Russian Orthodoxy’s Unreconciled Dualism
May 24, 2012
Nicholas Myers
At the height of the Cold War, political scientists questioned whether the Orthodox Church had become incompatible with the modern state. Although history textbooks highlight how patriarch and emperor were integral offices to the Byzantine Empire, the West has always had a far more tangible division between pope and prince. In Russia in particular, church and state have been in elaborate entanglement for centuries, the result of which has paradoxically been widespread abandonment of the practice of the faith. And contrary to those inclined to see a triumphant tale of Christianity emerging from communism, today’s Church remains plagued by the same ills it has borne for centuries.
Today, the Cold War is history and the Russian Orthodox Church again enjoys religious freedom, yet it has little influence on public discourse, especially when compared with the impact of the Catholic Church, which weighs in on arguments even in countries where Catholics do not even comprise a majority (consider, for example, the recent successes prelates have had in setting the terms of the American contraception mandate and British gay marriage debates). Some Russians (and a fair number of Westerners) imagine this is simply the impact of Soviet atheism on the Russian people, but the reality is more complicated.
The role of the Orthodox Church in the Russian Empire diverged significantly from that of any Western Christian denomination after 1648. The Tsar’s authority over them was derived from the Tsar’s authority over the Church.
In the 1650s, Patriarch Nikon sought to reform Russian Orthodox services and rituals by making them more true to historical Byzantine ceremonies in line with Moscow’s claim to be the “Third Rome.” And in the early 1700s Peter the Great further consolidated control over the Russian Orthodox Church by replacing the Patriarch of Moscow with the Holy Synod, a council of bishops overseen by a civil servant. The church effectively became a government ministry under the Tsar’s personal authority. Though this restored the Tsar’s legitimacy through the Church, the core ecclesiastical hierarchy fell into disrepute: by the nineteenth century, Orthodox priests were generally illiterate, sons of previous priests (they were required to marry), and unemployed. Forced to scrounge their subsistence from fees for Church services, Orthodox priests were regarded as social parasites by Russian intellectuals.
As a direct consequence of this muddling of spiritual and temporal power, nineteenth-century Russians turned to Orthodox ascetics, rather than the priests and bishops of the Orthodox Church for spiritual guidance. They became, to use a contemporary phrase, “spiritual but not religious.” And as the century wore on, Orthodox believers seemed to find confirmation of this view in the arts. They became enraptured, in particular, by Leo Tolstoy’s vision of Christian anarchism: the only true sovereign was God and God alone, expressed through the story of Christ. In 1894, Tolstoy published The Kingdom of God is Within You, framing the spiritual foundation of the modern Russian soul: the Orthodox institution is key to Russia, but theology and spiritual understanding is profoundly personal. The Tsar unwittingly reinforced this dichotomy by suppressing Tolstoy’s religious writings, an act which only boosted Tolstoy’s popularity further.
True, the crucible of the communist years saw much state repression of the Orthodox religion, but in many ways it also restored it as an institution. In 1943, in the midst of the Second World War, Joseph Stalin restored authority to the Patriarch from the Synod, making the Orthodox Church as at least a nominally autocephalous body.
Nevertheless, today’s Orthodox Church faces a unique problem. Post-Soviet Russia retains a large number of atheists. 50% of Russians confess themselves Orthodox, but only 7% attend church services once a month; a mere 3% do so every week. These numbers are markedly lower than even the most thoroughly secularized Western European countries, like France (with an 8% rate of weekly Mass attendance among self-proclaimed Catholics) or the Netherlands (12%).
Among the tiny minority of Russians who actively practice their faith, devotion is extremely stringent, to a degree many Westerners might find inconceivable. Whereas tourists visiting a Spanish cathedral, for example, might be politely asked to wear sleeves and some form of footwear, a female who enters a Russian cathedral, especially outside Moscow and St. Petersburg, should prepare for (at a minimum) a hail of loud verbal abuse from the congregation if her head is uncovered. The Church’s current Patriarch (Kirill I) was forced to recant his ecumenism by the faithful due to their fears of reconciliation with the Catholic Church.
Whereas the body of thought and practice in most of the world’s religions today runs the ideological gamut from multicultural reformers to staunch conservatives, the Russian Orthodox Church is polarized in a dualism of non-observant believers-in-name-only and religious reactionaries who have survived the crucible of the Communist era and seem to resent everyone else, classing them as ‘outsiders.’
The Russian Orthodox Church survived the Communist era and indeed doubled its confessed membership to 60 million in the years since, but the centuries-old divide between earthly authority and spiritual transcendence remains deeply ingrained in the Russian mindset. In February 2012, for example, a Russian feminist punk rock group stormed into the largest Orthodox cathedral in Moscow, performing a vulgar song beseeching, among other things, for “the Holy Mother, the Blessed Virgin,” to “chase Putin out.” When the Church’s Patriarch denounced the group, they responded via blog, “You cannot believe in an earthly tsar if his deeds contradict those values for which the Heavenly Tsar was crucified.”
The Church today has completely vacated the Russian political arena, and its impact on ordinary Russian lives is negligible. The Christian spirit has not departed Russia, but the influence of an established church is long gone. St. Paul’s hope of making “both one” (Eph.2:16) seems harder than ever, for only reactionaries remain within the institution.
Nicholas Myers is a research fellow at the Center for the National Interest and a 2011 graduate of Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service.
RESOURCES
International Rates of Mass Attendance, Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate, Georgetown University
Ria Novosti coverage of the punk band incident
The Cambridge History of Russia: To 1689 edited by Maureen Perrie, Vol. 1, Cambridge UP, 2006.
Christianity in a Revolutionary Age: A History of Christianity in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries: The Nineteenth Century in Europe: The Protestant and Eastern Churches Vol. 2 by Kenneth Scott LaTourette. Harper & Brothers, 1959.
Natasha's Dance: A Cultural History of Russia by Orlando Figes. Macmillan, 2003 (U.S.; 2002, U.K.)
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Comments:
5.24.2012 | 11:54am
Fr. Basil says:
\\ (consider, for example, the recent successes prelates have had in setting the terms of the American contraception mandate and British gay marriage debates)\\
Have they indeed had such success? Not that I can tell.
