have to grant that there are any number of avenues by which supernatural reality might be partially apprehended. But I suspect that your very superstitious epistemology will forbid you from understanding this. I forgive you though--every fundamentalist has a right to his own unreflective creed.
Gosh, that does seem to be your definition of the supernatural, and you're sticking with it. It's completely nonsensical, of course, because if there is a supernatural realm--and indeed there is, however minimal it might be, since nature cannot explain the reality of its own existence, as Dr Hart pointed out (and you failed to grasp) a while ago--then there are any number of possible ways of knowing something about it: inductive reasoning, deductive logic, mystical experience, historical revelation, etc. Unless you're one of those poor confused positivists who think that we don't know anything that can't be tested in a laboratory (in which case, we don't know anything at all, because the proposition that knowledge comes through laboratory experiment is not susceptible to proof in a laboratory), then you have to grant that there are any number of avenues by which supernatural reality might be partially apprehended. But I suspect that your very superstitious epistemology will forbid you from understanding this. I forgive you though--every fundamentalist has a right to his own unreflective creed.
11.17.2010 | 8:14am
Paul says:
Joe,
I concur that Blackstone was important to the framers--who blew hot or cold over him because of a certain ambiguity in his work. On the one hand his work does contain a natural law theory of the nature of law--and a theory that has certain resonances with classical natural law theory at that. Hamilton read him this way. And Forrest McDonald persuasively argues that Hamilton got him right (in what I think is clearly the most important biography on Hamilton). James Wilson, on the other hand, was quite opposed to Blackstone on account of what he took to be Blackstone's absolutist theory of Parliamentary sovereignty. From Wilson's vantage, Blackstone's account of the authority of Parliament echoes more the (political) absolutist traditions of Bodin and Hobbes (Hamilton, prior to the Revolution, had invoked Blackstone against Hobbes and the American Loyalist Samuel Seabury). Needless to say, I think the reason that Blackstone is interpreted in such opposing ways by individuals who read him closely is just because Blackstone's commentary admits of such readings--because Blackstone says apparently conflicting and seemingly opposed things. But then it would seem that his influence on the Constitution is at least potentially equivocal.
I concur that Blackstone was important to the framers--who blew hot or cold over him because of a certain ambiguity in his work. On the one hand his work does contain a natural law theory of the nature of law--and a theory that has certain resonances with classical natural law theory at that. Hamilton read him this way. And Forrest McDonald persuasively argues that Hamilton got him right (in what I think is clearly the most important biography on Hamilton). James Wilson, on the other hand, was quite opposed to Blackstone on account of what he took to be Blackstone's absolutist theory of Parliamentary sovereignty. From Wilson's vantage, Blackstone's account of the authority of Parliament echoes more the (political) absolutist traditions of Bodin and Hobbes (Hamilton, prior to the Revolution, had invoked Blackstone against Hobbes and the American Loyalist Samuel Seabury). Needless to say, I think the reason that Blackstone is interpreted in such opposing ways by individuals who read him closely is just because Blackstone's commentary admits of such readings--because Blackstone says apparently conflicting and seemingly opposed things. But then it would seem that his influence on the Constitution is at least potentially equivocal.
11.17.2010 | 8:21am
J de la Cruz says:
@ Joe Carter
Greatly appreciate your recommendations! A lot of food for thought that will keep the candle burning throughout the Advent season.
Greatly appreciate your recommendations! A lot of food for thought that will keep the candle burning throughout the Advent season.
11.17.2010 | 8:53am
MacGabhann says:
@Andrew Lyttle
…there is a supernatural realm--and indeed there is, however minimal it might be, since nature cannot explain the reality of its own existence, as Dr Hart pointed out (and you failed to grasp) …
Or may it not be that nature is quite capable of explaining “the reality of its own existence” but that you are not capable of understanding the explanation? Or are you so sure of your own transcendent comprehension of nature that you just know that it is incapable of explaining “the reality of its own existence” to your satisfaction? And is your transcendent comprehension a thing of nature, as natural as your need for an explanation that will satisfy your natural desire for satisfaction? Perhaps Nature is just toying with you, Mr. Lyttle? Perhaps it has driven you to become a Lyttle unnatural?
…there is a supernatural realm--and indeed there is, however minimal it might be, since nature cannot explain the reality of its own existence, as Dr Hart pointed out (and you failed to grasp) …
Or may it not be that nature is quite capable of explaining “the reality of its own existence” but that you are not capable of understanding the explanation? Or are you so sure of your own transcendent comprehension of nature that you just know that it is incapable of explaining “the reality of its own existence” to your satisfaction? And is your transcendent comprehension a thing of nature, as natural as your need for an explanation that will satisfy your natural desire for satisfaction? Perhaps Nature is just toying with you, Mr. Lyttle? Perhaps it has driven you to become a Lyttle unnatural?
11.17.2010 | 8:54am
Ray Ingles says:
Paul - "Ray Ingles like to define "religion" in rather idiosyncratic terms. He certainly does NOT define religion in the way in which religious believers characterize their own belief."
Um, hold up a sec. *Joe's* is objecting to other characterizations of religion and proposing Clouser's definition instead... which has the effect of including everyone in the 'religious' category.
I'm proposing a different definition which I argue more correctly 'carves nature at the joints'. It is useful, precise, and yet matches the common usage of the term (as I noted with respect to Confucianism and Buddhism).
"But I'm sure he'd object if we characterized his way of thinking in terms he does not accept. Which leads to this question: Why the double standard Ray?"
Well, I *am* objecting precisely because I think Joe's characterizing my way of thinking in terms I do not accept. Since Joe's doing the same thing, though, I don't see where there's a double standard.
Note, however - if he's right, then ipso facto, I too am a religious believer. But then it would follow that *Joe* is the one who is not "defin[ing] religion in the way in which religious believers characterize their own belief", since he's not defining religion in the way I - putatively a religious believer - characterize my own belief.
Talk about a double standard. :)
Um, hold up a sec. *Joe's* is objecting to other characterizations of religion and proposing Clouser's definition instead... which has the effect of including everyone in the 'religious' category.
I'm proposing a different definition which I argue more correctly 'carves nature at the joints'. It is useful, precise, and yet matches the common usage of the term (as I noted with respect to Confucianism and Buddhism).
"But I'm sure he'd object if we characterized his way of thinking in terms he does not accept. Which leads to this question: Why the double standard Ray?"
Well, I *am* objecting precisely because I think Joe's characterizing my way of thinking in terms I do not accept. Since Joe's doing the same thing, though, I don't see where there's a double standard.
Note, however - if he's right, then ipso facto, I too am a religious believer. But then it would follow that *Joe* is the one who is not "defin[ing] religion in the way in which religious believers characterize their own belief", since he's not defining religion in the way I - putatively a religious believer - characterize my own belief.
Talk about a double standard. :)
11.17.2010 | 9:05am
Ray Ingles says:
Andrew Lyttle - "Gosh, that does seem to be your definition of the supernatural, and you're sticking with it."
Well, yeah. It seems to cover the ground pretty well.
"It's completely nonsensical, of course, because if there is a supernatural realm--and indeed there is, however minimal it might be, since nature cannot explain the reality of its own existence, as Dr Hart pointed out (and you failed to grasp) a while ago..."
(A perhaps biased recounting of this: http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2010/10/hellipof-hills-brooks-standing-lakes-and-groveshellip/david-b-hart )
"...then there are any number of possible ways of knowing something about it: inductive reasoning, deductive logic, mystical experience, historical revelation, etc."
"Knowing something about it" is not the same thing as "fully comprehending it". One could in theory know everything about an electron, say. Indeed, so far as we can tell we've got electrons fairly well nailed down. There's no inherent assumption that if we find something unusual about electrons later on, we can't hope to figure out and account for such new behavior in new conditions.
The supernatural isn't like that. Different terms are often used - "Mystery", "Ineffable", "Transcendent", etc. - but it boils down to "humans will *never* completely understand this."
