Anatolios makes the striking observation that Aristotle’s “Unmoved Mover” is even more transcendent than Plato’s form of the good. For Plato, being is self-communicative, and his most exalted realities (the form of the good, the forms) are participatable. Not . . . . Continue Reading »
James’s post, "A View from Somewhere of this Month in Pomocon," as I understand him, seems to me to describe a contemporary view of politics that has striking similarities to the age of the classical Greeks who were confronted with the death of their myth and the ongoing . . . . Continue Reading »
I make the argument here that an increasing reliance upon Powerpoint among college professors in the humanities reveals much about the state of liberal education and the condition of professional philosophy today. A snippet: The hidden premise beneath the proliferation of PowerPoint in university . . . . Continue Reading »
Jean Blum characterized Hamann’s thought as follows: “Hamann’s thought is what those who do not normally think would think if they did think.” That gets it pretty well, as does Berlin’s comment that Hamann “was a major force in transforming the ideas which . . . . Continue Reading »
In a proto-Wittgensteinian vein, Hamann wrote to Jacobi: “Metaphysics has its own school and court languages . . . and I am incapable of either understanding or making use of them. Hence I am close to suspecting that the whole of our philosophy consists more of language than of reason, and . . . . Continue Reading »
In the Berlin-doesn’t-get-Hamann department, there’s also Berlin’s claim that for Hamann “existence logically precedes reason” and “there exists a pre-rational reality.” Not exactly. The world is there before we start reflecting on it; it’s got to be . . . . Continue Reading »
Isaiah Berlin’s book on Hamann is lively engaging, but Berlin doesn’t get Hamann. For instance: “Hamann’s constantly repeated point is that revelation is direct contact between one spirit and another, God and ourselves.” Not. The opposite is the case: His constantly . . . . Continue Reading »
Frederick Beiser’s ( Fate of Reason ) account of Hamann is a mess. He gets the history right (so far as I know it), but his summary of Hamann’s thought is not only mistaken; it’s incoherent. For Hamann, Beiser says, “faith is an immediate experience,” like sense . . . . Continue Reading »
Rorty: “Great systematic philosophers are constructive and offer arguments. Great edifying philosophers are reactive and offer satires, parodies, aphorisms. They know their work loses its point when they period they were reacting against is over. They are intentionally peripheral. Great . . . . Continue Reading »
Beiser again, commenting on Hamann’s influence in the 19th century: “One devotee of Hamann’s was F. W. J. Schelling, whose Positivephilosophie reflects Hamannian themes. Another avid student of Hamann’s was F. Schlegel, who wrote one of the first appreciative essays on . . . . Continue Reading »
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