In Defense of Disgust
Dec 15, 2010
Joe Carter
Relating an incident that occurred on an expedition to South America, Charles Darwin wrote:
In Tierra del Fuego a native touched with his fingers some cold preserved meat which I was eating at our bivouac, and plainly showed utter disgust at its softness; whilst I felt utter disgust at my food being touched by a naked savage, though his hands did not appear dirty.
As Darwin discovered, while we may differ about what evokes the response, disgust is one of the few universally shared human emotions. The native was expressing what psychologists call "core disgust." Unlike animals, which instinctively seek out certain foods, humans have to learn what to eat and are justifiably cautious about sampling new foods. Since Darwin’s cold, soft piece of preserved meat had a tactile resemblance to animal feces, the native was understandably disgusted by the thought of eating it. The revulsion was triggered by the idea that "like produces like"; since the preserved meat had many similarities to feces, the native assumed it might be similarly contaminated.
Darwin's unease was also based on a variation of the same core disgust. While his dinner companion worried that an object (the meat) could be contaminated because of its similarity to another object (feces), Darwin feared the contagion could be spread by contact with the native.
Since this incident was published eighteen years before Robert Koch proved the germ theory of disease, it’s unlikely that Darwin understood the connection between dirty hands, microbes, and contamination. More likely he was simply reacting to a pre-rational intuition that belied his scientific understanding.
But where did this emotion come from? Is it possible, then, that the emotion of disgust was a result of natural selection? Can revulsion be classified as an adaptive mechanism that prevents us from coming into contact with contaminants? Not likely, as anyone who has ever come in contact with a human baby can attest.
Infants, as any parent can attest, have no concept of disgust. They will, quite literally, put anything they can get their hands on into their mouths. While most other animals instinctively avoid contact with certain objects, human infants do not possess such scruples. Unable to make a distinction between a piece of food and the dropping the puppy left on the carpet, they will attempt to eat both.
Because we lack an innate sense of what to avoid, the full range of disgust triggers must be taught. Disgust, as an emotion, must be learned. And as with any knowledge that is not inherently in our biological makeup, disgust can be culturally relative and passed on through successive generations.
By this we can conclude that there is such a thing as what bioethicist Leon Kass calls "wisdom of repugnance," at least with regard to core disgusts such as our taste for food. But does disgust have any meaning in a social context?
Before that question can be answered we must first examine the relation between core disgust and a concept that psychologists classify as socio-moral disgust.
In the seminal psychological research paper "Body, Psyche, and Culture: The Relationship Between Disgust and Morality", Jonathan Haidt and his coauthors note that disgusting events remind us of our animal nature. Because we feel the need to hide these markers of our kinship to lower creatures, we develop humanizing rituals and practices.
If you wanted to convince yourself that you were not an animal, your body would confound you in certain domains: you would still eat, excrete, and have sex, and you would still bleed when your outer envelope was breached, or when you menstruated or gave birth. Every culture prescribes the proper human way to handle these biological functions, and people who violate these prescriptions are typically reviled or shunned.
As an example of this animal-reminder view, the researchers point out that the only bodily secretion not generally regarded as disgusting is the only one peculiar to humans: tears. (To prove their point, they provide the following illustration: Imagine that you lend your handkerchief to an acquaintance, who returns it wet with mucous, urine, sweat, saliva, breast milk, semen, or tears. In which case would you be least uncomfortable?)
This animal-reminder view of disgust also highlights a common quality of food, sex, and bodily envelope-violations. In all three domains there are many safe options available to human beings, yet many or most options are taboo.
Almost all animal flesh is edible and nutritious, yet most human societies taboo many of the animal species available to them. All human beings (and some animals) are potential sexual partners, yet most human societies taboo many of the possible pairings of partners (and many of the possible sexual acts). There are dozens of safe modifications of the body envelope, yet most human societies taboo all but a few (e.g., ear-piercing, "nose jobs", body building, and perhaps breast enlargement or reduction for Americans). Americans would consider it monstrous (i.e. inhuman) for a person to engage in unrestricted sex, unrestricted eating of animal flesh, or unrestricted body modification.
But if disgust is a human emotion, how does it become a cultural artifact?
The answer may perhaps be found in a controversial but growing view of human cognition: that it is embodied, and that it may involve metaphors and pattern-matching more than propositions and reasoning. Margolis (1987) argues that language and propositional reasoning are so recent in the evolution of the human brain that they are unlikely to be the basic processes of human cognition. He proposes that cognition, for humans as well as animals, is primarily a matter of quick and intuitive pattern matching, in which patterns get "tuned up" gradually by past experience. This view of cognition is consistent with current research on neural networks, which do not process information by manipulating symbols. Rather, we apply past patterns of action or recognition, quickly and intuitively, in new situations that resemble the original cuing conditions.
Repugnance, therefore, may be a form of knowing that precedes rational thought. Reactions to the repugnant may be similar, for instance, to the way that "fight-or-flight-or-freeze" responses work. When confronted with a dangerous situation, we don't have to wait until we can develop a reasoned response based on propositional knowledge before we react. Our autonomic responses, which are conditioned to respond to similar situations, take over and allow us to respond quickly.
Of course, as our example of the little dung-eaters shows, not every harmful situation elicits fear. This may be why we've developed the emotion of disgust:
Anger, fear and disgust may be responses to different kinds of threats. Anger is a proper and effective response to threats to one's rights, or one's property, which can be challenged. Fear is an effective response to threats that can not be challenged, which one can run away from. Yet there are threats for which fear and anger are not appropriate. There are threats that one can't simply run away from or fight off. Some of these threats, such as oral contamination, may be inescapable aspects of human bodily experience. Other threats, such as individual meaninglessness, may be cultural constructions unique to a particular time and place. We suggest that disgust, or some subset of its embodied schemata, is the emotional response to this heterogenous class of threats. Disgust makes us step back, push away, or otherwise draw a protective line between the self and the threat.
Whereas core-disgusts guard against contamination of the body, socio-moral disgusts guard against contamination of the soul. Where one protects the health of the human body, the other protects human dignity. Prior to the germ theory of disease, scientific knowledge was inadequate to explain why certain forms of "contamination" should disgust us. This pre-rational wisdom, though, allowed us to survive as a species until our knowledge caught up with our intuitions.
If socio-moral disgust is an offshoot of core disgust, then shouldn't we be careful before we dismiss it as a relic of an outmoded cultural bias? What if the wisdom of repugnance protects us from harm in the same way core disgust do? Should this form of cognition be dismissed simply because it may hinder progressivism?
The wisdom of core-disgust preceded the knowledge of science by thousands of years and served to protect our bodies from harm. What if a similar wisdom is protecting human dignity? On what grounds do we have for rejecting thousands of years of socio-moral wisdom?
Revulsion is not an argument, as Leon Kass once noted, and "some of yesterday's repugnances are today calmly accepted—though, one must add, not always for the better. In crucial cases, however, repugnance is the emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason's power fully to articulate it."
Indeed, the wisdom of repugnance is not an argument; it is merely a stop-gap in the onslaught against the degradation of human dignity. Like all products of a culture produced by a fallen humanity, it can contain error and be in need of correction. But the process should be taken carefully and its discernment should be based not only on our own limited understanding but also on the received wisdom and tacit knowledge of those who have come before us.
Those who reject the concept of the wisdom of repugnance must be prepared to deliver solid arguments against incest, bestiality, necrophilia, and other moral horrors that lie within the Pandora's Box of taboo behaviors. If all ethical arguments must withstand the rigors of analytical reasoning then we will have to reject a great deal of our deepest moral presuppositions. Are we prepared to do that in order that radical individualism may advance unimpeded?
Joe Carter is web editor of First Things. His previous articles for “On the Square” can be found here.
RESOURCES
Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals
Jonathan Haidt, Body, Psyche, and Culture: The Relationship between Disgust and Morality
Leon Kass, The Wisdom of Repugnance
Comments:
12.15.2010 | 9:23am
Tristian says:
The problem is that disgust, precisely because its targets can be socially selected, can also be a vehicle for prejudice and discrimination. As Martha Nussbaum notes in her own important work on this subject, irrational fears of contamination by members of unpopular groups are often deliberately cultivated. Rather than say disgust is a kind of knowledge, it would be better to say it's a type of claim to knowledge, and as with any such thing it should be subject to skeptical and critical scrutiny. This is particularly important when its object--as was the case with your example with Darwin--is a stigmatized class of persons. Disgust itself, no matter how traditional or "normal", should carry not epistemic, legal or moral weight.
12.15.2010 | 11:39am
Joe the Human says:
Strange to say, the New Testament seems to have suggested that "nothing is unclean," except insofar as our thoughts make it so. Corroborating that quote, St. Peter seems to have had a dream, that allowed him to eat anything.
This seems strangely out of keeping with medicine; and the idea that "disgust" might have some kind of real function. But it also suggests an occasional cultural component.
The trick is, to find out which of our ideas have a real, natural/biological function; and which are culturally-conditioned, and even culturally biased.
This seems strangely out of keeping with medicine; and the idea that "disgust" might have some kind of real function. But it also suggests an occasional cultural component.
The trick is, to find out which of our ideas have a real, natural/biological function; and which are culturally-conditioned, and even culturally biased.
12.15.2010 | 11:47am
Thomas says:
"If all ethical arguments must withstand the rigors of analytical reasoning then we will have to reject a great deal of our deepest moral presuppositions."
If ethical arguments don't have to stand up to critical reason or be based in practical reason, we're left with the sort of anti-intellectualism that can be used to try to justify anything. After all, if one points out to a Klansman that there's no basis in practical reason (or physical anthropology for that matter) to regard one race as lower than another and points out that such racism doesn't stand up to critical reason, then the Klansman can just say that his argument (just like Joe's) doesn't have to withstand the rigors of reason, and that racism is the product of a deep wisdom of the sort that reason cannot penetrate.
