Aquinas on Gratitude

Comments primarily on Aquinas on Gratitude/Ingratitude (primarily ST, II-II, qs 106-7).

Aquinas describes gratitude as a virtue “annexed” to justice, and so to understand his discussion of gratitude, we must get some handle on what he means by justice. In ST II-II, q. 58, he describes justice as a virtue. Virtues “make human acts and human beings themselves good,” and since justice orders human actions in a right way, it is a virtue. Unlike other virtues, however, justice is not confined to directing human acts in relation to the actor but in relation to others (q. 57). Other virtues pertain to what Aristotle described as “praxis,” which has to do with acts whose effects remain with the actor; but justice is “poetic,” pertaining to acts that have effects on others. Justice has to do with “the relation of deeds to other human beings.”

He defines justice in terms of equality: “we call our deeds just if they return quid pro quo to others (e.g., the payment of wages due for services rendered)” (ST II-II, q. 57). The equivalence required by justice can be of several kinds. In some cases, there is a natural equivalence, and this gives rise to natural right; if I give $10 for $10 of goods, there is natural justice in the exchange. But in other cases, the equivalence is established by consent, either by the consent of two contracting parties or by the general consent of a community. This latter category of equivalences is established by human will, and Thomas speaks of this as positive justice. This is valid, but the human will cannot, by itself, make something intrinsically unjust to be just. A community may agree that theft is lawful, but that does not make it just.

Further on, he describes justice as “the habit whereby one with steadfast and enduring will renders to others what it due them” (q. 58). Every virtue is “a habit that is the source of good acts,” a habit being an innate, infused, acquired disposition toward a particular kind of action or behavior. Since virtues are habits that produce good acts, and since virtues are defined in terms of the good acts that the virtue produces, that are the proper matter of the virtue, with justice specifically we can say that “justice concerns things in relation to other things as its proper matter.” Justice is also located in the will, so that “acts of justice should be voluntary,” and since virtues need to be enduring and not momentary, justice must be defined as an enduring disposition to act in a particular way.

Again, “The subject matter of justice consists of external actions insofar as they or the things we use through them are related to other persons, and justice directs us in relation to them. But we say that what is, in equal proportion, due other persons belongs to them. And so the proper act of justice consists only of rendering to others what is due them.”

Thomas’s model of justice involves not only an equivalence of thing exchanged, but also an equality of the persons who do the exchange. Justice per se pertains only to persons who are “absolutely other” and “altogether distinct.” That is the case when neither “is subject to the other, although both are subject to the ruler of a political community.” Between such equal citizens, “there is justice without qualification.” On the other hand, there are differences within a community that are not “absolute” differences. A father is not “absolutely” different from his children, nor a master from his slave, because each is defined in relation to the other. Fathers and masters have a certain kind of “ownership,” and thus in these relations what pertains is not “justice absolutely” but a qualified form of justice – paternal justice and master-slave justice. It would be unjust, for instance, for a free citizen to strike another free citizen; but it is not unjust for a father to spank his children. Wives, Thomas says, are in an in-between category: “although they belong to their husbands, [they] are nonetheless more distinct from their husbands and children are from their fathers, or slaves from their masters, since wives share in the common life of marriage. And so there is more of the character of justice between husbands and wives than there is between fathers and their children, or between masters and slaves.”

Justice is both virtue in general and the most important of the virtues. Justice can direct human beings to render what is due to an individual, but can also direct actions toward the common good of a community. Each individual in a community is a part of the community, and can direct his actions toward the common good; and each part of the person can be directed toward the common good. Thus, the good of any virtue can be ordered in relation to the individual person or in relation to the common good, and this direction of things to the common good displays the virtue of justice. Thus, “the acts of all the virtues can, in this respect, belong to justice as it directs human beings to the common good.” Justice is the most important of the virtues for two reasons: First because “justice inheres in the more excellent part of the soul (i.e., the rational appetite; namely the will)” while other virtues reside in “the sense appetites, to which emotions belong.” Second, “we praise other virtues only by reason of the good of the virtuous persons themselves, but we praise justice insofar as virtuous persons are rightly related to others. And so justice is, in one respect, the good of others.”

Thomas deals with gratitude in the context of his larger treatise on justice, but more technically, gratitude, like piety, religion, obedience, and other virtues, are “potential parts” “annexed” to justice. He explains the notion of “annexed” virtues in II-II, q. 80. Annexed virtues must have something in common with the principal virtue to which they are annexed. Thus, gratitude has something in common with justice – it renders a person what is due to him. All the virtues annexed to justice have this quality of being “directed to another person.” But the annexed virtues fall short of the perfection of the virtue to which they are annexed. This happens in two ways: first, when a virtue falls short of justice with respect to equality (of persons or of things exchanged), second, when a virtue falls short “of the aspect of due.” Religion is annexed to justice, but since we are not equals with God and cannot return to Him what He has given us, piety is not justice. Filial piety falls short of justice in the same way.

Gratitude falls short of justice because of an imperfection in the aspect of due. Due is of two kinds, legal and moral. Legal due “is that which one is bound to render by reason of a legal obligation.” This sort of due is the proper matter of justice. Moral due “is that to which one is bound in respect of the rectitude of virtue.” Gratitude falls into this latter category, and thus falls short of justice. Aquinas further distinguishes different senses of “due.” Due is a kind of necessity, and it is a necessity in the sense that without it “moral rectitude cannot be ensured.” This can be examined from the perspective of the debtor who owes the thing due, or from the perspective of the person to whom it is due. In the latter case, when we consider due by comparing the reward received with good things that have been done, we come to gratitude as annexed to justice. Gratitude is “recollecting the friendship and kindliness shown by others, and in desiring to pay them back.”

