Irrationality of Islam

Irrationality of Islam September 17, 2006

Pope Benedict’s remarks on Islam have sparked violent protests, and many have noted the irony: Muslims violently protests the Pope’s claim that they practice a violent religion. But the Pope’s main point in the address was about the detachment of God’s word from human reason; he traced efforts to deHellenize Christianity from the late medieval period through the modern, and claimed that the resulting severing of faith and reason led to the exclusion of theology from the university and made dialogue between religions impossible. So the irony is even larger: The whole speech was a plea for a place for theology in the academy, because such is necessary to pursue religious dialogue.

The following paragraphs summarize his conclusions:


“This attempt, painted with broad strokes, at a critique of modern reason from within has nothing to do with putting the clock back to the time before the Enlightenment and rejecting the insights of the modern age. The positive aspects of modernity are to be acknowledged unreservedly: we are all grateful for the marvelous possibilities that it has opened up for mankind and for the progress in humanity that has been granted to us. The scientific ethos, moreover, is the will to be obedient to the truth, and, as such, it embodies an attitude which reflects one of the basic tenets of Christianity. The intention here is not one of retrenchment or negative criticism, but of broadening our concept of reason and its application.

“While we rejoice in the new possibilities open to humanity, we also see the dangers arising from these possibilities and we must ask ourselves how we can overcome them. We will succeed in doing so only if reason and faith come together in a new way, if we overcome the self-imposed limitation of reason to the empirically verifiable, and if we once more disclose its vast horizons. In this sense theology rightly belongs in the university and within the wide-ranging dialogue of sciences, not merely as a historical discipline and one of the human sciences, but precisely as theology, as inquiry into the rationality of faith.

“Only thus do we become capable of that genuine dialogue of cultures and religions so urgently needed today. In the Western world it is widely held that only positivistic reason and the forms of philosophy based on it are universally valid. Yet the world’s profoundly religious cultures see this exclusion of the divine from the universality of reason as an attack on their most profound convictions. A reason which is deaf to the divine and which relegates religion into the realm of subcultures is incapable of entering into the dialogue of cultures. At the same time, as I have attempted to show, modern scientific reason with its intrinsically Platonic element bears within itself a question which points beyond itself and beyond the possibilities of its methodology.”

The treatment of Islam is confined to a few paragraphs near the beginning of of the speech:

“I [recently] read the edition by Professor Theodore Khoury (Münster) of part of the dialogue carried on— perhaps in 1391 in the winter barracks near Ankara— by the erudite Byzantine emperor Manuel II Paleologus and an educated Persian on the subject of Christianity and Islam, and the truth of both. It was probably the emperor himself who set down this dialogue, during the siege of Constantinople between 1394 and 1402; and this would explain why his arguments are given in greater detail than the responses of the learned Persian.

“The dialogue ranges widely over the structures of faith contained in the Bible and in the Qur’an, and deals especially with the image of God and of man, while necessarily returning repeatedly to the relationship of the three Laws: the Old Testament, the New Testament, and the Qur’an. In this lecture I would like to discuss only one point— itself rather marginal to the dialogue itself— which, in the context of the issue of faith and reason, I found interesting and which can serve as the starting-point for my reflections on this issue.

“In the seventh conversation edited by Professor Khoury, the emperor touches on the theme of the jihad (holy war). The emperor must have known that surah 2, 256 reads: ‘There is no compulsion in religion.’ It is one of the suras of the early period, when Mohammed was still powerless and under threat.

“But naturally the emperor also knew the instructions, developed later and recorded in the Qur’an, concerning holy war. Without descending to details, such as the difference in treatment accorded to those who have the ‘Book’ and the ‘infidels,’ he turns to his interlocutor somewhat brusquely with the central question on the relationship between religion and violence in general, in these words: ‘Show me just what Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will find things only evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith he preached.’

“The emperor goes on to explain in detail the reasons why spreading the faith through violence is something unreasonable. Violence is incompatible with the nature of God and the nature of the soul. ‘God is not pleased by blood, and not acting reasonably is contrary to God’s nature. Faith is born of the soul, not the body. Whoever would lead someone to faith needs the ability to speak well and to reason properly, without violence and threats . . . To convince a reasonable soul, one does not need a strong arm, or weapons of any kind, or any other means of threatening a person with death . . . .’

“The decisive statement in this argument against violent conversion is this: not to act in accordance with reason is contrary to God’s nature. The editor, Theodore Khoury, observes: ‘For the emperor, as a Byzantine shaped by Greek philosophy, this statement is self-evident. But for Muslim teaching, God is absolutely transcendent. His will is not bound up with any of our categories, even that of rationality.’ Here Khoury quotes a work of the noted French Islamist R. Arnaldez, who points out that Ibn Hazn went so far as to state that God is not bound even by his own word, and that nothing would oblige him to reveal the truth to us. Were it God’s will, we would even have to practice idolatry.”

Again, the overall thrust of this is a call to dialogue and debate with Muslims, and a condemnation of religious violence of any kind. But the Pope’s statement at the same time undercuts this call to dialogue, because it suggests that there is an inherent tendency toward irrationality at work in Islam that, held consistently, would make religious dialogue impossible.

It’s important to note that Benedict accuses Scotists and Protestants, especially liberal Protestants, of a similar kind of detachment of faith and reason, Bible and Hellas. I’m still waiting, however, for reports of militant Scotists and armed Lutherans storming the Vatican.


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