But, as Hegel points out, all such arguments are ultimately based on the passions, pre-reflective assumptions, and "common sense." --
"Since the man of common sense makes his appeal to feeling, to an oracle within his breast, he is finished and done with anyone who does not agree; he only has to explain that he has nothing more to say to anyone who does not find and feel the same in himself. In other words, he tramples underfoot the roots of humanity. For it is the nature of humanity to press onward to agreement with others; human nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds. The anti-human, the merely animal, consists in staying within the sphere of feeling, and being able to communicate only at that level."
If ethical arguments don't have to stand up to critical reason or be based in practical reason, we're left with the sort of anti-intellectualism that can be used to try to justify anything. After all, if one points out to a Klansman that there's no basis in practical reason (or physical anthropology for that matter) to regard one race as lower than another and points out that such racism doesn't stand up to critical reason, then the Klansman can just say that his argument (just like Joe's) doesn't have to withstand the rigors of reason, and that racism is the product of a deep wisdom of the sort that reason cannot penetrate.
But, as Hegel points out, all such arguments are ultimately based on the passions, pre-reflective assumptions, and "common sense." --
"Since the man of common sense makes his appeal to feeling, to an oracle within his breast, he is finished and done with anyone who does not agree; he only has to explain that he has nothing more to say to anyone who does not find and feel the same in himself. In other words, he tramples underfoot the roots of humanity. For it is the nature of humanity to press onward to agreement with others; human nature only really exists in an achieved community of minds. The anti-human, the merely animal, consists in staying within the sphere of feeling, and being able to communicate only at that level."
12.15.2010 | 1:52pm
Joe the Human Person says:
I agree with thomas and Tristan - and the Bible and St. Peter: "disgust," our sense that something is "unclean," is all too often culturally conditioned. The jews for example insisted that pork was disgusting and unclean; but then Peter bent these "law"s, this sense of disgust. So that Christians are today allowed to eat pork, pig meat; even though it is forbidden in the Old Testament.
So Apparently, against your thesis, this disgust, found deep in the Old Testament itself, was not natural after all. Or if it was, God could change it.
So Carter, it seems the Bible and God are against you, and the Neo Cons; as usual.
So Apparently, against your thesis, this disgust, found deep in the Old Testament itself, was not natural after all. Or if it was, God could change it.
So Carter, it seems the Bible and God are against you, and the Neo Cons; as usual.
12.15.2010 | 2:36pm
Joe Carter says:
@Tristian ***The problem is that disgust, precisely because its targets can be socially selected, can also be a vehicle for prejudice and discrimination.***
While I don't disagree that it can be a danger, the same is true for rationality. Should we stop appealing to reason since it can be used as a vehicle for prejudice and discrimination?
***As Martha Nussbaum notes in her own important work on this subject, irrational fears of contamination by members of unpopular groups are often deliberately cultivated.***
The problem with Nussbaum's argument is that she applies it inconsistently. She doesn't like the emotion of disgust because it tends to work against things she favors (such as homosexual behavior). But she is fine with using emotions such as anger, love, compassion, etc. That selective application undercuts her position.
***Rather than say disgust is a kind of knowledge, it would be better to say it's a type of claim to knowledge, and as with any such thing it should be subject to skeptical and critical scrutiny. ***
I agree that it should be subject to skeptical and critical scrutiny. But so should all types of knowledge and claims about what is or can be known.
***This is particularly important when its object--as was the case with your example with Darwin--is a stigmatized class of persons.***
The wisdom of repugnance must always be subsumed under the wisdom of Christianity. The Chrisitan tradition teaches us that all people have dignity because they are made in the image of God. Because of that, we should be careful about stigmitizing people.
But if kept in its proper place, the wisdom of repugnance can be very useful. For example, Christianty teaches us that lepers are people who are worthy of love and compassion. Yet if we were to discount our natural aversion to touching lepers, then we'd soon have more people infected, thereby causing a greater problem than before.
***Disgust itself, no matter how traditional or "normal", should carry not epistemic, legal or moral weight.***
But why? According to this claim, unless a parent is aware of why fecal matter is harmful then they shouldn’t let disgust carry any epistemic weight in their decision not to let a baby eat some of the stuff. Fortunately, our parents didn’t agree with this arbitrary standard or we wouldn’t be around to have a debate about disgust. ; )
@Joe the Human *** Strange to say, the New Testament seems to have suggested that "nothing is unclean," except insofar as our thoughts make it so.***
In that context, "unclean" is a theological concept, not a claim about sanitation.
@Thomas ***If ethical arguments don't have to stand up to critical reason or be based in practical reason, we're left with the sort of anti-intellectualism that can be used to try to justify anything.***
I'm not sure how that follows. Analytical reasoning is not the only form of intellect, so I'm not sure why it would necessarily be anti-intellectual not to allow it to be used as a trump card.
***After all, if one points out to a Klansman that there's no basis in practical reason (or physical anthropology for that matter) to regard one race as lower than another and points out that such racism doesn't stand up to critical reason, then the Klansman can just say that his argument (just like Joe's) doesn't have to withstand the rigors of reason, and that racism is the product of a deep wisdom of the sort that reason cannot penetrate.***
But you seem to forget that the arguments used by the Klansman were, at the time, rooted in analytical reasoning. Even Darwin made arguments for why certain races were inferior to others, and he did so by appeals to reason rather than to disgust.
Indeed, if we conclude that naturalistic evolutionary processes are true, then there is sufficient reason to think that certain races *are* likely to be inferior and unequal in certain respects. Ironically, we find such claims to be "repugnant" not because they are contrary to reason but because they are contrary to our ideals of what is acceptable to believe. (Personally, I believe that the entire concept of race is a social construction. But there are people who can make solid arguments based on neurobiology that there are differences between people of racial categories.)
However, as I noted in my article, my claim is not that repugnance should have the last word. I think repuganance is a useful way of knowing because we often "know" concepts before we can prove them. Just because we don't know how we know or because we can't articulate a foolproof argument for a position does not mean that they are irrational, much less wrong.
Darwin was probably right not to let the native touch his food—even though he was right for the wrong reasons. Even today, we would be disgusted if a stranger touched a piece of our bologna. The difference is that we now know to be concerned about getting contamination from the germs that could be on the person's fingers rather than just because they are a stranger. Darwin's reaction wasn't irrational, even if his motivation was misguided.
The "wisdom" in the wisdom of repugnance is merely that of Chesterton's admonition about fences: "Don't ever take a fence down until you know the reason it was put up."
The problem today is that we think we should be tearing down every fence unless someone has an airtight, universally-acceptable argument for why we should leave it up. We suffer from a form of intellectual hubris in thinking that if we can't imagine how harm could be caused then it obviously can't cause harm. Such thinking is, of course, quite stupid. But we're seeing it in all sorts of areas.
Take, for instance, the recent discussion about consensual incest. The old argument against incest was similar to the one the Klansman might make against misengenation—that it is harmful to the gene pool. But now that we've divorced sex from reproduction and made it completely about consent we have not reason to prohibit incest.
@Joe the Human *** So Apparently, against your thesis, this disgust, found deep in the Old Testament itself, was not natural after all. Or if it was, God could change it. So Carter, it seems the Bible and God are against you, and the Neo Cons; as usual.***
Becaue I have to moderate all comments, I'm forced to read all of the ones you've posted. To be honest, I can't tell if your comments are made out of honest ignorance or if you intentionally say dumb stuff just to get a rise out of people. (I suspect it’s the latter.)
Many people have asked me to ban you from commenting because you rarely (never?) add anything of value to the discussion. I've been hesitant to do that. Instead, I'll appeal to you as a fellow human and blog reader: If you are a troll, then please go somewhere else. You've done your duty in irritating people and are free to move on. But if you are truly interested in expressing your opinion and engaging in a thoughtful dialogue, then please stop making such goofy, inflammatory remarks and insults. Sound fair?
While I don't disagree that it can be a danger, the same is true for rationality. Should we stop appealing to reason since it can be used as a vehicle for prejudice and discrimination?
***As Martha Nussbaum notes in her own important work on this subject, irrational fears of contamination by members of unpopular groups are often deliberately cultivated.***
The problem with Nussbaum's argument is that she applies it inconsistently. She doesn't like the emotion of disgust because it tends to work against things she favors (such as homosexual behavior). But she is fine with using emotions such as anger, love, compassion, etc. That selective application undercuts her position.
***Rather than say disgust is a kind of knowledge, it would be better to say it's a type of claim to knowledge, and as with any such thing it should be subject to skeptical and critical scrutiny. ***
I agree that it should be subject to skeptical and critical scrutiny. But so should all types of knowledge and claims about what is or can be known.
***This is particularly important when its object--as was the case with your example with Darwin--is a stigmatized class of persons.***
The wisdom of repugnance must always be subsumed under the wisdom of Christianity. The Chrisitan tradition teaches us that all people have dignity because they are made in the image of God. Because of that, we should be careful about stigmitizing people.
But if kept in its proper place, the wisdom of repugnance can be very useful. For example, Christianty teaches us that lepers are people who are worthy of love and compassion. Yet if we were to discount our natural aversion to touching lepers, then we'd soon have more people infected, thereby causing a greater problem than before.