Think about the difference between the notion of the 'powerful alien' (a staple of science fiction) and the notion of a 'god' in a religion. What's the essential difference between them? In the stories, they both do amazing, astonishing things. But a powerful alien is (ultimately, eventually) comprehensible - often in the story humans are able to figure out some way of duplicating its powers, or interfering with them, etc. Gods, though, are beyond what humans can do, and there's no point in trying to figure out why or how they do what they do.
Well, yeah. It seems to cover the ground pretty well.
"It's completely nonsensical, of course, because if there is a supernatural realm--and indeed there is, however minimal it might be, since nature cannot explain the reality of its own existence, as Dr Hart pointed out (and you failed to grasp) a while ago..."
(A perhaps biased recounting of this: http://www.firstthings.com/onthesquare/2010/10/hellipof-hills-brooks-standing-lakes-and-groveshellip/david-b-hart )
"...then there are any number of possible ways of knowing something about it: inductive reasoning, deductive logic, mystical experience, historical revelation, etc."
"Knowing something about it" is not the same thing as "fully comprehending it". One could in theory know everything about an electron, say. Indeed, so far as we can tell we've got electrons fairly well nailed down. There's no inherent assumption that if we find something unusual about electrons later on, we can't hope to figure out and account for such new behavior in new conditions.
The supernatural isn't like that. Different terms are often used - "Mystery", "Ineffable", "Transcendent", etc. - but it boils down to "humans will *never* completely understand this."
Think about the difference between the notion of the 'powerful alien' (a staple of science fiction) and the notion of a 'god' in a religion. What's the essential difference between them? In the stories, they both do amazing, astonishing things. But a powerful alien is (ultimately, eventually) comprehensible - often in the story humans are able to figure out some way of duplicating its powers, or interfering with them, etc. Gods, though, are beyond what humans can do, and there's no point in trying to figure out why or how they do what they do.
11.17.2010 | 9:23am
Michael says:
I like Carter’s idea that Christians should not eliminate religion from the conversation, but I think Ray’s revision is more accurate in counting as real everyday experience, science, and worldview. Some worldviews are religious, and some are not.
Ray’s revision seems noncontroversial to me, so I’m puzzled by Paul’s and Andrew’s responses. What exactly is “idiosyncratic” about Ray’s definition? It seems clear to me that Christianity includes a belief in the supernatural.
Furthermore, Ray’s revision clears away Carter’s insulting and dismissive attitude toward folks like Smith. Carter says, “The only proper response to such foolishness is to deride their palpable and wholly self-imposed vincible ignorance.”
A better response is to point out to the Smiths of the world that when they want to exclude religion from the discussion, they are expressing the values of their own worldview. When the Smiths of the world exclude religion, they are being inconsistent.
Ray’s revision seems noncontroversial to me, so I’m puzzled by Paul’s and Andrew’s responses. What exactly is “idiosyncratic” about Ray’s definition? It seems clear to me that Christianity includes a belief in the supernatural.
Furthermore, Ray’s revision clears away Carter’s insulting and dismissive attitude toward folks like Smith. Carter says, “The only proper response to such foolishness is to deride their palpable and wholly self-imposed vincible ignorance.”
A better response is to point out to the Smiths of the world that when they want to exclude religion from the discussion, they are expressing the values of their own worldview. When the Smiths of the world exclude religion, they are being inconsistent.
11.17.2010 | 9:43am
Albert says:
Mr. Carter, it is ironic that Scalia's review of Law's Quandary shows that Steven Smith is the one who understands the necessity of a religious grounding of the theory and practice of law while Scalia defends a legal realism relying solely on democratic interpretation legitimated by popular sovereignty apart from unnecessary religious belief.
It would have been far more interesting for Mr. Carter to challenge Justice Scalia's understanding, which relies on a false distinction between the legitimization entailed by "the divine right of kings" and the legitimization entailed by "popular sovereignty" where that of "popular sovereignty" supposedly does not suffer from the law's quandary while legal regimes like that of common law based on the divine right of kings do suffer from the quandary.
No, in fact, both suffer from the law's quandary since both "the divine right of kings" and "popular sovereignty" legitimate law only to the extent that a priori religious beliefs (concerning the will of the people or the will of a monarch) entail the legitimization. In other words and as Roy Clouser might put it, the theory that "law is legitimated by the will of the people" is or is derived from some religious belief exactly as is the theory that "law is legitimated by the will of the king." This is something Scalia apparently does not acknowledge and does not even argue, but which is the source of his self-admitted incomprehension concerning Smith's thesis.
It would have been far more interesting for Mr. Carter to challenge Justice Scalia's understanding, which relies on a false distinction between the legitimization entailed by "the divine right of kings" and the legitimization entailed by "popular sovereignty" where that of "popular sovereignty" supposedly does not suffer from the law's quandary while legal regimes like that of common law based on the divine right of kings do suffer from the quandary.
No, in fact, both suffer from the law's quandary since both "the divine right of kings" and "popular sovereignty" legitimate law only to the extent that a priori religious beliefs (concerning the will of the people or the will of a monarch) entail the legitimization. In other words and as Roy Clouser might put it, the theory that "law is legitimated by the will of the people" is or is derived from some religious belief exactly as is the theory that "law is legitimated by the will of the king." This is something Scalia apparently does not acknowledge and does not even argue, but which is the source of his self-admitted incomprehension concerning Smith's thesis.
11.17.2010 | 10:00am
Albert says:
Michael, unfortunately Mr. Carter's piece has unintentionally perpetuated a false picture of Steven Smith's work and understanding of the law. It is in fact the opposite of the "religion must be excluded position."
If you read Scalia's review, Smith posited the anti-religious academic position in order to show its futility (!) in the face of "law's quandary." It is actually Scalia--as a good modern liberal of the classical/conservative variant--who is defending the superfluousness of religion with respect to modern law because law apparently can rest on popular sovereignty and common sense language apart from the theological underpinnings of both!
If you read Scalia's review, Smith posited the anti-religious academic position in order to show its futility (!) in the face of "law's quandary." It is actually Scalia--as a good modern liberal of the classical/conservative variant--who is defending the superfluousness of religion with respect to modern law because law apparently can rest on popular sovereignty and common sense language apart from the theological underpinnings of both!
11.17.2010 | 10:40am
Axel says:
As for not splitting infinitives (which has nothing to do with Latin, because you couldn't split a Latin infinitive even if you wanted to), the notion does not come from some so-called authoritarian rule. It is aesthetic. Ninety-nine percent of split infinitives happen because people are lazy or unimaginative about the placement of an adverb. The tendency is always to stick it up right next to the verb, even if "bravely to go" is much more forceful than "to bravely go", for instance.
As for theistic explanations... they leave nostalgic pagans like me somewhat wistful.
As for theistic explanations... they leave nostalgic pagans like me somewhat wistful.
11.17.2010 | 10:55am
Joe Carter says:
@Axel ***s for not splitting infinitives (which has nothing to do with Latin, because you couldn't split a Latin infinitive even if you wanted to), ***
It was precisely because you can't split infinitives in Latin that the dead-language loving grammarians imposed the bogus rule. Since Latin was considered the superior language, the Latin lovers claimed that we should be bound by that languages conventions on infinitives.
It was precisely because you can't split infinitives in Latin that the dead-language loving grammarians imposed the bogus rule. Since Latin was considered the superior language, the Latin lovers claimed that we should be bound by that languages conventions on infinitives.
11.17.2010 | 11:12am
A Lyttle says:
@Joe,
Actually, the 16th century preference against splitting infinitives had more to do with a general reverence for French rather than Latin.
That said, the splitting of infinitives was generally regarded as wrong (at least, in practice) well before that period, and there was always--from the time of Gower and Chaucer--a clear sense that one ought not to sever the "to" from the verb proper. Until very recently, it apparently always struck the ear wrong.
