Peter J. Leithart

The notion that death can be life-giving doesn’t appear to make philosophical sense, Thomas notes ( ST III, 50, 6). Death is a privation of life, and a privation doesn’t have power to act. Therefore, no death, including Christ’s, has power to give life. Thomas admits that . . . . Continue Reading »

Republicans are changing their minds on same-sex marriage, but, according to NRO’s Daniel Foster , in more complicated ways than might appear. Some raw numbers to start: “opposition to same-sex marriage is increasingly tenuous, particularly along two axes. First, self-described tea-party . . . . Continue Reading »

Rev. Richard Bledsoe explores the pastoral and social implications of the story of the Gadarene demoniac over at the Trinity House web site. . . . . Continue Reading »

In her little classic On Violence , Hannah Arendt quotes two complaints against the injustice of time. Alexander Herzen: “Human development is a form of chronological injustice, since late-comers are able to profit by the labors of their predecessors without paying the same price.” And . . . . Continue Reading »

Like all medievals, like all scholastics, Thomas asks unusual questions. Nearly always they are odd questions that help you turn corners to see roads you wouldn’t have seen otherwise. He asks, “Was the Godhead of the Son separated from the flesh of Christ when he died?” ( ST III, . . . . Continue Reading »

How does Christ’s passion liberate from sin? Perhaps surprisingly, Thomas’s first answer (III, 49, 1) is entirely Abelardian: “Christ’s Passion is the proper cause of the forgiveness of sins in three ways. First of all, by way of exciting our charity . . . it is by charity . . . . Continue Reading »

The variety and flexibility of Thomas’s terminology regarding Christ’s passion and sin is remarkable. In ST III, 49, 1, he asks whether Christ’s passion liberates from sin ( liberati a peccato ). Christ’s death brings freedom. Then he shifts gears. Objection 2 says that . . . . Continue Reading »

Christ’s death fulfills the figures of Israel’s sacrificial system ( ST III, 48, 3). It exceeds them in being the sacrifice of human flesh for humanity. But it’s not just reality in relation to figure, but is itself a figure, a “sign for of something to be observed by . . . . Continue Reading »

How could Christ’s death be a sacrifice, since “those men who slew Christ did not perform any sacred act but rather wrought a great wrong”? ( ST , III, 48, 3). Christ’s passion is no sacrificium but a maleficium . Thomas answers by stressing the voluntary character of . . . . Continue Reading »

Did Christ effect salvation by way of redemption? Thomas asks ( ST III, 48, 4). It’s a question about salvation as payment . The first objection states that Christ could not have saved by way of redemption because no one buys or buys back ( emit vel redimit ) what already belongs to him. Sed . . . . Continue Reading »