***Disgust itself, no matter how traditional or "normal", should carry not epistemic, legal or moral weight.***
But why? According to this claim, unless a parent is aware of why fecal matter is harmful then they shouldn’t let disgust carry any epistemic weight in their decision not to let a baby eat some of the stuff. Fortunately, our parents didn’t agree with this arbitrary standard or we wouldn’t be around to have a debate about disgust. ; )
@Joe the Human *** Strange to say, the New Testament seems to have suggested that "nothing is unclean," except insofar as our thoughts make it so.***
In that context, "unclean" is a theological concept, not a claim about sanitation.
@Thomas ***If ethical arguments don't have to stand up to critical reason or be based in practical reason, we're left with the sort of anti-intellectualism that can be used to try to justify anything.***
I'm not sure how that follows. Analytical reasoning is not the only form of intellect, so I'm not sure why it would necessarily be anti-intellectual not to allow it to be used as a trump card.
***After all, if one points out to a Klansman that there's no basis in practical reason (or physical anthropology for that matter) to regard one race as lower than another and points out that such racism doesn't stand up to critical reason, then the Klansman can just say that his argument (just like Joe's) doesn't have to withstand the rigors of reason, and that racism is the product of a deep wisdom of the sort that reason cannot penetrate.***
But you seem to forget that the arguments used by the Klansman were, at the time, rooted in analytical reasoning. Even Darwin made arguments for why certain races were inferior to others, and he did so by appeals to reason rather than to disgust.
Indeed, if we conclude that naturalistic evolutionary processes are true, then there is sufficient reason to think that certain races *are* likely to be inferior and unequal in certain respects. Ironically, we find such claims to be "repugnant" not because they are contrary to reason but because they are contrary to our ideals of what is acceptable to believe. (Personally, I believe that the entire concept of race is a social construction. But there are people who can make solid arguments based on neurobiology that there are differences between people of racial categories.)
However, as I noted in my article, my claim is not that repugnance should have the last word. I think repuganance is a useful way of knowing because we often "know" concepts before we can prove them. Just because we don't know how we know or because we can't articulate a foolproof argument for a position does not mean that they are irrational, much less wrong.
Darwin was probably right not to let the native touch his food—even though he was right for the wrong reasons. Even today, we would be disgusted if a stranger touched a piece of our bologna. The difference is that we now know to be concerned about getting contamination from the germs that could be on the person's fingers rather than just because they are a stranger. Darwin's reaction wasn't irrational, even if his motivation was misguided.
The "wisdom" in the wisdom of repugnance is merely that of Chesterton's admonition about fences: "Don't ever take a fence down until you know the reason it was put up."
The problem today is that we think we should be tearing down every fence unless someone has an airtight, universally-acceptable argument for why we should leave it up. We suffer from a form of intellectual hubris in thinking that if we can't imagine how harm could be caused then it obviously can't cause harm. Such thinking is, of course, quite stupid. But we're seeing it in all sorts of areas.
Take, for instance, the recent discussion about consensual incest. The old argument against incest was similar to the one the Klansman might make against misengenation—that it is harmful to the gene pool. But now that we've divorced sex from reproduction and made it completely about consent we have not reason to prohibit incest.
@Joe the Human *** So Apparently, against your thesis, this disgust, found deep in the Old Testament itself, was not natural after all. Or if it was, God could change it. So Carter, it seems the Bible and God are against you, and the Neo Cons; as usual.***
Becaue I have to moderate all comments, I'm forced to read all of the ones you've posted. To be honest, I can't tell if your comments are made out of honest ignorance or if you intentionally say dumb stuff just to get a rise out of people. (I suspect it’s the latter.)
Many people have asked me to ban you from commenting because you rarely (never?) add anything of value to the discussion. I've been hesitant to do that. Instead, I'll appeal to you as a fellow human and blog reader: If you are a troll, then please go somewhere else. You've done your duty in irritating people and are free to move on. But if you are truly interested in expressing your opinion and engaging in a thoughtful dialogue, then please stop making such goofy, inflammatory remarks and insults. Sound fair?
12.15.2010 | 2:40pm
Don Roberto says:
Professor Cater, I like this essay. Thanks. There is a kernal of truth in what some of your critics above say (and of course the child raised by cannibals may by training find the taste of his brother's roasted flesh pleasant; and secularists, following the evil one, are doing all they can to train our children *not* to find many objectively depraved acts revolting); but God gives us both faith and reason, instinct and learning. As you say, we should ignore instinct only with great caution, when the weight of reason supporting this is substantial.
(And in my humble opinion, we probably *should* be more disgusted by the flesh of swine, insofar as reason tells us of the miserable life pigs suffer in captivity, and that in order to satisfy our often glutonous desire we must slaughter untold millions of very intelligent animals. If this does not turn ones stomach, then the vast rivers of pig excrement leaking into soil and sea should.)
(And in my humble opinion, we probably *should* be more disgusted by the flesh of swine, insofar as reason tells us of the miserable life pigs suffer in captivity, and that in order to satisfy our often glutonous desire we must slaughter untold millions of very intelligent animals. If this does not turn ones stomach, then the vast rivers of pig excrement leaking into soil and sea should.)
12.15.2010 | 3:36pm
Tristian says:
Joe, the antidote to prejudice based on the faulty use of reason is the better use of reason. I don't think this works with disgust. What fixes a faulty use of the disgust mechanism, so to speak, is also a better use of reason., so they are hardly on par. And this is also why your criticisms of Nussbaum are entirely unfair--she explains very thoroughly how anger and the like differ from something like disgust, and a key point is that anger is much more amenable to rational control and for that very reason much more amenable to correction. Disgust is very difficult to eradicate, even when we know its object is benign.
The reason we should generally distrust disgust is that it is very unreliable--we can find good food disgusting and poison quite palatable. This does not mean it never gets things right; it means when it does it's often by luck, rather like astrologists. Who's doing better--a parent who is knowledgeable about what is harmful for her child to ingest or a parent who figures if it doesn't smell gross it's ok? In a state of complete ignorance natural disgust might be better than nothing. But why settle for that when we can do so much better?
The reason we should generally distrust disgust is that it is very unreliable--we can find good food disgusting and poison quite palatable. This does not mean it never gets things right; it means when it does it's often by luck, rather like astrologists. Who's doing better--a parent who is knowledgeable about what is harmful for her child to ingest or a parent who figures if it doesn't smell gross it's ok? In a state of complete ignorance natural disgust might be better than nothing. But why settle for that when we can do so much better?
12.15.2010 | 3:50pm
Thomas says:
There are a few different claims that should be distinguished.
1. Ethical arguments need not "withstand the rigors of analytical reason."
If analytical reason means anything like critical or practical reason, this should clearly be rejected. To say that an ethical argument should be affirmed despite the fact that critical inquiry shows its claims to be irrational is to simply advocate irrationality, to converse on a merely animal level (as Hegel would say).
2. Ethical arguments may be affirmed despite not being the result of a compelling argument.
This is a much softer claim, but probably still wrong. An ethical argument must be supported by a reason, otherwise it's not really an argument, it's just a feeling (and an irrational one at that).
This argument is usually made by those who think that reason is primarily a matter of deduction, where one starts from self-evident principles, and moves by necessity to equally compelling conclusions. This conceives of reason in a very narrow sense, and misunderstands the nature and power of inductive and (especially) dialectical reason. The classical method for ethical argumentation is primarily dialectical, which is why post-Enlightenment thinkers have so much trouble understanding it.
3. Our feelings of disgust are sometimes valuable even if the reason is not immediately apparent.
This, of course, is true. Assuming your argument about Darwin is right, (3) follows, but (1) and (2) do not.
I don't want to criticize you too much for the mistakes about biology (assuming race has a biological basis, for example, is demonstrably false), because you don't claim to be a biologist and that's not really the point of the essay. Suffice it to say that the truth of evolutionary theory means that we will tend to be averse to things that harm fitness (and this is more true the more a physical capacity of the body, such as smell, is involved). But just because we tend to be averse to things that damage our biological fitness does not mean that we should act on the aversion. Evolution tends to discourage self-sacrifice, for example (though this can be complicated), but that doesn't mean that one should avoid self-sacrifice. Sometimes our inherited traits point us in the right way (with bad-smelling foods), other times the wrong way (xenophobia, laziness). The way to judge between them is not to retreat into a form of irrationalism, remaining content with our prejudices, but to subject them to rational scrutiny.
1. Ethical arguments need not "withstand the rigors of analytical reason."
If analytical reason means anything like critical or practical reason, this should clearly be rejected. To say that an ethical argument should be affirmed despite the fact that critical inquiry shows its claims to be irrational is to simply advocate irrationality, to converse on a merely animal level (as Hegel would say).
2. Ethical arguments may be affirmed despite not being the result of a compelling argument.
This is a much softer claim, but probably still wrong. An ethical argument must be supported by a reason, otherwise it's not really an argument, it's just a feeling (and an irrational one at that).
This argument is usually made by those who think that reason is primarily a matter of deduction, where one starts from self-evident principles, and moves by necessity to equally compelling conclusions. This conceives of reason in a very narrow sense, and misunderstands the nature and power of inductive and (especially) dialectical reason. The classical method for ethical argumentation is primarily dialectical, which is why post-Enlightenment thinkers have so much trouble understanding it.
3. Our feelings of disgust are sometimes valuable even if the reason is not immediately apparent.
This, of course, is true. Assuming your argument about Darwin is right, (3) follows, but (1) and (2) do not.
I don't want to criticize you too much for the mistakes about biology (assuming race has a biological basis, for example, is demonstrably false), because you don't claim to be a biologist and that's not really the point of the essay. Suffice it to say that the truth of evolutionary theory means that we will tend to be averse to things that harm fitness (and this is more true the more a physical capacity of the body, such as smell, is involved). But just because we tend to be averse to things that damage our biological fitness does not mean that we should act on the aversion. Evolution tends to discourage self-sacrifice, for example (though this can be complicated), but that doesn't mean that one should avoid self-sacrifice. Sometimes our inherited traits point us in the right way (with bad-smelling foods), other times the wrong way (xenophobia, laziness). The way to judge between them is not to retreat into a form of irrationalism, remaining content with our prejudices, but to subject them to rational scrutiny.