@MacGhabann,
You seem to miss the point. That nature cannot explain its own existence is a necessary conclusion of reason, not a supposition based on a limited knowledge of what nature is. By definition, nature is the totality of contingent things, and cannot possibly be convertible with its own existence, unless you simply want to dissolve the whole idea of the natural into a sort of Spinozan metaphysics (which is incoherent in any event). And since there is that which goes beyond nature, then there may very well be--and almost certainly are--ways of gaining some limited knowledge of it (though certainly not an exhaustive comprehension). Thus Mr Ingles' definition of nature is defective.
Actually, the 16th century preference against splitting infinitives had more to do with a general reverence for French rather than Latin.
That said, the splitting of infinitives was generally regarded as wrong (at least, in practice) well before that period, and there was always--from the time of Gower and Chaucer--a clear sense that one ought not to sever the "to" from the verb proper. Until very recently, it apparently always struck the ear wrong.
@MacGhabann,
You seem to miss the point. That nature cannot explain its own existence is a necessary conclusion of reason, not a supposition based on a limited knowledge of what nature is. By definition, nature is the totality of contingent things, and cannot possibly be convertible with its own existence, unless you simply want to dissolve the whole idea of the natural into a sort of Spinozan metaphysics (which is incoherent in any event). And since there is that which goes beyond nature, then there may very well be--and almost certainly are--ways of gaining some limited knowledge of it (though certainly not an exhaustive comprehension). Thus Mr Ingles' definition of nature is defective.
11.17.2010 | 11:35am
Joe Carter: “You can believe your fairy stores about Jehovah and Jesus,” they smirk, “but they are inadmissible in academic explanations.”
The only proper response to such foolishness is to deride their palpable and wholly self-imposed vincible ignorance.
While I tend to agree with you about the "proper" response, one has to realize that they'll be in for a lot of condemnation from both Christians and non-Christians for expressing derision of foolishness.
The only proper response to such foolishness is to deride their palpable and wholly self-imposed vincible ignorance.
While I tend to agree with you about the "proper" response, one has to realize that they'll be in for a lot of condemnation from both Christians and non-Christians for expressing derision of foolishness.
11.17.2010 | 11:46am
Ray Ingles says:
(My previous reponse seems to have been lost. Let's try again.)
Andrew Lyttle - "Gosh, that does seem to be your definition of the supernatural, and you're sticking with it."
Well, yeah. It seems to cover the ground pretty well.
"It's completely nonsensical, of course, because if there is a supernatural realm--and indeed there is, however minimal it might be, since nature cannot explain the reality of its own existence, as Dr Hart pointed out (and you failed to grasp) a while ago..."
That recap might be perhaps a *tad* biased. :) (I tried to link to that discussion, but perhaps that was what caused the post to be rejected...)
"...then there are any number of possible ways of knowing something about it: inductive reasoning, deductive logic, mystical experience, historical revelation, etc."
But 'knowing something about it' is different from 'comprehensively understanding it'. Take electrons, for example. We think we've got them pretty well nailed down, and even if we found some new behavior on their part we wouldn't assume there was no hope of ever fully accounting for it.
The supernatural, on the other hand, isn't like that. Various terms are used - "ineffable", "mystery", "transcendent", "surpasseth understanding" - but the key trait is 'humans will never fully understand this, ever'. I mean, are you saying that God *doesn't* work in mysterious ways?
Think about the difference between the notion of the 'powerful alien' (a staple of science fiction) and the notion of a 'god' in a religion. What's the essential difference between them? In the stories, they both do amazing, astonishing things. But a powerful alien is (ultimately, eventually) comprehensible - often in the story humans are able to figure out some way of duplicating its powers, or interfering with them, etc. Gods, though, are beyond what humans can do, and there's no point in trying to figure out how (or even why) they do what they do.
Andrew Lyttle - "Gosh, that does seem to be your definition of the supernatural, and you're sticking with it."
Well, yeah. It seems to cover the ground pretty well.
"It's completely nonsensical, of course, because if there is a supernatural realm--and indeed there is, however minimal it might be, since nature cannot explain the reality of its own existence, as Dr Hart pointed out (and you failed to grasp) a while ago..."
That recap might be perhaps a *tad* biased. :) (I tried to link to that discussion, but perhaps that was what caused the post to be rejected...)
"...then there are any number of possible ways of knowing something about it: inductive reasoning, deductive logic, mystical experience, historical revelation, etc."
But 'knowing something about it' is different from 'comprehensively understanding it'. Take electrons, for example. We think we've got them pretty well nailed down, and even if we found some new behavior on their part we wouldn't assume there was no hope of ever fully accounting for it.
The supernatural, on the other hand, isn't like that. Various terms are used - "ineffable", "mystery", "transcendent", "surpasseth understanding" - but the key trait is 'humans will never fully understand this, ever'. I mean, are you saying that God *doesn't* work in mysterious ways?
Think about the difference between the notion of the 'powerful alien' (a staple of science fiction) and the notion of a 'god' in a religion. What's the essential difference between them? In the stories, they both do amazing, astonishing things. But a powerful alien is (ultimately, eventually) comprehensible - often in the story humans are able to figure out some way of duplicating its powers, or interfering with them, etc. Gods, though, are beyond what humans can do, and there's no point in trying to figure out how (or even why) they do what they do.
11.17.2010 | 12:06pm
Ray Ingles says:
A Lyttle - "By definition, nature is the totality of contingent things..."
This does seem to be the discussion for disputation over definitions. I rather contend - as I have above - that 'nature' is the totality of *comprehensible* things.
This does seem to be the discussion for disputation over definitions. I rather contend - as I have above - that 'nature' is the totality of *comprehensible* things.
11.17.2010 | 12:32pm
Ray Ingles says:
Joe - '“You can believe your fairy stores about Jehovah and Jesus,” they smirk, “but they are inadmissible in academic explanations.”'
Sorry, can't resist any longer. :)
http://www.sciencecartoonsplus.com/pages/gallery.php
"I think you need to be more explicit in step two."
Sorry, can't resist any longer. :)
http://www.sciencecartoonsplus.com/pages/gallery.php
"I think you need to be more explicit in step two."
11.17.2010 | 1:20pm
Paul says:
Ray Ingles says this: "And what makes a worldview religious? Whether or not it contains a supernatural element. And what does ‘supernatural’ mean? In practice, so far as I can see, it means something ‘unknowable’, something forever removed from human ken."
His definition of religion includes his definition of supernatural. His definition of "supernatural" is idiosyncratic and is not a the definition of "supernatural" subscribed to by most adherents of some form or other of religious belief. For instance, it's not the view of Plantinga or Alston or Calvin or Aquinas or Augustine or of most theists historically or now. The point is this, if his definition of religion includes his definition of the supernatural and if his definition of "supernatural" is idiosyncratic, as I apparently is, then his definition of religion is also idiosyncratic. This is no more than a straightforward application of a rule of inference logicals denominate as transitivity. The idiosyncrasy of Ingles definition of religion, given his definition of supernatural and give transitivity, seems so apparent as to be non-controversial. But as one either gets transitivity or not, I really don't have anything more to say about it.
His definition of religion includes his definition of supernatural. His definition of "supernatural" is idiosyncratic and is not a the definition of "supernatural" subscribed to by most adherents of some form or other of religious belief. For instance, it's not the view of Plantinga or Alston or Calvin or Aquinas or Augustine or of most theists historically or now. The point is this, if his definition of religion includes his definition of the supernatural and if his definition of "supernatural" is idiosyncratic, as I apparently is, then his definition of religion is also idiosyncratic. This is no more than a straightforward application of a rule of inference logicals denominate as transitivity. The idiosyncrasy of Ingles definition of religion, given his definition of supernatural and give transitivity, seems so apparent as to be non-controversial. But as one either gets transitivity or not, I really don't have anything more to say about it.
