Time and the end of actions

Time and the end of actions April 6, 2006

Why should there be a final judgment when God judges in time? Aquinas answers: “Judgment on something changeable cannot be rendered fully before its consummation. Thus judgment cannot be rendered fully regarding the quality of any action before its completion, both in itself and its results, because many actions appear to be advantageous, which by their effects are shown to be harmful.” Even a human life continues after the human life is ended:


“it must be observed that althought a person’s earthly life in itself ends with death, it nevertheless remains to some degree dependent on what comes after it in the future. In one way, one’s life continues on in people’s memories, in which, sometimes contrary to the truth, good or evil reputations linger on. In another way, one lives on in one’s children, who are, as it were, something of their parent . . . . In a third way, one lives on to a degree in the result of one’s actions, as in the case of how, from the deceit of Arius and other false leaders, unbelief continues to flourish down to the end of the world, just as faith will continut to derive its progress until then from the preaching of the apostles. In a fourth way, one lives on as regards the body, which is sometimes buried with honor and sometimes left unburied, and finally turns completely to dust. In a fifth way, one lives on in the things on which one’s heart is set, such as worldly concerns, some of which are ended quickly, while others endure longer.”

Given this, God must render judgment not only actions and persons in the middle of their history but also at the end: “a definitive and public judgment cannot be made of all these things during the course of this present time.”

As Frederick Bauerschmidt comments, this doesn’t do much to answer the question, since Aquinas believes that the final verdict will be the same as the verdict passed at the time of a person’s death (a person will be in heaven or hell before their actions are “ended”). He suggests that one reason for the final public judgment is to overturn and correct “the imperfect judgment that human beings have made” in the course of history. Plus, although the judgment rendered at death is not reversible, there can be a kind of intensification of judgment: “Arius, at his death, could be judged for his erroneous beliefs about the Trinity; at the final judgment he could also be held accountable for the evil effects of his teaching on later generations.”

Apart from the context of final judgment, Thomas’ comments here are very intriguing. First, it suggests that endings are as problematic and elusive as beginnings. Second, it suggests some grounds for thinking that the meaning/significance of things appears to change over time. The reason Aquinas gives is that actions are not complete until all the consequences of the action have been taken into account. Precisely, Thomas does not believe that the significance of an action changes over time, but rather that the action is not complete without its effects, and that the meaning of the action cannot be known until it is complete. Thus, for instance, the final meaning of my speech-act today is deferred until all the effects of my speech-act are realized. This puts Thomas intriguingly into conversation with Derrida, with the absolutely critical difference that Thomas believes there is an end, a final summing up, a final judgment. (Thomas also believes that there are judgments within history as well as at the end; this also seems to be an important qualification to his recognition of dissemination.)

Finally, this passage discloses something about Thomas, whose theology is often characterized as static and rigid. To that we can say: Not a bit of it.


Browse Our Archives