Aquinas deals with gratitude and ingratitude directly in II-II, qs. 106-
7. The first of these questions deals with gratitude and the second with the corresponding vice of ingratitude. Question 106 begins with the question of whether thankfulness is a special virtue, distinct from other virtues. Thomas concludes that it is a special virtue by describing the various debts that we owe to various causes, which he arranges in a hierarchy of mutually inclusive causes. God is the giver of all goods, our parents give us life and nurture, our superiors give us favors, and we are bound to respond to these favors, to pay these debts, by “worship” in various forms – religion (debt to God), honor (debt to parents), and observance (debt to superiors). Each of the higher forms of repayment includes the lower – we are to honor God as well as parents, pay due observance to parents and God as well as superior. A benefactor who gives us particular favors is due our thanks, and not any of these other repayments. But thanks is part of our obligation to superiors, parents, and God as well.

In the second article, he asks whether a penitent is more bound to thank God than the penitent. He concludes that the penitent is to be more thankful because the thanks (gratiarum actio) corresponds to the favor (gratia). The degree of thanks due varies in two ways. First, the greater the quantity of the gift, the greater the thanks owed; in this case, the innocent is more obligated to thanks since the gift of innocence is a greater gift than restoration to justice. Second, the gratitude required varies proportionally to the gratuitousness of the original gift, and in this sense the penitent is more obligated to repay. Even on the first point, the penitent has the greater obligation, because the quantity of the gift is not absolute but relative to the recipient. To a poor man, a small gift is greater than a large gift is to a rich man. Thus, the penitent receives a quantitively greater gift, as well as receiving it more gratuitously, and therefore he is more deeply obligated to repay with gratitude.

Thomas answers the question of whether it is always necessary to give thanks to benefactors affirmatively. Interestingly, he answers in terms of cause and effect. Effects turn “naturally toward its cause,” he says, citing Pseudo-Dionysus, who writes that “God turns all things to Himself, because He is the cause of all.” Effects thus double back toward their causes, and this is true because “the effect must needs always be directed to the end of the agent.” That is, the agent who acts as the cause of a particular effect, acts in order to achieve some aim, some end. If the act has the desired effect, that means it reaches the end to which the agent directed it, and thus the effect turns back toward the agent who started the process in the first place. Since a benefactor is the cause of a gift, “the natural order requires that he who has received a favor should, by repaying the favor, turn to his benefactor according to the mode of each.” The one exception he makes is that one is not obligated to return thanks if the benefactor has so lapsed from virtue that a repayment would encourage sin.

A man is not, Thomas argues in the fourth article, obligated to return a favor at once, since that tends to turn the gift into a debt. He has argued that gratitude is a kind of repayment of a debt, but he distinguishes here between gratitude and repayment (again, we are back to the fact that gratitude is a virtue annexed to justice, rather than justice per se). Aquinas develops his answer by distinguishing between the “affection of the heart” and “the gift.” With regard to the former, repayment is made at once, in a gracious reception of the gift. But with regard to the gift itself, the recipient should wait “until such a time as will be convenient to the benefactor.”

In receiving a gift, one should attend to the benefactor’s disposition, and the gratitude due in return is proportional to the largeness of heart displayed by the giver. Of course, only God can fully plumb the dispositions of a person, but Aquinas argues that disposition is “shown by certain signs,” and is thus possible for us to know. In developing his answer, Aquinas suggests that the repayment of favors belongs to three virtues: justice, gratitude, friendship. Repayment is an act of justice when it is a legal debt. Repayment in the context of friendship differs depending on the cause of the friendship – if the friendship aims at usefulness, then the repayment should be proportionate to the usefulness of what was given. Finally, gratitude regards the favor as something “bestowed gratis,” and thus must pay attention to “the disposition of the giver,” since that’s what distinguishes a favor from a loan or an act of friendship. Thus, “repayment of a favor depends more on the disposition of the giver than on the effect.”

Finally, Aquinas argues that a repayment of gratitude should be in excess of the gift received. The reason has to do with the fact that gratitude attends to the disposition of the benefactor, and the fact that gratitude has similarities to justice. The benefactor deserves praise “for having conferred the favor gratis without being bound to do so,” and the recipient must respond with something gratuitous in return. If he repays only equivalently, “he would seem to do nothing gratis, but only to return what he has received.”

Question 107 deals with ingratitude. Aquinas spends most of this question dealing with questions about the sinful character of ingratitude, arguing that it is always sin, it is a special sin, and that it might be a mortal or venial sin depending on circumstances. In discussing whether ingratitude is a special sin, Aquinas gives his most extended summary of what gratitude involves. There are three degrees of gratitude: “The first of these is to recognize the favor received, the second to express one’s appreciation and thanks, and the third to repay the favor at a suitable place and time according to one’s means.” Ingratitude destroys each of these, but in reverse order, since “what is last in the order of generation is first in the order of destruction.” A man reaches the first degree of ingratitude when he “fails to repay a favor, the second when he declines to notice and indicate that he has received a favor, while the third and supreme degree is when a man fails to recognize the reception of a favor, whether by forgetting it or in any other way.” Further, ingratitude turns into the opposite of gratitude; hence: “it belongs to the first degree of ingratitude to return evil for good, to the second to find fault with a favor received, and to the third to esteem kindness as though it were unkindness.”

Finally, Aquinas argues that we should imitate God in giving favors to the ungrateful. This has the added benefit of potentially turning the ungrateful from their vice to the virtue of gratitude. But there is a limit: “If . . . the more he repeats his favors, the more ungrateful and evil the other becomes, he should cease from bestowing his favors upon him.”