\\In the 1650s, Patriarch Nikon sought to reform Russian Orthodox services and rituals by making them more true to historical Byzantine ceremonies in line with Moscow’s claim to be the “Third Rome.”\\
I don't know where you got your information. The Greek usages had themselves changed, and Patriarch Nikon was conforming the Russian books to 16th century Greek usages, NOT "historical Byzantine ceremonies."
\\As a direct consequence of this muddling of spiritual and temporal power, nineteenth-century Russians turned to Orthodox ascetics, rather than the priests and bishops of the Orthodox Church for spiritual guidance.\\
Actually, most of them were indeed priest-monks.
Of course, there were also frauds who gave themselves the trappings of asceticism and fooled many. The most notorious was Gregory Rasputin
Have they indeed had such success? Not that I can tell.
\\In the 1650s, Patriarch Nikon sought to reform Russian Orthodox services and rituals by making them more true to historical Byzantine ceremonies in line with Moscow’s claim to be the “Third Rome.”\\
I don't know where you got your information. The Greek usages had themselves changed, and Patriarch Nikon was conforming the Russian books to 16th century Greek usages, NOT "historical Byzantine ceremonies."
\\As a direct consequence of this muddling of spiritual and temporal power, nineteenth-century Russians turned to Orthodox ascetics, rather than the priests and bishops of the Orthodox Church for spiritual guidance.\\
Actually, most of them were indeed priest-monks.
Of course, there were also frauds who gave themselves the trappings of asceticism and fooled many. The most notorious was Gregory Rasputin
5.24.2012 | 11:55am
Douglas Johnson says:
Dear Stuart Koehl,
I know little about what you have written above and I would like to know more. Could you recommend additional reading, specifically on the topic of the Church informing on its members?
I know little about what you have written above and I would like to know more. Could you recommend additional reading, specifically on the topic of the Church informing on its members?
5.24.2012 | 12:35pm
Scott Kenworthy says:
There is no question that the situation of the Orthodox Church in contemporary Russia is extremely complex and in many ways not what it should be. But it takes a much more thoughtful and informed analysis even to begin to understand the problems. Unfortunately, this article suffers from extremely biased stereotypes of pre-revolutionary Russian Orthodoxy that have long been debunked by scholars who actually study the field, none of which is reflected in the "Resources." For example, the whole notion that somehow Russian Orthodoxy was more subordinate to the state than Western churches is a blatant fallacy: the tsar was never the 'head' of the Russian church the way in which the monarchs of England were. Not to mention the ties between the 'magisterial' Reformers and the state. Patriarch Nikon was pushing precisely for authority of the Church vis-a-vis the state, not the reverse, as the article seems to apply. And the myth that the Holy Synod was reduced to a mere 'department of state' by Peter the Great was exploded by Gregory Freeze twenty years ago.
And that's only the beginning. Russian clergy were among the most educated and literate segments of Russian society before 1917. Indeed, all of the early professors of Moscow University, when it was first established, were products of the church's schools (unless they came from abroad). All priests had seminary degrees in the 19th century.
It is certainly true that Orthodox believers turned to ascetics for spiritual guidance, as I myself have written about extensively. But this was nothing particularly new (Orthodox believers have always revered ascetics), and it is patently absurd that this become something "spiritual but not religious." Those very ascetics themselves were, with very rare exceptions, very devoted to the Church. There was no dualism at all, but an organic wholeness that bound the Church together from believers to priests to monasteries to bishops.
We must also never forget that the Russians produced more Christian martyrs in the 20th century than any other church in history: nearly 1 million clergy and believers were executed for their faith in one year alone (1937), and that was 20 years after the Revolution happened. If the Russian people were so poorly attached to their church as this article suggests, they would have abandoned it long before that--and never produced so many martyrs. (This is not to mention the millions more who were sent to the Gulag.) The history of what happened before WWII has to be kept in mind before we rush to judge what happened afterwards. (By the way, Stalin did not restore the Patriarchate, that was done by the Church Council in 1917, and it has only been alleged, not "established," that Aleksii II was a "colonel" in the KGB.) After 70 years of militant atheism, it should come as no surprise that people's living link with the Church and its practices was broken or severely disrupted.
Before one begins to judge Russian Orthodoxy, there is a great deal that must be learned from those who actually research and study it--not LaTourette and Figes!
And that's only the beginning. Russian clergy were among the most educated and literate segments of Russian society before 1917. Indeed, all of the early professors of Moscow University, when it was first established, were products of the church's schools (unless they came from abroad). All priests had seminary degrees in the 19th century.
It is certainly true that Orthodox believers turned to ascetics for spiritual guidance, as I myself have written about extensively. But this was nothing particularly new (Orthodox believers have always revered ascetics), and it is patently absurd that this become something "spiritual but not religious." Those very ascetics themselves were, with very rare exceptions, very devoted to the Church. There was no dualism at all, but an organic wholeness that bound the Church together from believers to priests to monasteries to bishops.
We must also never forget that the Russians produced more Christian martyrs in the 20th century than any other church in history: nearly 1 million clergy and believers were executed for their faith in one year alone (1937), and that was 20 years after the Revolution happened. If the Russian people were so poorly attached to their church as this article suggests, they would have abandoned it long before that--and never produced so many martyrs. (This is not to mention the millions more who were sent to the Gulag.) The history of what happened before WWII has to be kept in mind before we rush to judge what happened afterwards. (By the way, Stalin did not restore the Patriarchate, that was done by the Church Council in 1917, and it has only been alleged, not "established," that Aleksii II was a "colonel" in the KGB.) After 70 years of militant atheism, it should come as no surprise that people's living link with the Church and its practices was broken or severely disrupted.
Before one begins to judge Russian Orthodoxy, there is a great deal that must be learned from those who actually research and study it--not LaTourette and Figes!
5.24.2012 | 12:52pm
Scott Kenworthy says:
Douglas--it depends upon what you are interested in learning. On the pre-revolutionary period, an excellent place to start is Kivelson and Greene, Orthodox Russia.
