Nature/Supernature, Gift and Grace

McGrath offers the following genealogy of the distinction of nature and supernature:

Prior to the 12th century, theologians defined grace as a “gift of God” without distinguishing various kinds of gifts. But this left open the question of whether “all of God’s gifts” should be “identified as God’s grace.” Is free bestowal the defining quality of grace? During the 12th century, this was addressed by distinguishing between gifts that were natural (datum – “given”) and gifts that were additional to the gifts of nature (donum – “gift”).

Scotus Erigena was the first to make a systematic distinction between the two: Donum gratiae neque intra terminos conditae naturae continetur neque secundum naturalem virtutem operatur, sed superessentialiter et ultra omnes creatas naturales rationes effectus suos peragit. And Erigena used the explicit language of “gratia supernaturalis.” Theologians increasingly employed phrases like “supra naturam” or “ultra naturam.” Simon of Tournai argued that “datum” is natural, while “donum” is spiritual: “Datis autem subsistit homo, quod est et qualis est naturaliter; donis vero qualis est spiritualiter. Ex datis ergo contrahit naturalem; ex donis, spiritualem.”

Peter of Poitiers suggested that naturalia was what originated in man, while gratuita originated from God: “Naturalia dicunt illa quae habet homo a nativitate sua,” and this included “ratio, ingenium, memoria, etc.” Grace “sunt illa quae naturalibus superaddita sunt,” such as “virtutes et scientiae,” and it is called gratuita because “a Deo homini per gratiam conferuntur.”

Early in the 13th century, Praepositinus of Cremona (who deserves to be remembered if only for his name) argued that there must be an order beyond nature. His argument was that “Fides mea est supra rationem et ratione nullum naturale bonum est homine excellentius. Ergo fides supra omnia naturalia.” That is: Reason is the highest of natural human qualities, yet faith is higher; faith thus belongs to a realm beyond the natural.

Philip the Chancellor, in McGrath’s summary, “distinguishes the natural order from the ‘more noble’ supernatural order: to the former belong reason and natural love, to the latter faith and charity.” When applied to justification, this meant that it takes place as a “twofold operation”: First, grace operates on the will to produce moral good (natural) and then grace raises them from natural goodness to a supernatural plane where they are meritorious.