11.17.2010 | 2:41pm
MacGabhann says:
@Andrew Lyttle
--- And since there is that which goes beyond nature, then there may very well be--and almost certainly are--ways of gaining some limited knowledge of it—
Is the knowledge you have of the supernatural (“that which goes beyond nature”) a natural knowledge? You know, one derived solely from and within this world of “contingent things?” If yes, then what is so supernatural about the content of that natural knowledge? Put otherwise, if our natural knowledge can comprehend what is supernatural, then in what sense is that which is comprehended go beyond nature?
--- And since there is that which goes beyond nature, then there may very well be--and almost certainly are--ways of gaining some limited knowledge of it—
Is the knowledge you have of the supernatural (“that which goes beyond nature”) a natural knowledge? You know, one derived solely from and within this world of “contingent things?” If yes, then what is so supernatural about the content of that natural knowledge? Put otherwise, if our natural knowledge can comprehend what is supernatural, then in what sense is that which is comprehended go beyond nature?
11.17.2010 | 3:52pm
Timothius says:
Joe,
This paragraph of yours captures your main point well enough: "Scalia notes that Smith excludes the last from consideration because of the “norm prescribing that religious beliefs are inadmissible in academic explanations.” The view he describes has become the conventional wisdom despite being utter nonsense. The sort of nonsense up with which I will not put. And up with which you should not put either."
In the general sense, I agree with your point. But, it is this same "general-ness" that has me wondering what it is you are referring to specifically. I'm wondering what specific "academic explanation" you have posited yourself, or have read, where religious belief is, or has been, regarded as inadmissible.
This also gets me thinking about the nature of a religiously based argument. Is it that we get scoffed at, when we say, "I prayed about it, and I believe God led me to chose thus?" If not this, is it when we build a religiously based rational argument, based on what history has shown us?
I'm pointing out how very quickly the nature of what you are saying takes on a completely different tenor and feel, once you apply it to a specific encounter. Your point is true, but it's also quite removed from what you actually encounter when arguing a particular perspective.
This paragraph of yours captures your main point well enough: "Scalia notes that Smith excludes the last from consideration because of the “norm prescribing that religious beliefs are inadmissible in academic explanations.” The view he describes has become the conventional wisdom despite being utter nonsense. The sort of nonsense up with which I will not put. And up with which you should not put either."
In the general sense, I agree with your point. But, it is this same "general-ness" that has me wondering what it is you are referring to specifically. I'm wondering what specific "academic explanation" you have posited yourself, or have read, where religious belief is, or has been, regarded as inadmissible.
This also gets me thinking about the nature of a religiously based argument. Is it that we get scoffed at, when we say, "I prayed about it, and I believe God led me to chose thus?" If not this, is it when we build a religiously based rational argument, based on what history has shown us?
I'm pointing out how very quickly the nature of what you are saying takes on a completely different tenor and feel, once you apply it to a specific encounter. Your point is true, but it's also quite removed from what you actually encounter when arguing a particular perspective.
11.17.2010 | 4:39pm
Michael says:
Paul,
Thanks. I now see your objection.
When Ray said, “unknowable” and placed it in quotation marks, I took him to mean unknowable as a synonym for “unprovable” in a scientific, rational sense. I can’t prove to anyone that I have experienced God the same way that I can prove a mathematical theorem or the existence of gravity. You either get God, or you don’t.
As I reread Ray’s posts, I’m not sure if I understand him rightly. If Ray doesn’t believe in God, there’s no way of proving God’s existence to him. I can only point out inconsistencies in his reasoning if any exist. Similarly, since I believe in God, an atheist can only point out inconsistencies in my reasoning if any exist. If neither of us is being inconsistent, we can only shrug and move on.
---
Thanks for the clarification, Albert. I haven’t read Scalia’s or Smith’s pieces. It sounds like I need to check them out myself.
---
I’m so glad you said this, Timothius. I find Carter’s generalities unhelpful in just the way you describe. But he’s not alone. Many if not most of the writers of these On the Square pieces paint with big brushes and rarely provide concrete examples. Elizabeth Scalia is the worst offender.
Thanks. I now see your objection.
When Ray said, “unknowable” and placed it in quotation marks, I took him to mean unknowable as a synonym for “unprovable” in a scientific, rational sense. I can’t prove to anyone that I have experienced God the same way that I can prove a mathematical theorem or the existence of gravity. You either get God, or you don’t.
As I reread Ray’s posts, I’m not sure if I understand him rightly. If Ray doesn’t believe in God, there’s no way of proving God’s existence to him. I can only point out inconsistencies in his reasoning if any exist. Similarly, since I believe in God, an atheist can only point out inconsistencies in my reasoning if any exist. If neither of us is being inconsistent, we can only shrug and move on.
---
Thanks for the clarification, Albert. I haven’t read Scalia’s or Smith’s pieces. It sounds like I need to check them out myself.
---
I’m so glad you said this, Timothius. I find Carter’s generalities unhelpful in just the way you describe. But he’s not alone. Many if not most of the writers of these On the Square pieces paint with big brushes and rarely provide concrete examples. Elizabeth Scalia is the worst offender.
11.17.2010 | 6:39pm
Timothius says:
Joe,
I think I asked a similar question of you in your debate series with Barret Brown. (My question above, at 3:52PM)
About the same time of the Barret Brown debate, I read the news story of the Christian family in Britain, denied a foster child, because of their views on homosexuality. Did yo catch this? (I think it was you how posted it at FT.)
This got me thinking about what I think is at the core of what you are dancing around here, and in the Brown debate. It's the idea of who's definition of what is "normal, good, and estimable," are we going to use?
The state restricts and funnels. That's what it is for, so we should use it sparingly. But underneath the funnel, are these definitions. I think your point of today applies to "who is invited to the "The States" table to debate and establish these definitions."
I find discussing child-rearing with people to be very insightful. What are the things we try to convey to our young? People that don't even have kids, still have big opinions here. It is not uncommon for secular folk to feel that Christians actually damage the minds of their children. "Let the children decide for themselves," they tell me. Of course they really have no idea what goes on in a Christian home. The fact that they feel we "do damage" implies that they know better. It means that they know of "no damage," or less damage. This is where their "helpful advice" usually ends. They usually cannot take me much further.
"Find the things you enjoy doing," they tell me. Very well, I will continue to pursue the riches of Christ Jesus.
I'm not very developed in my study of this, but I'm certain that there is a very powerful cultural ethic influencing the average American and/or Westerner. The "average person" does not talk about such things, much at all, but they still seem to "just know." "The Children's Book of Virtues," would fall into this. That "good stuff," that "everybody" just knows to be true. Common goodness.
What's curious to me is that this ethic is not all that different in many ways from what Christians believe to be "good" and "worthy of pursuit." However, we do depart at certain points.
Joe, I sure love your work at First Things. I know I'm more rambling than presenting a good argument. Who knows, maybe someday I will be pleasantly surprised to learn that I sparked your next essay.
I think I asked a similar question of you in your debate series with Barret Brown. (My question above, at 3:52PM)
About the same time of the Barret Brown debate, I read the news story of the Christian family in Britain, denied a foster child, because of their views on homosexuality. Did yo catch this? (I think it was you how posted it at FT.)
This got me thinking about what I think is at the core of what you are dancing around here, and in the Brown debate. It's the idea of who's definition of what is "normal, good, and estimable," are we going to use?
The state restricts and funnels. That's what it is for, so we should use it sparingly. But underneath the funnel, are these definitions. I think your point of today applies to "who is invited to the "The States" table to debate and establish these definitions."
I find discussing child-rearing with people to be very insightful. What are the things we try to convey to our young? People that don't even have kids, still have big opinions here. It is not uncommon for secular folk to feel that Christians actually damage the minds of their children. "Let the children decide for themselves," they tell me. Of course they really have no idea what goes on in a Christian home. The fact that they feel we "do damage" implies that they know better. It means that they know of "no damage," or less damage. This is where their "helpful advice" usually ends. They usually cannot take me much further.