There is little reliable work on the Russian Church in the later Soviet period. The best place to start is probably N. Davis, A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy.
On the post-Soviet period, see Wallace Daniel, Orthodox Church and Civil Society; or Irina Papkova, Orthodox Church and Russian Politics
There is little reliable work on the Russian Church in the later Soviet period. The best place to start is probably N. Davis, A Long Walk to Church: A Contemporary History of Russian Orthodoxy.
On the post-Soviet period, see Wallace Daniel, Orthodox Church and Civil Society; or Irina Papkova, Orthodox Church and Russian Politics
5.24.2012 | 2:09pm
Tomas says:
Fr. Basil,
While I can indeed understand how one would wish to take affront at what Mr. Myers has written, I do believe you are being somewhat unfair in how you are taking him to task. The mandate and the gay marriage issue in Britain are currently ongoing affairs and while one cannot say the Church has "succeeded" in so far as it has shut down both, there have been successes in causing a major ruckus, beginning to draw lines, and making sure a goodly number of the faithful are aware of and proactive in making their opinions knows. Time will tell if it will be a full success, but this does not mean one should call it a lack of success.
Regarding the reforms of Patriarch Nikon, while the reforms were, in effect, striving for conformity with contemporary Greek practices, the reason was to be more conformed with what was perceived to be the more ancient practice of the Byzantine Empire. The Old Believers practices were actually the more ancient, as later research revealed, but that doesn't change Patriarch Nikon's motives. One can't apply to him was only much later research revealed.
While most of the staretz from the period Mr. Myers discussed were priest monks, this does not change Mr. Myers' point that spiritual and popular ecclesial guidance shifted radically from being a local, parochial or diocesan occurrence to the purview of the monastics, ascetics, and hermits. I'm not sure of the full ramifications of this, actually. It's a fascinating idea to work out, especially in light of the popular ecclesiology of Zizoulas.
In general, I don't believe Mr. Myers is simply calling the Russian Orthodox Church a fraud with no spiritual weight. There will be a desire, especially among those affiliated with the Orthodox Church, to caricature his argument as such, but I believe a much more fruitful discussion could be made in dealing with the points he brings up rather than simply calling out supposed "errors." Apatheia is a much stronger place to discuss from than impassioned defense.
While I can indeed understand how one would wish to take affront at what Mr. Myers has written, I do believe you are being somewhat unfair in how you are taking him to task. The mandate and the gay marriage issue in Britain are currently ongoing affairs and while one cannot say the Church has "succeeded" in so far as it has shut down both, there have been successes in causing a major ruckus, beginning to draw lines, and making sure a goodly number of the faithful are aware of and proactive in making their opinions knows. Time will tell if it will be a full success, but this does not mean one should call it a lack of success.
Regarding the reforms of Patriarch Nikon, while the reforms were, in effect, striving for conformity with contemporary Greek practices, the reason was to be more conformed with what was perceived to be the more ancient practice of the Byzantine Empire. The Old Believers practices were actually the more ancient, as later research revealed, but that doesn't change Patriarch Nikon's motives. One can't apply to him was only much later research revealed.
While most of the staretz from the period Mr. Myers discussed were priest monks, this does not change Mr. Myers' point that spiritual and popular ecclesial guidance shifted radically from being a local, parochial or diocesan occurrence to the purview of the monastics, ascetics, and hermits. I'm not sure of the full ramifications of this, actually. It's a fascinating idea to work out, especially in light of the popular ecclesiology of Zizoulas.
In general, I don't believe Mr. Myers is simply calling the Russian Orthodox Church a fraud with no spiritual weight. There will be a desire, especially among those affiliated with the Orthodox Church, to caricature his argument as such, but I believe a much more fruitful discussion could be made in dealing with the points he brings up rather than simply calling out supposed "errors." Apatheia is a much stronger place to discuss from than impassioned defense.
5.24.2012 | 2:26pm
sdf says:
Your history is extremely muddled.
"...the West has always had a far more tangible division between pope and prince. In Russia in particular, church and state have been in elaborate entanglement for centuries, the result of which has paradoxically been widespread abandonment of the practice of the faith."
In both the West and East prior to the Modern period the prince was, to a large extent, subject of the Church. The violent reversal of that arrangement pretty well defines the emergence of the Modern state. Some States took the Church captive and forced it to do their bidding (e.g. France, Russia), others simply replaced it with a doppleganger that was openly an organ of the State (e.g. England, Holland), and still others called forth a "zombie" version of the Church to serve as chaplain to its civil creed (e.g. the U.S.).
"...political scientists questioned whether the Orthodox Church had become incompatible with the modern state."
They were and are probably right. In those areas where the Church was too ingrained in the culture to be supplanted (France, Russia, and most other Orthodox countries) the emergence of Modern states ultimately required all-out war on the Church and an attempt to utterly annihilate it. The true Church and authentic Christianity can never bow to the demands of the Modern state for ultimate allegiance.
"...the West has always had a far more tangible division between pope and prince. In Russia in particular, church and state have been in elaborate entanglement for centuries, the result of which has paradoxically been widespread abandonment of the practice of the faith."
In both the West and East prior to the Modern period the prince was, to a large extent, subject of the Church. The violent reversal of that arrangement pretty well defines the emergence of the Modern state. Some States took the Church captive and forced it to do their bidding (e.g. France, Russia), others simply replaced it with a doppleganger that was openly an organ of the State (e.g. England, Holland), and still others called forth a "zombie" version of the Church to serve as chaplain to its civil creed (e.g. the U.S.).
"...political scientists questioned whether the Orthodox Church had become incompatible with the modern state."
They were and are probably right. In those areas where the Church was too ingrained in the culture to be supplanted (France, Russia, and most other Orthodox countries) the emergence of Modern states ultimately required all-out war on the Church and an attempt to utterly annihilate it. The true Church and authentic Christianity can never bow to the demands of the Modern state for ultimate allegiance.
5.24.2012 | 3:49pm
Stuart Koehl says:
Scott Kenworthy himself engages in more than a little wishful thinking. Yes, Myers is wrong objectively about the results of the Nikonian Reform, but he is right about the objectives of Patriarch Nikon and Tsar Alexei (see Paul Meyendorff, "Russia, Ritual and Reform").
