In his book on the origins of German Romanticism and idealism ( Mystical Sources of German Romantic Philosophy (Pittsburgh Theological Monographs) ), Ernst Benz notes that, in contrast to France where philosophical terminology could be smoothly translated from Latin, German philosophy drew its . . . . Continue Reading »
According to Slavoj Zizek, German idealism is characterized by the combination of two insights that appear contradictory: “(1) subject is the power of ‘spontaneous’ (i.e., autonomous, starting-in-itself, irreducible to preceding causality) synthetic activity, the force of . . . . Continue Reading »
Milbank again: “thought, as Eckhart also pointed out, is a kind of jullity precisely because (after Augustine) it is intentional. To think something is kenotic - it is to let that thing be and not to try to be that thing, even not to try to be oneself when thinking oneself. Hence . . . . Continue Reading »
Nietzsche nails the issue in the section of Twilight of the Idols on “reason” in philosophy. Philosophy kills and mummifies in order to analyze. Philosophy especially wants to rid itself of the body: “You ask me which of the philosophers’ traits are most . . . . Continue Reading »
Descartes (Second Meditation) considers a piece of wax that, when heated, changes its properties yet remains wax. He concludes that the “wax” must not be accessible to the senses, since sensible properties all change but the wax remains: “what was there in the wax that was so . . . . Continue Reading »
In an essay on the Christian use of the Greek philosophical conception of God ( Basic Questions in Theology, Vol. 2 ), Pannenberg notes that the Platonic tradition only gradually drew the conclusion that God was incomprehensible. Even Middle Platonists conceived of God as mind, and . . . . Continue Reading »
Robert Sokolowski ( Phenomenology of the Human Person ) finds contemporary talk about “the self” extraordinary: “How odd it is, even gramatically, to speak of ‘the self.’ The linguistic strangeness of the term the self is matched by the oddity of the terms the . . . . Continue Reading »
Augustine said that knowing and willing were inseparable. Knowledge is “a thing discovered,” and “discovery is often preceded by a search which aims at resting in its object. Searching is a striving ( appetitus ) for discovery.” He continues: “We may . . . . Continue Reading »
A friend, Aaron Cummings, writes in response to my comments about Derrida and prodigal words: “A few days ago, you alluded to Derrida, that words run prodigal from the speaker/writer. You said that this was true of Mankind’s words, but not of God’s. It seems to me that this is true . . . . Continue Reading »
In the second of his “theological orations,” Gregory Nazianzen catalogs the impenetrable mysteries of creation: “How is it,” he asks, “that the earth stands solid and unswerving? On what is it supported? What is it that props it up, and on what does that . . . . Continue Reading »
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