"Find the things you enjoy doing," they tell me. Very well, I will continue to pursue the riches of Christ Jesus.
I'm not very developed in my study of this, but I'm certain that there is a very powerful cultural ethic influencing the average American and/or Westerner. The "average person" does not talk about such things, much at all, but they still seem to "just know." "The Children's Book of Virtues," would fall into this. That "good stuff," that "everybody" just knows to be true. Common goodness.
What's curious to me is that this ethic is not all that different in many ways from what Christians believe to be "good" and "worthy of pursuit." However, we do depart at certain points.
Joe, I sure love your work at First Things. I know I'm more rambling than presenting a good argument. Who knows, maybe someday I will be pleasantly surprised to learn that I sparked your next essay.
11.17.2010 | 7:01pm
Paul DeHart says:
Amended version of the post above (corrected for typos):
Ray Ingles says this: "And what makes a worldview religious? Whether or not it contains a supernatural element. And what does ‘supernatural’ mean? In practice, so far as I can see, it means something ‘unknowable’, something forever removed from human ken."
His definition of religion includes his definition of supernatural. His definition of "supernatural" is idiosyncratic and is not a definition of "supernatural" to which most adherents of religious belief subscribe. For instance, it's not the view of Plantinga or Alston or Calvin or Aquinas or Augustine or of most theists historically or now. The point is this, if his definition of religion includes his definition of the supernatural and if his definition of "supernatural" is idiosyncratic, as it apparently is, then his definition of religion is also idiosyncratic. This is no more than a straightforward application of a rule of inference logicians denominate as transitivity. The idiosyncrasy of Ingles definition of religion, given his definition of supernatural and give transitivity, seems so apparent as to be non-controversial. But as one either gets transitivity or not, I really don't have anything more to say about it.
Ray Ingles says this: "And what makes a worldview religious? Whether or not it contains a supernatural element. And what does ‘supernatural’ mean? In practice, so far as I can see, it means something ‘unknowable’, something forever removed from human ken."
His definition of religion includes his definition of supernatural. His definition of "supernatural" is idiosyncratic and is not a definition of "supernatural" to which most adherents of religious belief subscribe. For instance, it's not the view of Plantinga or Alston or Calvin or Aquinas or Augustine or of most theists historically or now. The point is this, if his definition of religion includes his definition of the supernatural and if his definition of "supernatural" is idiosyncratic, as it apparently is, then his definition of religion is also idiosyncratic. This is no more than a straightforward application of a rule of inference logicians denominate as transitivity. The idiosyncrasy of Ingles definition of religion, given his definition of supernatural and give transitivity, seems so apparent as to be non-controversial. But as one either gets transitivity or not, I really don't have anything more to say about it.
11.17.2010 | 7:44pm
Ray Ingles says:
Michael - 'When Ray said, “unknowable” and placed it in quotation marks, I took him to mean unknowable as a synonym for “unprovable” in a scientific, rational sense. I can’t prove to anyone that I have experienced God the same way that I can prove a mathematical theorem or the existence of gravity. You either get God, or you don’t.'
Nah, I'm okay with that. The concept of a being outside our universe communicating with us telepathically isn't an immediately contradictory concept. Hasn't talked to me yet, at least in any recognizable way, though. Nothing about that is necessarily incomprehensible. Like I said, "powerful alien" vs. "god".
But I genuinely believe that in essence 'supernatural' boils down to 'unknowable'. Consider a Neanderthal exposed to modern technology - it would appear quite magical and inexplicable. However, she could, given sufficient instruction, learn how it worked. A stage magician could do the kind of things that are reported for, say demonic possession. But demons are supposed to do what they do in a way that humans can't get at, while magicians are graspable.
A more detailed explication here: http://ingles.homeunix.net/rants/atheism/unknowable.html
Nah, I'm okay with that. The concept of a being outside our universe communicating with us telepathically isn't an immediately contradictory concept. Hasn't talked to me yet, at least in any recognizable way, though. Nothing about that is necessarily incomprehensible. Like I said, "powerful alien" vs. "god".
But I genuinely believe that in essence 'supernatural' boils down to 'unknowable'. Consider a Neanderthal exposed to modern technology - it would appear quite magical and inexplicable. However, she could, given sufficient instruction, learn how it worked. A stage magician could do the kind of things that are reported for, say demonic possession. But demons are supposed to do what they do in a way that humans can't get at, while magicians are graspable.
A more detailed explication here: http://ingles.homeunix.net/rants/atheism/unknowable.html
11.18.2010 | 4:34am
Ray Ingles says:
Patrick - "Is death then also an supernatural concept?"
Hardly. We seem to have a pretty good handle on it. When someone dies, the elaborate arrangements and processes in the brain decohere, fall apart, and are lost.
Now, life after death? That *can* be a supernatural concept, depending on how it's defined. If it's totally hidden from living people by definition, then sure, it's supernatural. But things like NDEs can be looked at... http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/09/080910090829.htm
Hardly. We seem to have a pretty good handle on it. When someone dies, the elaborate arrangements and processes in the brain decohere, fall apart, and are lost.
Now, life after death? That *can* be a supernatural concept, depending on how it's defined. If it's totally hidden from living people by definition, then sure, it's supernatural. But things like NDEs can be looked at... http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/09/080910090829.htm
11.18.2010 | 8:35am
Mark says:
"Would they attempt to apply this ridiculous standard in dismissing the explanations of Augustine, Aquinas, Sir William Blackstone, T.S. Eliot, Isaac Newton, Johann Kepler, or Alvin Plantinga?"
As for Newton, he is revered in the scientific community because he helped invent the field of calculus (along with Leibniz) and mathematical reasoning to show that if gravitational force was defined by the equation F = G*m1*m2 / r^2 then point masses moving with a certain velocity will enter into elliptical orbits as described by Kepler's laws.
That's an extraordinary intellectual achievement and the whole point of it is that it renders supernatural explanations superfluous. Gravity is still something of a mystery for scientists but it adds nothing of value to say that gravity has its origins in the divine. Your list noticeably leaves out Laplace who was one of the greatest scientific minds before Einstein but he is said to have remarked "I am not in need of that hypothesis" to Napoleon when asked why his scientific writings left out any mention of God.
When Newton did delve into the supernatural, the results were frequently ridiculous. Newton had a fascination with alchemy, thought that God intervened occasionally to nudge planets and moons in their orbits (there are better explanations for these anomalies today) and held extremely bizarre beliefs about the properties of menstrual blood.
As for Newton, he is revered in the scientific community because he helped invent the field of calculus (along with Leibniz) and mathematical reasoning to show that if gravitational force was defined by the equation F = G*m1*m2 / r^2 then point masses moving with a certain velocity will enter into elliptical orbits as described by Kepler's laws.
That's an extraordinary intellectual achievement and the whole point of it is that it renders supernatural explanations superfluous. Gravity is still something of a mystery for scientists but it adds nothing of value to say that gravity has its origins in the divine. Your list noticeably leaves out Laplace who was one of the greatest scientific minds before Einstein but he is said to have remarked "I am not in need of that hypothesis" to Napoleon when asked why his scientific writings left out any mention of God.
When Newton did delve into the supernatural, the results were frequently ridiculous. Newton had a fascination with alchemy, thought that God intervened occasionally to nudge planets and moons in their orbits (there are better explanations for these anomalies today) and held extremely bizarre beliefs about the properties of menstrual blood.
11.18.2010 | 10:52am
Jason says:
“You can believe your fairy stores about Jehovah and Jesus,” they smirk, “but they are inadmissible in academic explanations.”
I don't really see the problem with this perspective. It's not as though this idea simply sprang out of thin air; it was born from the fact that no religious/supernatural explanation has ever been a sufficient answer to an academic question. Sure, it was good enough to satisfy ancient minds, but today we see that suggesting a supernatural or religious explanation is equivalent to saying "I don't know".
