Gracia’s own suggestion is that we can make sense of the determinateness and indeterminateness of meaning by distinguishing between “essential” and “accidental” meanings: “although texts may have a well-delimited core of meaning (an essential meaning), they may . . . . Continue Reading »
In the entry on meaning in the Dictionary for Theological Interpretation of the Bible (Baker), Jorge Gracia responds to the view that textual meaning has no limits with this: It is true that “texts are understood by different persons, or even by the same person at different times, to mean . . . . Continue Reading »
Joel Garver writes, in response to several posts from Raymond Tallis’s Not Saussure : “Most post-structuralist authors I’ve read aren’t dealing with things such as cups or trees or rocks, but rather things such as rationality, madness, criminality, virtue, etc. Foucault, for . . . . Continue Reading »
In an effort to maintain his distinction of meaning and significance, interpretation and critical assessment, E. D. Hirsch examines Welleck’s treatment of Marvell’s phrase “vegetable love.” He notes that “Welleck could not even make his point unless he could . . . . Continue Reading »
Tallis yet again: He argues that confusion of langue and parole : leads to “conflation of the idea of a world as a value or set of values within the system with the meaning of a word used on a particular occasion, that by virtue of which verbal meaning is specified with verbal meaning itself, . . . . Continue Reading »
Tallis thinks that one of the basic confusions of post-Saussurean criticism is a confusion of the levels of parole and langue . Signifiers and signifieds are, for Saussure, purely differential; but words are not signifiers or signifieds, but types of signs, which are combinations of the two. . . . . Continue Reading »
Does language take cues from reality? Tallis says Yes; at least, that’s one kind of relation language has to reality. His charming evidence: He notes that it’s more common to add “barking” to “dog” than to add other verbs. If language doesn’t take its cues . . . . Continue Reading »
Tallis contests the post-structuralist notion that all distinctions are linguistic, imported to reality by what we say about them. This, he thinks, oversimplifies a more complex situation. For some realities, the “edges” are determined by language, because those realities depend on . . . . Continue Reading »
Tallis is Not Saussure about post-structuralism, but that’s partly because he things posts distort the original structuralism of Saussure. Even if Saussure is correct that there no ideas before language links a sound with a concept, that doesn’t mean that there is no differentiation in . . . . Continue Reading »
Raymond Tallis ( Not Saussure ) is no friend of post-structuralism, but he recognizes that absent texts shape the reading of present ones: “What seems to be offered to us when we confront a particular work is at least partly determined by the silent presence of other works belonging to the . . . . Continue Reading »
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