12.15.2010 | 3:52pm
GABRIEL says:
So Darwin was a racist and a moron. And as I recall the guy`s grandmother was according to himself, a monkey, so what do you expect?
12.15.2010 | 6:23pm
Bill says:
Disgust, likely, was originally biological; probably related to our sense of taste and smell. Which are rather automatically, biologically hard-wired, to dislike certain things, and to cough and sneeze and split things out that smell or taste bad.
On the other hand, biblical and other examples clearly suggest that this native sense, can indeed be culturally changed, transformed. To conform to rather arbitrary cultural and some dispensationally, culturally-dependent theologial preferences. In that case, being as variable - and as unreliable - as cultural biases, it should not be entirely trusted.
This seems reasonable.
Should we trust reason? "Come, let us reason together" says the Bible.
If disgust is an emotion, pre-logical feeling, too, it is close to the "heart." But the Bible says over and over, that the heart can be "deceived."
In that case, it seems advisble to follow the biblical command to "reason together."
On the other hand, biblical and other examples clearly suggest that this native sense, can indeed be culturally changed, transformed. To conform to rather arbitrary cultural and some dispensationally, culturally-dependent theologial preferences. In that case, being as variable - and as unreliable - as cultural biases, it should not be entirely trusted.
This seems reasonable.
Should we trust reason? "Come, let us reason together" says the Bible.
If disgust is an emotion, pre-logical feeling, too, it is close to the "heart." But the Bible says over and over, that the heart can be "deceived."
In that case, it seems advisble to follow the biblical command to "reason together."
12.15.2010 | 10:50pm
Mark VA says:
A very interesting article on a deep subject.
It seems to me that judging the morality of disgust is no simple matter. Especially when the subjects of this emotion are our fellow human beings - prudence and humility would suggest that especially here we're on thin ice.
Perhaps we should scrutinize this feeling in ourselves by default when dealing in the area of interpersonal relations. I realize that I should take my own medicine here as well - I recently expressed this very emotion, without prudence, on the subject of modern poetry.
Christ threw the money changers out of the Temple because they profaned holy ground - the Temple was dedicated to the worship of one true God, not to the worship of profit. Undeniably, Christ felt anger at this profanation. Perhaps we can also propose that He felt disgust for this sin. But I'm reluctant to propose that he felt disgusted with these particular sinners. Ditto for the Pharisees. Thus, is it moral to express disgust toward another soul?
It seems to me that judging the morality of disgust is no simple matter. Especially when the subjects of this emotion are our fellow human beings - prudence and humility would suggest that especially here we're on thin ice.
Perhaps we should scrutinize this feeling in ourselves by default when dealing in the area of interpersonal relations. I realize that I should take my own medicine here as well - I recently expressed this very emotion, without prudence, on the subject of modern poetry.
Christ threw the money changers out of the Temple because they profaned holy ground - the Temple was dedicated to the worship of one true God, not to the worship of profit. Undeniably, Christ felt anger at this profanation. Perhaps we can also propose that He felt disgust for this sin. But I'm reluctant to propose that he felt disgusted with these particular sinners. Ditto for the Pharisees. Thus, is it moral to express disgust toward another soul?
12.16.2010 | 12:08am
Christopher Benson says:
In my opinion, Mr. Carter's treatment of disgust does not adequately distinguish between what philosopher Martha Nussbaum calls DISGUST AT PRIMARY OBJECTS (“feces, blood, semen, urine, nasal discharges, menstrual discharges, corpses, decaying meat, and animal/insects that are oozy, slimy, or smelly”), which she says is “usually a useful heuristic, steering us away from the dangerous when there is no time for detailed inquiry,” and PROJECTIVE DISGUST that is “shaped by social norms, as societies teach their members to identify alleged contaminants in their midst,” which she says rarely withstands rational scrutiny.
“Projective disgust (involving projection of disgust properties onto a group or individual) takes many forms,” she claims, “but it always involves linking the allegedly disgusting group or person somehow with the primary objects of disgust.” Jews were regarded as slimy and ugly by German anti-Semites, African-Americans as smelly by whites, and homosexuals as diseased and deadly by heterosexuals. In all cases, “projective disgust involves a double fantasy: a fantasy of the dirtiness of the other and a fantasy of one’s own purity. Both sides of the projection involve false belief, and both conduce to a politics of hierarchy." In conclusion, projective disgust should never be described as "the wisdom of repugnance" (Leon Kass), but named for what it is: learned prejudice, if not hatred.
“Projective disgust (involving projection of disgust properties onto a group or individual) takes many forms,” she claims, “but it always involves linking the allegedly disgusting group or person somehow with the primary objects of disgust.” Jews were regarded as slimy and ugly by German anti-Semites, African-Americans as smelly by whites, and homosexuals as diseased and deadly by heterosexuals. In all cases, “projective disgust involves a double fantasy: a fantasy of the dirtiness of the other and a fantasy of one’s own purity. Both sides of the projection involve false belief, and both conduce to a politics of hierarchy." In conclusion, projective disgust should never be described as "the wisdom of repugnance" (Leon Kass), but named for what it is: learned prejudice, if not hatred.
12.16.2010 | 1:11am
Joe Carter says:
@Christopher Benson ***In my opinion, Mr. Carter's treatment of disgust does not adequately distinguish between what philosopher Martha Nussbaum***
The reason I don't make such a distinction is because it is a mainly a strawman that was created by Nussbaum. No serious person who argues for the wisdom of repugnance is saying that we should stigmatize entire groups of people.
Yet she tries to poison the well by associating the emotion of disgust with bigots and Nazis. That sort of thing (should be) beneath such an esteemed public intellectual. Besides, Klansmen and German anti-Semites also used reason to form their prejudice. Should we follow her argumentum ad consequentiam and discard reason too since it can lead to bad consequences?
(I've never been impressed by Nussbaum's writings on disgust. She commits a slew of logical fallacies in an attempt to justify the liberal position that she considers self-evident.)
Nussbaum also seems to embrace a form of disembodied dualism. She doesn't seem to grasp the concept that the disgust with homosexual sex is directed at primary objects (e.g., feces, blood, semen). As much as she'd like to pretend that gay sex is some Platonic action that occurs in a sterile clean-room between disembodied souls, it is an action done by real humans with real bodies.
That does not mean, however, that the disgust at the behavior is turned into a projective disgust at the people involved. Being disgusted by behavior does not mean that the people involved are themselves intrinsically disgusting. I can be disgusted by the behavior of my daughter without devaluing her or considering her unworthy of human dignity.
The reason I don't make such a distinction is because it is a mainly a strawman that was created by Nussbaum. No serious person who argues for the wisdom of repugnance is saying that we should stigmatize entire groups of people.
Yet she tries to poison the well by associating the emotion of disgust with bigots and Nazis. That sort of thing (should be) beneath such an esteemed public intellectual. Besides, Klansmen and German anti-Semites also used reason to form their prejudice. Should we follow her argumentum ad consequentiam and discard reason too since it can lead to bad consequences?
(I've never been impressed by Nussbaum's writings on disgust. She commits a slew of logical fallacies in an attempt to justify the liberal position that she considers self-evident.)
Nussbaum also seems to embrace a form of disembodied dualism. She doesn't seem to grasp the concept that the disgust with homosexual sex is directed at primary objects (e.g., feces, blood, semen). As much as she'd like to pretend that gay sex is some Platonic action that occurs in a sterile clean-room between disembodied souls, it is an action done by real humans with real bodies.
That does not mean, however, that the disgust at the behavior is turned into a projective disgust at the people involved. Being disgusted by behavior does not mean that the people involved are themselves intrinsically disgusting. I can be disgusted by the behavior of my daughter without devaluing her or considering her unworthy of human dignity.
12.16.2010 | 2:47am
Rick says:
I do believe that disgust is largely culturally conditioned. Long, long ago, when I was a young "navy brat" at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, we had friends with a baby about a year old. One day, the parents caught her eating something off the floor. The dad forced open her mouth and pulled out a mangled cockroach--one of the huge tropical kind we had down there. The baby had no problem with it, but the mom ran to the bathroom and threw up.
Much later, but still long ago, after I had come back from my Peace Corps service in West and North Africa, I rented a small cottage in the back yard of a retired Army colonel--tall, blonde, West Point class of 1955, distinguished family, son of a brigadier general in World War II, home decorated with early American antiques, and so forth. He was very decent to me. I could never have complained about the way I was treated. However, shortly after I moved in, he came to "inspect" his cottage. I had decorated the walls with large, mounted prints of photos I had taken in Africa. He leaned across a table to peer at them: closeup portraits of Berber women of the Atlas Mountains in their gorgeously colorful costumes, ancient, white-bearded desert nomads, looking like they had stepped right out of the Old Testament, and so forth. His lip curled slightly in distaste. "And what's this?" he asked, referring to the black and white striped blanket covering the table that he had put his hand on. "Oh, that's a blanket from the Sahel region in West Africa," I said. He actually leaped backwards, yanking his hand off the blanket as though it were a hot iron. I restrained the impulse to tell him that it was quite safe...he wouldn't turn black because he had touched it.
So, growing up in a certain cultural milieu will definitely take its toll on one's susceptibility to the sensation of disgust.