Honestly, what possible mystery exists for which "God did it" explains anything at all? I'm sure many would say that god is a good explanation for the existence of...well, existence...but what does that really explain? We still are left with no idea how the universe came to be, but we are introduced to the new question of how & why god exists (a question for which the devout are all too willing to accept "because he has to in order to explain the existence of the universe" as an answer, which is just asinine).
The bottom line is that no relgious explanation is considered an appropriate explanation in academia because god has never been shown to exist at all, let alone been shown to have been responsible for anything.
I don't really see the problem with this perspective. It's not as though this idea simply sprang out of thin air; it was born from the fact that no religious/supernatural explanation has ever been a sufficient answer to an academic question. Sure, it was good enough to satisfy ancient minds, but today we see that suggesting a supernatural or religious explanation is equivalent to saying "I don't know".
Honestly, what possible mystery exists for which "God did it" explains anything at all? I'm sure many would say that god is a good explanation for the existence of...well, existence...but what does that really explain? We still are left with no idea how the universe came to be, but we are introduced to the new question of how & why god exists (a question for which the devout are all too willing to accept "because he has to in order to explain the existence of the universe" as an answer, which is just asinine).
The bottom line is that no relgious explanation is considered an appropriate explanation in academia because god has never been shown to exist at all, let alone been shown to have been responsible for anything.
11.18.2010 | 11:45am
Paul says:
@ Ray,
But you're either stipulating that the supernatural is unknowable as an analytic truth or you're simply asserting that this is so. You seem to treat it as an analytic truth, though. According to Hume, analytic truths are all tautological and so philosophically trivial. That is, they all involve non-substantive claims. So if you're defining "supernatural" as "unknowable" or holding that this is analytically true in some other way, then you're making a category mistake. For the claim is certainly not tautological. Nor is the the claim "supernatural = unknowable" self-evident or undeniable or incorrigible. It's not a necessary truth. But that leaves your claim as nothing other than an unsubstantiated assertion--in which case, there's no reason why anyone who disagrees with it should pay it any attention.
It certainly would be a mistake to presume that such a grandiose claim as yours was analytical. For Al Plantinga, in Does God Have a Nature? shows how a very similar claim is self-referentially incoherent. Meanwhile, I would have thought skepticism about what is knowable would have cautioned greater humility. The most a skeptic can ever say is that he or she doesn't know whether there is such a person as God or such a thing as the supernatural. They cannot, without collapsing into self-referential incoherency, claim that God or the supernatural does not exist or is certainly unknowable. What is unknown to them doesn't entail anything about what is unknowable as such. Your claim strikes me as the sort of thing the now discredited school of logical positivism used to say--statements about God are meaningless, etc. But there are no serious logical positivists left in philosophy just because the criterion of verifiability is not itself verifiable in the relevant sense--thereby defeating itself. All arguments that are of the logical positivist kind are therefore suspect.
But you're either stipulating that the supernatural is unknowable as an analytic truth or you're simply asserting that this is so. You seem to treat it as an analytic truth, though. According to Hume, analytic truths are all tautological and so philosophically trivial. That is, they all involve non-substantive claims. So if you're defining "supernatural" as "unknowable" or holding that this is analytically true in some other way, then you're making a category mistake. For the claim is certainly not tautological. Nor is the the claim "supernatural = unknowable" self-evident or undeniable or incorrigible. It's not a necessary truth. But that leaves your claim as nothing other than an unsubstantiated assertion--in which case, there's no reason why anyone who disagrees with it should pay it any attention.
It certainly would be a mistake to presume that such a grandiose claim as yours was analytical. For Al Plantinga, in Does God Have a Nature? shows how a very similar claim is self-referentially incoherent. Meanwhile, I would have thought skepticism about what is knowable would have cautioned greater humility. The most a skeptic can ever say is that he or she doesn't know whether there is such a person as God or such a thing as the supernatural. They cannot, without collapsing into self-referential incoherency, claim that God or the supernatural does not exist or is certainly unknowable. What is unknown to them doesn't entail anything about what is unknowable as such. Your claim strikes me as the sort of thing the now discredited school of logical positivism used to say--statements about God are meaningless, etc. But there are no serious logical positivists left in philosophy just because the criterion of verifiability is not itself verifiable in the relevant sense--thereby defeating itself. All arguments that are of the logical positivist kind are therefore suspect.
11.18.2010 | 12:55pm
Ray Ingles says:
Paul, if you read the link I gave before ('more detailed explication'), it addresses most of your concerns. Honest. It's not even that long.
For example, I'm not claiming "supernatural=unknowable" as an analytic truth - just that that's what the term always ends up meaning in practice. That's how people use the term.
For another, I don't claim that unknowable things can't exist or that the unknowable is a logically incoherent concept. I simply argue that it's a concept with zero practical utility.
For example, I'm not claiming "supernatural=unknowable" as an analytic truth - just that that's what the term always ends up meaning in practice. That's how people use the term.
For another, I don't claim that unknowable things can't exist or that the unknowable is a logically incoherent concept. I simply argue that it's a concept with zero practical utility.
11.18.2010 | 12:58pm
Paul says:
Given that Mark understands the implications of Newton's discovery very differently from Newton (indeed, in an almost opposite way), whom shall we go with as to the meanings of the discovery? Mark has merely asserted without argument that this is the implications of Newton's discovery. He assumes this is almost self-evident. But it's not evident at all. Moreover, it presumes a reductionistic causal theory that he can hardly blame others (given the lack of argument for his own interpretation of Newton's discovery)--others such as Newton--for rejecting. Moreover, Leibniz most certainly wouldn't have understood the implications of Newton's discovery in this way either. Of course, Newton may have held some supernatural beliefs about the supernatural. Some of us regard as bizarre the a priori rejection of the supernatural that lurks in the careless arguments of folks like Dawkins.
Meanwhile, Jason's last paragraph claims far more than he can ever hope to rationally defend. Needless to say, the most he can claim is that there are no demonstrations of which he is aware or with which he is satisfied. But that does not entail that there are no or can be no successful demonstrations. It just tells us something about Jason--not about the actual state of affairs in which we find ourselves. Meanwhile, one might claim that other minds have never been shown to exist either. Does Jason therefore reject belief in other minds?
Meanwhile, Jason's last paragraph claims far more than he can ever hope to rationally defend. Needless to say, the most he can claim is that there are no demonstrations of which he is aware or with which he is satisfied. But that does not entail that there are no or can be no successful demonstrations. It just tells us something about Jason--not about the actual state of affairs in which we find ourselves. Meanwhile, one might claim that other minds have never been shown to exist either. Does Jason therefore reject belief in other minds?
11.18.2010 | 5:36pm
Paul says:
@ Ray Ingles,
I will try to give your account a link. But let me just reply to the claim that you are describing linguistic practice. On your account people tend to use "supernatural" for "unknowable." If this is the tendency of some people, it is not the tendency of most traditional religious believers. When religious people refer to God as acting in a supernatural way they are referring to a person (or a trinity of persons on Christian belief) that is infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, all good (both metaphysically and morally) and that is incorporeal. "Supernatural" is predicated of the actions of this being and not of the being itself--though the being itself both grounds and transcends the created order. Natural is frequently used in these conversations to denominate the created order, inclusive not just of things in that order but also of relations, events, etc. that obtain within it. The created order is the way God wills the cosmos to go ceteris paribus. But sometimes God wants to act in a special or unique way in that order and in way that some event or thing comes to be without having gone through the natural causal chain. The event or thing is not brought about without a cause--the God who created the universe is the cause. Rather, God has chosen to cause an event or thing to come about in some way other than the usual way that we now denominate by the word natural. Such an understanding, of course, comports with science. For science reaches inductive generalizations about what is the case and so can reach only contingent and never necessary conclusions. And because science is essentially inductive, it can never rule out the possibility of divine intervention. Whether or not God has intervened in some instances--well, we'll have to use other methods than science to figure that out. For science could never rule God in or out since it studies only corporeal things.