He's technically right that the Tsar was never head of the Russian Church in the sense that Queen Elizabeth is head of the Church of England--but, by making the Church a branch of the Russian civil service, he exercised through his procurator far more direct control than any English monarch had since the Glorious Revolution. Moreover, the independence exercised by the Church of Constantinople under the Byzantine, as well as by the Church of Kiev (later Moscow), vanished under Ivan IV Grozny and his successors. After the murder of Patriarch Filip by Ivan, the ability (or willingness) of Russian prelates to oppose the will of the secular power was practically nil.
Regarding the literacy of the Russian clergy, saying they were among the most literate elements of Russian society is damning with faint praise. Most priests were, in fact, functionally illiterate, navigating their way through the liturgical books by rote (one reason the Nikonian Reforms were so unsettling). Yes, a relative handful of priests advanced to the theological academies (where, by the 19th century, instruction was based on Roman seminaries and conducted in Latin), but most were actually trained at the parish level--as recounted in the 1920s by the Russian musicologist Johan Gardner.
The division between the clerical hierarchy and the spiritual ascetics may not have been as radical as Myers describes (remember, he's writing an essay, not a book), but it was real nonetheless. One example, recently mentioned by forum member Adam DeVille, was the widespread phenomenon of the "holy fool", which took hold of the Russian spiritual imagination as it never did in any other Orthodox society.
The result was, by 1905, an Orthodox Church that, according to its own hierarchs, had become hollowed out and lacking in substance. The tragedy of 1917 is the reestablishment of the Patriarchate and the creation of an independent synod could have resulted in the spiritual renewal of Russia and the Church of Moscow. Instead, the emergence of the Bolsheviks devastated the Church and drove it back into subservience to the state, from which it has yet to emerge. No less a person than Metropolitan Hillarion has written of how, by the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, the faith of most Russians had become superficial at best, for which reason the Bolsheviks succeeded in delegitimizing the Church with surprising ease.
He's technically right that the Tsar was never head of the Russian Church in the sense that Queen Elizabeth is head of the Church of England--but, by making the Church a branch of the Russian civil service, he exercised through his procurator far more direct control than any English monarch had since the Glorious Revolution. Moreover, the independence exercised by the Church of Constantinople under the Byzantine, as well as by the Church of Kiev (later Moscow), vanished under Ivan IV Grozny and his successors. After the murder of Patriarch Filip by Ivan, the ability (or willingness) of Russian prelates to oppose the will of the secular power was practically nil.
Regarding the literacy of the Russian clergy, saying they were among the most literate elements of Russian society is damning with faint praise. Most priests were, in fact, functionally illiterate, navigating their way through the liturgical books by rote (one reason the Nikonian Reforms were so unsettling). Yes, a relative handful of priests advanced to the theological academies (where, by the 19th century, instruction was based on Roman seminaries and conducted in Latin), but most were actually trained at the parish level--as recounted in the 1920s by the Russian musicologist Johan Gardner.
The division between the clerical hierarchy and the spiritual ascetics may not have been as radical as Myers describes (remember, he's writing an essay, not a book), but it was real nonetheless. One example, recently mentioned by forum member Adam DeVille, was the widespread phenomenon of the "holy fool", which took hold of the Russian spiritual imagination as it never did in any other Orthodox society.
The result was, by 1905, an Orthodox Church that, according to its own hierarchs, had become hollowed out and lacking in substance. The tragedy of 1917 is the reestablishment of the Patriarchate and the creation of an independent synod could have resulted in the spiritual renewal of Russia and the Church of Moscow. Instead, the emergence of the Bolsheviks devastated the Church and drove it back into subservience to the state, from which it has yet to emerge. No less a person than Metropolitan Hillarion has written of how, by the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, the faith of most Russians had become superficial at best, for which reason the Bolsheviks succeeded in delegitimizing the Church with surprising ease.
5.24.2012 | 5:21pm
Christopher Stroop says:
While I do not agree with everything in Scott Kenworthy's assessment, he raises a number of excellent points. I do not agree that "an organic wholeness... bound the Church together from believers to priests to monasteries to bishops" in pre-revolutionary Russia, at least without definition and qualification, as Orthodoxy and its institutions, as Scott of course well knows and demonstrates in his book _The Heart of Russia_, were riddled with tensions.
However, I fully agree with Scott that Myers' analysis is woefully uninformed and overdrawn, and Scott is absolutely right to call his assertion that turning to ascetics for guidance made Russians "spiritual but not religious" is "patently absurd." Myers elides and conflates far too much history here--one wonders if he even knew about the All-Russian Church Council of 1917-1918--and paints with far too broad a brush. The impact of the Orthodox Church in Russia today, in politics and society is far greater than he allows, and I question the usefulness of church attendance figures--derived from a sociological model biased by Protestant norms--as a measure of anything like "religiosity." In fact, I even question its usefulness for non-Orthodox contexts.
Finally, I'd like to second Scott's assertion that analysis of Russian Orthodoxy should be grounded in the research of experts in the subject (such as Scott himself is). And regarding Figes, nobody should ever cite him for anything; he's thoroughly discredited himself and brought considerable shame on the historical profession. On this see the article linked below.
http://www.thenation.com/article/168028/orlando-figes-and-stalins-victims
However, I fully agree with Scott that Myers' analysis is woefully uninformed and overdrawn, and Scott is absolutely right to call his assertion that turning to ascetics for guidance made Russians "spiritual but not religious" is "patently absurd." Myers elides and conflates far too much history here--one wonders if he even knew about the All-Russian Church Council of 1917-1918--and paints with far too broad a brush. The impact of the Orthodox Church in Russia today, in politics and society is far greater than he allows, and I question the usefulness of church attendance figures--derived from a sociological model biased by Protestant norms--as a measure of anything like "religiosity." In fact, I even question its usefulness for non-Orthodox contexts.
