Will Russia Invade?

George Friedman doesn’t think so. 

Putin’s posturing over Ukraine continues his strategy of expanding Russian power and, just as importantly, of projecting the image of Russian power: “The Russians cannot simply allow [Ukrainian independence] to stand. Not only does it create a new geopolitical reality, but in the longer term it also gives the appearance inside Russia that Putin is weaker than he seems and opens the door to instability and even fragmentation. Therefore, the Russians must respond. . . . the Russian government must demonstrate its power to its citizens and the world.” It also reflects Russia’s sense of geo-political realities, since the loss of Ukraine as an ally would put Russian right next to Western powers, “hostage to the intentions and capabilities of Europe and the United States.” Putin’s reaction is also born of fear that Ukraine might inspire secessionist movements elsewhere in the Russian Federation. 

Invasion is an option, but it would present three main problems: “First, Ukraine is a large area to seize and pacify. Russia does not need an insurgency on its border, and it cannot guarantee that it wouldn’t get one, especially since a significant portion of the population in western Ukraine is pro-West. Second, in order for an invasion of Ukraine to be geopolitically significant, all of Ukraine east of the Dnieper River must be taken. Otherwise, the frontier with Russia remains open, and there would be no anchor to the Russian position. However, this would bring Russian forces to the bank opposite Kiev and create a direct border with NATO and EU members. Finally, if the Russians wish to pursue the first option, pulling eastern Ukrainian voters out of the Ukrainian electoral process would increase the likelihood of an effective anti-Russian government.”