From Derrida, still talking about the analogy of father-son and origin-speech:
the father is not the generator or procreator in any “real” sense prior to or outside all relation to language. In what way, indeed, is the father/son relation distinguishable from a mere cause/effect or generator/engendered relation, if not by the instance of logos? Only a power of speech can have a father. The father is always father to a speaking/living being. In other words, it is precisely logos that enables us to perceive and investigate something like paternity.If I’m following this, it appears to be saying that the father-son in speech relation is constituted by the instance of logos, which means that the father is no father of speech without a son. The final sentence, then, says that the appearance of the son is what enables us to perceive paternity. Here again, Derrida’s thought seems to be crying out for Trinitarian fulfillment.
