In his early treatise de musica , Augustine arranges everything into a hierarchy: God and other immutable objects above; human souls between; bodies and other carnal things below. It’s a Neoplatonic and hardly Christian notion. But embedded within that Augustine gets at something more sound. . . . . Continue Reading »
My son had a dream last night. There was some mayhem and some police action, and the dream ended with him hearing a police siren. He woke up and his alarm was going off. What happened? Two possibilities, as far as I can see. The first is that he had been dreaming for some time before his alarm went . . . . Continue Reading »
David Hart notes, in a discussion of Derrida and Milbank on gift, that “absolute ‘selfless’ gratuity, which will not submit to reciprocation, is pure power; but interested exchange - even though sin inevitably corrupts all exchange with the shadow of coercion and greed - is not . . . . Continue Reading »
Baylor’s Alexander Pruss offers this nifty Aristotelian critique of Humean natural law: “The most basic dichotomy between views of laws of nature is that between Humean views on which the laws of nature are merely descriptions of the actual states of affairs that obtain, and anti-Humean . . . . Continue Reading »
De Certeau suggests that Cusa’s Germanized Latin provides a linguistic illustration of his theory of the “coincidence of opposites”: “Germanisms haunt his Latin. They are the ghosts of a particular place (Rhineland, or Germany) in a different place, Latin, a language . . . . Continue Reading »
In his treatise De Venatione Sapientiae , Nicholas of Cusa explained the Platonic doctrine of ideas as follows: “Ideas are not separated from individuals in such a way as to be extrinsic exemplars. For the individual’s nature is united to the Idea itself, from which it has all these . . . . Continue Reading »
From the introduction to Ellen Pollak’s Incest and the English Novel, 1684-1814 : According to Derrida, the prohibition against incest is “the unstable center of structuralist thought.” But in Derrida’s hands, it becomes “the condition of the possibility of . . . . Continue Reading »
It was an ancient axiom that truth comes before error. “The real thing always exists before the representation of it,” Tertullian wrote, “the copy comes later.” This means “truth comes first and falsification afterwards.” The “always” in first . . . . Continue Reading »
Rose again, criticizing the postmodern assault on reason: “The decision by the intellectuals that reason itself has ruined modern life, and should be dethroned and banned in the name of its silenced others, is comparable to the decision to stop small children, girls and boys, from playing . . . . Continue Reading »
Of Rosenzweig, Buber, and Levinas, Gillian Rose wrote, “The separation in their work of the lesson of love or perficient commandment from the actualities of law or coercion suffuses their ethics with an originary violence that has been borrowed from the political modernity which they refuse . . . . Continue Reading »
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