Finally, I'd like to second Scott's assertion that analysis of Russian Orthodoxy should be grounded in the research of experts in the subject (such as Scott himself is). And regarding Figes, nobody should ever cite him for anything; he's thoroughly discredited himself and brought considerable shame on the historical profession. On this see the article linked below.
http://www.thenation.com/article/168028/orlando-figes-and-stalins-victims
5.24.2012 | 6:00pm
Brian says:
The article gives the impression that Orthodoxy has been dwindling in Russia ever since the Revolution, till it has reached a point where only a few "reactionaries" remain in it. But the reality, it seems to me, is that the Church has enjoyed a spectacular renaissance since 1991. Almost any church you visit in Russia in 2012 was a ruin 20 years ago. They have been slowly, painstakingly rebuilt, and their congregations have blossomed. True, this growth has not been as triumphant as one might have hoped - it seems to be more prevalent in the cities than in the country, and among the educated classes rather than the uneducated. But it is still a huge change for the better. (I attended a baptism in Moscow just after Easter this year, and a family of four - two parents and two children - were being baptized as well as the child I had come to see.)
As for the Church's cautious support for the Putin regime - I think they are simply being prudent. My Russian Orthodox friends who vote for Putin are under no illusions about him. But they have a real fear of anarchy, and the recent desecration of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour mentioned in the article was an ugly reminder that anti-clericalism has not gone away completely. It is in the Church's interest to support a strong state, a conservative-minded government and law and order.
As for the Church's cautious support for the Putin regime - I think they are simply being prudent. My Russian Orthodox friends who vote for Putin are under no illusions about him. But they have a real fear of anarchy, and the recent desecration of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour mentioned in the article was an ugly reminder that anti-clericalism has not gone away completely. It is in the Church's interest to support a strong state, a conservative-minded government and law and order.
5.24.2012 | 9:30pm
Stuart Koehl says:
Christopher Stroop wrote: "Myers elides and conflates far too much history here--one wonders if he even knew about the All-Russian Church Council of 1917-1918--and paints with far too broad a brush."
I alluded to the All-Russian Synod of 1917-18 as being one of the great missed opportunities of Russian Church history. The changes envisioned by the Synod indicated precisely the kind of institutional emptiness, the formalism of the Russian Church at the beginning of the 20th century, the very lack of deep commitment that Metropolitan Hillarion identified as allowing the Bolsheviks to gain so much support from the notionally Orthodox Russian people.
The impact of the Russian Church in politics today is mainly one of providing a veneer of legitimacy to the Putin regime, as well as providing a focus of national unity for a demoralized people still looking for something to replace the Party.
I alluded to the All-Russian Synod of 1917-18 as being one of the great missed opportunities of Russian Church history. The changes envisioned by the Synod indicated precisely the kind of institutional emptiness, the formalism of the Russian Church at the beginning of the 20th century, the very lack of deep commitment that Metropolitan Hillarion identified as allowing the Bolsheviks to gain so much support from the notionally Orthodox Russian people.
The impact of the Russian Church in politics today is mainly one of providing a veneer of legitimacy to the Putin regime, as well as providing a focus of national unity for a demoralized people still looking for something to replace the Party.
5.24.2012 | 9:36pm
Mark VA says:
This is a very tangled subject.
One aspect of the "Russian mindset" is the question of pan-Slavism, its relation to the Russian Orthodoxy, to those Slavs who are not Orthodox, and to the West in general. Is "Holy Mother Russia" to be understood as a messianic or a political concept, or is it a mixture of both? Also, how does Russia's special relationship with Germany play into all this? Why do Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky appeal so much to the Western mind? How about Solovyov? How much damage did enforced atheism do?
One question morphs into another. God willing, one day the Russians will untangle themselves from all of this.
One aspect of the "Russian mindset" is the question of pan-Slavism, its relation to the Russian Orthodoxy, to those Slavs who are not Orthodox, and to the West in general. Is "Holy Mother Russia" to be understood as a messianic or a political concept, or is it a mixture of both? Also, how does Russia's special relationship with Germany play into all this? Why do Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky appeal so much to the Western mind? How about Solovyov? How much damage did enforced atheism do?
One question morphs into another. God willing, one day the Russians will untangle themselves from all of this.
5.25.2012 | 5:44pm
poetcomic1 says:
The Orthodox churches are very nationalistic and this above all sets them apart from the Catholic church. When Constantine embraced Christianity and made Constantinople the splendid imperial city, Rome was already a 'backwater' half in ruins and would remain so a thousand years. Yet the Catholic church, in this backwater WAS the Catholic Universal church. Any convert who has explored Orthodoxy and then, disillusioned, became Catholic can vouch for the Greekness of Greek Orthodox and the Russianness of Russian Orthodox etc. It is a schismatic flaw of essential 'non-catholicity'.
5.25.2012 | 8:56pm
Christopher Stroop says:
Stuart Koehl says: "The impact of the Russian Church in politics today is mainly one of providing a veneer of legitimacy to the Putin regime, as well as providing a focus of national unity for a demoralized people still looking for something to replace the Party."
On this I mostly agree to you. But I think it that when national identity and religion are closely linked, we should nevertheless not assume that the religion in the mix reduces to mere secular nationalism. Incidentally, the Russian Orthodox Church was mobilized for electoral politics in the late tsarist era as well. There's a little known episode in the 1912 Duma elections in which the church hierarchy not only forced priests to vote, but also forced them to vote for conservative parties. Sergei Bulgakov, who would become a priest in 1918, was extremely critical of this policy (and the hierarchy's culpability in it)--he published his observations as an electoral observer in the leading 'thick' journal of Russian national liberalism, Russian Thought (Russkaia mysl'). So, as I said, I do not share Scott Kenworthy's idealism about the unity of the Russian Orthodox Church, and, I believe, I'm more critical than he of the hierarchy and its relationship to secular authority both historically and in the present, but I deeply respect him as a thorough and extremely knowledgeable historian of Russian Orthodoxy. For my part, I'm a historian of Russian religious philosophers; my doctoral dissertation is about Bulgakov, Berdiaev, and others in their capacity as social and political commentators (in which capacity they were often internal lay critics of the Orthodox hierarchy). Scott knows far, far more than I do about the church's institutions.
