God acting humanly

Yeago again, explaining Maximus’s use of the soul/body distinction in his discussion of Christology. The spirit/soul union is his main example of a “union according to hupostasis . Maximus explains: “the features which mark off someone’s body from other bodies, and someone’s soul from other souls, coming together by virtue of union, characterize and at the same time mark off from other humans the hupostasis made up of them, that of Peter, for example, or of Paul. But these features do not mark off the soul of Peter from his own body. For both, soul and body, are identical ( tautos ) with one another, by the principle ( logos ) of the one hupostasis made up of them by virtue of union. For neither of these actually exists on its own, separate from the other, before their composition ( sunthesis ) to produce the species. For the production ( genesis ), the composition, and the constitution ( sumplerosis ) of the species by virtue of their composition, are simultaneous with one another.”

Yeago helpfully glosses:

“we distinguish body and soul with respect to what they are, and we also distinguish particular bodies and particular souls from other bodies and souls with respect to which ones or whose they are. But the characteristic features by which we differentiate Peter’s soul from other souls do not differentiate Peter’s soul from Peter’s body in its corresponding differentiation from other bodies. On the contrary, it is these characteristic features which mark the identity of Peter’s soul with Peter’s body in the register of hupostasis .” We describe Peter and ask, Who is that?; the answer is “Peter.” We describe his body, and ask the same question; the answer is also “Peter.” Thus, “it is never possible to isolate the idiomata of Peter’s soul from the idiomata of Peter’s body and ascribe them to different subjects,” neither has an independent existence. In the register of hupostasis , “they are simply identical with one another”; “Peter is Peter in particular insofar as he is inseparably this body and this soul at the same time.”

When we apply this grammar to Christ, we arrive at this kind of formulation: “we distinguish deity from flesh with respect to what they are, and at the same time, we distinguish this one who is God from the Father and the Spirit, and this flesh from other flesh, with respect to which ones or who they are. But the characteristic features in terms of which we differentiate the flesh of Jesus from other flesh do not differentiate his flesh from his deity in its corresponding differentiation from the deity of the Father and the Spirit. Rather, those features which distinguish Jesus’ humanity from the humanity of others, and those which differentiate the deity of the Logos from the deity of the Father and the Spirit, are precisely the features in terms of which we identify Jesus and the Logos as one and the same, a singular subject admitting no differentiation at all, in the register of hupostasis .”

Yeago illustrates with several examples. To the question, “Who was born of the Virgin Mary and suffered under Pontius Pilate?” the answer is “Our Lord Jesus Christ, the only Son of God.” If, on the other hand, we ask “Who was begotten of the Father before all worlds?” the answer is just the same: “Our Lord Jesus Christ, the only Son of God.” For Maximus, then, “the particularities of the humanity and the particularities of the deity cannot be abstracted from one another and ascribed to distinct subjects; in the mystery of the voluntary kenosis of the divine Logos, they have no real existence apart from one another, and so make up an irreducibly singular subject of attribution.”

If we speak at the register of ousia , then we “distinguish between the flesh and the Logos who is God by nature.” One of Yeago’s main goals is to explain how the particular Jesus has universal significance, and he finds a clue here: ”

The human Jesus is one and the same subject as the universal Logos of God insofar as he is a particular person, insofar as he is this human, and no other. If only one who is God can be said to be of universal and unsurpassable saving significance, and if the human Jesus is identical with one of the Holy Trinity insofar as he is a particular human, differentiated from all others, then Jesus is of universal and unsurpassable saving significance precisely insofar as he is a particular human, this one and no other.”

What is said about the idiomata of Christ is also true of His actions. In itself, energy is a characteristic of ousia ; a particular thing has the energies that it has because of the kind of thing it is – birds fly because they have the energy of flight common to (most) birds. Yet, energy is never exerted by a simple nature, and thus “the acts in which energy is manifested must be spoken of in the register of hupostasis , since ousia cannot in a strict sense be an ascriptive subject of action, only particular somethings or someones, hupostases . Thus it is necessary to say that a hupostasis performs actions in which the specific energy of its ousia is concretely displayed.”

Christologically, Jesus has two natures, and thus two distinct energies, but in the actual performance of any act, it is the single hupostasis at work, synthesizing both energies. The energies “interpenetrate,” Maximus argues, and this interpenetration takes place “in the register of hupostasis .” Naturally diverse energies are evident “by virtue of the inexpressible union,” and thus “divine things are done humanly and human things divinely.”

Whom do the wind and waves obey? Who walks on the water? Who hungers in the wilderness and sweats blood in Gethsemane? Who dies on the cross? The answer is always the same: These are the acts of Jesus Christ, the only Son of God, always doing divine things humanly, and human things divinely.