Ads


Paul and the Swiss-Cheese Theory of Natural Law

Natural lawyers commonly cite a passage from the second chapter of Paul’s letter to the Romans to show the existence of natural law to Christians. While I accept some version of natural law, natural lawyers often seem to want to derive much more from the text than it supports.

James R. Rogers The commonly quoted passage from the book of Romans is this:


For when Gentiles who do not have the Law do instinctively the things of the Law, these, not having the Law, are a law to themselves, in that they show the work of the Law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness and their thoughts alternately accusing or else defending them . . .

The place of this text in Paul’s broader argument helps us understand the argument he makes here, and we’ll consider that below. But even the text as often quoted has problems when deployed as a reference for the idea of a broadly accessible morality discerned in nature.

One word in the passage that seems to drop out when commentators quote or cite it as support for natural law is the word “when” at the very beginning of the sentence. “For when Gentiles . . . do instinctively the things of the law . . . [they] show the work of the Law written in their hearts.”

The “when” would suggest the possibility of significant limits on the extent to which natural law is written on people’s hearts. Consider a similarly phrased observation: “When my son visits his grandmother, he shows himself helpful.”

This statement says nothing about my son’s helpfulness at places other than his grandmother’s, let alone that he’s generally helpful. It’s a statement about a condition that holds when my son is helpful. Indeed, the sentence could be used to discuss how typically unhelpful my son is in every other place than his grandmother’s.

Paul’s argument in this text could be consistent with what I call “Swiss-cheese” morality. There could be lots of holes in a person’s natural morality—huge air pockets of amoralism—yet Paul’s statement would still hold true for that person. That Gentiles show the work of the law when they instinctively do the things of the law does not say anything about how commonly the condition holds.

Paul’s broader argument, after all, is about guilt rather than morality. Natural lawyers often cite the passage with the suggestion that the guilt about which Paul writes in this passage necessarily assumes a law that causes that guilt. And so it does. Yet this guilt does not predicate a broad swath of common morality accessible by reason.

Indeed, Paul’s claim would hold true even if a person’s instincts witnessed to only one moral obligation that the person transgressed during an entire lifetime. Recall that with the breaking a single commandment one becomes guilty of breaking the entire law. That may seem an extreme case, yet, on an individual level, I know that I have had a guilty conscience about far fewer sins than I have committed.

The air pockets in the Swiss-cheese of natural law could locate around substantive requirements of morality—one could take a life without a twang on conscience, or commit adultery, or thieve another person’s goods. But the air pockets might also result from false limits on the extent of the moral obligations to others, perhaps holding that obligations to right behavior do not extend beyond immediate family or clan, or beyond showing honor to other thieves.

Indeed, even some people who exposit the natural law could be affected by the fall, failing to identify obligations that the law requires, or affirming obligations that the law does not impose. Christians, too, have on more than one occasion accommodated the spirit of the times, thereby conforming their morality to that spirit rather than to the Spirit.

Beyond the possible Swiss cheesiness of the moral instincts discussed in this text, natural lawyers also often overlook the temporal expectations in the passage, an expectation that suggests the conscience of the Gentile witnesses at a specific point in the future rather than it being a transhistorical experience. Consider the passage quoted somewhat more broadly:


For all who have sinned without the Law will also perish without the Law, and all who have sinned under the Law will be judged by the Law; for it is not the hearers of the Law who are just before God, but the doers of the Law will be justified. For when Gentiles who do not have the Law do instinctively the things of the Law, these, not having the Law, are a law to themselves, in that they show the work of the Law written in their hearts, their conscience bearing witness and their thoughts alternately accusing or else defending them, on the day when, according to my gospel, God will judge the secrets of men through Christ Jesus.

The perishing without the Law that Paul refers to here is perishing on the day of judgment. So, too, the specific witness of the conscience is active on the day of judgment, “their conscience bearing witness and their thoughts alternatively accusing or else defending them, on the day when, according to my gospel, God will judge the secrets of men through Christ Jesus.”

To be sure, this does not rule out the possibility that the conscience works in the here and the now. After all, the instinctive doing of the law is in the here and the now. Yet it is Paul who distinguishes between the instinctive doing of the law today and the work of the conscience in accusing or defending on that future day.

Natural law theorists would seem to need to push the witness of the conscience from this future date into the here and now. To work as a practical matter for the foundation for a recognizably common morality accessible by Christian and non-Christian alike, however, the conscience would need to be activated naturally, or naturalistically, rather than spiritually. It is at this point that questions about how optimistic a view of human nature natural law theory requires would seem to have some bite. I’m not suggesting that the questions are insuperable, only that the Scriptures have a bit to say on the question as well.