On this I mostly agree to you. But I think it that when national identity and religion are closely linked, we should nevertheless not assume that the religion in the mix reduces to mere secular nationalism. Incidentally, the Russian Orthodox Church was mobilized for electoral politics in the late tsarist era as well. There's a little known episode in the 1912 Duma elections in which the church hierarchy not only forced priests to vote, but also forced them to vote for conservative parties. Sergei Bulgakov, who would become a priest in 1918, was extremely critical of this policy (and the hierarchy's culpability in it)--he published his observations as an electoral observer in the leading 'thick' journal of Russian national liberalism, Russian Thought (Russkaia mysl'). So, as I said, I do not share Scott Kenworthy's idealism about the unity of the Russian Orthodox Church, and, I believe, I'm more critical than he of the hierarchy and its relationship to secular authority both historically and in the present, but I deeply respect him as a thorough and extremely knowledgeable historian of Russian Orthodoxy. For my part, I'm a historian of Russian religious philosophers; my doctoral dissertation is about Bulgakov, Berdiaev, and others in their capacity as social and political commentators (in which capacity they were often internal lay critics of the Orthodox hierarchy). Scott knows far, far more than I do about the church's institutions.
5.26.2012 | 4:57pm
To poetcomic1 I would counter that the recent (reported here just yesterday by Tim Kelleher) terse notification from Cardinal Sandri to the married (gasp!) Byzantine Catholic priests is just one stark instance of a singularly *Latin* "'non-catholicity.'" And the fourth century Churches in Constantinople, Antioch, Alexandria and Jerusalem (and Lyon and Thessaloniki and Sardis) were ALSO the "Catholic Universal Church." A disillusioned western Christian, finding Orthodox Christianity like I and countless others have, will attest to the very (not especially "catholic") Latin-ness of both Catholicism and protestantism; the Greek, Russian, Romanian and American Orthodox all agree in and profess the same (and universal) faith.
Regarding the article, one wonders if Martin Luther recognized Myers' purported "far more tangible division between pope and prince" when the obscure Saxon monk found himself confronted not only with the armed-for-battle papal legate (Aleander von Eck), but with the Hapsburg Charles V in his very own person. Note well that Worms was an "Imperial" Diet, called precisely to sniff out doctrinal heresy; the "Imperial" title shows, in fact, that the Latin Church did not in the least hesitate to participate in a very unapologetic "tangible commingling" of pope and prince. And this was certainly a "Catholic-Latin-West" church/state doctrine that was unquestioningly continued (hangings, floggings, stake-burnings and all the attendant trappings) by the Reformers in their newly cleansed polities.
Regarding the article, one wonders if Martin Luther recognized Myers' purported "far more tangible division between pope and prince" when the obscure Saxon monk found himself confronted not only with the armed-for-battle papal legate (Aleander von Eck), but with the Hapsburg Charles V in his very own person. Note well that Worms was an "Imperial" Diet, called precisely to sniff out doctrinal heresy; the "Imperial" title shows, in fact, that the Latin Church did not in the least hesitate to participate in a very unapologetic "tangible commingling" of pope and prince. And this was certainly a "Catholic-Latin-West" church/state doctrine that was unquestioningly continued (hangings, floggings, stake-burnings and all the attendant trappings) by the Reformers in their newly cleansed polities.
5.28.2012 | 3:50pm
Scott Kenworthy says:
I haven't had a chance to get back to this in a few days--not sure anyone will still be reading! But to respond to Stuart Koehl: The Russian Church never became a "branch of the civil service." The clergy remained quite distinct from the civil service. By any definition, I would think the very first criteria of being a civil servant is that you are paid by the state--something that never happened for clergy in Russia (though some may have wanted it!). Second, although the clergy were to perform some functions for the government (collecting data about births, deaths, marriages, etc.), most of these fell in line with their clerical duties anyways. The most notorious example that is usually cited--that clergy were to 'inform' on cases of opposition to the govt, even if heard through the confession--in fact only ever happened once. Moreover, when Peter the Great created the office of the chief procurator of the Synod, it was almost an afterthought, and quite literally defined as the "eyes of the emperor" in the Synod. For the 18th century the procurators remained insignificant. It was only under Nicholas I and procurator Protasov, and in the late 19th century under Pobedonovtsev, that the procurators exercised real power over the Church. And this was not something the Church simply rolled over and accepted--there was plenty of push-back (and resentment!). This is not at all to say that there was not a great deal of state control over the Church, clearly there was--but that the Church simply became a passive instrument of the government is also incorrect.
On this, see Gregory Freeze, "Handmaiden of the State?" Journ of Eccl History 1986; also John Basil, _Church and State in late Imperial Russia_
As for the literacy of the Russian clergy, it is true that they were functionally literate and trained in parishes in the period of the Nikonian reforms, but after the creation of the seminary system in the 18th century they became universally literate. Indeed, one could not become a priest in 19th century Russia without having finished the seminary degree. It may have been based on Roman Catholic models and conducted in Latin until the mid-19th century, but they were still highly literate. Many went on to the university and other professions such as doctors, lawyers, teachers, and the like.
On this, see Gregory Freeze, _Parish Clergy in 19th Century Russia_
Laurie Manchester, _Holy Fathers, Secular Sons_
As for the divide between hierarchy & spiritual ascetics, of course Chris is right in criticizing my comment about the "organic wholeness." That is definitely oversimplified and I wanted to go back and change the moment I hit "submit"! But the point is this: Tolstoy had great influence, but mainly among educated elites who were already disaffected with the Church; and Rasputin's popularity was restricted primarily to the Court. Of far, far greater popularity among ordinary Russians were the Optina elders and John of Kronstadt, who (despite tensions) remained very devoted to the Church. Moreover, there was never any sense that seeking spiritual guidance from an elder meant you didn't need to go to Church, participate in the sacraments & the liturgy. Quite the opposite. So one might not go to one's local parish priest for spiritual guidance (since they were rather overburdened with trying to feed their families and conduct rituals), but that never implied you stopped going to that same priest and his church on a regular basis. Russian rates of religious participation far, far exceeded those of Western Europe up until 1917.