Much later, but still long ago, after I had come back from my Peace Corps service in West and North Africa, I rented a small cottage in the back yard of a retired Army colonel--tall, blonde, West Point class of 1955, distinguished family, son of a brigadier general in World War II, home decorated with early American antiques, and so forth. He was very decent to me. I could never have complained about the way I was treated. However, shortly after I moved in, he came to "inspect" his cottage. I had decorated the walls with large, mounted prints of photos I had taken in Africa. He leaned across a table to peer at them: closeup portraits of Berber women of the Atlas Mountains in their gorgeously colorful costumes, ancient, white-bearded desert nomads, looking like they had stepped right out of the Old Testament, and so forth. His lip curled slightly in distaste. "And what's this?" he asked, referring to the black and white striped blanket covering the table that he had put his hand on. "Oh, that's a blanket from the Sahel region in West Africa," I said. He actually leaped backwards, yanking his hand off the blanket as though it were a hot iron. I restrained the impulse to tell him that it was quite safe...he wouldn't turn black because he had touched it.
So, growing up in a certain cultural milieu will definitely take its toll on one's susceptibility to the sensation of disgust.
12.16.2010 | 11:56am
Joe the Human says:
I guess the larger question is the value of taste/vs. distaste; how accurate is it? When is it useful ... and when is it prejudiced?
Probably we should not simply dogmatize here, but should examine each individual case, on a case-by-case basis. Personally for example, I share the 1) Pope's seemingly native revulsion, for pederastical priests. And then too, 2) there are certain foods I did not eat as a child, that did not taste good to me; that in fact turned out to be full of pesticides and other contaminants. So in at least some cases, the sense of smell, and taste - and the sense of acceptance or disgust - seems functional and good. Though not in others.
Sometimes it is 3) not easy to determine what is good, and what is not. Note For example that even heterosexual sex, between consenting adults, even married sex, often seems "yucky" and messy, to teenaged girls, etc.. So that many cases that appear natural and useful to many, may not be quite so natural useful as we thought.
Therefore, we should always examine our tastes,with Reason; to find out which ones are good and accurate - and which ones are not.
Probably we should not simply dogmatize here, but should examine each individual case, on a case-by-case basis. Personally for example, I share the 1) Pope's seemingly native revulsion, for pederastical priests. And then too, 2) there are certain foods I did not eat as a child, that did not taste good to me; that in fact turned out to be full of pesticides and other contaminants. So in at least some cases, the sense of smell, and taste - and the sense of acceptance or disgust - seems functional and good. Though not in others.
Sometimes it is 3) not easy to determine what is good, and what is not. Note For example that even heterosexual sex, between consenting adults, even married sex, often seems "yucky" and messy, to teenaged girls, etc.. So that many cases that appear natural and useful to many, may not be quite so natural useful as we thought.
Therefore, we should always examine our tastes,with Reason; to find out which ones are good and accurate - and which ones are not.
12.16.2010 | 1:01pm
Christopher Benson says:
@Joe Carter: Calling projective disgust a straw man doesn't make it so. There are historical examples of projective disgust, as in the cases of Jews and African-Americans. Serious question: How can you be sure that the wisdom of repugnance doesn't slip into the normative irrationality of projective disgust, which is always connected to stigma and hierarchy? Isn't it a fine line? In FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY, Nussbaum shows how some figures in the Religious Right have used projective disgust against homosexuals to advance their political agenda. It's not only bad argumentation but bad witness-bearing. The deployment of disgust in the public square only reinforces James Davison Hunter's observation that some Christians have become "functional Nietzscheans," willing to use whatever means necessary to exercise their will to power. Orthodox Christians have at their disposal superior arguments in the debate on same-sex marriage, and ought to be using those instead of disgust.
12.16.2010 | 1:04pm
Tristian says:
You seem to determined to be unfair to Nussbaum.
Her point with Nazis and the like is to show, with a real world example, how easy it is to hijack this emotion and put it in the service of pernicious practices directed at groups. She is not accusing people like Kass of trying to stigmatize groups of people. She's pointing out that such stigmatization often exploits a cultivated disgust. Further, she argues--and this is surely true--it is easy enough to slide from disgust at behavior to disgust for the group identified with the behavior, however well intentioned we are.
Disgust at homosexual sex is not directed at "feces, blood, semen"; it's directed at homosexual sex. Many people find images of two men doing more than kissing disgusting; conversely, heterosexual anal sex is a popular genre of pornography. It's that two men are doing it that gets to people. As Nussbaum notes in what is actually a very frank discussion of these matters, lesbian sex often does not provoke disgust in same people find male/male sex disgusting.
Her point with Nazis and the like is to show, with a real world example, how easy it is to hijack this emotion and put it in the service of pernicious practices directed at groups. She is not accusing people like Kass of trying to stigmatize groups of people. She's pointing out that such stigmatization often exploits a cultivated disgust. Further, she argues--and this is surely true--it is easy enough to slide from disgust at behavior to disgust for the group identified with the behavior, however well intentioned we are.
Disgust at homosexual sex is not directed at "feces, blood, semen"; it's directed at homosexual sex. Many people find images of two men doing more than kissing disgusting; conversely, heterosexual anal sex is a popular genre of pornography. It's that two men are doing it that gets to people. As Nussbaum notes in what is actually a very frank discussion of these matters, lesbian sex often does not provoke disgust in same people find male/male sex disgusting.
12.16.2010 | 1:41pm
Christopher Benson says:
@Joe Carter: ***[Nussbaum] doesn't seem to grasp the concept that the disgust with homosexual sex is directed at primary objects (e.g., feces, blood, semen). As much as she'd like to pretend that gay sex is some Platonic action that occurs in a sterile clean-room between disembodied souls, it is an action done by real humans with real bodies.***
Which Martha Nussbaum are you reading? The passage below from DISGUST TO HUMANITY is contrary to your statement above:
What inspires disgust is typically the male thought of the male homosexual, imagined as anally penetrable. The idea of semen and feces mixing together inside the body of a male is one of the most disgusting ideas imaginable – to males, for whom the idea of nonpenetrability is a sacred boundary against stickiness, ooze, and death. (The idea of contamination-by-penetration is probably one central idea, but the more general idea is that of the male body as defiled by the contamination of bodily fluids: and proximity to a contaminated body is itself contaminating.) The presence of a homosexual male in the neighborhood inspires the thought that one might lose one’s own clean safeness, one might become the receptacle for those animal products. Thus disgust is ultimately disgust at one’s own imagined penetrability and ooziness, and this is why the male homosexual is both regarded with disgust and viewed with fear as a predator who might make everyone else disgusting. The very look of such a male is itself contaminating – as we see in the extraordinary debates about showers in the military. The gaze of a homosexual male is seen as contaminating because it says, “You can be penetrated.” And this means that you can be made of feces and semen and blood, not clean plastic flesh. Thus it is not surprising that (to males) the thought of homosexual sex is even more disgusting than the thought of reproductive sex, despite the strong connection of the latter with mortality and the cycle of the generations. For in heterosexual sex the male imagines that not he but a lesser being (the woman, seen as animal) receives the pollution of bodily fluids; in imagining homosexual sex he is forced to imagine that he himself might be so polluted. This inspires the stronger need for boundary drawing (qtd. FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY).
Which Martha Nussbaum are you reading? The passage below from DISGUST TO HUMANITY is contrary to your statement above:
What inspires disgust is typically the male thought of the male homosexual, imagined as anally penetrable. The idea of semen and feces mixing together inside the body of a male is one of the most disgusting ideas imaginable – to males, for whom the idea of nonpenetrability is a sacred boundary against stickiness, ooze, and death. (The idea of contamination-by-penetration is probably one central idea, but the more general idea is that of the male body as defiled by the contamination of bodily fluids: and proximity to a contaminated body is itself contaminating.) The presence of a homosexual male in the neighborhood inspires the thought that one might lose one’s own clean safeness, one might become the receptacle for those animal products. Thus disgust is ultimately disgust at one’s own imagined penetrability and ooziness, and this is why the male homosexual is both regarded with disgust and viewed with fear as a predator who might make everyone else disgusting. The very look of such a male is itself contaminating – as we see in the extraordinary debates about showers in the military. The gaze of a homosexual male is seen as contaminating because it says, “You can be penetrated.” And this means that you can be made of feces and semen and blood, not clean plastic flesh. Thus it is not surprising that (to males) the thought of homosexual sex is even more disgusting than the thought of reproductive sex, despite the strong connection of the latter with mortality and the cycle of the generations. For in heterosexual sex the male imagines that not he but a lesser being (the woman, seen as animal) receives the pollution of bodily fluids; in imagining homosexual sex he is forced to imagine that he himself might be so polluted. This inspires the stronger need for boundary drawing (qtd. FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY).
12.16.2010 | 1:42pm
Joe Carter says:
@Christopher Benson *** Calling projective disgust a straw man doesn't make it so. There are historical examples of projective disgust, as in the cases of Jews and African-Americans.***
Of course there are examples she could find of digust being used for nefarious purposes. The same, though, is true for reason. No one has yet answered, though, why we shouldn't also throw out reason since it can be used to justify prejudices and atrocities.
***Serious question: How can you be sure that the wisdom of repugnance doesn't slip into the normative irrationality of projective disgust, which is always connected to stigma and hierarchy?***
You can't. But that is true for every form of knowledge. I don’t understand why disgust is treated differently than other forms of knowing.
***In FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY, Nussbaum shows how some figures in the Religious Right have used projective disgust against homosexuals to advance their political agenda.***
I don't have a copy handy. Do you remember who she references? Are they key figures in the Religious Right or marginal people no one has every heard of?