I will try to give your account a link. But let me just reply to the claim that you are describing linguistic practice. On your account people tend to use "supernatural" for "unknowable." If this is the tendency of some people, it is not the tendency of most traditional religious believers. When religious people refer to God as acting in a supernatural way they are referring to a person (or a trinity of persons on Christian belief) that is infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, all good (both metaphysically and morally) and that is incorporeal. "Supernatural" is predicated of the actions of this being and not of the being itself--though the being itself both grounds and transcends the created order. Natural is frequently used in these conversations to denominate the created order, inclusive not just of things in that order but also of relations, events, etc. that obtain within it. The created order is the way God wills the cosmos to go ceteris paribus. But sometimes God wants to act in a special or unique way in that order and in way that some event or thing comes to be without having gone through the natural causal chain. The event or thing is not brought about without a cause--the God who created the universe is the cause. Rather, God has chosen to cause an event or thing to come about in some way other than the usual way that we now denominate by the word natural. Such an understanding, of course, comports with science. For science reaches inductive generalizations about what is the case and so can reach only contingent and never necessary conclusions. And because science is essentially inductive, it can never rule out the possibility of divine intervention. Whether or not God has intervened in some instances--well, we'll have to use other methods than science to figure that out. For science could never rule God in or out since it studies only corporeal things.
11.18.2010 | 5:38pm
Mark says:
Paul, if you want to engage in an appeal to authority with respect to Newton (which is precisely what your "argument" is) then you have to confront the fact that he was clearly wrong on many issues where he delved into the supernatural. Alchemy is a prime example.
So how do we go through the writings of great scientific minds and separate the valuable nuggets of insight from the nonsense? Karl Popper had the answer: you give the most respect to those parts that can be falsified (but haven't been yet) and give the least respect to those that cannot be falsified.
Newton was wrong about many things but in those cases where he was right (or at least closer to the truth than any previous attempt), we can confirm it through empirical observation.
If you want to grant deference to Newton's assertions of the supernatural, you are going to need an argument that does not rest on the authority of Newton himself.
So how do we go through the writings of great scientific minds and separate the valuable nuggets of insight from the nonsense? Karl Popper had the answer: you give the most respect to those parts that can be falsified (but haven't been yet) and give the least respect to those that cannot be falsified.
Newton was wrong about many things but in those cases where he was right (or at least closer to the truth than any previous attempt), we can confirm it through empirical observation.
If you want to grant deference to Newton's assertions of the supernatural, you are going to need an argument that does not rest on the authority of Newton himself.
11.18.2010 | 5:48pm
Mark says:
I have to add, Paul, that your assertion, "Mark has merely asserted without argument that this is the implications of Newton's discovery" is clearly wrong.
I said above that it adds nothing of value to say that gravity or gravitational phenomena have their origins in the divine. That may look like an assertion but it is one that I think hardly any practitioner would take issue with. If you disagree, all you have to do is point me to an insight that has real-world value derived from a belief in the supernatural. Does it help NASA engineers develop better rockets or lead to more accurate mathematical models of the solar system?
Moreover, as I pointed out above, Newton's divine explanations of anomalies observed in the orbits of the planets and moons are also wrong as they have been replaced by general relativity, more accurate measurements, and better mathematical tools.
That strikes me as a pretty good argument against invoking the divine in scientific endeavors (and certainly against the Newtonian God of Gaps). If you disagree, you only have to answer my query above about how theology helps scientists develop better rockets and predict the orbits of asteroids and comets better.
I said above that it adds nothing of value to say that gravity or gravitational phenomena have their origins in the divine. That may look like an assertion but it is one that I think hardly any practitioner would take issue with. If you disagree, all you have to do is point me to an insight that has real-world value derived from a belief in the supernatural. Does it help NASA engineers develop better rockets or lead to more accurate mathematical models of the solar system?
Moreover, as I pointed out above, Newton's divine explanations of anomalies observed in the orbits of the planets and moons are also wrong as they have been replaced by general relativity, more accurate measurements, and better mathematical tools.
That strikes me as a pretty good argument against invoking the divine in scientific endeavors (and certainly against the Newtonian God of Gaps). If you disagree, you only have to answer my query above about how theology helps scientists develop better rockets and predict the orbits of asteroids and comets better.
11.18.2010 | 8:18pm
Paul says:
@ Mark,
I think you missed the satirical element of the post. I wasn't using Newton as an appeal to authority so much as endeavoring to show the reductio ad absurdum tendency of your argument. But you certainly did make an assertion without argument. And now you've complicated that by your own appeal to authority--the authority of contemporary practitioners. But like Newton, contemporary practitioners are frequently wrong. And you can't establish truth by consensus. If you'll take a look at Locke's Essays on the Law of Nature you'll find an argument as to what endeavoring to that is circular.
I think you missed the satirical element of the post. I wasn't using Newton as an appeal to authority so much as endeavoring to show the reductio ad absurdum tendency of your argument. But you certainly did make an assertion without argument. And now you've complicated that by your own appeal to authority--the authority of contemporary practitioners. But like Newton, contemporary practitioners are frequently wrong. And you can't establish truth by consensus. If you'll take a look at Locke's Essays on the Law of Nature you'll find an argument as to what endeavoring to that is circular.
11.18.2010 | 8:53pm
Patrick says:
Ray,
I think you dismiss death too easily. Yes, we can observe the physical process of death in other people. However, I can never understand what it means for me to die (subjectively). It is an experience that is, as you say, "totally hidden from living people by definition."
The lack of respect for what Heidegger called the "final horizon of understanding" and the attendant solidarity expressed in "Being-unto-death" , and its replacement by the illusion of perfect and infinite knowledge, is what I find most distasteful in modern science.
I think you dismiss death too easily. Yes, we can observe the physical process of death in other people. However, I can never understand what it means for me to die (subjectively). It is an experience that is, as you say, "totally hidden from living people by definition."
The lack of respect for what Heidegger called the "final horizon of understanding" and the attendant solidarity expressed in "Being-unto-death" , and its replacement by the illusion of perfect and infinite knowledge, is what I find most distasteful in modern science.
11.18.2010 | 9:05pm
Mark says:
"And now you've complicated that by your own appeal to authority--the authority of contemporary practitioners."
I am not appealing to practitioners as authority figures. I am appealing to them as people who actually accomplish useful things in the real world and use scientific theory to do so. Joe Carter's original assertion that people who dismiss the divine in academic discussions are "unserious."
All you need to do is answer my question: what insights can theology provide that will lead to better rockets, better predictions of orbits in space, better medicine, or any of the thousands of things that practitioners working in the real world concern themselves with? A single example will do.
So answer the question and you will have refuted my point. If you cannot answer, then Joe Carter's original point remains unsupported.
I am not appealing to practitioners as authority figures. I am appealing to them as people who actually accomplish useful things in the real world and use scientific theory to do so. Joe Carter's original assertion that people who dismiss the divine in academic discussions are "unserious."
All you need to do is answer my question: what insights can theology provide that will lead to better rockets, better predictions of orbits in space, better medicine, or any of the thousands of things that practitioners working in the real world concern themselves with? A single example will do.
So answer the question and you will have refuted my point. If you cannot answer, then Joe Carter's original point remains unsupported.
11.19.2010 | 10:38am
Ray Ingles says:
Paul - "When religious people refer to God as acting in a supernatural way they are referring to a person (or a trinity of persons on Christian belief) that is infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, all good (both metaphysically and morally) and that is incorporeal."
Sure, different people who believe in the supernatural put the border in different places, but the *truly* supernatural is always removed from human ken. Including in your example. Or are you saying God is, in principle at least, fully comprehensible by humans?