I'd be curious to see where Metropolitan Hilarion made those statements. As much as I respect him, there is an enormous amount of recent research (based on archives and other primary sources) which demonstrate that religious life was thriving on the last decades before 1917: the rate of pilgrimage to holy sites was constantly growing, the rate of publishing and selling popular religious literature exploded, and many other indications (see recent books and articles by Christ Chulos, Robert Greene, Roy Robson, Christine Worobec, Page Herrlinger, and others). The idea that the faith of Russians was superficial at the end of the old regime is a myth, as is the idea that the Bolsheviks were able to gain support of the people against the Church somehow quickly or easily. In fact there were many instances in which people attempted to defend their churches. It took decades of enormous effort, brute force, and aggressive persecution for the Soviets to displace the Church from the Russian population. In the 1937 Census, more than half the Russian population were willing to declare that they still believed in God--20 years after the Revolution. (Although I do have to correct my figures of victims--I was working too fast and added a zero to the number! There were 100,000 Orthodox clergy and believers executed for religious reasons in 1937, still an incredible number.)
On this, see Gregory Freeze, "Handmaiden of the State?" Journ of Eccl History 1986; also John Basil, _Church and State in late Imperial Russia_
As for the literacy of the Russian clergy, it is true that they were functionally literate and trained in parishes in the period of the Nikonian reforms, but after the creation of the seminary system in the 18th century they became universally literate. Indeed, one could not become a priest in 19th century Russia without having finished the seminary degree. It may have been based on Roman Catholic models and conducted in Latin until the mid-19th century, but they were still highly literate. Many went on to the university and other professions such as doctors, lawyers, teachers, and the like.
On this, see Gregory Freeze, _Parish Clergy in 19th Century Russia_
Laurie Manchester, _Holy Fathers, Secular Sons_
As for the divide between hierarchy & spiritual ascetics, of course Chris is right in criticizing my comment about the "organic wholeness." That is definitely oversimplified and I wanted to go back and change the moment I hit "submit"! But the point is this: Tolstoy had great influence, but mainly among educated elites who were already disaffected with the Church; and Rasputin's popularity was restricted primarily to the Court. Of far, far greater popularity among ordinary Russians were the Optina elders and John of Kronstadt, who (despite tensions) remained very devoted to the Church. Moreover, there was never any sense that seeking spiritual guidance from an elder meant you didn't need to go to Church, participate in the sacraments & the liturgy. Quite the opposite. So one might not go to one's local parish priest for spiritual guidance (since they were rather overburdened with trying to feed their families and conduct rituals), but that never implied you stopped going to that same priest and his church on a regular basis. Russian rates of religious participation far, far exceeded those of Western Europe up until 1917.
I'd be curious to see where Metropolitan Hilarion made those statements. As much as I respect him, there is an enormous amount of recent research (based on archives and other primary sources) which demonstrate that religious life was thriving on the last decades before 1917: the rate of pilgrimage to holy sites was constantly growing, the rate of publishing and selling popular religious literature exploded, and many other indications (see recent books and articles by Christ Chulos, Robert Greene, Roy Robson, Christine Worobec, Page Herrlinger, and others). The idea that the faith of Russians was superficial at the end of the old regime is a myth, as is the idea that the Bolsheviks were able to gain support of the people against the Church somehow quickly or easily. In fact there were many instances in which people attempted to defend their churches. It took decades of enormous effort, brute force, and aggressive persecution for the Soviets to displace the Church from the Russian population. In the 1937 Census, more than half the Russian population were willing to declare that they still believed in God--20 years after the Revolution. (Although I do have to correct my figures of victims--I was working too fast and added a zero to the number! There were 100,000 Orthodox clergy and believers executed for religious reasons in 1937, still an incredible number.)
5.28.2012 | 7:07pm
Christopher Stroop says:
Scott is too modest to cite himself, but some of the important documentation of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century trends he mentions in the comment above can be found in his own thoroughly researched and highly readable book, _The Heart of Russia_, a study of the Trinity St. Sergius Lavra. I have reviewed the book here:
http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=34052
On believers defending themselves against the Bolsheviks, see also Richard Hernandez, “Sacred Sound and Sacred Substance: Church Bells and the Auditory Culture of the Russian Village during the Bolshevik ‘Velikii Perelom’” in The American Historical Review 109, no. 5 (2004): 1475-1504, and “Good Shepherds: The Public Authority of Parish Clergy in the Era of Collectivization” in Russian History / Histoire Russe 32, no. 2 (2005): 195-214.
http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=34052
On believers defending themselves against the Bolsheviks, see also Richard Hernandez, “Sacred Sound and Sacred Substance: Church Bells and the Auditory Culture of the Russian Village during the Bolshevik ‘Velikii Perelom’” in The American Historical Review 109, no. 5 (2004): 1475-1504, and “Good Shepherds: The Public Authority of Parish Clergy in the Era of Collectivization” in Russian History / Histoire Russe 32, no. 2 (2005): 195-214.
6.1.2012 | 1:12am
Theodore G. Karakostas says:
The article by Nicholas Myers deserves to be challenged. First, is the criticism of the Russian Orthodox faithful because of low Church attendance.
Exactly, what do these mindless statistics serve as a purpose? Orthodox Christians are accountable to Jesus Christ the founder of the Orthodox Church and not to some mindless pollster. It is a fact that in the world of today,
secularism has had a corrossive effect on the lives of many.
For many believers throughout the world, it is perhaps not possible to attend each and every service, observe every form of prayer ritual, etc..
Pollsters cannot and do not know the sincerity of belief that is in the heart, the soul, and the mind of an Orthodox believer, Russian or otherwise.
First Things as a forum has for a long time taken out a personnal attack on the Russian Orthodox Church, and this article is very petty.
One should rejoice that Russians have been baptized in the faith and have become believers. Being a Christian believer, whether Eastern or Western is a difficult task at any time. Is one to conclude that if a believer misses a service or does not pray repeatedly that they are not Christian?
Who is fit to make such an assumption, and to make judgements about the piety of other Christians? The religious establishment at the time of Jesus
Christ liked to be seen in their religious practices to show how devout they were, which as we know from the scriptures was not true piety.