***The deployment of disgust in the public square only reinforces James Davison Hunter's observation that some Christians have become "functional Nietzscheans," willing to use whatever means necessary to exercise their will to power.***
I don't see how that follows. Its seems bizarre that pointing out disgusting behavior is considered " functionally Nietzschean." Since the Bible finds certain things disgusting should we never refer to the Bible as a source?
***Orthodox Christians have at their disposal superior arguments in the debate on same-sex marriage, and ought to be using those instead of disgust.***
I don't understand why it is necessary to make it an either-or proposition. We can use the superior arguments at our disposal *and* use legitimate concerns that are rooted in disgust.
In fact, one of the reasons why homosexual sex has become so tolerated by the younger generation is because we've "disembodied" it from the actual behavior. Back in the 1970s, gay sex was talked about less but understood more. People knew what was involved and were rightly disgusted by it. Sure, some people used it to stigmatize homosexuals. But many Christians understood that there was simply no way that you could love your neighbor and condone their engaging in such behavior.
Sadly, the behavior hasn't changed all that much but we've hidden the aspects of it that triggered revulsion (or adopted them in heterosexual culture). I'm sure that many people (especially younger folks) think that they are being compassionate and tolerant by trying to gloss over the seamier side of homosexuality. But the result has been tragic for both the gay community and the culture at large.
@Tristian ***You seem to determined to be unfair to Nussbaum. Her point with Nazis and the like is to show, with a real world example, how easy it is to hijack this emotion and put it in the service of pernicious practices directed at groups.***
I don't think it is unfair to Nussbaum to point out her obvious inconsistencies. For example, she thinks anger has a place but not disgust. But disgust is rarely a terminal emotion. It tends to trigger other emotions, ranging from empathy to anger. The problem with the Nazis is not only that they were "disgusted" by the Jews, but that they turned it into anger that led to the Holocaust. Nussbaum glosses over that fact because it undercuts her agenda.
***She is not accusing people like Kass of trying to stigmatize groups of people. ***
Who does she think is the most prominent person making the argument for the wisdom of repugnance if not Kass? Are her arguments not applicable to him also? She knows she can't take him on head-on so she attempts to poison the well by using the tired old The Nazis Did It Too!
*** Further, she argues--and this is surely true--it is easy enough to slide from disgust at behavior to disgust for the group identified with the behavior, however well intentioned we are. ***
Absolutely. But just because something can lead to bad consequences does not mean that we must therefore stop doing it. I can get killed driving my car. Should we therefore ban driving?
***Disgust at homosexual sex is not directed at "feces, blood, semen"; it's directed at homosexual sex.***
What do you think homosexual sex *involves*? I know that's its popular nowadays to "clean it up" and portray homosexual sex as *just like* heterosexual sex. It is not.
Now admittedly some younger people might not understand what goes on. But I suspect those of us old enough to remember tales of what occurs in bathhouses and highway rest stops (e.g., the tearoom trade) will have a different view.
***Many people find images of two men doing more than kissing disgusting; conversely, heterosexual anal sex is a popular genre of pornography.***
Let me push back on that last part. While the act you describe is being engaged by heterosexuals, I would hesitate to call it a heterosexual act. I'm not sure how to put it delicately enough on a family site like FT so I'll just say that men who are into that sort of think likely have unresolved homosexual tendencies.
Also, that genre did not become popular until *after* the normalization of homosexuality. Since many homosexul behaviors are about power, domination, and objectification rather than about sex, it isn't surprising that many so-called heterosexual males would adopt it.
***As Nussbaum notes in what is actually a very frank discussion of these matters, lesbian sex often does not provoke disgust in same people find male/male sex disgusting. ***
Exactly, which undercuts Nussbaum's argument. Gay sex often involved blood, feces, and semen. Lesbian sex does not. If it were solely about a "projective disgust" of homosexual people, rather than practices, then we should expect to find lesbianism just as repugnant.
Of course there are examples she could find of digust being used for nefarious purposes. The same, though, is true for reason. No one has yet answered, though, why we shouldn't also throw out reason since it can be used to justify prejudices and atrocities.
***Serious question: How can you be sure that the wisdom of repugnance doesn't slip into the normative irrationality of projective disgust, which is always connected to stigma and hierarchy?***
You can't. But that is true for every form of knowledge. I don’t understand why disgust is treated differently than other forms of knowing.
***In FROM DISGUST TO HUMANITY, Nussbaum shows how some figures in the Religious Right have used projective disgust against homosexuals to advance their political agenda.***
I don't have a copy handy. Do you remember who she references? Are they key figures in the Religious Right or marginal people no one has every heard of?
***The deployment of disgust in the public square only reinforces James Davison Hunter's observation that some Christians have become "functional Nietzscheans," willing to use whatever means necessary to exercise their will to power.***
I don't see how that follows. Its seems bizarre that pointing out disgusting behavior is considered " functionally Nietzschean." Since the Bible finds certain things disgusting should we never refer to the Bible as a source?
***Orthodox Christians have at their disposal superior arguments in the debate on same-sex marriage, and ought to be using those instead of disgust.***
I don't understand why it is necessary to make it an either-or proposition. We can use the superior arguments at our disposal *and* use legitimate concerns that are rooted in disgust.
In fact, one of the reasons why homosexual sex has become so tolerated by the younger generation is because we've "disembodied" it from the actual behavior. Back in the 1970s, gay sex was talked about less but understood more. People knew what was involved and were rightly disgusted by it. Sure, some people used it to stigmatize homosexuals. But many Christians understood that there was simply no way that you could love your neighbor and condone their engaging in such behavior.
Sadly, the behavior hasn't changed all that much but we've hidden the aspects of it that triggered revulsion (or adopted them in heterosexual culture). I'm sure that many people (especially younger folks) think that they are being compassionate and tolerant by trying to gloss over the seamier side of homosexuality. But the result has been tragic for both the gay community and the culture at large.
@Tristian ***You seem to determined to be unfair to Nussbaum. Her point with Nazis and the like is to show, with a real world example, how easy it is to hijack this emotion and put it in the service of pernicious practices directed at groups.***
I don't think it is unfair to Nussbaum to point out her obvious inconsistencies. For example, she thinks anger has a place but not disgust. But disgust is rarely a terminal emotion. It tends to trigger other emotions, ranging from empathy to anger. The problem with the Nazis is not only that they were "disgusted" by the Jews, but that they turned it into anger that led to the Holocaust. Nussbaum glosses over that fact because it undercuts her agenda.
***She is not accusing people like Kass of trying to stigmatize groups of people. ***
Who does she think is the most prominent person making the argument for the wisdom of repugnance if not Kass? Are her arguments not applicable to him also? She knows she can't take him on head-on so she attempts to poison the well by using the tired old The Nazis Did It Too!
*** Further, she argues--and this is surely true--it is easy enough to slide from disgust at behavior to disgust for the group identified with the behavior, however well intentioned we are. ***
Absolutely. But just because something can lead to bad consequences does not mean that we must therefore stop doing it. I can get killed driving my car. Should we therefore ban driving?
***Disgust at homosexual sex is not directed at "feces, blood, semen"; it's directed at homosexual sex.***
What do you think homosexual sex *involves*? I know that's its popular nowadays to "clean it up" and portray homosexual sex as *just like* heterosexual sex. It is not.
Now admittedly some younger people might not understand what goes on. But I suspect those of us old enough to remember tales of what occurs in bathhouses and highway rest stops (e.g., the tearoom trade) will have a different view.
***Many people find images of two men doing more than kissing disgusting; conversely, heterosexual anal sex is a popular genre of pornography.***
Let me push back on that last part. While the act you describe is being engaged by heterosexuals, I would hesitate to call it a heterosexual act. I'm not sure how to put it delicately enough on a family site like FT so I'll just say that men who are into that sort of think likely have unresolved homosexual tendencies.
Also, that genre did not become popular until *after* the normalization of homosexuality. Since many homosexul behaviors are about power, domination, and objectification rather than about sex, it isn't surprising that many so-called heterosexual males would adopt it.
***As Nussbaum notes in what is actually a very frank discussion of these matters, lesbian sex often does not provoke disgust in same people find male/male sex disgusting. ***
Exactly, which undercuts Nussbaum's argument. Gay sex often involved blood, feces, and semen. Lesbian sex does not. If it were solely about a "projective disgust" of homosexual people, rather than practices, then we should expect to find lesbianism just as repugnant.
12.16.2010 | 3:33pm
Joe says:
Personally, I am not attracted to the gory details of male homosexuality. However ...
Hetero sex involves 1) semen. (Which many women do not seem to mind too much). And even 2) blood; menstrual. And 3) changing your subsequent babies' diapers, involves feces.
So it probably it would not be JUST these substances, that are the real cause of revulsion. Indeed, some might say, they all but cancel out as a constant, when reviewing hetero vs. male homosexual sex.
So what's left? The cultural/ideological element.
Hetero sex involves 1) semen. (Which many women do not seem to mind too much). And even 2) blood; menstrual. And 3) changing your subsequent babies' diapers, involves feces.
So it probably it would not be JUST these substances, that are the real cause of revulsion. Indeed, some might say, they all but cancel out as a constant, when reviewing hetero vs. male homosexual sex.
So what's left? The cultural/ideological element.
12.16.2010 | 3:39pm
Joe Carter says:
@Joe ***Hetero sex involves 1) semen. (Which many women do not seem to mind too much). And even 2) blood; menstrual. And 3) changing your subsequent babies' diapers, involves feces.***
Claiming that part of heterosexual sex includes changing dirty diapers is a considerable stretch. And I suspect that most people avoid intercourse during menstruation.
The obvious distinction, of course, is that homosexual sex often includes all three elements at the same time. That is why most people find it repugnant.
