Frederick Beiser ( The Fate of Reason ) laments the obscurity of Hamann in Anglo-American philosophy. His influence on German intellectual history was notable: “Hamann was the father of the Sturm und Drang , the intellectual movement that grew up in Germany during the 1770s in reaction . . . . Continue Reading »
I fell for it. Hamann begins a brief discussion of the temporality of truth apparently agreeing with Mendelssohn, “I, too, know of no eternal truths except those who are unceasingly temporal.” Stephen Dunning ( Tongues of Men ) explains the dense irony of the statement. Hamann is . . . . Continue Reading »
Hamann agreed with Mendelssohn that there are “no eternal truths save as incessant temporality,” and in this he locates the difference between Judaism and Christianity: “it is solely a matter of temporal truths of history, which occurred once and never come again - of facts which . . . . Continue Reading »
Van Ranke: “I wish I could eradicate myself, as it were, to let only the things speak, the powerful forces appear.” . . . . Continue Reading »
Paul Helm argues in a 1975 articles that “merely Cambridge events” are not actually events. He is picking up on Peter Geach’s claim that only intrinsic changes, and not relational changes, are real changes. More specifically, he is responding to Jaegwon Kim’s argument that . . . . Continue Reading »
JME McTaggart argued in the 1920s that everything changes when anything changes: “If anything changes, then all other things change with it. For its change must change some of their relations to it, and so their relational qualities.” David Weberman finds this “perfectly . . . . Continue Reading »
How can we justify knowledge? Very roughly: Foundationalist justification is justification from the origin. We can’t let the argument stray from the source, lest it meander. Pragmatic justification is justification at the end. We know what is true because it proves true, it works. . . . . Continue Reading »
Weberman returns to Danto to advance his argument. He notes that Danto shies away from saying that past events change, and suggests that he did this in order to remain a realist about past events; Danto held that “past events are what they are in a mind-independent way.” He insists that . . . . Continue Reading »
In an article in the Review of Metaphysics (1997), David Weberman argues for the “nonfixity of the historical past.” He starts from Arthur Danto’s argument that historical inquiry and writing cannot be a reconstruction available to an “ideal chronicler” who knows . . . . Continue Reading »
Eco is not uncritical of Derrida, but he disagrees with Searle’s claim that “Derrida has a distressing penchant for saying things that are obviously false,” insisting instead that “Derrida has a fascinating penchant for saying things that are nonobviously true, or true in a . . . . Continue Reading »
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