Leithart
Peter Lombard argued (Book 1, distinction 17 of the Sentences ) that the Spirit is both the love by which God loves us and the origin of the love by which we love Him: “the Holy Spirit is the Love [amor] of the Father and the Son, by which They love [amant] one another and us. Moreover, it must be added to these, that the very same Holy Spirit is the Love or Charity, by which we love [diligimus] God and neighbor. When this Charity is so great in us, that it makes us love God and neighbor, the Holy Spirit is then said to be sent and/or to be given to us; and he who loves the very love [dilectionem], by which he loves (his) neighbor, in this very (thing) loves God, because Love itself is God, that is, the Holy Spirit.”
Analyzing some passages from Augustine, Lombard argues that Augustine “declares in a sufficiently open manner, that the very same fraternal love — for fraternal love is that whereby we love one another — (is) not only from God, but even is preached to be God by such a great authority, namely (St.) John. When, therefore we love (our) brother from Love, we love (our) brother from [de] God, nor can it come about, that we do not love chiefly the same Love, by which we love (our) brother, since ‘God is Love.’ Likewise: ‘He who does not love (his) brother is not in love; and he who is not in love is not in God, because God is Love.’”
He recognizes that some deny that the Spirit is the love by which we love God, claiming that the Spirit is only the love of God for us. They base this distinction on a passages from Augustine, such as this from On the Spirit and the Letter : “Whence is love, except whence faith itself is, that is from the Holy Spirit? For it would not be in us, unless it were poured forth in our hearts through the Holy Spirit. But the charity said to be poured fourth in our hearts is not, that by which He loves us, but that by which He makes us lovers of Him [dilectores suos]. Just as God’s justice is said (to be), that by which we are made just by His gift [munere], and the Lord’s salvation, that by which He saves us, and the faith of Christ, that by which He makes us faithful.”
In response, Peter argues that this passage does not divide “the Charity, by which God loves us, from that, by which we love, but rather, since there is one and the same Charity and It is said (to be) the very Charity of God, It is shown in Scripture to be named the ‘Charity of God’ from diverse causes and reckonings. For it is said (to be) the ‘Charity of God,’ either because God loves us by It, and/or because He makes us lovers of Him by It.”
Further, it is objected, the Spirit cannot be the charity that we exercise toward others since “charity is an affection of mind and a movement of the spirit [animi]; but the Holy Spirit is not an affection of the spirit and/or a movement of the mind, because the Holy Spirit is immutable and uncreated: therefore He is not charity.” To this, Lombard replies that God is said to be our hope and patience because “He makes us hope and be patient [pati]; thus Charity is said to be a movement or affection of the spirit, because through it the spirit is moved and affected to love God.” In short, “in this manner Charity is said to be a movement of the spirit, not because It Itself is a movement and/or affection and/or virtue of the spirit, but because through It, as if It were a virtue, the mind is affected and moved.”
Other acts and movements of the soul are caused by the Spirit operating through some virtue in the soul. But love is different: “Charity works the other acts and movements of the virtues, that is, the Holy Spirit (works), by means of the virtues, the acts of which they are, as for example the act of faith, that is, to believe by means of the faith, and the act of hope, that is, to hope by means of hope. For through faith and hope He works the aforesaid acts. However the act of loving, that is ‘to love,’ He works through Himself without the means of any virtue.” The Spirit “works this act in a manner other than the other acts of the virtues. And for that reason Scripture, which grants this especially to Charity, speaks differently of this and of the others. Therefore Charity is truly the Holy Spirit.”
Thomas won’t buy it. He argues (ST II-II, 23, 2) that charity must be something created in the soul, rather than the direct operation of the Spirit. His reasons are derived from an Aristotelian account of action. He summarizes Peter’s point this way: “charity is not something created in the soul, but is the Holy Ghost Himself dwelling in the mind. Nor does he mean to say that this movement of love whereby we love God is the Holy Ghost Himself, but that this movement is from the Holy Ghost without any intermediary habit, whereas other virtuous acts are from the Holy Ghost by means of the habits of other virtues, for instance the habit of faith or hope or of some other virtue: and this he said on account of the excellence of charity.
Such a position is, Thomas thinks, “detrimental to charity.” The Spirit does not lead the mind to charity by “some extrinsic motive power,” as when a material thing is knocked over by force. That would be “contrary to the nature of a voluntary act, whose principle needs to be in itself.” Were Lombard right, then “it would follow that to love is not a voluntary act, which involves a contradiction, since love, of its very nature, implies an act of the will.”
Nor can the Spirit work on the will in such a direct manner “as though the will were an instrument, for an instrument, though it be a principle of action, nevertheless has not the power to act or not to act, for then again the act would cease to be voluntary and meritorious.” Since “the love of charity is the root of merit,” an account of charity that destroys merit cannot be correct.
Positively, Thomas argues that “no act is perfectly produced by an active power, unless it be connatural to that power of reason of some form which is the principle of that action.” In this sense, “God, Who moves all things to their due ends, bestowed on each thing the form whereby it is inclined to the end appointed to it by Him.” Since “it is evident that the act of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will,” it is clear that “unless some form be superadded to the natural power, inclining it to the act of love, this same act would be less perfect than the natural acts and the acts of the other powers; nor would it be easy and pleasurable to perform.” That is, if there is no “extra” added to the will that moves it toward love, the will cannot act to perfection and the will cannot act with ease and pleasure. But the will guided by charity can act both with ease and with pleasure, and therefore there must be some superadded gift beyond the natural power of the will. “Therefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of charity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity, and causing it to act with ease and pleasure.”
This move is crucial for the development of medieval soteriology. Instead of conceiving charity as the indwelling presence of the Spirit that inclines the will and mind to charity, Thomas posits the need for some created reality, a gift of God to be sure, that ensures that the acts of the charitable will are voluntary acts, acts possessed by the person that can be called “his own.” But Thomas’ argument either proves to much or collapses into a nature/grace dualism.
On the one hand, it might prove too much if his argument was directed against the noti
on of double agency. Thomas sounds at times as if the will must be moved by “something within,” and therefore it is impossible for the will to move and be moved simultaneously. But this is not the case. Thomas does believe in double agency in action and choice. He insists that acts must be voluntary, moved by a principle within even if that internal principle of movement is not a first principle. He also recognizes, however, that God moves the will to choose and act, and sees nothing incompatible in this with the voluntary nature of actions: “God moves man to act, not only by proposing the appetible to the senses, or by effecting a change in his body, but also by moving the will itself; because every movement either of the will or of nature, proceeds from God as the First Mover. And just as it is not incompatible with nature that the natural movement be from God as the First Mover, inasmuch as nature is an instrument of God moving it: so it is not contrary to the essence of a voluntary act, that it proceed from God, inasmuch as the will is moved by God. Nevertheless both natural and voluntary movements have this in common, that it is essential that they should proceed from a principle within the agent.”
Since Thomas is not rejecting double agency, the problem seems to be that he falls into a nature/grace scheme. If the First Mover can move the will naturally toward a particular choice and a particular act, then what prevents the Spirit of the First Mover from moving the will toward charity? The answer appears to be that human nature as such lacks some faculty, some capacity, to be moved toward charity. As created, man has no principle of charity within himself, but must receive a superadded habitus . For man to reach his final end, to act with genuine charity, it is not enough for human nature to be moved by the Spirit toward charity; something, an internal principle, is lacking in human nature as created, and must be added before the will can become charitably inclined.
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