Claiming that part of heterosexual sex includes changing dirty diapers is a considerable stretch. And I suspect that most people avoid intercourse during menstruation.
The obvious distinction, of course, is that homosexual sex often includes all three elements at the same time. That is why most people find it repugnant.
12.16.2010 | 5:35pm
Tristian says:
Joe, you are saying things about Nussbaum that are simply untrue. She does confront Kass directly and in detail, and her argument is nothing like what you suggest. She points out, quite rightly, that disgust has been used to stigmatize groups unjustly. This is not to suggest Kass is doing this, but rather to put him in a dilemma. Assuming it was wrong to cultivate disgust towards "Jews, or mixed race couples, or the novels of James Joyce or D. H. Lawrence" (her examples) the question is on what grounds to we say so. The problem is that the very fact that we have an answer (such disgust was irrational and morally unwarranted) points to a) the moral and epistemic unreliability of disgust and b) the fact that we have a readily available and superior standard.
As to why we shouldn't reject rational inquiry because it's not infallible either, well the answer is obvious. First we can't, and secondly we don't need to as reason is its own corrective. Neither is true of disgust.
Lastly, I seriously doubt that men and women need to learn about anal sex from gays (c.f. Lawrence). In any case, gay men do more than have anal sex; as mentioned, they kiss, something that is enough to elicit disgust in many people. That lesbian sex is less stigmatized (as long as the women in question conform to standard conceptions of female beauty) shows only that male homosexuality is the most problematic for most people. We tend to be much less comfortable with any physical affection between men.
As to why we shouldn't reject rational inquiry because it's not infallible either, well the answer is obvious. First we can't, and secondly we don't need to as reason is its own corrective. Neither is true of disgust.
Lastly, I seriously doubt that men and women need to learn about anal sex from gays (c.f. Lawrence). In any case, gay men do more than have anal sex; as mentioned, they kiss, something that is enough to elicit disgust in many people. That lesbian sex is less stigmatized (as long as the women in question conform to standard conceptions of female beauty) shows only that male homosexuality is the most problematic for most people. We tend to be much less comfortable with any physical affection between men.
12.17.2010 | 12:15pm
Mark G. says:
I rather agree with D. von Hildebrand that affective responses (like disgust) can be as true as any logical statement, such as when we naturally admire something that genuinely calls for admiration, or are awed by something that truly is awe-inspiring, &, yes, even when we are disgusted by something that really is disgusting. If logical truth is nature in accord with right reason, then it is analogous that affective truth is nature in accord with the affective response of the heart.
The initial affective response of digust may be somewhat out of one's direct control, whether nurtured or natured, but when pondered further with one's reason or other powers of cognition, then one can sanction the response, understand its truth, and make it one's own. This is the complimentary relationship of affectivity to reason, & also the corrective to an erroneous over-emphasis on either. It seems to be a both/and component of human nature, not either/or.
I would also note that there are some responses of disgust out of which one can never reason themselves. Much of the argumentation in the above thread follows along the lines of, "Sure, it works in the real world, but will it work in theory?" Most morally conscience people are rightly disgusted by disgusting things without having to think about it too hard.
The initial affective response of digust may be somewhat out of one's direct control, whether nurtured or natured, but when pondered further with one's reason or other powers of cognition, then one can sanction the response, understand its truth, and make it one's own. This is the complimentary relationship of affectivity to reason, & also the corrective to an erroneous over-emphasis on either. It seems to be a both/and component of human nature, not either/or.
I would also note that there are some responses of disgust out of which one can never reason themselves. Much of the argumentation in the above thread follows along the lines of, "Sure, it works in the real world, but will it work in theory?" Most morally conscience people are rightly disgusted by disgusting things without having to think about it too hard.
12.18.2010 | 2:42am
Everyone Else says:
First of all I would correct the assertion that the Nazis changed disgust into anger against Jewish people. I'm sure most Nazi horrors were not perpetrated with anger. In that case the Nazis usually transformed their disgust into contempt, thereby alleviating any potential moral problems by dehumanizing the Jews.
Second, you may wish to be made aware of the way you are yourself held in contempt. "Unclean" things and people are sources of disgust, as pointed out in detail by Jonathan Haidt in the paper you mention. Below is a quote from Wikipedia. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mecca) which states the reason given by Islam, the Koran, and the state of Saudi Arabia, for prohibiting any non-Muslim from so much as setting foot in Mecca. As you will see, non-Muslims are "nothing but unclean", meaning nothing but disgusting and polluting.
"Non-Muslims are not permitted to enter Mecca under Saudi law.[2] The Saudi government supports their position using Sura 9:28 from the Qur'an:
O you who believe! the idolaters are nothing but unclean, so they shall not approach the Sacred Mosque after this year; and if you fear poverty then Allah will enrich you out of His grace if He please; surely Allah is Knowing Wise.
—Qur'an, Sura 9 At-Tawba, ayah 28,"
Second, you may wish to be made aware of the way you are yourself held in contempt. "Unclean" things and people are sources of disgust, as pointed out in detail by Jonathan Haidt in the paper you mention. Below is a quote from Wikipedia. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mecca) which states the reason given by Islam, the Koran, and the state of Saudi Arabia, for prohibiting any non-Muslim from so much as setting foot in Mecca. As you will see, non-Muslims are "nothing but unclean", meaning nothing but disgusting and polluting.
"Non-Muslims are not permitted to enter Mecca under Saudi law.[2] The Saudi government supports their position using Sura 9:28 from the Qur'an:
O you who believe! the idolaters are nothing but unclean, so they shall not approach the Sacred Mosque after this year; and if you fear poverty then Allah will enrich you out of His grace if He please; surely Allah is Knowing Wise.
—Qur'an, Sura 9 At-Tawba, ayah 28,"
12.18.2010 | 11:33am
Joe the Human says:
Seconding "Everyone Else":
Therefore indeed, disgust, the sense of things being "unclean," is partially natural ... but also partially dependent on culture, ideology. Indeed, as Everyone rightly notes, cultures differ, even in what they think is "unclean" or disgusting.
Therefore? Disgust is not really all that natural, or reliable; and it is culturally variable.
To be sure, homosexual sex specifically, does involve things that will seem at first to many, seemingly naturally, to be "disgust"ing; like anal sex. While in fact, anal sex is THE high-risk activity, that spreads AIDS. So that there, our seemingly natural distaste, is biologically functional.
On the other hand, eating pork, "pig meat," is "unclean" - and disgusting - to Muslims. And for that matter, to Jews, and to the Old Testament as well (Deut. or Numb. 14?). But the New Testament changed all that.
Therefore? What is considered disgusting, "unclean," changes somewhat, from one culture - and even one theology - to another.
So that we need to examine each and every case of disgust; to see if it is indeed, well-founded biologically, scientifically ... or not.
No doubt in some cases, disgust is functional; in others, it is the result of mere cultural prejudice.
Therefore indeed, disgust, the sense of things being "unclean," is partially natural ... but also partially dependent on culture, ideology. Indeed, as Everyone rightly notes, cultures differ, even in what they think is "unclean" or disgusting.
Therefore? Disgust is not really all that natural, or reliable; and it is culturally variable.
To be sure, homosexual sex specifically, does involve things that will seem at first to many, seemingly naturally, to be "disgust"ing; like anal sex. While in fact, anal sex is THE high-risk activity, that spreads AIDS. So that there, our seemingly natural distaste, is biologically functional.
On the other hand, eating pork, "pig meat," is "unclean" - and disgusting - to Muslims. And for that matter, to Jews, and to the Old Testament as well (Deut. or Numb. 14?). But the New Testament changed all that.
Therefore? What is considered disgusting, "unclean," changes somewhat, from one culture - and even one theology - to another.
So that we need to examine each and every case of disgust; to see if it is indeed, well-founded biologically, scientifically ... or not.
No doubt in some cases, disgust is functional; in others, it is the result of mere cultural prejudice.
12.18.2010 | 3:01pm
Bryan says:
While I'm in agreement with some points in the article it should be titled "In Defense of Qualified Disgust."
Pre-rational wisdom is only qualified as wisdom in hindsight and all of your examples are hinged on that. So as fallen humanity how do we choose that disgust which is wise and avoid that which is not and get it right before the next human horror story occurs?
We can't blindly trust the past and infinitely fallible intuitions nor can we afford to wait around on science and progress to explain everything and start with a "year zero" every time we learn something new. We are alive now.
Pre-rational wisdom is only qualified as wisdom in hindsight and all of your examples are hinged on that. So as fallen humanity how do we choose that disgust which is wise and avoid that which is not and get it right before the next human horror story occurs?
We can't blindly trust the past and infinitely fallible intuitions nor can we afford to wait around on science and progress to explain everything and start with a "year zero" every time we learn something new. We are alive now.
12.19.2010 | 4:18pm
Joe the Human Person says:
Bryan:
And so? In real life, most of us indeed, just strike a rough balance, a working guess. Between our intuitive emotions ... and things known rationally.
And so? In real life, most of us indeed, just strike a rough balance, a working guess. Between our intuitive emotions ... and things known rationally.
12.19.2010 | 6:38pm
Jack says:
This is a fascinating article, and one that people ignore at their peril. Much human "thinking" and decision making obviously takes place at a non-verbal, emotional level. Framing becomes all important. Whether Rogers and Hammerstein are correct the "you've got to be carefully taught" your prejudices or whether they are innate ,or, more likely, some combination of the two, they are very powerful factors in how we perceive and react to the world. Contrary to George W Bush, "they" don't "hate us for our freedom", but they are actually disgusted by many aspects of Western life, particularly our attitude toward sexual behavior and the behavior itself. Whatever one may think of these feelings, they cannot be ignored. They are real and they motivate people's actions. When we ignore such things and try to analyze and mold other people through the prism of our own beliefs, prejudices and disgusts, we had up with senseless tragedies like the Iraq war and the never-ending Afghanistan tragedy.
