Jumping up and down eagerly, I’d like to point you to Ivan Kenneally’s article on neuroscience and the soul . Ivan blogged about it previously here .
I may be horribly misreading the article, but it seems to me that the problem lies more in reductionist accounts of human experience being exalted as ontologically "more real" than it does in reductionism taking place in a vacuum.
Certainly, a purely materialist account of the workings of my brain is a legitimate, and perhaps someday will even be an accurate, account of what is going on. The trouble comes when we claim that the materialist account is all that is going on; when we confuse the lightning with its flash or take the flapping curtain to be the breeze rather to be a sign of the breeze. It’s this move, the reifying of mere correlation, that both makes neuroscience unscientific and makes naturalism philosophically poisonous.
We needn’t stop there, however, we can argue against reductionism on its own turf! The point that Ivan makes eloquently is that by its own standards, reductionism fails. An Einsteinean picture of the universe replaced the Newtonian one because it provided a better description of how the universe works. Reudctionism has acheived no such thing. The "best account" of my subjective experience remains a not-wholly-materialist one.
Part of this is due to the uniqueness of the objects of study in the "human sciences". Observer-independence is fetishized in the natural sciences for important reasons, but extending the same principle to the study of persons is wholly inappropriate.