Consider, for example, if this universe were an elaborate computer simulation by some advanced species. The operator could interfere with our causality in a way indistinguishable from what you've described, but would you call that supernatural - or super-science?
Sure, different people who believe in the supernatural put the border in different places, but the *truly* supernatural is always removed from human ken. Including in your example. Or are you saying God is, in principle at least, fully comprehensible by humans?
Consider, for example, if this universe were an elaborate computer simulation by some advanced species. The operator could interfere with our causality in a way indistinguishable from what you've described, but would you call that supernatural - or super-science?
11.19.2010 | 10:39am
Ray Ingles says:
Paul - "When religious people refer to God as acting in a supernatural way they are referring to a person (or a trinity of persons on Christian belief) that is infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, all good (both metaphysically and morally) and that is incorporeal."
Sure, different people who believe in the supernatural put the border in different places, but the *truly* supernatural is always removed from human ken. Including in your example. Or are you saying God is, in principle at least, fully comprehensible by humans?
Consider, for example, if this universe were an elaborate computer simulation by some advanced species. The operator could interfere with our causality in a way indistinguishable from what you've described, but would you call that supernatural - or super-science?
Sure, different people who believe in the supernatural put the border in different places, but the *truly* supernatural is always removed from human ken. Including in your example. Or are you saying God is, in principle at least, fully comprehensible by humans?
Consider, for example, if this universe were an elaborate computer simulation by some advanced species. The operator could interfere with our causality in a way indistinguishable from what you've described, but would you call that supernatural - or super-science?
11.20.2010 | 10:16am
michael Currie says:
Ray, In a 1939 text book "Religion in Essence and manifestation" the author made the comment that in his opinion the only true empiricists were primitive man in that they saw power and responded to it. The world they lived in was teeming with gods. They reconciled themselves to this perception by accommadating to it in their rituals and daily lives. It shaped their world and gave it meaning. They saw the wind moving the trees and said that was the god of the wind etc. What impressed me in this telling was the relationship that developed between man and the world around him.We would explain the wind in different terms, jet streams, steering currents, low and high pressure systems and so on. Most of the Religious people that I know have no problem with the modern worlds take on things which except for the particulars and our perception of them attempt to do what early man did, place himself in the world by trying to understand it according to their talents and inclinations. Sadly this modern placing has tended to create a bifurcation in our world view, one I might add, that is shared by most humans regardless of how they understand the world. There is a loss of the sacredness of existence which has been replaced by a utilitarian, functional atheism which shows itself in its hang up on the particularity of the world, even in its recognition of many of mans grand theories. The unity of the existant seems to imply nothing but itself. For those of us who claim more for the world this unity speaks of a unifying underpinning and from this thought we try to reconcile ourselves to it in our rituals and in our daily lives. It has been said that the last great question is "why is there something instead of nothing", I would add that an equal and perhaps greater question is "why does anything relate at all". Science struggles mightily with these questions, Religion with very different resources does the same but has intuited the answer and at its best has honored it.
11.22.2010 | 6:26am
Ray Ingles says:
Michael Currie - "What impressed me in this telling was the relationship that developed between man and the world around him... There is a loss of the sacredness of existence which has been replaced by a utilitarian, functional atheism which shows itself in its hang up on the particularity of the world, even in its recognition of many of mans grand theories."
Even if you understand something thoroughly, it can still be marvelous, wonderful, and inspiring. A rainbow isn't 'degraded' by having arisen from 'mere' physical processes. Physical processes are *ennobled* by giving rise to such beauty. I don't have less respect for the wind because I have a handle on what causes it. I have *more* respect for the amazing, complex, elaborate system of convection and coriolis forces and sunlight and evaporation and radiation that gives rise to everything from the soothing cool breeze to the awesome tornado.
If you *need* mysteries, it's not like we're in any danger of running out. Both relativity and quantum mechanics work beautifully, and predict things down to many decimal places. Yet they make *different* predictions in many areas we can't test right now, like near black holes. At least one of them and probably both are wrong to some degree. We've learned so much about biology, but we've still a long way to go. It's not like the math journals are going to close up shop tomorrow 'cause there are no more theorems left to prove. Have we figured out the best political arrangements yet?
"Science struggles mightily with these questions, Religion with very different resources does the same but has intuited the answer and at its best has honored it."
Even with 'mere physical' phenomena, human intuition *sucks*. If people can't or won't properly test their hypotheses, they can believe *anything*. Heliocentrism, continental drift, atomic theory, relativity, quantum mechanics - all completely counterintuitive surprises. And those are supposed to be *simpler* things than "the unity of the existent".
Even if you understand something thoroughly, it can still be marvelous, wonderful, and inspiring. A rainbow isn't 'degraded' by having arisen from 'mere' physical processes. Physical processes are *ennobled* by giving rise to such beauty. I don't have less respect for the wind because I have a handle on what causes it. I have *more* respect for the amazing, complex, elaborate system of convection and coriolis forces and sunlight and evaporation and radiation that gives rise to everything from the soothing cool breeze to the awesome tornado.
If you *need* mysteries, it's not like we're in any danger of running out. Both relativity and quantum mechanics work beautifully, and predict things down to many decimal places. Yet they make *different* predictions in many areas we can't test right now, like near black holes. At least one of them and probably both are wrong to some degree. We've learned so much about biology, but we've still a long way to go. It's not like the math journals are going to close up shop tomorrow 'cause there are no more theorems left to prove. Have we figured out the best political arrangements yet?
"Science struggles mightily with these questions, Religion with very different resources does the same but has intuited the answer and at its best has honored it."
Even with 'mere physical' phenomena, human intuition *sucks*. If people can't or won't properly test their hypotheses, they can believe *anything*. Heliocentrism, continental drift, atomic theory, relativity, quantum mechanics - all completely counterintuitive surprises. And those are supposed to be *simpler* things than "the unity of the existent".
11.24.2010 | 4:30pm
Paul says:
@ Ray Ingles,
I think you're conflating two things. The first is a modal conflation. You're conflating (1) knowing that x is the case with (2) knowing how x is the case. You're argument depends either on religious people affirming (2) or (2) being the case. But (2) is not (1). And religious people affirm (1)--all of the arguments in the realm of natural theology really go no further than (1). Second, you're conflating knowing something about God with knowing everything about God. In effect, you're riposte to my reply is that religious people can't mean what they think they mean when they talk about God. Which I think leaves you in the company of the now thoroughly debunked school of logical positivism. But, you may not be aware, the criterion of verifiability doesn't have a leg to stand on. If scientific and logical positivists had only read Hume, they would have known they were shooting themselves in the foot right at the start.
I think you're conflating two things. The first is a modal conflation. You're conflating (1) knowing that x is the case with (2) knowing how x is the case. You're argument depends either on religious people affirming (2) or (2) being the case. But (2) is not (1). And religious people affirm (1)--all of the arguments in the realm of natural theology really go no further than (1). Second, you're conflating knowing something about God with knowing everything about God. In effect, you're riposte to my reply is that religious people can't mean what they think they mean when they talk about God. Which I think leaves you in the company of the now thoroughly debunked school of logical positivism. But, you may not be aware, the criterion of verifiability doesn't have a leg to stand on. If scientific and logical positivists had only read Hume, they would have known they were shooting themselves in the foot right at the start.
11.24.2010 | 4:33pm
Paul says:
I think if Mark reads Nietzsche's The Gay Science and perhaps Beyond Good and Evil he might become aware of the way in which theology has proven useful to science. Or maybe he hasn't realized that science is still a metaphysical faith. Or perhaps Mark is unaware of the deep relation of Scholastic mathematical developments to the so-called Copernican revolution? The problem with the breathless assertions of folks like Mark is that they belie a deep ignorance of the history of science. By the way, when Liebniz was developing calculus--he didn't think of that work as distinct from philosophy or from theology.