Incidentally, Republicans are masters of manipulating behavior of voters based on these concepts, particularly disgust, while Democratic rational discussions are simply a waste of time and money.
Incidentally, Republicans are masters of manipulating behavior of voters based on these concepts, particularly disgust, while Democratic rational discussions are simply a waste of time and money.
12.19.2010 | 8:42pm
deb says:
'Those who reject the concept of the wisdom of repugnance must be prepared to deliver solid arguments against incest, bestiality, necrophilia, and other moral horrors that lie within the Pandora's Box of taboo behaviors.'
Just because accepting the 'wisdom of repugnance' and delivering 'solid arguments' are options for solving the same problems doesn't mean the former is more valid; if anything don't such serious issues demand solid arguments and critical analysis?
Hmm, I suppose it's the visceral presupposition of these things as 'moral horrors' that betrays a settling for the 'wisdom of repugnance', which shouldn't be the case. Least so in socio-cultural cases of repugnance.
Just because accepting the 'wisdom of repugnance' and delivering 'solid arguments' are options for solving the same problems doesn't mean the former is more valid; if anything don't such serious issues demand solid arguments and critical analysis?
Hmm, I suppose it's the visceral presupposition of these things as 'moral horrors' that betrays a settling for the 'wisdom of repugnance', which shouldn't be the case. Least so in socio-cultural cases of repugnance.
12.19.2010 | 9:27pm
des greene says:
Disgust is an emotion and as such is linked to our personal experience of the world - which in turn reflects the society we live in and our exposure to same.
The basis of disgust is one of protection of the subject to culturally and personally perceived threats and dangers.
It is relative in that more frequent exposure leads to a diminution of the adverse emotion and ultimately to acceptance.
Its value is that of immediate stalling of potential threat or danger.
To read much more into it is perhaps to endow it with greater impact on human existence than it deserves!
The basis of disgust is one of protection of the subject to culturally and personally perceived threats and dangers.
It is relative in that more frequent exposure leads to a diminution of the adverse emotion and ultimately to acceptance.
Its value is that of immediate stalling of potential threat or danger.
To read much more into it is perhaps to endow it with greater impact on human existence than it deserves!
12.20.2010 | 3:21am
His Shadow says:
You know what's revolting? This twaddle...
"and secularists, following the evil one, are doing all they can to train our children *not* to find many objectively depraved acts revolting"
What kind of emotionally stunted person comes up with this statement? Anyone who rejects the overly common delusions of gods and religions is automatically an evil person attempting to turn children into perverts? Grow up.
"and secularists, following the evil one, are doing all they can to train our children *not* to find many objectively depraved acts revolting"
What kind of emotionally stunted person comes up with this statement? Anyone who rejects the overly common delusions of gods and religions is automatically an evil person attempting to turn children into perverts? Grow up.
12.20.2010 | 8:55pm
Eric says:
There are hosts of assumptions and unfounded generalizations about homosexuality in both this article and many of the comments from Mr. Carter. Where is the evidence that proves that most people are "rightly" disgusted by homosexual sex? Where are the studies, the statistics and the numbers that demonstrate this beyond doubt? How can we even know when people are speaking honestly about their attitudes towards sex and sexuality? There seems a lot of anxious pontification here about a simple fact: both heterosexual and homosexual sex are behaviors with a long pedigree in human history. After decades of reading and contemplation of history, psychology, sociology and anthropology, I have come to see that both behaviors are probably natural to different people, to different degrees, at different times. That should not be cause for alarm to anyone.
On an anecdotal level, I have rarely heard anyone disclose honest repugnance at the idea of two handsome men lovingly pleasuring eachother's bodies. It is a fact of life that has fueled some of the greatest painting, sculpture, poetry and fiction we know. I think that, as a culture, we'd be much the poorer with out it.
On an anecdotal level, I have rarely heard anyone disclose honest repugnance at the idea of two handsome men lovingly pleasuring eachother's bodies. It is a fact of life that has fueled some of the greatest painting, sculpture, poetry and fiction we know. I think that, as a culture, we'd be much the poorer with out it.
12.21.2010 | 5:51pm
Dan L says:
Shallow analysis.
"Can revulsion be classified as an adaptive mechanism that prevents us from coming into contact with contaminants? Not likely, as anyone who has ever come in contact with a human baby can attest.
Infants, as any parent can attest, have no concept of disgust."
It doesn't follow from this that disgust isn't hard-wired in important ways. Infants go through demonstrable developmental stages in which their cognitive capacities and limitations change at a furious pace. Before 6 months old, for example, infants can differentiate phonemes apparently arbitrarily (but cannot attach meanings to the words formed from the phonemes). At about 6 months, the ability to discriminate phonemes narrows so that the child will have trouble making distinctions that are not common in its native language (or languages).
While it may be true that disgust is acquired, it seems to me not only possible but likely that hard-wired biological constraints do most of the work in determining what any given person will find disgusting. The consistency of factors that cause disgust across cultural boundaries provides some evidence that this is the case.
"Can revulsion be classified as an adaptive mechanism that prevents us from coming into contact with contaminants? Not likely, as anyone who has ever come in contact with a human baby can attest.
Infants, as any parent can attest, have no concept of disgust."
It doesn't follow from this that disgust isn't hard-wired in important ways. Infants go through demonstrable developmental stages in which their cognitive capacities and limitations change at a furious pace. Before 6 months old, for example, infants can differentiate phonemes apparently arbitrarily (but cannot attach meanings to the words formed from the phonemes). At about 6 months, the ability to discriminate phonemes narrows so that the child will have trouble making distinctions that are not common in its native language (or languages).
While it may be true that disgust is acquired, it seems to me not only possible but likely that hard-wired biological constraints do most of the work in determining what any given person will find disgusting. The consistency of factors that cause disgust across cultural boundaries provides some evidence that this is the case.
12.22.2010 | 1:20pm
Griffin says:
But ....
1) What about the fact that disgust is acquired at the same time as language - which is often culturally biased? As per the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, etc..
And 2) considering the DIFFERENCES between cultures, regarding what is disgusting? Suggest that PART of disgust, might biologically hard-wired; but at least half of it, is not.
Therefore, no one should very simply assume that feeling disgust, is sufficient proof that this or that feeling of distaste is firm, biological, or "Natural" Law.
Rather instead, cases of "disgust," like every aspect of alleged "Natural Law,' should always be open to continuous, scientific exploration and questioning.
1) What about the fact that disgust is acquired at the same time as language - which is often culturally biased? As per the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, etc..
And 2) considering the DIFFERENCES between cultures, regarding what is disgusting? Suggest that PART of disgust, might biologically hard-wired; but at least half of it, is not.
Therefore, no one should very simply assume that feeling disgust, is sufficient proof that this or that feeling of distaste is firm, biological, or "Natural" Law.
Rather instead, cases of "disgust," like every aspect of alleged "Natural Law,' should always be open to continuous, scientific exploration and questioning.
1.27.2011 | 7:32am
thepassingofdays says:
"If all ethical arguments must withstand the rigors of analytical reasoning then we will have to reject a great deal of our deepest moral presuppositions. "
Let me give an example of just how stupid this position is: let's say that I feel black people are morally and intellectually inferior. It's just a feeling I have, it's one of my deepest moral presuppositions. If this ethical argument must withstand the rigors of analytic reasoning, then I might have to give it up! Oh no! I can't think black people are inferior because someone asked me to examine my views! How absurd. This article isn't just an appeal to emotion, it's also an argument from ignorace. What you're essentially saying is that things are wrong because they feel wrong and we don't know that they're not wrong because we didn't (and shouldn't!) think about them too much.
All moral rational positions require grounding and argument. If you have moral beliefs which you don't think should be examined philosophically, then they're probably irrational beliefs.
Let me give an example of just how stupid this position is: let's say that I feel black people are morally and intellectually inferior. It's just a feeling I have, it's one of my deepest moral presuppositions. If this ethical argument must withstand the rigors of analytic reasoning, then I might have to give it up! Oh no! I can't think black people are inferior because someone asked me to examine my views! How absurd. This article isn't just an appeal to emotion, it's also an argument from ignorace. What you're essentially saying is that things are wrong because they feel wrong and we don't know that they're not wrong because we didn't (and shouldn't!) think about them too much.
All moral rational positions require grounding and argument. If you have moral beliefs which you don't think should be examined philosophically, then they're probably irrational beliefs.
2.26.2011 | 7:26am
Elidia Tolmie says:
This is a fascinating article, and one that people ignore at their peril. Much human "thinking" and decision making obviously takes place at a non-verbal, emotional level. Framing becomes all important. Whether Rogers and Hammerstein are correct the "you've got to be carefully taught" your prejudices or whether they are innate ,or, more likely, some combination of the two, they are very powerful factors in how we perceive and react to the world. Contrary to George W Bush, "they" don't "hate us for our freedom", but they are actually disgusted by many aspects of Western life, particularly our attitude toward sexual behavior and the behavior itself. Whatever one may think of these feelings, they cannot be ignored. They are real and they motivate people's actions. When we ignore such things and try to analyze and mold other people through the prism of our own beliefs, prejudices and disgusts, we had up with senseless tragedies like the Iraq war and the never-ending Afghanistan tragedy. ***Serious question: How can you be sure that the wisdom of repugnance doesn't slip into the normative irrationality of projective disgust, which is always connected to stigma and hierarchy?***
This article disgusted me.
;-)