In any case, Orthodox believers and their obligations are a matter between them and the Bishops-Priests of the Church.
Missing from any mention in this article are the large crowds that turned out in Russian Churches last Winter to venerate the belt that Orthodox believe was worn by the Mother of God that had been brought to Russia by a spiritual elder of the Vatopaidi Monastery from Mount Athos in Greece.
The attendance rate which showcased the love that Russians have for the Mother of God was quite high. Why no mention of this in the above article?
While Russians were venerating the belt of the Mother of God, our fellow citizens in America were beginning the Season of the birth of our Lord by lining up in stores on the so called "Black Friday" and using pepper spray on other citizens in order to get a good deal on some useless material possessions.
Are Orthodox Countries perfect? Absolutely not. Do they have serious problems, yes. But that does not change the fact that Orthodox Churches for the most part are succeeding despite the propaganda campaigns in western media, and despite their own serious failings in some cases.
The Russian Church has come a long way since the collapse of Communism. It would be nice if the West expressed some respect for the fact that Christianity has toppled the idols of Lenin and Marx and that Christianity is taught in schools and people can worship freely.
Dissaproval of how Orthodox Churches function in their homelands by the
West is irrelevant to most Orthodox. What First Things has been most
effective in articulating is how distinct and different Catholicism and Orthodoxy really are.
Russian Orthodox have suffered the horrors of Bolshevism and have survived.
This itself is a miracle.
Western Christians need to ask themselves if they intend to embrace the Orthodox (especially Russia) as brothers and to bestow good will on them,
or if they intend to replace the Communists to wage their own war against
Russian Orthodoxy?
Most Sincerely,
Theodore G. Karakostas
Exactly, what do these mindless statistics serve as a purpose? Orthodox Christians are accountable to Jesus Christ the founder of the Orthodox Church and not to some mindless pollster. It is a fact that in the world of today,
secularism has had a corrossive effect on the lives of many.
For many believers throughout the world, it is perhaps not possible to attend each and every service, observe every form of prayer ritual, etc..
Pollsters cannot and do not know the sincerity of belief that is in the heart, the soul, and the mind of an Orthodox believer, Russian or otherwise.
First Things as a forum has for a long time taken out a personnal attack on the Russian Orthodox Church, and this article is very petty.
One should rejoice that Russians have been baptized in the faith and have become believers. Being a Christian believer, whether Eastern or Western is a difficult task at any time. Is one to conclude that if a believer misses a service or does not pray repeatedly that they are not Christian?
Who is fit to make such an assumption, and to make judgements about the piety of other Christians? The religious establishment at the time of Jesus
Christ liked to be seen in their religious practices to show how devout they were, which as we know from the scriptures was not true piety.
In any case, Orthodox believers and their obligations are a matter between them and the Bishops-Priests of the Church.
Missing from any mention in this article are the large crowds that turned out in Russian Churches last Winter to venerate the belt that Orthodox believe was worn by the Mother of God that had been brought to Russia by a spiritual elder of the Vatopaidi Monastery from Mount Athos in Greece.
The attendance rate which showcased the love that Russians have for the Mother of God was quite high. Why no mention of this in the above article?
While Russians were venerating the belt of the Mother of God, our fellow citizens in America were beginning the Season of the birth of our Lord by lining up in stores on the so called "Black Friday" and using pepper spray on other citizens in order to get a good deal on some useless material possessions.
Are Orthodox Countries perfect? Absolutely not. Do they have serious problems, yes. But that does not change the fact that Orthodox Churches for the most part are succeeding despite the propaganda campaigns in western media, and despite their own serious failings in some cases.
The Russian Church has come a long way since the collapse of Communism. It would be nice if the West expressed some respect for the fact that Christianity has toppled the idols of Lenin and Marx and that Christianity is taught in schools and people can worship freely.
Dissaproval of how Orthodox Churches function in their homelands by the
West is irrelevant to most Orthodox. What First Things has been most
effective in articulating is how distinct and different Catholicism and Orthodoxy really are.
Russian Orthodox have suffered the horrors of Bolshevism and have survived.
This itself is a miracle.
Western Christians need to ask themselves if they intend to embrace the Orthodox (especially Russia) as brothers and to bestow good will on them,
or if they intend to replace the Communists to wage their own war against
Russian Orthodoxy?
Most Sincerely,
Theodore G. Karakostas
8.18.2012 | 7:13pm
ell says:
Don't forget that the "influence" of the church historically was greatly strengthened by the fear of punishment in the afterlife. The mystical aspects of this highly visceral religion allowed many religious leaders to be more influential in decision-making than those who ordered the armies about. Think of how Rasputin - himself a twisted Orthodox monk - got a foothold in the palace and then a stranglehold on the Czar and his family.
I believe in a clear separation of church and state. And a clear distinction between belief and science.
I believe in a clear separation of church and state. And a clear distinction between belief and science.
The most heinous offense of the Church was informing on its members. As the Soviet archives demonstrate, priests were informing on congregants, bishops on priests. It has been established that former Patriarch Alexei II was actually a colonel in the KGB, receiving prestigious awards for his service to the state.
Until the Church of Moscow has a full and complete accounting of its behavior during the Soviet era, it will continue to be perceived as morally compromised by the majority of Russians.
This cynicism towards the Church by average Russians will continue so long as the present Patriarch and his synod maintain their symbiotic relationship with the Putin regime. Criticism of the government's abuses is minimal and muted; praise for its various institutions and initiatives is visible and vocal. The Church's dependence on the government creates organizational conflicts of interest that make it impossible for the Church to be a truly independent witness, and often leads to hypocritical positions; e.g., the Church preaches against the evils of alcohol, yet is the owner of one of the largest Vodka companies in Russia.
In short, the Church must shake free of the regime and stand on its own feet, bearing witness only to Christ, if it wishes to be taken seriously by the majority of Russians. But old habits die hard. There are many brilliant young priests and bishops rising in the Church of Moscow, but at present they are stifled by the old guard. Only when the last of the priests and bishops formed under the Soviet Union has left the scene will they be able to express the true voice of Orthodoxy in Russia.