James R. Rogers is department head and associate professor of political science at Texas A&M University. He leads the “New Man” prison ministry at the Hamilton Unit in Bryan, Texas, and serves on the Board of Directors for the Texas District of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. His previous “On the Square” articles can be found here.

Become a fan of First Things on Facebook, subscribe to First Things via RSS, and follow First Things on Twitter.

Comments:

11.20.2012 | 9:20am
Michael PS says:
“Conscience” may be being used here simply in the sense of self-knowledge.

The etymology of is “knowing together,” just like Latin “Conscire.”

A common meaning is “to share a secret,” “to be privy to.” Thus Tacitus says that Sallust was “Agrippinae interficiendi conscius;” he was privy to her murder, he was “in the know.”

Now a person is privy to his own thoughts, intentions and motives. This is the meaning of Horace’s “nil conscire sibi,” literally “to know nothing to oneself.” One finds the same sense in Newman’s, “I was not conscious to myself, on my conversion, of any change, intellectual or moral, wrought in my mind. The reflexive is very important here.

Thus, “my conscience is clear,” may be an assertion of the purity of one’s intentions, the knowledge that one acted for the best, or “I have nothing on my conscience,” meaning “nothing with which to reproach myself,” appearances to the contrary notwithstanding

This is quite different to the “synderesis” of the Scholastics, meaning the habitual knowledge of the universal practical principles of moral action. I do not believe “conscience” is ever used in that sense in the New Testament.
11.20.2012 | 10:43am
John Hartung says:
This just seems to confuse the distinction between de dicto and de re of moral discourse. De dicto, the worldlings in Romans 2 may have a swiss cheesy grasp of moral law depending on where and when their conscience is still functioning properly, but the point is that de re there is a natural law, which follows from the fact that there are times when conscience does function properly. That text is sufficient to support the point of being a natural lawyer which is to recognize and articulate the objective law. Further, the "air pockets" are things for which God will hold the world accountable. They are culpable pockets. The scholastic synderesis is conscience in the formal sense, in terms of its proper functioning, and the NT (at least here) is describing conscience in the material sense, it terms of its state as we find it.
11.20.2012 | 2:01pm
David WL says:
Hear, hear.

The entire point of Romans 1 and 2 is to say that Gentiles don't live up to the moral light they COULD have. Before the text quoted, Paul says:

21 For although they knew God, they did not honor him as God or give thanks to him, but they became futile in their thinking, and their foolish hearts were darkened. 22 Claiming to be wise, they became fools, 23 and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man and birds and animals and creeping things. (ESV)

So clearly Gentile do not recognize the wisdom they could have.

As for "conscience". Whenever used in the NT, it always refers to the new moral light bestowed through Christ. The text Mr. Rodgers quotes is not an exception, since it is (as he correctly) observes, the light provided at the eschatological judgment.

As for the "synderesis" of the Scholastics, the short version of their mistake is that they confuse a specific moral consciousness, created by the presence of the supernatural life of Jesus Christ, with a generic "habitual knowledge of the universal practical principles of moral action."
They provide no *philosophical* argument that such a thing exists, and as Michael PS says, it is never used in that sense in the NT.

Thus: "synderesis" doesn't exist.
11.23.2012 | 9:14am
I like the idea of conscience as something with a strong communal, or relational dimension. Maybe the geometry of "conscience" is really simpler in the scriptures.
It seems sensible that people's responses are 'naturally' appropriate to their surroundings or circumstances, or the circumstances they see coming toward them from the future. And so the scriptures talk about the Lord 'pitching His tent among us,' His presence being what makes the difference. This is less abstract and more grounded to me than a somewhat remote idea of 'virtue,' for instance.
11.26.2012 | 10:40am
Paul says:
I think it's a stretch to say natural law theorists depend that much upon this passage (J. Budziszewski, for instance, invokes this passage as but one among many; neither Aquinas nor Lewis depend on it to any significant degree when claiming that the natural law is part of Christian belief or presumed by it). This is a passage that is sometimes invoked to show the presence of the natural law in Scripture. The case could actually be made without any appeal to any New Testament passage--though a number of New Testament passages clearly presume the existence of the natural law. Moreover, the empirical case for a substantively rich (rather than a substantively thin) natural law--as formulated along Thomistic lines--is quite strong. Many Christian skeptics of natural law let the relevant anthropological evidence go by the way. There's no scriptural case, they wrongly assert, all the while ignoring the anthropological evidence.
type the text above in the box below

Links

Blogs

Find Us

Contact